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It  should be  self-evident that there  can  be  no  question  of progress  towards a  united 
Europe without democratic institutions to support it.  It is a fundamental feature  of the 
European  Communities that they are  solidly  based  on parliamentary  democracy,  and 
it has  always  been  the concern  of the European  Parliament  to do  all  in its  power to 
prevent  the  Community's  institutions  degenerating  into  a  mere  technocracy.  It  was 
therefore  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm  that,  when I took over  the  Presidency  of the 
Parliament from Walter Behrendt, I pursued the idea he had put forward to the Bureau 
that there should be a Symposium organised to study the future of Parliaments in Europe 
and their relationship to European integration.  The Bureau had approved the proposal 
in October 1972 and the Conference of Presidents of national Parliaments held in Stras-
bourg in january 1973  took note of this as  the first  step in its progress. 
The idea  of the Symposium was in some respects  unique because it was  probably the 
first  occasion  on which  Members  of Parliament  met together  with  academic  experts 
engaged on studying these problems to discuss how to make parliamentary democracy 
work better and adapt itself to the situation of the 1970s. It was also the first such Sym-
posium  ever  to  be held by a Parliament  in Europe. 
After careful  preparation,  to  which I gave  every encouragement,  the Symposium took 
place on 2nd and 3rd May 1974 in Luxembourg. The participants included a wide cross-
section of academic experts and observers,  from  all Member States of the Communities, 
from  several  other European  countries and from  North America.  They included some 
of the most distinguished authors and teachers in the field of political and parliamentary 
studies  in  their  own countries.  In  Luxembourg they  were  able  to  meet on their  own 
ground  - the  Chamber  of the  European  Parliament  - Members  of the  Parliament 
nominated  by  their  political  groups,  but also  including  independent  Members,  thus 
representing  all  shades  of political  opinion  in  the  Community. 
The problems faced by the participants were, and still remain, formidable. Every country 
has experienced a loss of confidence in the ability of parliamentary institutions to solve 
the Problems of their peoples, and these difficulties are not made easier by the fact  that 
it is to a considerable extent young men and women who have become the most disillus-
ioned.  However,  Sir  Winston  Churchill  once  pointed out that democracy  was  one  of 
the worst systems of government that could ever  have  possibly  been devised  with the 
sole  exception  of every  other system  that had been  devised,  and  the  proceedings  of 
this Symposium certainly show that the participants shared a fundamental appreciation 
of the  necessity  to  seek solutions  of the  crises  facing  Parliaments  in  Europe  and not 
simply to  call  attention to their  defects. 
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.  It is with this encouraging fact in mind that I have pleasure in introducing in book form 
the papers and a full summary of the debates submitted to the Symposium which took 
place both in plenary session and in the three working groups set up. It is my hope and 
belief  that  this  publication,  which  represents  a  very  considerable  body of expertise, 
both theoretical and  practical,  will be of the utmost value  both as  a record  of what 
thinkers and practitioners of politics consider should be done to revitalise parliamentary 
democracy and as a basis for ensuring that the Europe  of the future will be firmly based 
on its  principles. 
Cornelis  BERKHOUWER 
President  of the  European  Parliament,  1973-1975 CONTENTS 
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8 SECTION I 
INTRODUCTORY PAPERS BASIC  TRENDS  IN THE DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  FUNCTIONS 
OF  PARLIAMENT  IN WESTERN  EUROPE 
Note by Professor  Klaus  von BEYME,  Tiibingen  University 
A  COMPARISON  OF THE FUNCTIONS  OF PARLIAMENT 
Almost  all  the  national  studies  prepared  for  the  symposium  begin  by  listing  the  functions  of 
Parliament.  The basic  assumptions  of  systems  theory underlying  function-typologies  of this  kind 
originally categorized Parliament among the output functions  of the political system,  although the 
term  'rule-making  function'  was  preferred  to  'legislation'  in  an  attempt  to  take into  account 
changes in the norm-setting process, since laws as a relatively infrequent and solemnly promulgated 
norm are the exception rather than the rule in influencing  the lives  of citizens.  However,  recent 
theorists who still adopt the systems  approach no longer view norm-setting as  the main function; 
in that case a clear categorization of the functions of Parliament is  only possible as  a streamlining 
of outputs. 
Communication  rather  than  legislation  then  appears  as  the  main  subfunction  of  Parliament.  A 
distinction  can be  drawn between  six principal functions  of Parliament in the input and output 
sectors  of the political systems: 
1.  The representation  and articulation function. 
2.  The communication function. 
3.  The controlling function. 
4.  The function  of participation  in the appointment and dismissal  of the executive. 
5.  The legislative  function. 
6.  The recruiting  function. 
Depending on the approach adopted in the national studies varying  emphasis  is  placed on these 
individual functions.  The more  juristic the approach the greater will  be  the emphasis  placed  on 
functions subject to strict formal control, such as functions 3 - 5  (especially in the case of France); 
when decision theory is the guiding factor the first two functions move into the forefront (Denmark, 
United  Kingdom,  Netherlands).  Significantly  the  recruiting  function  is  barely  mentioned  in  all 
these papers; an empirical study of this function would require a  complex accumulation of social 
background data or survey  data  (exceptions:  B,  page 29;  NL, page 133). 
None of these papers reaches  a  clear verdict on the principal function  (the  most pessimistic note 
is  generally struck in the paper on Great Britain where the Mother of Parliaments seems to have 
degenerated  into  a consultative  council  or  sounding  board  (GB,  page  156). 
11 A clear assessment is  difficult to reach in a  study of individual parliamentary systems  and genera-
lizations  become  quite  impossible  in  a  comparison  of  the  new  EEC  systems.  The strength  and 
functions  of  the parliaments  are  determined  by  a  series  of  external constraints: 
1)  Juristic constraints 
a)  The norms of the  constitution which influence many functions  of  parliament, most significantly 
the interplay of power between parliament and government in the fourth function e.g.  in the elev-
ated  status  of  the President  under the  semi-presidential parliamentary system  of  the Fifth  French 
Republic  or  in  the  incompatibility  provisions  in  the  Netherlands  which  mainly  influence  the 
recruiting function. 
b)  Organization and infrastructure of parliaments shaped by historical developments. These aspects 
are  most  strikingly  reflected,  as  far  as  the  legislative  function  is  concerned,  in  the pattern of 
organization of the parliamentary committee  system; special  attention was  therefore  given  to the 
committee system in the national studies  especially  when  deveant  cases  or striking  changes  occur 
(GB,  page  156;  F,  page  61;  DK,  page  38). 
2)  Socio-economic  constraints 
a)  The party system  which  mainly  influences  the government-forming function  but also  helps  to 
shape policy  output and decide  which party or coalition will exercise  the legislative  function  and 
which must  be  confined to the bill  reviewing  function  (DK,  page 38). 
b)  The  system  of interest  groups  and  institutionalized  channels  available  for  the  expression  of 
interests  in the  system  ranging  from  methods  of  direct  democracy,  (e.g.  referendum  or popular 
initiative)  to  the  formation  of  special  bodies  to  represent  interests  (e.g.  social  and  economic 
councils). 
1)  Representation  and articulation  function 
The representation  and  articulation function  is  dependent  on several  factors: 
a)  The  organization  of the  parliament  in  one  or  two houses  which  has  been  almost  completely 
disregarded  in  these  studies  (exception  Ireland,  page  75).  There  are  widely  varying  forms  of 
organization. 
1)  single  chamber systems  (Luxembourg,  Denmark since  1953;  para. 28) 
2)  uniformly elected  chamber divided into  two houses  (Norway, para 73) 
3)  Elected  second  chamber  on  a  different  territorial  basis  (France,  Art.  24,  3;  Italy  Art.  57; 
Belgium,  Netherlands) 
4)  Federalistic  chamber  with  a  council  system  (appointed  representatives  of  the  Lander  govern-
ments,  e.g.  Federal  Republic  of  Germany) 
5)  Nomination  of  some  members  of  the  second  chamber  (Ireland,  11  out of  60  senators;  Italy 
5  senators,  Art.  59,  2). 
The greater the emphasis on the different territorial (especially in a federalist system)  or functional 
bases  of representation of a  second chamber, the greater the influence  of the pattern of organiza-
tion on the representation function. 
12 b)  Differentiation  of the  protective  function 
Auxiliary functions  to defend  the interests  of  underprivileged  groups have developed in  a  variety 
of forms  in the parliaments. The petition committees formed  in many parliaments have generally 
tended to decline  in importance with the development of a  constitutional system since  early 19th 
century constitutionalism. Work in the petition committees  is  quite  often little  more than a  duty 
for  parliamentary  freshmen  which  earns  little  publicity (
3
). 
The position of the ombudsman based on the Swedish  example (4)  which has developed in some 
of the EEC parliamentary systems (England, Denmark, Norway, defence commissioner in Germany (
5
) 
has  acquired  an important protective  and controlling  role  in some  cases.  But it can scarcely  be 
described  as  an organ of parliament and has  not infrequently come  into conflict with the latter, 
especially in the  case  of the German  defence  commissioner (
6
). 
In the context of parliamentary reform the improvement of the articulation function has, however, 
played a  role in reviving  and facilitating the earlier right to put questions  or in the introduction 
of the  'topical hour'  (see  GB,  page 156  (7)),  an instrument which has  so  far  achieved  little  more 
than a  streamlining  of  inputs  and demands. 
c)  The  plebiscita!  component 
In parliamentary systems  the plebiscita}  component is  hardly  a  threat to the legislative  authority 
of parliament.  The risk is  greatest where  a  semi-presidential system favours  the manipulative use 
of the referendum  (cf.  the French  referendum in 1969  in which de  Gaulle linked two questions). 
In the case of innovations  such  as  the  peoples'  pension  issue  in Sweden in 1957, on the occasion 
of  referendums  in  1963  and  1969  in  Denmark  (DK,  page  38),  the  referendum  of  October  1968 
which led to the rejection of amendments to the constitution in Ireland, and in the case of the threat 
of  a  referendum  used  by  conservative  groups  to  oppose  the  divorce  law  in Italy,  parliamentary 
majorities  have  in some  cases  appeared  more progressive  than the  majority  of the electorate  at 
large (8).  The shortcomings  of the articulation function  and the function  of representing interests 
have not,  however,  disappeared through the mere existence of the plebiscita}  norm-setting process 
in the EEC  countries.  Protest  movements  have  contested  parliamentary systems  with or without 
referendums. 
d)  Institutionalization  of the  articulation  of interests  in  parliament 
Side  by side with the attempt to channel and control the influence of interest groups in parliament 
(by  registering  lobbyists,  developing  public  hearings,  party  laws  and  the  setting  of  maximum 
contributions to election funds)  the highly institutionalized form of interest representation outside 
parliament  has  developed  particularly  strongly  in  the  countries  of  the  European  Community. 
Economic  councils  with constitutional  status  (Conseil  Economique  et social  in  France,  Consiglio 
Nazionale dell'Economia e  del  Lavoro in Italy)  have  been  formed,  or councils  which  are part of 
an economic organization under public law such as  the Sociaal-Economische Raad in the Nether-
lands or the Belgian Conseil Central de l'Economie; in Denmark, on the other hand, the Economic 
Council has a coordinating function only. Sometimes these councils have the possibility of influencing 
parliament directly; this right may even be institutionalized, as  in the case of the right of represen-
tatives  of the French  CES  to speak in Parliament  or the right of the Italian  CNEL to introduce 
proposed legislation (9). 
The  risk  of  a  secondary  parliament  which  has  frequently  been  referred  to  has  never  in  fact 
materialized.  These  economic  policy  advisory  bodies  have  not even  led  to the disappearance  of 
all  the drawbacks for  the interest  representation function  in  the parliamentary chambers  such as 
the lobby system in parliament, even though most of the national studies note the growing tendency 
for  direct  contact with the executive  (especially  with strong unions)  thus  bypassing  contact with 
parliament  (IRL,  page 75; GB,  page 156; DK, page 38; NL, page 133). 
13 For the countries of the European Community there is  still a lack of recent pressure group studies 
offering roughly comparable material, so that it is not really possible to make any general comment 
on the importance of the factor  of  interest representation  by  groups (10). 
2)  The  communication  function 
Some  authors  have  lately  emphasized  the  communication  function  between  the  people  and  the 
government as  the most important role of parliament (11). But recent left-wing criticism of the par-
liamentary system has  described this function  as  being particularly weak although this process  of 
weakening  is  generally  measured  against  highly  superficial  indicators  such  as  the  frequency  of 
participation by  members,  the decline  of parliament as  a  debating body and the reduction in the 
number  of  plenary  sittings (12).  Survey  studies  are  also  repeatedly  quoted  as  evidence  of  the 
disappearing communication function. According to a survey in 1965, 28 % of a population sample 
in the Federal Republic thought that the Bundestag was the government and 14% were unable to 
give  any answer (13). 
The loss  of parliamentary legitimation  has  not infrequently  been  associated  with  the inadequate 
exercise  of  the  communication  function  (GB,  page  156)  and  the  development  of  mass  commu-
nication  media - especially  the  tendency  of heads  of government and party leaders  to perform 
the communication function  telecratically by television - has also  helped to weaken parliament's 
role in this  area. 
3)  The  controlling  function 
In  the  early days  of  the parliamentary system  there  was  a  sharp distinction  between  the present 
EEC  countries in regard to the controlling powers of parliament. In general a distinction may  be 
made between two traditions:  (1).  The development of the right  to  put questions  which  matured 
only  slowly  into the right of interpellation with motions or even  a  formal  vote of no-confidence 
(the  constitutional  monarchies  in  Germany  and Scandinavia,  generally  based  on English  parlia-
mentary practice) (2).  The early  development  of  a  right  of interpellation  with  motions  (ordre  du 
jour, ordine del giorno)  in the French sphere of influence where,  with a greater fragmentation  of 
the  parliamentary groups,  the  motions  of the day stood,  at the end  of  an interpellation  debate, 
like  a  permanent sword of  Damocles,  over  the head of the government  and contributed a  great 
deal  to  the  instability  of  the  cabinet  (France,  Belgium,  Italy)  (14). 
After the second  world war these differences  were  balanced out by the harmonization of rules  of 
procedure  on the one hand  and  the  more  stable hegemony of the government groups  in  several 
EEC  countries (15). 
With  the reduction  in the  tendency  for  governments  to be  overthrown  by  a  formal  vote  of  no-
confidence  (see  below)  elements  of the British controlling system, such as  question time, were also 
taken over  by  other countries. 
The development of the rights of  opposition members and minorities is  not, however, a risk to the 
stability of government as  the hegemony of individual parties is  stronger in several EEC countries 
than it had been before the second world war, which meant that many traditional means of control 
such  as  committees  of  enquiry,  budget law,  controlling  committees  and the more  recent  devices 
such as  hearings,  question time  or ombudsmen became fairly ineffective in confrontation with the 
relatively  stable  domination  of  bourgeois  majorities (16). 
This may be  one of the reasons why the controlling function has not been dealt with in detail in 
most of the national studies  (exception NL,  page 133).  The controlling function has been  referred 
14 to in the greatest detail in connection with the establishment of the budget, as  here the independent 
initiative  of  parliament  was  assumed  to  exist  in  every  case  (see  GB,  page  156;  IRL,  page  75; 
NL,  page  133). 
In the  modern  European  parliamentary  systems  the fronts  have  been  reversed.  In the  age  of  a 
constitutional  dualism  between  the government  of the king  and the  bourgeois  representatives  of 
the people, penny-pinching parliaments were proverbial; today on the other hand the government 
generally has to defend its  budget estimates, based on austerity programmes or stability measures, 
against  the  would-be  generosity  of  political groups  which  subscribe  to a  concept  of  democracy 
backed  by  electoral  hand-outs. 
4)  The  function  of participation  in the  appointment and dismissal  of the executive 
a)  Participation  in  forming  the government 
Participation in forming the govetnment depends largely on constitutional norms which have been 
shaped  very  differently  depending  on  the  parliamentary  tradition  and  constitutional  continuity. 
The following  variants  are conceivable: 
1)  Election by  the Parliament  (Ireland,  Art.  13,1). 
In Ireland (as in the FRG)  the function of the Dail was purely formal except when the hegemony 
of  Fianna Fail was threatened  as  in 1948 (11). 
2)  Appointment of the head of government by the head of state symbolizing election by parliament 
(FRG,  Art.  63; Italy,  Art.  92,  2; 94,  3). 
3)  Appointment  by  the  head  of  state  without  elections  of  parliamentary  investiture  (Denmark, 
para.  14; France,  Art.  8). 
In other countries  an investiture vote became standard practice.  The legal  participation of Parlia-
ment, reflected in a formal election or an investiture vote for  a head of government appointed by 
the head of state is,  however, less  decisive than the factual  participation of parts of Parliament in 
the process of government. This appears all the more complicated the more fragmented the multi-
party system is.  Unlike England, France and the FRG, the government-formation process  in Italy, 
Belgium  or the Netherlands  not infrequently  requires  the  arrangement  of  consultations  with the 
outgoing head of government, the President of Parliament (especially in Italy and the Netherlands), 
the  party and group  leaders  and what are  known  as  'informed  sources'  (especially  in  Belgium 
and the  Netherlands)  (18). 
The process of consultation and formalization of the consensus reached in it until coalition agreements 
have  been  worked out, means  that parliamentary involvement  in  an 'official  vote'  is  increasingly 
becoming  a  pure formality.  Only in a  few  countries  where  minority government  has  often  been 
necessary,  particularly in Denmark and in Italy,  may it still be a problem (19). 
b)  Overthrow  of the  government  by a  parliamentary  vote 
The determination of parliamentary responsibility and the possibility of parliament imposing sanctions 
have counted among the main concerns of the draftsmen of constitutions in all more recent consti-
tutional assemblies.  In EEC  countries  the following  models  have  arisen: 
1)  Dual responsibility of ministers  de  iure  to Parliament, de  facto  to the president (see F, page 61 
as  in the  case  of  Pompidou 1962,  Chaban-Delmas  1969  and Messmer  1973). 
2)  Unrestricted vote of no confidence  (United Kingdom, de  facto  irrelevant since the second world 
war, Benelux  countries,  Norway,  Denmark). 
15 3)  Disciplined vote  of no confidence tied to specific  conditions  (France,  Art.  49,  2; FRG,  Art.  67; 
Italy,  para.  94). 
In all three types  of parliamentary EEC  countries  the overthrow of  the government  by  a  vote  in 
parliament no longer plays an important role.  Even in cases where it has occurred (Denmark 1947, 
France 1962,  Netherlands  1966,  Norway 1963)  it was  frequently  not consciously  used  to dissolve 
a coalition by  a counter-coalition ready and willing to govern, but rather a kind of parliamentary 
industrial accident.  This is  particularly true of the few  instances of votes  of no confidence against 
individual  ministers  (e.g.  Luxembourg 1958)  which  generally led  to the  breakdown of  the ruling 
coalition.  After the second world war the break-up of the coalition had become the main reason 
for  the  dissolution  of  a  government  in  the  EEC  countries,  and  the  parliamentary  no-confidence 
machinery has seldom been used. President Coty of France  once  deprecatingly  said  'People  forget 
that governments are no longer overthrown by assemblies today. We live in the nuclear age. Govern-
ments generally just disintegrate as  in a  classical tragedy, they go  off to die  in the wings, and not 
on stage'  (20). 
The social and political bases of parliamentarianism therefore have a more decisive influence today 
on the existence of the government than the limitation of the right of Parliament to participate in 
the formal  sense. 
c)  The dissolution  of Parliament  as  a  weapon used  by  the government to oppose the influence  of 
Parliament  on the fate  of the government. 
The dissolution  of Parliament is  also  strongly governed  by normative  provisions. 
The following  variants  exist in  the EEC  countries: 
1)  No right of dissolution  (Norway). 
2)  Dissolution of Parliament by the head of state without counter-signature by the head of govern-
ment  (France,  Article  12). 
3)  Unconditional dissolution by the head of state at the initiative of the head of government (Great 
Britain,  Ireland,  Article  13,  2,  2; Lux.,  Article 74; Belgium,  Netherlands, Article  114). 
4)  Conditional dissolution by the head of state at the initiative of the head of government  (FRG, 
Art.  63,  4; 68,  1; Italy,  Art.  88;  Denmark para.  32,  2). 
The dissolution of parliament as a counter-measure taken by the government has declined in import-
ance simultaneously with the reduction in the tendency for parliament to use its strongest instruments 
of  control of the government. 
As  to the motives  for  the  dissolution  of parliament  (conflict  between parliamentary majority  and 
government,  deadlock  in  the  two  chamber  system,  coalition  crisis,  disciplinary  measure  against 
groups, substitute for referendum, as has occasionally been suggested in countries where parliament 
cannot  be  dissolved,  such  as  Norway (
21
)  a  conflict  between  parliament  and government  is  very 
infrequent  (Luxembourg  1958,  Denmark 1967,  Netherlands 1958,  FRG  1972,  France 1962).  In the 
case  of the most frequent reason for the cabinet to be dissolved, i.e.  breakdown of the coalition, 
because of the fragmentation of the party system the dissolution of parliament would not generally 
help to solve the government crisis  but would sometimes even  worsen the situation, e.g.  Denmark 
1973 (22). 
5)  The legislative  function 
It is unanimously agreed in almost all the national studies that the legislative function has increasingly 
degenerated to a bill-reviewing role (DK, page 38; NL, page 133). The smaller the right of initiative, 
16 the greater the development of controlling functions should be (see above). In many countries private 
members bills do not even represent one tenth of the initiatives tabled and they are not infrequently 
confined to specific  issues  on which governments  do  not like  to enforce a  whip  because they  are 
questions of  conscience  (e.g.  GB,  page 156).  The success  rate is  generally even  lower (in  Denmark 
1% of all initiatives; DK, page 38). The same applies to Italy where the number of laws tabled by 
individual  members  is  comparatively high (23). 
In some countries the reduction in the number of bills tabled by private members has been accom-
panied by a painful learning process, especially in the FRG where the SPD, which was in opposition 
until 1966, often used to table counter-proposals until it found that it could influence the legislative 
process more consistently by painstaking amendments in committee rather than by drafting its own 
bills (
24
). 
The legislative function is  influenced quite considerably by the structure of the internal organization 
of parliament and not only by the strength of the government. In all the EEC Member States the 
legislative output after the war was very high as the need for regulations on many issues was parti-
cularly great, especially in countries which were badly hit by the war. To that extent the organization 
of parliament, the efficiency of its infrastructure and above all its committee system, is no more than 
one important intervening variable. Depending on the genesis of the internal structural organization 
of parliaments a committee system has developed to differing degrees in the EEC countries according 
to the criteria  of  'degree  of  specialization'  and 'extent of  powers': 
1)  The British  model, in which  all  experiments  at setting  up  more  highly  specialized  committees 
since  1966  (c£,  GB,  page  156)  have failed  to succeed { 25). 
2)  The German model with strong specialization on the individual spheres of Government respons-
ibility. 
3)  The French  model with its limited number of six committees coupled with a kind of 'personality 
cult'  (F,  page  61)  (26 ). 
4)  The Italian model of committees which take decisions. Where there is a strong tendency towards 
fragmentation  of  legislation  the system  of  highly  specialized  committees  appears  to  make  for 
greater efficiency.  The flood  of laws may be swollen still further by a special provision such as 
exist in Italy where bills may be adopted by committees (Art.  72 of the Constitution); this possi-
bility is  made use  of in about three-quarters of all cases  (27). 
On the other hand in the two chamber system the possibility of utilizing the expert knowledge of 
the  upper chamber has  frequently  not brought about the  desired  improvement of the  legislative 
function.  In  Great  Britain  technically  complex  but politically  relatively  uncontroversial  bills  are 
first introduced in the upper house in about one quarter of all cases (28). In the FRG the Bundesrat 
plays  only a  small  part in the legislative  process { 29)  despite  its  executivistic  composition  and in 
countries with a system of two chambers which have almost identical rights, as  is  the case in Italy, 
the legislative  activity  of the senate is  significant. 
Much of the discussion of parliamentary reform in all the EEC countries seeks,  through technical 
improvement of the infrastructure (F, page 61; GB, page 156), to improve at the same time the legisla-
tive function; it is  only recently that the close links between material competence and the recruiting 
function  of Parliament have  been  recognized  more  realistically. 
6)  The  recruiting  function 
In most of these  studies  little  mention  has  been  made of the recruiting function  (exceptions  NL, 
page 133; F,  page 61), although its importance is growing in parliamentary systems with a tendency 
to increase the number of executive offices  constantly.  The change is  particularly noticeable in the 
17 FRG which in the space of a few years, by copying British institutions such as parliamentary secretaries 
of state and ministers of state, has more than doubled the number of executive posts to which appoint-
ments are made from parliament, this increase has only been surpassed in Italy where  the number 
of sottosegretari is now generally twice as great as the number of cabinet posts (3 0). In Ireland an attempt 
has been made to contain the increase in the number of offices  by fixing it at seven; the number of 
areas  of  responsibility  which  is  fixed  by  the  constitution  in  some  countries  (Norway,  Denmark, 
Luxembourg) (
31
). 
The recruiting function is sometimes also shaped by the normative framework of the system, although 
this  parliamentary function  may  be  traced  back to the social  basis  of the  system  rather than to 
normative  regulations.  The incompatibility  provisions  in  the  Netherlands  system,  which  became 
obligatory in 1938,  or the requirement for parliamentarians in the Fifth French Republic to resign 
their mandate when they accept a ministerial office has had a considerable influence on recruitment, 
although in both countries the trend to recruit from party leaders with considerable experience of 
parliamentary business has  not been halted by this (32). The French innovation which ran counter 
to the established parliamentary practice  of the 3rd and 4th French  Republics,  did  not have  the 
destructive consequences on the 5th Republic which publicists feared when it was first introduced (33), 
and parliament has remained the normal school of politicians. The trend to form closely knit elites 
and change positions has not been heightened in EEC parliamentary systems with or without incom-
patibility provisions. In Great Britainthis is  felt to be a shortcoming (GB,  page 156),  because there 
is  a  lack  of leaders  with management experience (34). 
Little comparative study has been made of the quality of the recruiting function, as it would require 
a vast amount of quantitative data. The gerontocratic tendencies, the predominance of middle class 
social  groups  and certain  professions  (e.g.  lawyers)  or regional  and religious  imbalances  have  so 
far  only  been  studied  for individual EEC  Parliaments  at three  levels: 
1)  By  social  background-data studies  of the national Parliaments (35). 
Recruiting  studies  could only become  truly relevant to parliamentary research  going  beyond a 
contribution on the social  mobility of politicians if the recruitment input were correlated with 
the legislative output, a problem that has only been seldom discussed  (exception NL, page 133). 
On the other hand it has  been  found  that the  pre-parliamentary background data seldom  has 
a  bearing  on the  subsequent attitude of parliamentarians  or on the  output. 
2)  By  studies  of the choice  of candidates  at the pre-parliamentary stage (36). 
3)  By  survey  studies  of the role  concept  of parliamentarians 
Because  of the backwardness of  behaviourist methods in Europe comparatively little work has 
been  done  in this  area  so far (37). 
However, most of the analyses provide more information on socialisation at the pre-parliamentary 
stage than on parliamentary activity as  such.  Comparative material is  not available because of 
the highly descriptive studies, which lack a theoretical basis of the recruiting function in the EEC 
countries. 
Summary 
The  positions  of parliaments  in  the  political systems  of the  EEC  countries 
The national studies  mostly  enumerate characteristics  on the basis  of a  typology of the functions 
of Parliament, but generally avoid  any comment on the dominant function.  Especially in the case 
of  multi-party  systems  with  complex  cabinet-forming  procedures  (DK,  page  38;  NL,  page  133; 
F,  page 61)  the socio-economic basis,  as  it affects  the party system, is  dealt with in greater detail. 
18 The main variables  are: 
1)  the number of parties. 
2)  the number of parties  eligible  to participate in a  coalition. 
In  the EEC  a  distinction  may  be  made  between: 
1)  Quasi-two and a quarter party systems with alternative government (FRG, Great Britain, Ireland). 
2)  Multi-party-systems in which practically all parties are eligible to participate in a coalition because 
no single  party has more than a relative preponderance  (Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium). 
3)  Multi-party-systems in which major groups are not considered eligible to take part in a coalition, 
with the result that the biggest  coalition  party enjoys  a  hegemony  (France,  Italy). 
Even where an approach has been made towards a  strong vertical structure, the fragmented party 
system on the whole brings the parliamentary mechanisms comparatively close to their goal while 
systems with one party hegemony, tends towards a  'correntocrazia' in which,  the main compromise 
decisions are taken in the biggest parliamentary group and the quasi-two party systems tend towards 
greater dependence  of the group on the party organization at national level. 
ln all three party systems there is  a high level of cabinet stability which leaves less latitude for the 
machinery to call  ministers  to account  before parliament than in  parliamentary systems  between 
the two world wars or even  in the 19th century (38). 
Italy and Belgium  are exceptions to this rule because of the super imposition of further cleavages 
on the principal social conflicts, e.g. the conflict between Flemish and Wallonen sectors of the popu-
lation in Belgium. 
None of these three types escapes the criticism levelled against West European parliamentary systems 
by modern radical theories of democracy. The distortion of the will of the electorate is  greatest in 
systems with long-term domination by a hegemony party (France, Italy). The second type in which 
almost all parties are eligible to take part in a coalition is also open to criticism: in this type of party 
system an increase in the number of electoral votes may even mean that the chance of entering the 
government is reduced rather than increased, and that the rational decision of the elector who wishes 
to elect a particular group may be not to follow his first preference (e,g.  the election of agricultural 
and centre parties in Scandinavia) (39). In the. quasi-two party system with alternating government 
the will of the electorate seems to have the strongest effect on the personal composition and on the 
policy content of the governments. But here too anti-democratic consequences have been repeatedly 
criticized,  because  the position of the government in these  prime-ministerial  systems  seems  parti-
cularly strong vis-a-vis the parliamentary majority, and the tendency for the concept of democracy 
to be reduced to the Schumpeter-Downs  concept of  an elitist  democracy  is  observed  particularly 
frequently  in this type  of party system (40). 
In addition to the party system the nature of the representation of interests  by interest groupings 
is tending to play an increasingly important role.  The more traditional the pattern of ownership 
and statutes of enterprises, the more authoritarian the interests of capital will be in the  economy, 
the less the tendency for parliament to still act as  a forum for expression of the conflict of interests 
and the sharper the tendency for the government to negotiate directly with the most powerful interest 
groupings.  With the growth in the power  of  the unions  and the increasing  politicization  of  the 
working classes since the great protest movements of the late 1960's there has been a similar tendency 
to  bypass  parliament  in some  countries,  especially  where  the  unions  are  founded  on materialist 
theories (France and Italy), or in countries where the unions have an important say in the strength 
of membership  of  the  Labour parties  (Great Britain,  Norway). 
The social situation founded on a  debate among social equals which existed until the first  world 
war in some of what were later to become the EEC Member States with their entrenched bourgeois 
19 parliamentary establishment no longer exists. A debating parliamentarianism with situations which 
are in principle open and not yet programmed, protected by a strictly regulated procedure against 
excessively  close interest groupings  and  the  cumulation  of  members'  roles  on the  one hand, and 
against impulsive expressions of popular will outside parliament on the other, is today the exception 
rather than the rule (41). 
In the modern parliamentary system of the EEC states, parliament still exists as  the highest formal 
level for the settlement of conflicts. The increasing tendency to settle conflict in the system of interest 
representation outside Parliament and the recurrent crises  of parliamentary legitimation  in which 
plebiscital or even anomie forms of expression of latent interests, which had hitherto scarcely been 
represented  and aggregated,  repeatedly  occur  characterise  European parliamentarianism since  the 
end of the period of socio-economic calm during the phase of European reconstruction which ended 
in the late  1960's. 
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22 INTRODUCTORY STUDY TO PAPERS  ON NATIONAL  PARLIAMENTS 
Note by  Professor  David  COOMBES,  University  of Loughborough 
1)  To study the role of Parliament in European integration is to come to the heart of the problem 
of legitimacy in the European Communities.  A problem of legitimacy  arises  when the procedures 
and methods by which political authority is exercised are not acceptable to its subjects. (In this sense 
the causes of the problem might include inefficiency as well as unresponsiveness.) Why such a problem 
exists in the European Communities, and why it is  likely to grow in importance, are not questions 
which need detain us here, although we should remark in passing that one's view of the importance 
of the problem must depend on one's view of the real purpose of the European Communities. I shall 
assume in this paper, however, that there would still be  a problem of legitimacy even if one were 
to maintain that the European  Communities should not expand in function or scope.  A question 
on which it would be much more difficult to find agreement is what should be the role of Parliament 
in providing that legitimacy. It is  essentially on this aspect of the problem as it faces the European 
Communities  that the present symposium  has  been focused. 
2)  In  spite  of  the  relatively  limited  role  entrusted  to the  European Parliament  in  the founding 
treaties, the Parliament has seen its own development as  being crucial to the problem of legitimacy. 
In particular the Parliament has sought to employ two provisions of the Treaty of Rome in order 
to encourage its own development: that concerning direct elections, and that concerning budgetary 
procedure. While its efforts regarding the first of these seem to have been blocked and those regarding 
the second have met with only partial success, attention in recent years has turned to wider aspects 
of its role, in particular, its functions in the legislative process of the Communities. The other institu-
tions,  and especially  the Commission, seem in the last few  years,  to have paid rapidly increasing 
attention to the powers  of  the Parliament,  and the Vedel  Report has provided a  widely-debated 
and influential account of ways in which those powers could be extended to provide greater legitimacy 
for the Communities. There is, therefore, an increasingly important and influential school of thought 
which maintains that the problem of legitimacy  in the Communities is  intimately associated with 
the functions  of Parliament,  and that in this  respect it is  necessary to increase the powers of the 
European Parliament until that function  is  properly performed.  This reasoning is  based,  not only 
on the view that legitimacy is  lacking in the Community institutions as  they are now but also on 
the related view that the transfer of functions from  a national to a  Community level  weakens the 
national Parliaments and that some substitute parliamentary function must be provided at a  Com-
munity level. What is needed in this argument, however, is a much more precise and realistic under-
standing of the role of national Parliaments. What has been particularly lacking is  an articulation 
of what parliamentary functions  really  are. 
3)  However,  there are  many who would place  much less  emphasis  on the role of the European 
Parliament in relation to the problem of legitimacy in the Communities. Some would see the strengthen-
ing  of the European Parliament primarily as  a  threat to national Parliaments  and would  oppose 
it on those grounds. Of course, if this argument rests on opposition to the transfer of powers to the 
Community level,  in general, then there is  not much we can say about it here,  because we  do not 
wish to discuss  the desirability of European integration. However, our study might be  useful, if  it 
showed whether Parliaments in the Member States could reasonably hope to retain effective influence 
23 and control over Community affairs.  On the other hand, there are more general objections to seeing 
the European Parliament as  essential to legitimacy, also based on assumptions about national Par-
liaments,  but arguing that Parliament's role as  a  source  of legitimacy is  exaggerated.  In a  variety 
of ways it is true that some scholastic and legalistic accounts of the role of Parliament give a misleading 
impression of the dominance of Parliament in the systems of Government operating in our Member 
States. In many respects there is  dislocation between the role of Parliament in modern practice and 
the traditional, normative view  of the  central role of Parliament in a  liberal democracy whether 
expressed in written constitutional terms or in conventions or in works of scholars. Thus disillusion-
ment or sheer scepticism about the importance of Parliament within the Member States leads many 
people  to question the realism or the desirability of concentrating on the European Parliament as 
a step to greater legitimacy in the Communities. In recent years this attitude may well have influenced 
the reaction of some representatives of 'Member States Governments  and of the Commission'  (and 
even of some members  of the Parliament themselves)  to proposals for strengthening the powers of 
the European Parliament. 
4)  Given  this vital difference  of view  about the role of Parliament in general,  a  substantial part 
of the symposium is being devoted to studies by experts from the Member States of the role of their 
national Parliaments. The authors take as their focus the relationship between, on the one hand the 
traditional view that Parliament is  the primary source of legitimacy in a liberal democracy and on 
the other the modern functions  which Parliament actually performs. The aim has been more than 
simply to provide a  list  of the functions  of national Parliaments,  or to give  purely  constitutional 
descriptions of their role. The authors have been asked to concentrate on the constraints and unforeseen 
consequences which make it difficult or impossible for Parliaments to exercise the functions expected 
of them. By this means we hope to learn more about the circumstances which have affected the role 
of Parliament in practice. Can one say, for example, that the constraints are such that Parliament's 
functions must be different from those which it is  supposed to exercise, or can adjustments be made 
to adapt the role of Parliament? At the same time it is  important to see how far the circumstances 
as  well as  the norms of Parliament's role differ from one State to another. Do we share a common 
conception of what the role of Parliament should be ? How far can the problems which confront 
our national Parliaments  be explained by conditions peculiar to one or more  countries ? 
5)  Obviously with such a broad perspective, the authors will find it necessary to treat their subjects 
with some generality. They have been given a great deal of flexibility in approaching their task and, 
rather than lay down a rigorous form for the contributions on each national Parliament, we confined 
ourselves to agreeing on the focus of interest just described. At the same time it was thought helpful 
to have some kind of common framework, if only as a list of what topics might be considered relevant 
and as  an analysis of these into different types of issue. A framework of this kind was produced in 
draft form  and discussed  at an earlier meeting by all the contributors of studies  on national Par-
liaments.  There was broad agreement that it covered  the main,  relevant issues  which the authors 
would need to consider and I shall paraphrase it here as  an introduction to their contributions. 
6)  By far the most difficult aspect in organising these studies of national Parliaments was deciding 
what we expected the functions of Parliament to be. It seemed important to make some suggestions 
about this, since in the end it is the functions of Parliament in modern circumstances that we shall 
be trying to assess.  Realising, therefore, that authors would probably wish to add to it or to amend 
it in various ways,  the following  analysis  of the functions  of Parliament was offered: 
a)  First, Parliaments exercise an elective function, in that some Governments are actually recruited 
from  Parliament,  and most depend on its  support. 
b)  Secondly,  there  is  what  might  be  called  Parliament's  representative  function,  which  has  two 
rather different aspects. First, there is its role as  a  'forum of the nation', in which public opinion 
finds  expression and in which the  actions  and policies  of Government can be  openly discussed 
and challenged. At the same time, as  the place where opposition .is  institutionalised, Parliament 
is  an instrument of consensus, a means by which Governments can get support for their policies 
and actions. 
24 c)  Finally and the most difficult to identify there is the function of Parliament in controlling admin-
istration, which is  probably best described as  its managerial function.  Two aspects of adminis-
tration can  be  important to Parliament from  this  point of view:  the relationship  between  the 
administration  and individual  members  of  the general  public  (an  aspect in which the  fairness 
or regularity of administrative action is most important) ; and the effectiveness of the administration 
in carrying out the tasks assigned to it (where it is  efficiency  which is  mainly in question). 
The extent to which these  functions  are  performed  and their relative  importance will vary from 
country to country, and over time, depending upon a variety of conditions which will now be sum-
marised. 
7)  The formal, constitutional powers and rights of Parliament may vary considerably, and clearly 
have a very fundamental influence on the way its functions are performed. They may be considered 
under five  general  headings : 
a)  Relationship with the executive  (e.g.  power of appointment and dismissal, nature of ministerial 
responsibility, compatibility of parliamentary and executive  membership), 
b)  Functions in procedure for making laws  (e.g.  the scope of Parliament's legislative rights, the use 
of committees,  powers  of  amendment  and approval). 
c)  Functions in budgetary procedure (e.g.  limitations on right to propose increases in expenditure, 
comprehensiveness  of the  budget,  role in a posteriori  control of expenditure), 
d)  Control of the administration (e.g. rights of inquiry and scrutiny, special procedures for presenting 
individual grievances  and settling  them), 
e)  Degree of independent status (e.g.  organisation of time-table and power to hold sessions,  arran-
gements for presiding over sessions and for determining and upholding procedure, parliamentary 
staff  and other services). 
8)  Influencing the way these powers and rights are exercised in practice is another set of fundamental 
factors,  not all of them constitutional and legal  in  nature,  arising from the general nature of the 
system of Government in which Parliament operates. The constitutional nature of the State concerned 
must obviously be considered before the role of its Parliament can be understood: in particular the 
extent to which the constitution provides for a separation of powers between executive and legislature 
(this aspect overlaps with 7 (a)  above), whether it is  a unitary or federal system and in general what 
relationship  exists  between  central  and local  Government.  The influence  of  constitutional factors 
will itself depend to some extent on the continuity of the constitution, what form it takes and what 
methods  are  adopted for  amending it.  Also  relevant is  the way in which public administration is 
organised, particularly, its relationship with the executive and the status and rights of its own mem-
bers. Parliament's role in relation to the administration must depend partly on the extent to which 
public agencies and corporations are given autonomy, and also the extent to which the work of the 
administration is directed and controlled according to a separate system of administrative jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the most important basic political factor determining the role of Parliament will be the nature 
of  the  electoral  system,  although this  must be  considered  in  relation  to other,  more  sociological 
aspects of the political system,  such as  the nature of the political parties. This in turn needs to be 
related to the role of interest groups, how they are organised and what channels of access to Govern-
ment they normally seek  and use.  Sometimes  there  may be  deep-seated conflict  about some issue 
or issues, which is  itself a determinant of the party system or of political behaviour in general, and 
this may alter the way Parliament's formal  powers and rights  can be exercised.  Finally this  brings 
us  to purely sociological,  economic  or geographic factors  which  sometimes  account for  practical 
differences  between one Parliament and another: for  example, the degree  of  ethnic,  religious  and 
linguistic homogeneity in the State  concerned,  its  level  of  economic  development,  the distribution 
of  its  population and so  on. 
25 9)  In addition to these basic constitutional and political features there are a number of considerations 
of a more immediate and practical kind which can place constraints on the function of Parliament. 
These  are divided  here into four  categories: 
a)  Ideas  and methods of representation which tend to diminish the role of Parliament. We  would 
include here both theories. of representation, such as the notion of the electoral mandate or belief 
in direct consultation of the people through referenda and so on, and actual developments such 
as the growth of disciplined political parties based on mass support and the introduction of direct 
election of the executive. The tendency of Governments in modern circumstances to prefer direct 
consultation  of  pressure  groups  to the  use  of purely  parliamentary  channels  is  also  relevant, 
although it could  also  appear elsewhere  in this  analysis. 
b)  Growth in the scope and size of Government. It is worth emphasising here that in most Member 
States  there  are certain areas  where  the executive  enjoys  prerogatives  or rights  which  exclude 
parliamentary control (functions associated with national security and defence, emergency powers 
and so on). The expansion of state activity into fields such as economic and social policy, however, 
seems  to have  greatly extended the areas  in which  executives  can successfully claim exceptions 
to Parliament's general powers. The adoption of medium- and long-term financial or economic 
programmes  is  one  example  of this,  but even  short-term,  conjunctural  economic  policy is  an 
area where Governments normally demand a good deal  of discretion. Membership of the Euro-
pean Communities itself  (like  many other aspects  of  relations  with foreign  States,  although to 
a  much  greater  degree)  obliges  executives  to  demand  greater  independence  from  Parliament. 
c)  Direct  effects  of  technological  change.  Two  particular  consequences  for  Parliaments  can  be 
singled  out for  mention here.  First,  the development  of new  techniques  of  decision-making  in 
Government requiring expensive and elaborate resources beyond Parliament's means; and secondly 
the rise of new forms  of communication between Government and public opinion such as  radio 
and television. 
d)  Inadequacies  in  Parliament's  own resources,  including  many  which  result directly from  factors 
we  have  already  considered.  Thus  some  Parliaments  may  have  reacted  better  than others  to 
demands  placed  upon their time,  upon their ability to  obtain  and  use  information,  and  upon 
their staff  and facilities  in general  by  the challenge of modern Government.  Some  would even 
see  in this  a challenge to the whole concept of the member of Parliament  as  an  'amateur'  or 
•layman';  others  would  wish  to  question  the  social  representativeness  of  Parliament;  others 
the adequacy of the relationship between members  of Parliament and their electors.  One could 
well raise here the whole question of Parliament's management of its own public relations and 
how it can  adapt its  role  as  a  channel  of communication. 
10.  If the papers  on national Parliaments  are written with this  analysis  and this focus  in mind, 
then it should be possible to derive from them a general assessment of the extent to which national 
Parliaments  can  and  do  exercise  their  traditional  functions  under  the  circumstances  of  modern 
Government.  This information will  be  invaluable,  both for  assessing  the impact of  the European 
Communities  on parliamentary functions  at the national level,  and for  deciding  what functions  it 
might  be  both theoretically  and practically  desirable  for  the  European  Parliament  to perform  at 
the Community level. The rest of the papers contributed to the symposium will deal with this wider 
Community aspect of the problem, whether by attempting a general survey of the role of Parliament 
in Western Europe, by dealing with the relations between the national Parliaments and the European 
Parliament,  or by  considering  what sort of conclusions  should  be  drawn  regarding  the future  of 
the European Parliament itself. The kind of analysis which is presented here and in the other papers 
cannot be of much practical value unless it is  placed in the context of the political problems involved 
in the process  of integration. However, if  it is  accepted that the question of legitimacy is  basic to 
that process  and is  becoming  ever  more  crucial  in  the  development  of  the  Communities, then  a 
realistic understanding of the actual and potential role of Parliament would seem  to be essential. 
26 SECTION II 
THE NATIONAL  PARLIAMENTS  OF  THE MEMBER  STATES THE BELGIAN  PARLIAMENT WITHIN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Paper by  M.  Jules  GERARD-LIBOIS,  Director  General  of the  Centre 
for  Socio-Political  Research  and Information,  Brussels 
On 16  November  1919,  for  the first  time  in  Belgium,  the rule  'one man,  one  vote'  - universal 
suffrage, though excluding women until1949, was applied at the parliamentary election. This innova-
tion,  introduced  just  after  the  war without  amendment  of  the constitution,  profoundly  modified 
parliamentary representation  and  brought about a  fundamental  and lasting change in  the Belgian 
political system. 
The basic unit in Belgian parliamentary elections is  the arrondissement: it is  essentially at this level 
that the  system  of  proportional  representation  operates  for  the election  of  deputies  and directly 
elected senators (1). This formula - enshrined in the Constitution and implemented by the law is 
one of the factors encouraging pluralism, the relatively large number of lists in all the arrondissements, 
even if, on the whole, it tends to serve the interests of lists or parties which have strong regional ties 
rather than those of political groups whose ideologies and representative character are less specific (
2
). 
Compulsory  voting,  universal  suffrage,  proportional  representation  at  arrondissement  level (3)  -
all this led in 1919 to a new situation: no list or party now had an absolute majority in the two Houses, 
so  no  homogeneous  government  could  be formed  on the  basis  of  a  corresponding parliamentary 
majority.  Under such  a  system the only possible solution was  coalition government, its form  and 
programme to be worked out by members  of  different  parties, endorsed  by  those parties or their 
executive  committees  and then approved  by  a  non-homogeneous  majority in  the two assemblies. 
This  situation, which  calls  for  coalition  governments,  because  of the distribution  of  seats  in par-
liament,  thus  became  a  permanent part of the system (4). 
The 'coalition  government - majority parliamentary groups'  tie-up  is  the  key  element  and  one 
which  has political significance for the real exercise of power and in decisive  relationships. 
In practice, as Carl H. Hojer points out (6)  the character of the parliamentary system is  most clearly 
revealed in the formation and dissolution of governments. The government becomes the dominant 
( 1)  The House of Representatives numbers at present 212 members, the Senate since the elections of March 1974, 181 members, of whom 
106  are directly elected, 50  are chosen  by the Provincial  Councils  and 25  are co-opted.  The Senate may also  include one or more 
ex-officio members, viz. the sons of the King or, where there are none, the princes of the branch of the Royal Family required to rule 
on attainment of  the  age  of  18. 
(')  Articles 48  and 53  of the present Constitution assume the existence of political parties.  The same is  true of Articles  115 a, 116, 118 a 
and  170  of the  electoral code. 
(')  Moderately influenced  by  the  political  alliances  reflected  in  the lists  at  provincial  level. 
(')  One exception: from 1950 to 1954, as a result of the royal question, the Christian Socialist Party (PSC)  enjoyed an absolute majority 
in the two Houses  and a  homogeneous  government  (with three different  Prime  Ministers)  could  be  formed. 
(
6
)  The Parliamentary  System  in  Belgium  from  1918  to  1940,  Carl-1-Ienrik  1-Iojer,  Uppsala  1946;  reprinted  by  CRISP-Brussels  1969 
(in  French). 
29 part of the system.  This is  not something peculiar to Belgium - it is  common to all the Western 
democracies in varying degrees, even to Great Britain, but in Belgium the need for coalition govern-
ments  assured of the support of  a  composite majority in Parliament is  by  no means  a  subsidiary 
factor. 
For this reason, the press, the opposition, the public and sometimes even members of the majority 
group,  condemn 'the crisis  of  Parliament'  and 'the parliamentary role': the Assemblies, it is  said, 
fail to reflect the wishes of the electorate, no longer being a vigorous arm of the legislature, an active 
and effective  centre for  government  control.  More and  more,  Parliament gives  the impression  of 
being simply a rubber stamp for decisions taken elsewhere, by those who have the ability to manipulate 
the parliamentarians  and take their place. 
Former Prime Minister and present Speaker of the Lower House, Achille Van Acker, had this criticism 
to make  in 1973:  "the major decisions are taken outside Parliament and the governments formulate 
both the conditions of application and the basic commitments, thus usurping the role of Parliament." 
That the real powers of Parliament have been eroded, that the government not only exercises executive 
authority in an ever-widening sphere and constantly extends its responsibilities but is also the driving 
force and/or the dominant arm of the legislative authority- all this can hardly be disputed: it has 
been the subject of thorough analysis, in Belgium (1}  and elsewhere. These studies of the functioning 
of the socio-political system have highlighted the widening gap between the rule of law, on the one 
hand, and the real decision-making process and the exercise of authority on the other. 
Certain criticisms of Parliament and its working methods will appear in this study, but Parliament 
will be seen  as  a  mirror of the crises  and tensions  manifested irt  Belgian society  and the State.  A 
distinction must also be drawn in this analysis between the basic phenomena produced by the overall 
socio-political system and those, such as  absenteeism, the formalism of certain debates and voting 
procedures, which are bound up with practices, methods, customs and procedures which the Assem-
blies  could, at least in part, modify themselves  by amending their standing orders or restructuring 
their services. The theme 'reassessment of parliamentary work' leads on to a series of draft reforms 
which only touch on the real exercise of their constitutional powers by the Upper and Lower Houses. 
The creation of a Belgian State in 1830 is  coming to be seen less  and less  as  the logical outcome of 
an aspiration,- or of  a national achievement by Belgians, long-standing and permanent, or even as 
a linear translation or projection in terms of a national State of a living and culturally homogeneous 
community. 
In fact, the Belgian State was born of the will of leading citizens and the general consensus of the 
populations  in the Belgian  provinces  of  the  Netherlands,  accepted  or tolerated  by the European 
powers, the guardians of the system of continental equilibrium established by the Congress of Vienna. 
From 1830 until the end of the century, or possibly up to 1914, Belgium was the concern of leading 
citizens, French-speakers from Flanders  and Wallonia, representatives  of a liberal bourgeoisie and 
capitalism; upholders of a constitutional regime  based on the separation of powers, parliamentary 
in type and monarchical in principle. In the second half of the XIXth century, the only important 
dividing line between the parties - Catholic and Liberal - was the school issue,  the main point 
on which tension between Church and State came to a head. This tension remains constant in Bel-
gium's political life even though, as  a result of successive clashes and compromises, an institutional 
pluralism has eventually been recognized, particularly in the areas of education, health and culture 
guaranteeing the existence  of  (subsidized)  systems,  sociological  projections  of  the Catholic world. 
(1)  For the most up-to-date view of the situation in Belgium see  Pouvoir de  fait  et regie  de  droit; W. J.  Ganshof van der Meerch; Biblio-
theque  de  l'Jnstitut  beige  de  science  politique; Brussels  1957;  La  decision  politique  en  Belgique,  J.  Ladriere,  J.  Meynanud  and F. 
Perin; Cahiers de Ia Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques; Lib. Armand Colin; Paris 1965- Le Regime parlementaire en Belgique, 
H.  van  Imple;  Ed.  Bruylant; Bruxelles  1968. 
30 From this cleavage on the school issue,  under an 'elitist' vote system  - property-based  and  later 
plural (1)  - emerged  parliamentary  majorities  and  homogeneous  governments,  the  two  parties 
tending to alternate in government. It was at this time that Belgian society began to develop other 
tensions  but these  were  not given  adequate expression  in Parliament  until universal  suffrage  had 
been  established.  These  tensions  and divisions  were  of  two kinds:  those engendered  by  industri-
alization and the development of a proletariat on the one hand and those linked with the development 
of Flemish national pride on the other (specific cultural character and communities; linguistic under-
valuation; social  under-development within  the  unitary Belgian  state). 
The creation of social, economic and workers' organizations and the awakening of a Flemish national 
spirit were  enough to call  in question  the  myths  on which the State of  1830  had been founded: 
Belgium's  cultural and linguistic  homogeneity,  institutional  unitarism and centralism; the primacy 
of individual values  and liberties  over  the needs  and rights  of  communities  (of  class,  of  culture). 
In terms of representation of the various social groups, universal suffrage has led to a marked improve-
ment. In 1919, in fact, the workers' party and the inass organizations which formed its basis secured 
a parliamentary representation commensurate with their following  (70  deputies, based on a 36.6 % 
share of the vote). The democratic movement gained in strength within the cartel of Catholic forces 
and the first  5 representatives of Flemish nationalism were elected to the Lower House. 
The House of Representatives and the Senate are certainly less  homogeneous than they were before 
the war, but the groups represented there are a more faithful reflection of social realities. The dominant 
position  of  a  certain  French-speaking  'bourgeoisie'  in  Flanders  was  weakened,  then  destroyed; 
the language problem acts as  a catalyst around parties and men who look ahead to the day when 
- within or without the framework of the Belgian State - language and territory, cultural com-
munity and political institutions may meet, coincide, and derive benefit from each other. Simultaneously 
and sometimes in concert, the organized workers' movement - essentially socialist and Christian -
proved able to organize itself quite impressively (2). It subsequently demanded and obtained measures 
to protect and safeguard employment, income and health even challenged the monopoly of economic 
power acquired by  a highly concentrated capitalism through both complex and ubiquitous holding 
companies. 
In relation to the 3 traditional divisions, Parliament-with its successful and less successful periods-
appears as a truly representative national body, but not necessarily in the sense whereby the Constitu-
tion defines each elected member as representing the nation entire and abstract, as opposed to repre-
senting a group, a region, or a social category. These 3 divisions are represented in Parliament, sometimes 
appearing within the same party: they  are  the products  of  alienation from  the  Church  (Church-
State relations in a pluralistic society),  industrialization  (economic  power and the workers'  move-
ment), and emotive feeling  (equal regard for different cultural communities and political institution-
alization). 
At the present time, in the Lower House, the 'traditional parties' i.e. those which have  a permanent 
'government  vocation'  - are  represented  by  162  out  of  a  total of 212  members:  67  Christian 
Socialists  (20  French speaking, 47 Flemish-speaking); 61  Socialists  (32 French-speaking, 29  Flemish-
speaking);  34  PLP  Liberals  (15  French-speaking,  19  Flemish-speaking).  These  parties  have  lost 
considerable ground since 1965: the Christian Socialists  have lost 10  deputies: the Socialists 3 and 
the  PLP  14.  On the  other hand,  those  parties  which  demand  the  introduction  of  federalism  are 
(
1
)  In 1835, under the property-based system, Belgium had only 23,000 voters for a population of 4,165,953. After the property qualification 
was  lowered, there  were  70,000  voters  in  1848.  Male  and  plural  universal  suffrage  was  introduced in  1893  following  strikes  and 
demonstrations by workers. This was reflected in a tripartite representation in the Upper and Lower Houses, including representatives 
from the Social  Democrats' Parti  Ouvrier Beige.  Just before the 1893  reform 136,775  electors out of a population of 6,195,355  had 
voted  at the previous  elections. 
(
1
)  In 1970,  61.29 %  (1,925,381  members)  of all  wage-earning  and salaried  staff  belonged  to trade unions.  The rate  was  79.99 % for 
workers. But in 1930 the percentage of trade union membership was already 35.05 %  (800,000  members); research by  Jean Neuville, 
the CRISP  Weekly  Bulletin. 
31 increasing  their representation (1): 24  deputies  for  the  Front democratique  des  bruxellois  franco-
phones  (FDF)  - Rassemblement Wallon  (RW)  as  compared with 5 in 1965; 21  for the Volksunie 
(  + 9).  The Communist Party has  5  deputies  as  before. 
Within the various  parties  and groups,  in varying  degrees  depending on particular circumstances, 
social and communal divisions  (Fleming-Walloon relations)  tend to be reflected in procedural rules 
or in  practices, providing for  equilibrium,  arbitration  or relations  between  them  (sometimes  also 
dominant positions)  and to find  expression in groups,  sub-groups  and wings. 
Equipped with representative assemblies,  the country still has to be governed.  Executive authority 
- the King acting under ministerial responsibility, in the words of the Constitution - belongs to 
the government within which has  gradually evolved  the dominant position of the Prime Minister, 
supported by one or two deputy Prime Ministers, who are the leaders within the government of the 
majority  party or parties. 
The formation of a coalition government and the assurance  of its  continued existence are  at once 
a  necessary  objective  and  a  delicate  operation. 
Even  before the elected members take their seats in parliament, consultations and negotiations are 
begun. The King traditionally consults the party chairmen before appointing a •formateur'  (initially, 
sometimes,  an 'informateur'), capable of successfully conducting  negotiations  between  the  various 
parties, of proposing a government formula that has  a good chance of not being blocked at some 
future  stage,  of achieving or endorsing an acceptable distribution of portfolios (2), of working out 
with  the  various  partners  a  government programme which  will  form  an inter-party  contract,  be 
the subject of a statement in both Houses and be supported by a vote of confidence from the par-
liamentary  majority  groups. 
At this stage of the negotiations - the party leadership, and with their support - leading figures 
well placed to obtain a portfolio if the operation is successful, generally play a decisive role. Before 
any  division  takes  place  in the  Houses,  the government  formula  and the government  agreement 
must be endorsed by the conferences or general councils of the coalition parties; they will normally 
be  defended by the •formateur' within his  own party and by the negotiators.  For  the  parties  and 
subsequently for the majority groups in the two Houses (3), the problem now is  whether to ratify 
or reject the coalition formula and the government compact. The question of possible modifications 
is  no longer  relevant. 
Here the majority parliamentary groups have to express their opinion on the matter by a  vote  of 
confidence  which  constitutes  at once  a  real  investiture  of the  government,  virtually  all  of whose 
members  have  been chosen from among them, and a pledge: to support in the future the projects 
and policy of the government and to refrain from action - either in the legislative sphere or in the 
shape of questions to members of the government - liable to split the coalition. Thus, a bond of 
solidarity - with all the discipline this demands from the groups and parliamentarians - is forged 
between the government  and the various  majority parliamentary groups. 
Facing this 'government-majority groups' partnership stands the opposition:  (possibly)  a traditional 
party excluded for a  while from  the coalition and whose  behaviour is  determined  by  past events 
(1}  In 1971  the FDF obtained 34.49 % of the vote in the Brussels' cantons, the Rassemblement Wallon  20.86 %  in  the  Wallon cantons 
and the  Volksunie  18.77 %  in Flanders. 
('}  The  apportionment  is  complex.  The  revised  Constitution  (Art.  86 a)  makes  linguistic  parity  obligatory  for  ministers  'with  the 
possible exception of the Prime Minister' but does not formally require it for secretaries of state. A political  apportionment  between 
the parties represented in the coalition is  inevitable.  Furthermore,  portfolios must be so  distributed  between senators and deJ?uties 
as not to offend either House. In order to take account of Belgian social realities, care must also be taken in allocating portfolios to 
avoid conflict with important pressure groups. 
('}  The Rules  of  Procedure of the  House of  Representatives  (8  February  1962}  and the Senate  (8  June  1971}  recognize  the  existence 
of  political  groups  in  the  Upper  and  Lower  Houses.  Furthermore,  Article  46  of  the  Constitution  tends  to  give  these  Rules  of 
Procedure the status of written sources of public law. At present the Chamber has 7 groups, the Senate 5, both of which have recently 
been  given  small  secretariats. 
32 and the image  it forms  of  itself  as  a  future  government party; the Communist party, for  which 
establishment of a parliamentary front is by no means a matter of priority and which cannot always 
express  itself  in  committee;  the  Federalist  parties  (the  Volksunie  and the  FDF-RW)  which  have 
never  known the responsibilities  and advantages  of  participation in government,  which challenge 
the very structure of the Belgian State, which seek to polarize all tensions around the community 
antagonisms, and which seek to put pressure on certain elements of the majority, especially those 
that fear competition from them on their territory but who are constrained in their attitude by the 
compromise accepted within the framework of the coalition in power. These parties also seek, to 
some extent in Parliament but mainly outside it, to present a credible alternative to the traditional 
coalition formula. 
The chief task of the maiority groups is to install the government, to keep it in being and to promote 
its policies for as long as the party leaderships are so minded. Priority is thus given, even in legislative 
matters, to government action:  four out of every  five  acts  of Parliament are introduced by Min-
isters (1)  while those originated by Parliament had to be given the go-ahead by Ministers. The annual 
voting of the budgets has been totally 'politicised' : it is a case of the majority against the opposition. 
A parliamentarian from the majority group is  not normally entitled to put questions to a Minister 
without the consent of his group, which also decides which speakers shall take part in debates. His 
right to initiate legislation - by tabling a bill or an amendment - is  generally subject to the same 
conditions and limitations. Any serious  breach of discipline may be penalized either by the parlia-
mentary group or by an official party body and the sanction, in its harshest form, may involve the 
'offender's'  being  removed  from  the lists  of candidates for the following  elections,  participation 
in the poll to draw up the list of candidates and the order of their presentation being increasingly 
limited to a minority of loyal members (a few percent of the electorate at best), the polling procedure 
itself increasingly giving way to the "standard list" of candidates proposed by the party committees. 
At first  sight,  therefore,  a member of the majority group is  merely a pawn in a game designed to 
ensure the survival of the government coalition, which can  also  make use of 'the big stick'  i.e. the 
right to dissolve  the Upper and Lower Houses in  a  crisis.  However, the situation is  in fact  more 
complex  than this.  Certain members  of  parliament  belong  to the highest  echelons  of  their party 
and, where the coalition gets  bogged down on problems of substance or problems connected with 
appointments, the government - or,  more frequently,  a  few  ministers  of acknowledged  political 
influence - convoke a 'summit'  confrontation with the party leaderships in order to start a process 
of arbitration and compromise. At these strategic moments, it is not necessarily the ministers' argu-
ments  that carry  the  most  weight. 
Furthermore, in the parliamentary committees (
2
), lively confrontations take place and amendments 
may be  made although the presence  of  'the other side'  may slow down or even  obstruct debates 
or amendments likely to embarrass the coalition. It is above all at the weekly meeting of each majority 
group  that the  process  of  controlling  or questioning  the  government  is  most  openly conducted; 
where the minister concerned  belongs  to the same party as  the  group,  'delicate'  matters  can  be 
dealt with among themselves, without serious risk  of  'leaks'  or political complications; where the 
matter is  not within the province of a  minister of the same party, the group summons a  member 
of the government of its own political colour who is  thought to be specially qualified to discuss the 
particular matter; the latter may not be able to answer all the questions put to him or to commit 
himself  as  the actual  holder of the portfolio  might,  but he can transmit information, particularly 
to the  Cabinet. 
(')  H.  Van  lmpe, op.  cit.  believes  that 'the Upper  and  Lower  Houses  have retained  a  subsidiary  or residual  legislative  power'  and 
that 'Parliament plays  only  a  marginal  role in  legislative  matters'.  Where  the  Cabinet  has  agreed  on a  Bill,  it is  customary  for 
its spokesman to present it as a decision, as  if the subsequent vote of Parliament were purely a  matter of form. In fact, before 1919, 
the legislative  initiative of the members  of the  Chambers  was  even  more  circumscribed. 
{
1
)  Each assembly has approximately 20 standing or special committees. These committees are represented by 23  members in the House 
of  Representatives  and 22  in the  Senate  chosen  according  to the rules  for  the  proportional re.Presentation  of  groups.  Committee 
chairmen  are  chosen  according to rules  of  relative  proportionality, based  on a  tradition of 'fa1r  play". 
33 If he represents a pressure group or lobby - and two-thirds of all Belgian parliamentarians do -
a  member of the Government majority is  not completely without influence:  his  image depends in 
no small measure on the kinds of terms he is  on with the ministers  and the kind of hearing he is 
given  in committee (1). 
He has the right to put questions to Ministers (2), albeit within certain limits. In budget discussions 
he has the chance to express the worries felt or demands made by his own region or particular social 
groups and to reach the public via the information media covering debates without, however, being 
able to bring  about a  negative  vote or even  an abstention.  Written  questions  to ministers  - an 
average of 1 500 a year - also constitute such a channel, limited but not without importance. There 
is nothing (except the fear of supplying the opposition with ammunition) to prevent a member from 
putting an oral question (
3
)  at a public sitting of the House: this is  the gentlest and most moderate 
way of exercising control over ministers  and it cannot lead to a  debate since the minister's  reply 
constitutes the last word. Similarly,  before any issue is  decided by the party, the group and/or the 
government,  any  member  of the Government  majority who wishes  to do so - may  call  a  press 
conference, get an article published in a  newspaper or make  a public statement in order to make 
known his personal views which may well not be those of the majority even if he has to vote dif-
ferently  in Parliament out of  allegiance  to his  group. 
This position - enforced  but in fact  inevitable - in  which the parliamentarian of the  majority 
finds  himself  undoubtedly  contributes  to the  general  feeling  that 'the  nation's  representative'  is 
not the parliamentarian of song and story, independent of the executive which he controls, a mouthpiece 
for the aspirations and grievances of the people he represents. In reality, this state of affairs is dictated 
by the system; it is a necessary feature of coalition dynamics. If, in a given situation, he feels compliance 
with the system incompatible with the minimum of loyalty required of him or if he feels  it to clash 
with what he believes to be political necessity or even his  own interests as  spokesman of a group, 
the parliamentarian can always resign or attempt to make so vigorous a stand that the government 
is  forced  to change  its  attitude or the coalition is  broken  up. 
If the majority breaks up, a  member of that majority will very  seldom  have the chance of voting 
against the government in a public sitting and forcing it to resign: if one of the parties composing 
the  majority  wishes  to withdrawn from  the  coalition the  Prime  Minister  will  generally  offer  his 
resignation to the King  without waiting for  the  sanction  of Parliament. 
The position of the  opposition in Parliament is  a  difficult  one  unless  it is  chiefly  concerned  with 
making a big impact on public opinion without really seeking to influence decisions. It will of course 
vote against the  government formula  and programme and the proposed budgets. It can  also  put 
questions to members of the government at public sitting but it knows that, even if it has no intention 
of tabling a motion of no confidence, the Upper and Lower House will avoid committing themselves 
on the substantive issues  being debated by adopting, in priority over any other motion, the simple 
agenda  or a  vote  of confidence  in  the  government.  Proposals for  legislation  emanating from  the 
opposition - inasmuch as they upset the Government's timetable and, even more, its plans - have 
to follow  a course that gives  them little chance of becoming law: the only comfort the opposition 
can take is  that, where the issue is  taken up by the information media, it can get a certain amount 
of publicity  and can  present the voter  with an alternative  to the coalition's proposals. 
As  far  as  exercising control over the government is  concerned, there is  in principle very  little the 
opposition can do. It can ask questions and demand explanations but in debate, even with the aid 
of its modest  Group secretariat, it is  technically in a  weak position vis-a-vis  the Minister, who is 
( 1)  Pressure groups are more concerned with gaining direct access  to the government and the administration than to the public forum 
of Parliament, but the one does  not exclude the other, particularly if  the parliamentarian who has received  a mandate or in whom 
the group is  recognized  agrees  to perform the  services  required  or is  likely  to  become  a  minister. 
(')  An  average  of 50  per  session. 
(•)  An  average  of  40  per  session. 
34 backed by  the services of both his 'cabinet' (1)  and the  administration (
2
). This  applies  with  parti-
cular  force  to  parties  outside  the  government  coalition.  The electoral  progress  of  the Federalist 
parties,  however,  does  have  some  influence  on ministers  and  Government  majority  parties:  the 
latter cannot ignore the threat they pose and very often  questions  are 'set in orbit' simply  because 
federalist  parties  make  them  subjects  of  extra-parliamentary  propaganda  and action. 
The attitude of the parties to the realities  of  government  determines  in large  measure their  ideas 
on enhancing Parliament's role  and the image  of the parliamentarian. 
The research departments of the 3 traditional parties (Christian Socialists, Socialists and PLP Liberals) 
have  jointly formulated  recommendations pertaining to the work of Parliament and based on the 
'irreversible: specialization'  of  duties  and the need for  rationalization. These recommendations are 
aimed  at securing: 
- a drastic reduction in the number of plenary sittings in Parliament (
3
). These would be reserved 
for government statements on general policy and for major questions to members of the govern-
ment, for budget discussion  of ways  and means,  the economic plan, matters dealt with by the 
Finance  Committee  and voting.  Other matters  would  be  channelled to permanent,  specialized 
public sections. Whether a given matter was of major political importance and of general scope 
would be decided,  in  doubtful  cases,  by  the  Chairmen's  Conference. 
- The time thus saved on public sittings would be devoted to the standing committees, where the 
real  legislative  work is  done - but at present  all  too slowly. 
Very little has been done about these recommendations since they were submitted in 1968-69.  Even 
where  working  methods  are  concerned,  resistance  to change  is  very  strong.  Some  commentators 
attribute this to the unyielding ultra-conservatism of the Speakers of the Upper and Lower Houses (4), 
who fear it would 'erode their prestige' and also to the fact that 'the present situation has advantages, 
especially for  the government,  which  makes  full  use  of them...  for  in  a  Parliament invested with 
greater power, it would not be easy to reduce the opposition to silence' { 6). These assessments are 
incomplete,  but they  cannot be  ignored. 
The parliamentarian who explained to the Lower House the reasons for the modifications proposed 
by the research departments of the PSC, the PSB and the PLP did not mince his  words: 'The failure 
of Parliament to keep  pace with its responsibilities  as  they evolve is  manifest  (  .. ) the two Houses 
of the legislature have scarcely made any changes in the working methods they adopted in 1831  (  .. ) 
the deplorable rate of absenteeism is  due to the slight amount of interest that debates have for four-
fifths  of the members  (  .. ) in spite of the considerable amount of time devoted to the discussion of 
budgets,  parliamentary control is  illusory (
6
). 
The Walloon opposition (RW)  for its part- mostly through its leader, F.  Perin, professor of public 
law - proposes measures to restore Parliament's role but stresses that the real crisis of the regime 
cannot be  solved by amending the Standing Orders of the Upper and Lower Houses and that the 
very  structure  of  the unitary State  needs  to be  changed. 
(')  There has been a striking increase in the number and size of ministerial 'cabinets'. At  present  the  Prime Minister has 8 cabinets  and 
in 1973 the 36 ministers and secretaries of state were served by 45 very large cabinets (see the address made by Mr Vlerick to the Senate 
on 7  November  1973). 
(')  Over 230,000  employees  in the State administrations, not including semi-public  bodies. 
(')  The parliamentary session is  opened on the second  Tuesday in  October and has to last at least 40  days  (Article 70 of the revised 
Constitution). In 1970-71, the Lower House sat for 376 hours, 15  in public sittings, and the Senate 366 hours. In the same year, the 
Lower  House held 364  committee meetings, the Senate 392.  Often, though admittedly not for the 1974  financial  year, budgets are 
submitted  well  behind  schedule  and  the  close  of sessions  is  marked  by  feverish  and  sometimes  quite  disorderly  activity,  which 
certainly does not help to improve parliament's image in the eyes of the public. It should be noted that, in December 1967, the Lower 
House's  Committee on Standing  Orders, voted in favour  of  referring  questions  of  local  importance addressed to  members  of  the 
government to permanent public sections,  if  approved by the Chairmen's  Conference. 
(')  La Libre  Belgique,  9  October  1973.  The then  Speaker  of  the Senate,  Mr Paul  Struye,  is  now  the  foreign-policy  editorialist  and 
columnist of  this  newspaper. 
(')  Ibid.; same  date. 
(')  A.  d'Aicantara; 1972-73  session,  House of Representatives;  Doc.  503-1. 
35 The RW's proposals are undoubtedly coloured by its experience in opposition, but they also indicate 
a desire for a more efficient system, a stable executive and a Parliament effective in its vital functions. 
They include proposals for ensuring that questions to Ministers are not ruled out by the expedient 
of a vote on the orders of the day, which takes, priority, for endowing Parliament with more adequate 
powers with which to discharge its constitutional responsibility for budgetary functions and control (
1
); 
for limiting the number of ministerial portfolios to 12; for averting artificial government crises  in 
the course of a Parliament's life; for increasing the value of committee work and reducing the number 
and duration  of  plenary sittings; for  new  ways  of  giving  publicity to debates (2); for  revitalizing 
Parliament's rights regarding commissions of enquiry as provided for by the Act of 3 May 1880, etc. 
The similarity between the various recommendations for improving Parliamentary work and methods 
is indicative of similar assessments of the present situation, if not of equal confidence in the possibility 
of giving  the system  a  new  dynamism. 
Parliament's role,  the basic  conditioning factors  of which are  described  above,  is  also  affected  by 
new  constitutional  provisions  stemming  primarily from  the  decade  of  tensions  between  the two 
communities. 
The revised Constitution of 1971 provides for a number of institutional reforms (3)  :  Belgium consists 
of two territories separated by a rigid linguistic  boundary and four linguistic regions  (one French-
speaking, one Dutch-speaking, the bilingual region of the capital, Brussels, and a German-speaking 
region); Belgium has three cultural communities  (French,  Dutch and German)  with certain limited 
and defined  powers;  Belgium  is  also  required  to have  regional  assemblies  and executives  for  its 
three regions -Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels - (Article 107c  of the Constitution), while economic 
decentralization is  reflected  in the creation of  regional  economic  bodies.  These reforms  affect  the 
two Houses and their  members.  In  each House each parliamentarian must belong  to a  linguistic 
group  (Dutch  or French).  Where  the  Constitution  has  so  provided  (special  majorities  prescribed 
by Article 1 (4); 3 a (3); 107c  or the 'alarm bell'  system  of Article  38a), the linguistic groups vote 
separately.  Furthermore,  all  parliamentarians  of  a  given  linguistic group sit on the corresponding 
Cultural Council (4}  which is  empowered to legislate by  decree  on the matters with which they are 
concerned. 
On the regional bodies statutorily created pursuant to Article 107c, parliamentarians will have seats, 
though the final arrangements have not yet been worked out. In addition there are parliamentarians 
in the regional  economic  councils  and in the regional  development  corporations. 
Besides these new developments, there is  the fact that many parliamentarians sit on local councils, 
sometimes even in the capacity of mayor, or on the Executive boards of supra-communal authorities. 
Pressures towards dispersion are thus very strong and, in fact, proposals for restricting the number 
of offices that can be held have been tabled or supported by organs of public opinion and the spokesman 
of the traditional parties' research departments feels  that the creation of  new  institutions  'makes 
it more than ever  necessary  to rationalize  parliamentary work'. 
On certain major topics that divide opinion, such as  education and culture, the government parties 
seek to conclude long-term pacts and thus prevent these matters from becoming subjects of permanent' 
controversy. The school pact signed between the three parties, the PSC, the PLP and the PSB in 1958, 
which  is  now  being  re-negotiated,  constitutes  an  interesting  precedent,  politically  speaking,  but 
(')  The  RW  recommends  appointing Inspectors  of  Finance  as  budgetary and  financial  advisers  to the Assemblies.  The Audit  Court, 
whose members  are  appointed  by  the  Lower  House,  submit  annually to the Assembly  a  general  State  Account,  accompanied  by 
observations,  but these  concern  only  the legality  and correctness  of operations  whereas  the R  W  would like  to  see  Inspectors  of 
Finance give  their  opinions  on questions  of efficiency. 
('}  Public debates enhance the value of draft legislation appreciably by making choices and alternatives more comprehensible. The R  W 
feels  that after their  closed  meetings,  all  parliamentary committees  should  hold  corresponding public  meetings. 
{8}  See:  Les  Institutions  politiques  de  Ia  Belgique  regionalisee,  Dossier du CRISP,  No. 6,  Brussels,  1973. 
(•)  The Councils  also  set  up  specialized  Committees  but it was  soon  found  advisable  to reduce  the  number  from  thirteen  to  eight 
(4  December  1973). 
36 makes considerable inroads on the legislative powers of the two Houses in these matters. A similar 
development has occurred in the areas of economic and social policy: the government deals directly 
with both sides of industry and any agreements they reach constitute virtual faits  accomplis for the 
two Houses (1). 
When Belgium  joined the European Communities and NATO, the powers not only of Parliament 
but also of the government were affected. A clear illustration of this is the question of the deployment 
of Belgium's military forces, in peacetime as well as in wartime. In the European context, the problem 
of the erosion of powers has arisen several times: in the coal sector, for example, the power vested 
in the national  'Directoire'  in  matters  of prices and subsidies had to be relinquished to the ECSC, 
Parliament already having transferred these powers to the High Authority by its ratification of the 
Treaty of Paris of 1951.  The question also arose in connection with  the  'Leburton legislation'  on 
regional  aid and also  in connection with agricultural prices, transport and Belgium's contribution 
to the various  European funds  (EAGGF,  EDF,  the  Social  Fund,  etc.). 
On the whole there has not been much resentment at this erosion of powers, as  various European 
measures felt to be necessary have made it possible to avoid  or limit national political responsibilities 
that  seemed  likely  to  arouse  negative  public  reaction;  above  all,  since  Belgium's  international 
situation (2)  - as  regards foreign trade, monetary policy and the need for political cooperation -
is  very seldom at variance with the Treaty of Rome, and the institutional mechanics and the organ-
ized system of decision-making safeguard the interests of the small Member States in the Community. 
When the Rome Treaties were ratified, the Belgian Parliament insisted on being supplied each year 
with a  government  report on the implementation  and application  of the treaties.  The House  of 
Representatives  - not the Senate (3)  - set  up  in February  1962 - a  Committee for  European 
Affairs composed of 23  members to report on the work of the Belgian delegations to the European 
Parliament, the WEU Assembly, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Inter-
parliamentary Council of Benelux, based on information supplied to it by the government on the 
implementation of the Treaties of Rome and on observations supplied by Belgian parliamentarians 
with seats  in these  assemblies. 
In fact,  this  committee  has  not come  up  to expectations:  bills  for  the approval  of  international 
treaties remain the preserve  of the Foreign Affairs  Committee  (including the treaties of accession/ 
enlargement  of the European  Communities); the report of the European Affairs Committee which 
is supposed to be submitted annually, fails to appear on time (4)  and is always linked in public sitting 
with the foreign  affairs  and development cooperation budget so  that it never gets  the limelight in 
a  debate  and is  approved 'implicitly'  by  the vote  on the budget. 
European matters are not therefore fully covered by this committee; far from it. It is  through the 
budgetary discussion  procedures,  questions  to Ministers  and matters  of  national importance that 
they reach the Upper and Lower Houses and even then only when they have a direct influence on 
Belgian  affairs  as  is  increasingly the case with the oil crisis, inflation  and regional aid. 
(1)  Both  sides  of industry  and  the  major  interest  groups  are represented  in  a  vast  network  of  advisory  bodies  of  greatly  varying 
effectiveness.  On the other hand, as such, or through  'round table'  or labour conferences  or meetings between the government and 
the  National  Committee for  Economic  Development,  these  major groups  strongly  influence  decisions  in  a  constantly  expanding 
economic and social field.  There are some who favour integrating all  these elements by remodelling the Senate so that it represents 
all  the various interests and occupations.  In  fact,  the two Houses have identical powers though there are some who would like to 
see the legislative role of the Senate strengthened with the Lower House concentrating specially on control and finance, 
(')  Before the enlargement of the EEC,  the EEC  accounted for two-thirds of the EUBL's  imports and three-quarters of its exports. The 
EUBL  and its production centres  (goods  and services)  associate themselves entirely with the liberal objectives  of the treaties. EUBL: 
Economic  Union  of Belgium  and Luxembourg. 
(1)  The Senate decided that information on the European  Assemblies  would  be included  in  the report on the foreign  affairs  budget. 
The importance of  this  part of the report therefore depends  on the  Committee and  the rapporteur. 
(•)  No  report  was  compiled  between  9 March  1967  and  June  1970. 
37 FUNCTIONS  OF  PARLIAMENT  IN THE  DANISH  POLITICAL  SYSTEM 
Paper by Professor Erik DAMGAARD,  University  of Aarhus 
I  - INTRODUCTION 
The Danish constitutional structure has evolved gradually from the foundation laid down 125 years 
ago. The 1849 constitution did away with royal absolutism and introduced a system of Government 
according to the classical theory of  representative democracy.  From then on representatives of the 
people shared law-making power with the executive. About fifty years later Parliament also obtained 
the right to appoint and dismiss cabinets. At a still later stage (1920)  Parliament itself was reformed 
with the introduction of universal suffrage  and a  proportional election system.  Finally,  in 1953,  a 
unicameral Parliament, the Folketing,  replaced the  old bicameral one. 
Though of course very important, this basic constitutional structure is only a framework for political 
life. Within this formal setting we find political parties and a number of important organized interest 
groups (farmers, workers, employers, etc.) none of which existed during the first decades of democratic 
government.  In  addition,  the  administrative  bureaucracy  has  grown  tremendously  and  assumed 
increasing importance  for  the  functioning  of the political system. 
From early in the 20th century until very recently the 'four old'  parties  were  the  main actors on 
the  political  arena.  These  four  parties  traditionally  appealed  to  different  social  groups:· Liberals 
(Venstre)  to farmers,  Conservatives to business  and higher public employees,  Social  Democrats to 
the working class,  while the Radical Liberal  (Radikale  Venstre)  Party's  voter  support was  more 
diversified  although it  originally  received  support from  smallholders  in particular.  Since  1906  no 
party has managed to win a parliamentary majority. Thus Danish politics essentially became politics 
of  compromise.  Traditionally,  cooperation  took  place  primarily  between  Social  Democrats  and 
Radical  Liberals  on the  one hand and Liberals  and Conservatives  on the  other.  This pattern  of 
coalition politics  changed  towards  the end of the  1960s  following  the emergence  of  the Socialist 
People's party. Cabinet formation then became dependent upon whether there was a parliamentary 
majority of Social Democrats + Socialist People (1966-67, 1971-73) or Liberals + Radical Liberals + 
Conservatives  (1968-71)  though defence and foreign policy  (including European policy)  still aligned 
the four old parties against the Socialist People's Party regardless of which parties were in office (1). 
At the election of  December, 1973,  however, the voters  returned a  highly fractionalized  Folketing 
of no less  than 10 parties, and a weak Liberal minority Government based on only 22  seats  came 
to power. The further  political consequences of that election are not yet  known, however. 
The aim of this paper is to describe the present role of Parliament within the Danish political system. 
First,  in Section II, I  shall  discuss  the general problem of delimiting parliamentary functions,  and 
for  reasons that hopefully  will  be  clear from that discussion,  the paper will  next concentrate on 
three important parliamentary functions with a section on each  (III  - V).  In Section VI  I conclude 
by describing the most significant consequences of EC-membership for the functions of the Folketing. 
(')  A systematic analysis· of Danish Government formations in this century may be found in Erik Damgaard,  'The Parliamentary Basis 
of Danish  Governments:  The Patterns  of  Goalition  Formation', Scandinavian  Political  Studies,  vol.  4, 1969,  pp.  30-57. 
38 II- THE FUNCTIONS  OF PARLIAMENT 
Since our general conceptions and definitions of Parliaments usually constitute a frame of reference 
for assessments of the role and performance of a Parliament it is imperative that we put first things 
first by asking a seemingly innocent question: What is a Parliament? Instead of reviewing innumerable 
suggested definitions, I shall refer only to the conclusion drawn by a distinguished student of legis-
latures.  He identified two structural characteristics  of political bodies  variously called Parliament, 
congress,  legislature,  diet,  Chamber of Deputies,  representative  assembly,  etc.:  (1)  their  members 
are formally  equal to one another in status, distinguishing Parliaments from hierarchically ordered 
organizations; and  (2)  the authority of their members  depends on their claim to representing the 
rest  of the community,  in  some  sense  of that protean concept,  representation. (1) 
These  two  characteristics,  formal  equality  and representation,  apply  to  all  Parliaments  and  can 
thus serve to define a  Parliament. The only possible trouble with the definition lies  in the concept 
of representation which is  certainly not unequivocal. A number of scholars have written about the 
problem of representation (2). On this occasion, however, I am not going to immerse myself in the 
question of what the concept of representation entails. I simply want to emphasize that the definition 
of Parliament above demonstrates that representing the people of a society is  an essential function 
of Parliament,  but it assumes  no more than that about parliamentary functions. 
In any attempt to describe the role of a Parliament, in this case the Danish Folketing,  it would be 
reassuring if some classification of legislative functions was available such that the assessments could 
be made in a  relatively systematic and comprehensive way.  Without some a priori notions of par-
liamentary functions the odds are that the resulting evaluations will rest on an arbitrary and subjective 
basis, and that important aspects of legislative activity are ignored. Therefore, we should be advised 
first  to look for  classifications  of  parliamentary functions  for  possible  use  as  analytical  tools  in 
specific  studies. 
With the fairly encompassing definition of Parliament in mind we may ask, first,  which functions 
are generally performed by Parliaments in various political systems, and, secondly, which important 
functions  are  performed  by  the Danish Folketing  in particular. 
As to the first question, it turns out that the abundant literature on Parliaments  contains an almost 
bewildering variety of functions attributed to Parliaments (3}. In part, this diversity is due to variations 
in national political structures and constitutional practices, but no less to differences  in vocabulary, 
conceptualizations, and perspectives of the authors. In addition, the more recent litterature on Par-
liaments, though it aims at precise measurement and comparative statements, focuses on the behaviour 
of  individual  legislators  with  a  tendency  not  to  ask  functional  questions  about  Parliaments  as 
collective  bodies.  On the other hand, the traditional literature on legislatures  does  have  much to 
say about parliamentary functions. What it says, however, is  usually couched in vague and impres-
sionistic  terms  with a  mixing of  description  and prescription (4). 
Given this state of affairs, the best we can do probably is  to identify the most frequently mentioned 
functions  of  Parliaments,  and,  thereby,  presumably  also  the  most important  ones.  These  appear 
to  be representation  (by  definition},  lawmaking,  and  control  of the  executive,  although  different 
labels  for  essentially  identical types  of  parliamentary activity  are  often  used (5). 
(
1
}  Gerhard  Loewenberg,  Modern  Parliaments.  Change  or  Decline  (Chicago,  New York:  Aldine  Atherton,  1971},  p.  3. 
('}  One of  the best analyses is  Hanna F.  Pitkin,  The  Concept  of Representation  (Berkley:  University  of California Press,  1967}. 
('}  Reading  a  book like  Allan  Kornberg  &  Lloyd  D.  Musolf,  eds.,  Legislatures  in  Developmental Perspective  (Durham,  N.C.:  Duke 
University  Press,  1970},  should  remove  any  possible  doubt about that. 
('}  These points  are  elaborated  and documented in Robert A.  Packenham, 'Legislatures  and Political  Development',  in  Kornberg  & 
Musolf,  op.  cit.,  pp.  521-582. 
('}  These  three  categories  were  used  by,  e.g.  Gerhard  Loewenberg  in  his  excellent  study,  Parliament in  the  German  Political System 
(Ithaca,  N.Y., 1967).  German edition,  Parlamentarismus  im  politischen  System  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  (Tiibingen,  1969}. 
39 Though perhaps not surprising, it is  noteworthy that these functional categories fit  very well with 
the role attributed to Parliament by classical theory of representative democracy. Parliaments were 
created as  a  means  to achieve  two basic objectives:  To ensure that the executive  behaved within 
the constraints outlined by decisions of the legislature, and to ensure that the general rules established 
by the legislature were produced collectively by men who had the confidence of the people. As  has 
most recently been emphasised by J.  Blonde! it was originally held as  axiomatic that the function 
of legislatures was to make laws - i.e.  to pass the most general rules under which countries were 
to be governed, the argument being that: "If the 'people' are to be sovereign, or at least as powerful 
as possible, their representatives should be concerned primarily with the most general rules. Executives 
are needed to keep the country going, but legislatures could and should decide on the general rules" (1). 
Now, the important thing to realize is that laws are no longer what they used to be. To quote Blondel 
once  again: 
"Locke and Montesquieu looked at societies in which state involvement in social and economic 
matters was minimal if not non-existent. For them, statutes did not mean education or housing 
acts; they covered problems of private property, individual rights, family law- in short the 
regulation of private relationships  between individuals.  Slowly the balance tilted, through the 
nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries,  toward  public  legislation  establishing  new  agencies  and 
regulating  social  and economic  matters.  But no one drew the conclusion that this  entailed  a 
different  type  of involvement for legislatures." (2) 
The conclusion that must be drawn is that, due to technological, economic, and social developments 
over the last one hundred years which led to the complex societies of the modern world, Parliaments 
can no longer make the laws as  assumed by  classical  theorists. Today, the Government supported 
by its bureaucracy and a variety of subject-matter experts, has the upper hand in law-making. Once 
we realise this we avoid falling into the trap of inferring actual functions of Parliaments from legal 
rights.  Also  we  avoid the error of comparing current legislative practices with antiquated ideas  of 
parliamentary functions lamenting the 'decline' of Parliament. This is  not to deny that Parliaments 
still play a role in law-making, but the exact nature of this role has to be determined empirically; 
it cannot be  deduced from  constitutional theory. 
Another corollary follows from the limited capability of Parliaments to make the laws of the land: 
If Parliaments by  and large must rely on Government initiatives in legislative  work it  becomes  all 
the more important for Parliament to control Government, i.e. to decide upon who are to form the 
cabinet and to constantly check  and review  Government policy. 
Before turning to the assessments of the role of the Danish Folketing with respect to political repre-
sentation, law-making, and control of Government I want to make an important reservation. What 
follows is  by no means an exhaustive account of the role or the functions of the Danish Parliament, 
but a rather short description of some  activities that traditionally have been considered important 
functions of Parliaments. This ought to be kept in mind throughout the remaining pages of the paper. 
III- PARLIAMENT AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
Parties  and Representation 
By  conventional yardsticks the Danish political system is  very  'democratic':  Suffrage  is  universal 
(with a voting age of 20 years), and the Folketing is elected according to a proportional representation 
formula. Elections have to take place at least every four years, but usually they occur more frequently 
( 1)  ]. Blonde!,  Comparative  Legislatures  (Englewood  Cliffs:  N.J.:  Prentice-Hall,  1973),  p.  4. 
(')  Ibid.,  p.  13. 
40 (on the average each 2.7 years in the post-war period)  since the Government has the right to call 
elections  at any time.  New political parties may participate in elections if they have  succeeded in 
collecting about 17,000 signatures from persons eligible to vote. Parties obtain a  share of the par-
liamentary seats which corresponds to their share of the vote provided they acqui(e at least 2 per 
cent of the total vote. 
Since  1960  turnout at Folketing  elections  has varied within the range of 86 - 89  per cent which is 
very high considering the fact that voting is not compulsory. Until recently, election outcomes tended 
to be rather stable from one election to the next. During the 1960s new signs  of electoral mobility 
and volatility appeared, however,  as  exemplified  by the emergence  of the Socialist People's Party, 
a surge of the Radical Liberal vote after a long period of decline, and an increasing number of votes 
for  new small parties that did not pass the electoral threshold of 2 per cent. These new develop-
ments culminated in the election of December, 1973, which suddenly increased the number of parties 
in the Folketing from 5 to 10,  and, for the first  time ever, reduced the strength of all established 
parties simultaneously. As indicated above, the four old parties (Social Democrats, Radical Liberals, 
Liberals,  and  Conservatives)  used  to  command  an overwhelming  proportion  of the  seats.  Thus, 
before the election of 1973  they jointly held 90.3  per cent of the seats,  but after the election only 
59.4  per  cent.  The 5  new  parties  (Progressive  Party,  Centre Democrats,  Christian People's  Party, 
Communists, and Justice Party)  captured 34.3 per cent of the mandates, while the Socialist People's 
Party obtained 6.3  per cent. 
All  established parties  thus lost ground in the electorate,  at least temporarily,  and obviously  the 
PR election system facilitated this development. From the point of view of these parties the outcome 
was an agonizing experience, signifying a grave governmental crisis or even potential political chaos. 
From  the  more  'party-neutral'  perspective  of  prevailing  Danish  democratic  ideology,  however, 
the results of the election must be interpreted as  implying that a great many voters were dissatisfied 
with the current state of affairs and with the performance of the old parties, and consequently, they 
switched to new alternatives. Only the future can tell whether the election results reflect short-term 
'protest-forces'  or whether  a  more permanent change of the party system has  finally  been brought 
about after many decades of remarkable stability (1). Anyhow, and this is the point to be made here, 
we  may  conclude that the party composition of  the Folketing  represents  the party preferences  of 
the voters  almost  as  accurately  as  PR can  possibly  do. 
The problem of political representation is  not settled by this conclusion, however. In a multiparty 
system,  where  no party has  a  majority, politics  necessarily  means  coalitions  and compromises.  A 
voter is  represented by the party he votes for  (or perhaps the candidate within the party he might 
have  picked  on the  ballot).  He does  not have  such  direct influence  upon government formation, 
however, since he cannot control, and sometimes not even predict, the strategy of his party in dealing 
with other parties in this respect. In a two-party system a vote for a party is also a vote for a Govern-
ment of the same party. In a multiparty system the voter has a wider range of party choice, but he 
also  has  less  chances  of  influencing  government  £ormation.  Therefore,  uncertainty  and  possibly 
frustration  is  experienced  by  some  voters,  who  might prefer  a  certain party over  others while at 
the  same time  disapproving  the  coalition  partner  chosen  by  his  party. 
Little research  has  so  far  been  done  on this intricate problem of  democratic  Government,  but at 
the very least I can illustrate the point by mentioning a few results from the national Danish survey 
carried out in connection with the election of 1971.  The data show, for example, that although a 
clear  majority of Social  Democratic voters  wanted their  own party to form  a  Government,  there 
were  also  divergent  views  on preferred coalition party:  12  per cent wanted the Socialist  People's 
Party to join and another 12 per cent wanted the Radical Liberal with the Social Democrats in Govern-
ment.  Among supporters of the Radical Party 12 per cent preferred the Government to be formed 
('}  Further information on the party system may be found in Erik Damgaard, 'Stability  and Change of  a  Party System:  Denmark in 
Half a  Century', Scandinavian  Political  Studies,  vol.  9,  1974  (forthcoming}. 
41 with the Social Democrats, while the majority preferred the continuation of the then existing Liberal-
Radical,  Liberal-Conservative  Government.  On  the  whole,  though,  Radical  Liberal  voters  were 
significantly  less  enthusiastic  about that Government  than were  Liberal  and  Conservative  voters. 
Representation and the Referendum 
The most common argument for the necessity of a representative assembly, is that direct democracy 
is impossible in today's world. The presumption is that representatives will make decisions in accordance 
with at least the majority view of the electorate.  However, the Danish constitution allows, and in 
some instances requires, that a referendum is held on policy matters. In the last decade four referenda 
took place. We therefore have an opportunity to test the degree of congruence between the policy 
position of members  of Parliament and of voters. 
In 1963, a set of bills, dealing with acquisition and use of land, had been adopted by a majority of 
Parliament (Social Democrats, Radical Liberals, and Socialist People's Party). Though these parties 
represented 56 per cent of the members of Parliament all four bills were defeated by the electorate 
with  a  'no'-vote per  cent ranging from 57 to 61  of the valid votes  (turnout 73  per cent).  Clearly 
then, the Folketing did not in these  cases  represent the majority position within the electorate. A 
similar situation arose in 1969 when a bill proposing a lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 years, 
supported by 61 per cent of the Folketing members present and voting, was defeated at the referendum 
by a 'no'-vote of no less than 78 per cent of the valid votes (turnout 64 per cent). In 1971, the Govern-
ment introduced a  bill granting voting rights to the 20  year olds which passed the Folketing by a 
91  per cent affirmative vote.  At the referendum it was approved by 56 per cent of the valid votes 
cast {turnout 86 per cent). Finally, in 1972, the question of entry into the European Community was 
put to a popular vote (1).The law had been adopted by a 81 per cent majority in the Folketing whereas 
the division of the electorate was  63  per cent in favour of membership with 37 per cent opposing 
(turnout 90 per cent). Thus, in the former two cases Parliament did not represent the majority view 
of the electorate, while it did so in the latter two cases even though electoral support for the issues 
was  not quite as  strong as  parliamentary support. 
To sum up the discussion thus far we must conclude that the Danish Folketing represents the citizens 
as  manifested in their party choice, but, as  we have just seen, not necessarily on all policy issues of 
the day. 
Interest  Groups  and Representation 
There is still another. aspect to political representation. While parliamentary parties represent groups 
of  voters  in  a  general  political-ideological  way,  organised interest groups  represent  categories  of 
citizens  in  more  specific  areas. 
Research on Danish interest groups is still in its infancy, but there is no doubt whatsoever that some 
groups play a very crucial role in Danish politics. Traditionally, workers', farmers', and employers' 
organisations  have  maintained  close  relationships  not  only  with  political  parties  but  also  with 
relevant government departments. They are not merely 'pressure' groups,  but rather fully  accepted 
actors in the policy-making system - from initiation to termination of the process - as far as  the 
interests  of their membership  are  concerned.  Their consent  and  cooperation  are  usually essential 
no  matter which  party is  in office. 
More recently other groups than those mentioned have also  developed strong organisations, such 
as,  e.g.,  public  employees  and white  collar  workers.  In  fact,  almost  any  conceivable  social  and 
( 1)  A  preliminary  analysis  of the  referendum  is  to  be  found  in  Nikolai  Petersen  &  }0rgen  Elklit,  'Denmark  Enters  the  Enropean 
Communities', Scandinavian  Political  Studies, vol.  8,  1973,  pp.  198-213. 
42 economic group is today mobilized in some sort of interest organisation. As a result of this develop-
ment the feeling  is  widespread  that Government  and  Folketing  have  actually  lost  control  of  the 
development  of society,  as  they  are  accused  of  having yielded to constant pressure from efficient 
interest groups concerned only with their own advantage. In the 1971  national survey, respondents 
were  asked whether they  agreed  or disagreed  with the following  question:  "The big trade unions 
and employers' associations have obtained a power which properly belongs to the Folketing." The 
distribution of answers  shows that 48  per cent agreed with the statement,  while only 22  per cent 
disagreed  and 30  per cent  neither  agreed  nor disagreed (
1
). 
Evidence  about the  perceived  influence  of interest  organisations  vis-a-vis  government  institutions 
came even more forcefully from the answers to the questions:  "Whichever parties are in power it 
is  a few  big organisations that determine what will be done." No less  than 74 per cent agreed to 
the statement, while only 13 per cent disagreed and another 13 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed (
2
). 
Though one should never push the interpretation of  such  findings  too far,  no one can deny that 
the results  furnish  information on the power relations within the political system  as  perceived by 
the electorate which is  inconsistent with classical notions of democratic government.  One possible 
implication of these findings  is, that, if measured at the psychological level in contradistinction to 
normative analyses at the level of democratic theory, political representation by parties in Parliament 
and  Government  may very  well  be  less  important than interest  group  representation,  at least  in 
matters  of interest to the organization's  membership. 
IV- PARLIAMENT  AND LAW-MAKING 
The original idea with the establishment of Parliaments was, as indicated above, that representatives 
of the people  should determine the general rules  of the country, i.e.  make the laws.  Today it is 
obvious that few  parliaments, if any,  actually perform this function  although,  of course, they are 
needed  to pass  the laws (3). 
The Danish Folketing  is  no exception to this  general  observation.  About 10 per cent of the bills 
proposed are private member's bills,  but only about 1 per cent of those enacted are proposed by 
private members of Parliament (4). In other words, the Government has acquired a de facto monopoly 
in proposing what is  to be the law  of the land. The Folketing is  not equipped with facilities  and 
resources required for playing an active  and leading role in law-making. The Government, on the 
other hand, has the bureaucracy and other informational and technical services  at its disposal. 
Nonetheless, the infrastructure of Parliament is  still basically reflecting  the idea  that the primary 
function  of Parliament is  to make laws.  In the latest decades,  however,  some procedural changes 
have been introduced, all of which may be interpreted as attempts to redefine the role of Parliament 
in the political process. 
First, whereas rules  allocating time fou  debates on bills were originally non-existent,  a  number of 
amendments to the rules of procedure since the 1930s  have gradually limited the time to be  spent 
on floor  debates.  Secondly,  increasing  work load has  been  put on the committees  of Parliament. 
In the first phase the solution adopted was to set up a steadily growing number of ad hoc committees 
( 1}  In reporting these results I have added the percentages of response categories 1 and 2 as  we11  as 4 and 5 of the original distribution 
":hich is:  1)  completely agree: 25.7, 2)  partly agree: 21.8, 3)  neither agree nor disagree: 30.1, 4)  partly disagree: 10.2, 5) completely 
d1sagree:  12.1. 
{')  As  in note 1.  Original  distribution:  1)  completely agree: 48.5,  2)  partly agree: 25.4, 3)  neither agree  nor disagree: 12.9, 4)  partly 
disagree:  7.6,  5)  completely disagree:  5.5. 
{')  This is  the conclusion that Packenham arrived  at, cf,  Kornberg  &  Musolf,  op.  cit. 
(')  This, and related information, is contained in Erik Damgaard, 'Top Civil  Servants  and Politics in Denmark: The Political Role of 
Non-Political Bureaucrats'  (espc.  Section II  on the development of executive domination)  in Mattei Dogan, ed., The  Political  Role 
of  Top  Civil  Servants,  (Sage  Publications,  1974,  forthcoming). 
43 for each particular bill introduced. But in the 1960s, a number of permanent, specialised committees 
was  gradually set  up,  culminating, in 1972,  with a complete reorganisation by which a  system  of 
about  20  permanent,  specialised  subject-matter  committees  was  created.  This  committee  system 
now constitutes  the nucleus  of  parliamentary law-making  activity. 
These two developments illustrate how Parliament adapted to, and tried to cope with, the changing 
conditions for  participation in the law-making process.  Relatively  speaking,  there is  less  time for 
public debates  of bills and more time is  spent on scrutinizing Government bills in committees. The 
stated objectives of the procedural changes were to achieve greater efficiency in parliamentary work, 
which, to a very high extent, narrowed down to the question of how to handle the great number 
of  bills  proposed  by  the  Government  in a  satisfactory  manner (1). 
Furthermore, a  couple of other innovations were introduced, again reflecting that ancient rules  of 
parliamentary procedure were no longer in tune with the needs perceived. First, from 1947 onwards, 
time was set aside for short questions to ministers. The question hour has since assumed increasing 
popularity among members of the Folketing as the following figures  show: In the 1950s the average 
number of questions per session was 58, in the 1960s it was 204, and since 1970 it has been about 350. 
Secondly,  a new device for initiating general debates on broadly defined policy areas without con-
nection to specific bills was introduced in 1953.  This is  the 'review'  (redeg0relse)  by  a  minister of 
some selected important policy issue or problem area,  which is  then followed  by a general debate 
without possibilities for motions of censure as  during other types of debates (2). In the 1960s there 
were  6 such review-debates  on the average per session. 
Even at a high risk of oversimplification it is tempting to conclude that these various developments, 
which I admit only to have touched upon, tend to confirm the assertion that the Folketing has no 
real  law-making  function.  It might  more  appropriately  be  called  a  •bill-reviewing'  function.  In 
addition, other types  of parliamentary activity seem  to have assumed increasing importance, such 
as the raising of a variety of current problems by means of short questions on any conceivable subject, 
and debates  on important political issues  of the times  - without dealing  with legislation  at the 
same time. 
Though this general characterization is  valid to some  extent, it needs  qualification in at least one 
respect. Thus it does not take into account that the role of the Folketing - or more precisely the 
role of non-Government parties - varies according to the parliamentary basis of the Government. 
It is true that most bills in Denmark are passed unanimously because they involve no, or only little, 
controversy  among  the  parties (3).  But  if  disagreement  exists  it  makes  a  difference  whether  the 
Government has  its  own majority to support  its  proposals or it has to seek the support required 
from other parties. A minority Government, like e.g.  the present Danish Government, is  forced to 
pay attention to  the demands  of parties  in Parliament either  before  proposals  are  introduced or 
during subsequent committee bargaining. 
On the basis of this line of reasoning one might therefore argue that the legislative role of Parliament 
in some situations may approach a real law-making function.  Still, I  would maintain that the term 
•bill-reviewing'  is  more  adequate  than  •law-making'  as  a  general  characterization of the role of 
the Folketing  in legislative  work, even if it must be  granted that the  'review'  in  some  instances 
may  leave  a  distinct  imprint on the final  product. 
].  Blonde! concluded his comparative study of legislatures by stating that law-making and Govern-
ment formation  are  "simply  not the  •functions'  of  legislatures",  adding  that: 
(
1
)  Cf.  'Betaenkning  og  indstilling  om  aendring  af  forretningsorden  for  folketinget  (afgivet  af  udvalget  for  forretningsordenen  den 
31.  august 1972) ', 
(1)  Such as  the interpellation debate, which is  a !so  sometimes used  without the intention of  attacking the Government. 
(')  Documentation available in Mogens  N.  Pedersen,  'Consensus and Conflict in the Danish Folketing',  Scandinavian  Political Studies, 
vol.  2,  1967,  and  Erik  Damgaard,  'Party  Coalition  in Danish  Law-Making  1953-1970',  European  journal  of Political  Research, 
vol.  1,  1973,  pp.  35-66. 
44 The function  of the legislature  is  to provide  a  means  of  ensuring that there  are  channels  of 
communication  between  the people  and the executive,  as  a  result of which it is  possible for 
demands  to be  injected into the decision-making  machinery whenever they  exist and for the 
executive  decisions  to be  checked  if  they raise  difficulties,  problems,  and injustices. (
1
) 
Now, if the previous exposition of the Danish situation is  correct, should we then perhaps endorse 
Blondel's  conclusion ? Aside  from  the  somewhat  suspicious  claim  to have  discovered  the  whole 
truth,  there is  certainly  much  to be  said for  this  'communication-channel'  model  of  Parliament 
in the Danish case as  well. The Folketing is  found not to perform a real law-making function, and 
most  of what was  said  in this  and the previous  section  may  be  interpreted  in communicational 
terms.  Further, other types of legislative activities  might have been mentioned to support the idea 
of Parliament as a communication channel such as, e.g., the 'errand-boy function' that MP's perform 
to the benefit  of  their constituents. 
On the other hand, there are some difficulties  related to this way of looking upon Parliaments. In 
the first  place, does the communication model differ from the traditional notion of representation, 
or is it just a modern way of saying that Parliament represents the people? Secondly, there are other 
channels of communication between the people and the Government  (e.g.  interest groups and the 
mass media) which beg the question of how Parliament differs from these other structures in performing 
a communication function. Finally, Blondel's view of the role of Parliament explicitly excludes what 
in the Danish context must be considered the most important function of Parliament: the formation, 
maintenance,  and control of Government,  to which  I  shall now turn. 
V- PARLIAMENT  AND  THE FORMATION AND  CONTROL OF  GOVERNMENT 
The previous exposition of parliamentary functions in Denmark adds up to the following preliminary 
conclusion: The Folketing represents the citizens in a most general way, but not necessarily on all 
possible policy issues.  Nor is  Parliament the only structure for  political representation: In specific 
areas interest group representation may be a more important and efficient way of exerting influence 
as  seen from the standpoint of individual voters.  Nevertheless, the Folketing represents  the voters 
in terms of their basic political orientations. In this sense it performs a unique representative function 
in the polity. At each election aggregated decisions of individual voters assign a new weight, in terms 
of parliamentary seats, to each party. The Folketing, it was further argued, does not perform a law-
making function, but rather a •bill-reviewing' function, since the Government has obtained prevailing 
influence.  However,  the 'weights' assigned  to parties by the electorate also determine the basis for 
formation  of  Governments. 
The Danish constitution stipulates that no government can remain  in  office  against the  will  of a 
parliamentary  majority.  This  principle  of  cabinet  responsibility  is  the  cornerstone  of  the  whole 
constitutional structure. If two or more parties with a majority in the Folketing agree to form a joint 
coalition government, it will be formed.  If no agreement is  achieved  a  minority Government may 
be appointed if inter-party bargaining has shown that it will not immediately be defeated by a par-
liamentary majority. I cannot review the complex set of parliamentary norms that has  crystallized 
around the formation  of  Governments  in Denmark.  The important point is  that, with respect  to 
the formation of Governments,  and only in this respect,  do we  find  a  truly unique and exclusive 
function of the Folketing in the Danish political system. To this we may add the facts  that cabinet 
members as a rule are recruited from the Folketing and that they keep their seats in that body while 
serving  as  ministers. 
It is  commonplace  to  assert  that  parliaments  have  •declined'  vis-a-vis  the  Government  over  the 
years.  In some respects this is  obviously true. But the import of this allegation is  less  significant in 
(')  J.  Blonde!,  op.  cit.,  p.  135. 
45 a  parliamentary system  like  the Danish  where  Parliament has  the  power to  appoint  and  dismiss 
Governments than in systems where this is not the case. No matter how difficult it is for Parliament 
to control Government policies, it still remains true that all policies must be  based on the support 
of  a parliamentary majority. This is,  after all,  a significant sine  qua non. 
If there is  a problem of political control, and I think there is  such a problem, it is  less  a problem 
of  Folketing-Government relationships than a problem which  more generally involves  the political 
leadership versus the administrative bureaucracy and the interest groups. The constitutional theory 
of  the  Danish system  is  constructed in the following  way:  Universal  suffrage,  free  elections,  and 
proportional  representation  assure  democratic  legitimacy  of  Parliament.  Majority  support  in 
Parliament (or at least absence  of  majority opposition)  confers  legitimacy upon Government.  The 
Government, in turn, on the basis  of its derived legitimacy, is  in charge of a complex bureaucracy 
which assists  in preparing and executing policies.  The administrative system, however, is to a high 
extent  structured  along  the  lines  of  the  major  interests  of  society  (farmers,  workers,  industry, 
education, etc.), to some extent even representing those interests. Therefore, the question that one 
must finally  ask is: How can 12 ministers, or 20 for that matter, without any politically appointed 
assistants  whatsoever,  possibly  make  sure that the development  of society  even  in the  short run 
follows  the course defined  by  stated political objectives? This problem,  however,  is  considered to 
be  outside the scope  of  the present paper. 
In summarizing  we  may  conclude that the Folketing is  influencing policy not  only  by  'reviewing' 
or amending Government proposals, but also,  because of the principle of cabinet responsibility to 
Parliament,  by determining  which  parties  are  to  propose legislation.  In the last analysis  the latter 
way of exerting influence is  presumably the  more important one. 
So far I have analytically separated three functions  of Parliament in an attempt to look at the role 
of the Folketing from different angles. Since the role of the Folketing in the Danish political system 
could  not be  described,  for  the  good  reason  that it does  not exist,  I  had to be  selective  in  my 
presentation. My justification for structuring the paper according to the three functions  was given 
in Section II.  At this point, however, it behoves  me  to emphasize that if one starts out, not from 
such abstract categories  but from 'the real world of politics', one will find that almost any political 
situation or event may be viewed from the perspective of such notions as representation, law-making 
and  control  of  Government  (and  indeed  from  many  other  perspectives).  Law-making  invariably 
involves  representation of interest or ideas  and important pieces  of legislation are inseparably tied 
to  the  question  of  the  very  existence  of  Governments.  The political  structures  that  unite  these 
functions  in the real world are,  of  course,  the political parties. 
Perhaps these  remarks  sound rather platitudinous,  but the fact that all functions  of  a  Parliament 
are inexorably intertwined in complex political processes  has  crucial implications for  the question 
to be  discussed in the concluding section: the consequences  of European Community membership 
for  the functions  of  the Danish Folketing. 
VI  - CONSEQUENCES  OF  EC-MEMBERSHIP  FOR THE FUNCTIONS 
OF  PARLIAMENT 
The  'Danish  Solution' 
It is  obvious  that decision-making in Denmark is  strongly affected  by membership  of the EC,  in 
substantive as well as procedural terms. From the point of view of Parliament the question becomes: 
How is  the Folketing to influence decision-making at the European level which often has  a strong 
and direct impact  on Danish society ? 
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that represents  the Danish citizens.  The European Parliament is  no  alternative - at least not at 
present.  Now,  given  the  political  structure  as  described  in  this  paper,  and  the  nature  of  the 
Community political system,  it follows  that parliamentary influence  can  only be exerted through 
the  Danish  Government.  This leads  us  to  a  very  important point. 
The most significant effect on parliamentary functions has to do with changes in the conditions for 
controlling the Government. The Vedel Report argues that national Parliaments have been weakened 
because  important decisions  are  made  in the  Council  of the  EC,  and since  national Parliaments 
cannot  easily  control  these  decisions,  it  follows  - according  to  the  Vedel  Report  - that  the 
European  Parliament  ought  to  be  strengthened:  "The logic  of  the  democratic  system  seems  to 
demand  a  compensation at the European level  for  this  weakening  of  Parliaments  at the national 
level"  (my  translation from  Danish language  edition,  p.  42). 
This argument is quite a strong one. But it is also possible to use another kind of logic which seems 
just as  persuasive: If as  Denmark's experience with the European Community has  already shown, 
parliamentary control of  Government  by  normal  means  is  difficult  or impossible  with  regard  to 
Danish Ministers in the Council,  one ought to find  new procedures  to remedy the defects  of the 
old ones.  This, in fact,  is  what happened in the Danish case. 
In order to ensure parliamentary control of Danish policy in the EC, the law by  which the country 
decided to join the Community specified that the Government shall:  (1)  report to the Folketing on 
the developments  within the EC,  and  (2)  inform the Folketing market committee about proposed 
Council decisions  which will immediately be applicable in Denmark or to the fulfillment of which 
parliamentary  action  is  required.  No sooner  had  membership  become  a  reality,  however,  before 
the  first  crisis  arose  around  the  parliamentary  control  problem.  The  three  opposition  parties 
(Liberals,  Radical  Liberals,  Conservatives)  accused  the  Social  Democratic  minority  Government 
of having committed Denmark to an unsatisfactory compromise on agricultural commodity prices 
in  defiance  of  its  demands,  stated  in  advance,  which  were  supported  by  the  opposition  parties. 
The three parties therefore asked the Government how it would make sure in the future that it had 
political support before committing Denmark to major decisions in the Council of the EC.  To the 
Government the situation was  critical.  Not only was  the united front of pro-EC parties  seriously 
shaken,  but the Socialist  People's  Party,  which  generally  supported the  Government  on domestic 
policy issues,  was  as  always  sceptical  about any .  Danish commitments  within  the EC.  The party 
agreed that the Government had not behaved properly in this matter, and utilized the crisis situation 
to impose  more  specific  obligations  upon the Government.  Thus the Government  was  forced  to 
accept  that  it  should  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Folketing  to  its  negotiation  position  and,  if 
negotiations in the Council required so, also to present changes in bargaining positions to the market 
committee. (1) 
A  few  months  later  a  more  elaborated  set  of  procedural  rules  atmmg  at the  strengthening  of 
parliamentary  control along  these  lines  were  agreed  upon  by  all  five  parties  then  represented in 
the Folketing. (2) 
This  outcome, I think, must be understood not just as  a product of party-political manoeverings, 
but rather as  evidence for a major point of this paper: that formation and control of Government 
is  a  most important function  of the Danish Parliament.  Any  event that might seem  to jeopardize 
this  bastion of the Folketing will predictably cause  a response to redress the balance. 
(1)  Folketingets  forhandlinger  {Parliamentary  Records}  1972/73, sp.  3269-3366. 
(I)  See  'Beretning  fra  markedsudvalget  {afgivet  den  29.  marts  1973}',  and  the  market  debate  of  16-17  May,  1973  {Folketingets 
forhandlinger),  1972/73,  sp.  6263·6293,  6362·6493. 
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Perhaps  this  conclusion  appears  too  conservative  and  pessimistic  to  those  who  favour  further 
European integration and a  strong European Parliament.  Thinking about the future,  however,  my 
own interpretation would be  a rather different one. Thus I would stress the point that any scheme 
for reforming the EC  system  should deliberately take into  account the role  that Parliaments  play 
in their  national  political  systems.  As  far  as  I  can  see  this  means,  first  and  foremost,  that high 
priority should be given to the question of the relationships between the European Parliament and 
the national Parliaments. To accept the premise that any Government in a parliamentary democracy 
must be responsible to its parliament is  not to preclude that those relationships can be developed 
in such a way that they function to the advantage of the EP  as  well as  to the national Parliaments. 
It is  likely, though, that the strategy for strengthening of the EP  should be  revised according to a 
new approach.  On the other hand a new course might lead faster toward the ultimate goal, which 
is  not just to enlarge the powers of the EP  but, as  I view it, to ensure democratic influence upon, 
control  of,  and support for  decisions  made  within  the framework  of the European  Community. 
Therefore, there is  a role to be  played by the EP  as  well  as  by the national Parliaments. 
48 THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG 
THE GUARDIAN  OF DEMOCRATIC STABILITY? 
Paper  by  Dr.  Uwe  THAYSEN,  Hamburg  University  School  of Social  Sciences 
A review  of  25  years  of  parliamentary government. 
Summary 
Preliminary  Note:  The  following  summary  was  prepared  by  the  services  of  the  European 
Parliament. The lengthy working document contains a number of diagrams and detailed references 
which  have  not been included  in the summary.  The reader  requiring  supplementary information 
is  requested to get  in touch either with the author or with the Directorate  General for  Research 
and Documentation of the European Parliament. 
I - The Concept of the Report 
The role of Parliament must be determined from its 'setting', i.e.: its historical context, its institutional 
background, etc.  Opinions differ widely on the actual importance of the Bundestag in the political 
system of the Federal Republic; these  opinions reflect the many theories concerning the dominant 
institutions  and forces  in this  country. 
The importance  of the  Bundestag  is  to be  determined  by  reference  to the  theories  of  the  State 
dominated by parties, interest groups or administrative structures. It  is therefore necessary to ascertain 
how  parliamentary  power  is  circumscribed  by  the  power  of  the  parties,  interest  groups  and 
administration, and the decision-making forces  not provided for in the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic  (in  'grey  areas'),  which  undermine  the Bundestag's  constitutional political  sovereignty. 
These  questions  will  be  answered  by  examining  how Parliament discharges  its  functions. 
The major problems in this report lie in the review of Parliament's functions.  There are no reliable 
(practicable)  categories  of  measurement  for  assessing  the importance  of  a  Parliament.  Bagehot's 
catalogue  of  parliamentary functions  is  used  below; the question is,  how far  does  the Bundestag 
fulfil the functions of this classic catalogue, which Bagehot gave as follows in order of importance: 
1)  the elective  function, 
2)  the expressive  function, 
3)  the teaching function, 
4)  the informing function, 
5)  the legislative  function. 
What are  the real  effects  of parties, interest groups,  administration and the  'grey  areas'  on  these 
classic  parliamentary  functions  in  the  German  Bundestag? 
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The author reviews the development of the parliamentary system in Germany and points out that 
in contrast to the parliamentary law of the Weimar Republic, that of the Bonn Parliament has been 
based primarily on the British  and American  model: 
Following the British example, question time was extended in 1952 for the benefit of the individual 
deputy  (§  110  GO-BT); on the American pattern, public hearings  (§  73  GO-BT)  were introduced 
in the same year. On the other hand, the agreements reached in 1955 for dealing with supplementary 
questions  (Appendix  4  GO-BT),  the  directives  introduced  in  1960  for  question  time  (Appendix 
2  GO-BT)  and the  discussion  of topical  matters  which  has  been  possible  since  1965  (Appendix 
3 GO-BT) are based on British tradition. Of the innovations made in the 'minor reform of Parliament' 
in 1969,  the extension of the technical and scientific premises of parliamentary work and the rein-
forcement of the powers of the Bundestag committees (including the right of own initiative reporting, 
§ 60  (2)  GO-BT), the introduction of committees of inquiry to prepare decisions on complex matters 
(§  74a GO-BT)  and the efforts to achieve greater transparency in lobbying are based on American 
patterns; the numerous  attempts to animate the Assembly  (§  3 et seq.  GO-BT), and in particular 
the option of holding committee meetings in public  (§  73  (2)  GO-BT are based on the example of 
the British Parliament. 
III - Functions  of the  Bundestag 
It  is  perhaps  superfluous  to  point  out  that  there  is  no  clear  demarcation  between  Bagehot's 
parliamentary functions.  The author has  resisted  the temptation to extend the Bagehot catalogue 
of functions by a further three. With Klaus von Beyme he first wanted to add a 'recruiting function' 
and,  on the  basis  of recent  research  and discussions,  a  'cultivating function'  (in  the  sense  of  a 
sublimation of political culture)  and  a  'ruling function'  (in  which Parliament is  seen primarily as 
a  machinery  for  ruling  and discipline').  Closer  examination  showed  that Bagehot  has  covered 
all these functions, even though he has not given them the importance frequently ascribed to them 
fn the present discussion. In the following, the recruiting function (for political personnel in general) 
is  considered  in  conjunction  with  the  elective  function  (particularly  of  the  government/cabinet), 
ihe  cultivating  function  is  considered  in  conjunction  with  the  teaching  function,  and the  ruling 
tunction in conjunction  with the expressive function. 
1)  The  Elective  Function:  appointment  of the  Government 
In the  basic  law the political system  of the Federal Republic  of  Germany is  clearly  defined  as  a 
parliamentary system of government. Having been appointed by direct election, the Bundestag itself 
becomes the elective body - not only for the Chancellor (Art.  63  of the basic law), who, together 
with his government, can be forced to resign by a vote of no confidence {Art.  67 of the basic law), 
but also for a number of  other organs, bodies and authorities. 
In fact,  the Bundestag has  always  been in a position since  1949  to elect a  government.  The only 
situation in which this power was in danger - the stalemate situation after the failure of the vote 
of no confidence and the loss of the majority by the SPD/FDP Government of the sixth Parliament 
on  28  April  1972  - was  taken  as  an occasion  to bring  about  a  premature  dissolution  of  the 
Bundestag for the purpose of restoring the elective function  to parliament as  soon as  possible  by 
means  of  further  elections.  The fact  that the stalemate still lasted  half a  year  (from  28  April  to 
22  September, the date of rejection of the Chancellor's  motion for a vote of confidence); the fact 
that this period included several weeks of parliamentary recess and that there were a further 8 weeks 
without a parliament during the election campaign  (until the election on 19  November 1972)  and 
almost a further 4 weeks went by before the constituent session of the 7th Bundestag (on 13 December, 
50 1972),  all goes  to show that this  was  a  period of  great weakness for the Bundestag - especially 
since  the constitution of the 7th Bundestag was followed  by the  familiar  '100  days  grace'  of the 
government (which was even extended in 1973). Nevertheless the final  result was a positive one -
the clear  re-establishment  of the elective  function. 
The stability of the elective function of the Bundestag can be explained against the background of 
the many factors in the exceptionally stable development of the West German  party  system. There 
is a clear trend towards a three party system with the two strongest parties having a clear advantage. 
In the Federal Republic the parties actually hold the monopoly for nominating deputies to the Bundes-
tag.  The small proportion  (between  10 %  and 30 %)  of  active  party members  narrows the circle , 
of those actually having an influence to about a quarter of a million electors. The local and regional 
levels of the party organizations jealously guard their right of nomination; the parliamentary groups 
have only a very marginal influence on the list of candidates for the Bundestag. The importance of 
the nominating party bodies can be  clearly seen in the fact that about two-thirds of the electoral 
districts of the Federal Republic are considered 'safe' for  one or another party, so that it is actually 
these  bodies  which  determine future  candidates for the Bundestag. 
In the recruiting of the deputies, therefore, the main power lies with the parties. Does the same not 
also apply to the recruiting of the Federal Chancellor and his government? Is  the Federal Chancellor 
really elected by the Bundestag, as stipulated in the Basic Law, or is it not rather the parties and/or 
electors which decide the issue? The author comes to the conclusion that in the election of the first 
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer,  the Bundestag  actually did take the deciding vote.  The subsequent 
elections of the Federal Chancellor in 1953, 1957 and 1961 were decided in advance by the electors. 
These  elections  were •Chancellor  elections'.  The  transition  from the fifth  Adenauer  Government 
(1962)  to the first Ludwig Erhard Government (1963)  was again effected by the Bundestag, in exactly 
the same way as occurred later (1966)  in the transition from the second Erhard Government (1965) 
to the first  and only Kurt Georg Kiesinger  Government  (1966).  The first  and second Willy Brandt 
Governments  (1969  and 1972)  were  again predetermined to a  greater extent by the result of  the 
election (much more so in 1972 than in 1969). The Adenauer/Erhard and Erhard!Kiesinger changes 
were  made  by  Parliament in  a  procedure which  was  primarily internal to the  CDU/CSU  group. 
In its elective function the Bundestag has successfully passed two critical tests. One was the change-
over of the major groups in government and opposition. In 1969  the SPD  replaced the CDU/CSU 
as  the  dominant  government  party.  The  second  was  the  successful  survival  of  the  period  of 
parliamentary weakness in the stalemate from April to December 1972.  It has sometimes been said 
that the parliamentary stalemate of the summer and autumn of 1972 showed that individual deputies 
were able to decide freely, independently of party, or even change their group, and that the parties 
were powerless against this. The equilibrium situation was  also said to show that the parties were 
helpless  and Parliament powerless. The opposite is  true.  The stalemate situation demonstrated the 
power  of the  parties  and  the  sovereignity  of Parliament. 
The role of the Parliament is similar to that of the parties: at the time of the greatest impasse during 
the stalemate situation the Bundestag demonstrated its full  power with respect to the government. 
In this  Republic  - in great contrast to the Weimar  Republic which failed  42  years  ago -it is 
impossible to govern if Parliament does not wish it or (and this is  important in contrast to Weimar) 
if  Parliament cannot govern i.e.  cannot muster a clear  majority for a government. 
In the process of recruitment of the political elite of the Federal Republic the Bundestag has become 
increasingly important. Party research shows the Bonn Parliament clearly to be a point of selection 
for this political elite. In the first 23  years, just 90 % of the 89 federal ministers had been members 
of the Bundestag at some time before their appointment.  (In  the Weimar Republic just half of the 
cabinet  members  held a  seat in the  Reichstag). 
The ideological  handicap  of the parliamentary system  in Germany - the impact of the dualistic 
view of the state and society and Bismarck's treatment of Parliament and parties -resulting from 
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in contrast to  the  •deputy/minister'  who  is  regarded with suspicion and contempt, seems to have 
disappeared. 
All in all - despite the limitation described  above - the political assessment of the Bundestag's 
fulfilment  of  the elective  function  can be  a favourable  one. 
2)  The Expressive  Function : Does  the  Bundestag  reflect  or distort  the will of the  people ? 
The expressive function is  the expression of the opinion of the people. This function is  not. stated 
in so many words in the Constitution of the Federal Republic, but it can be deduced as an intergral 
constituent of the sovereignty of the people from the democratic principles of the Basic Law.  The 
author proceeds from the assumption that society in the Federal Republic holds a wide variety of 
opinions  and there  is  no  homogeneous,  universal  'volonte  generale'  of  the  type  referred  to  by 
Rousseau which can be determined in advance.  The author is  convinced that those interests which 
cannot be organized or come into conflict are at a great disadvantage in this multiplicity of opinions. 
Initially, however, he puts this conviction in the form of a hypothesis to test it against the subject 
under investigation, the German Bundestag. This requires an investigation of the social composition 
of  the German Bundestag.  How far does  the social  profile  of  the Parliament on the Rhine  differ 
from the structure of the population between the Elbe and the Rhine ? It also requires an analysis 
of the substance of the laws adopted by the Bundestag. In whose interests and in whose favour were 
the laws of the Bundestag adopted? Finally, it is also necessary to examine in what way and to what 
extent the interests of the people are expressed in the assembly of the Bundestag - and elsewhere. 
To  quote  Max  Weber,  we  must  ask:  'How much' and 'what' is done in the German Bundestag? 
I. - One variable in the context of the expressive function is the social composition of the Parliament. 
A significant factor in a comparison of the German Reichstag (1881-1912)  and the German Bundestag 
(1953-1961)  is the drop in the number of farmers and clergymen.  •Since  1945 in Germany the cassock 
and the clerical  collar are clearly no longer in the political  forefront'.  The  fall  in the number of 
civil  servants, which was  mainly attributable to the low representation in the first  Bundestag was 
only temporary. There is a  clear trend  on the other hand towards a rise  in the numbers of trade 
unionists, political officials,  (other)  members  of associations  and the professional occupations,  and 
finally in the number of teachers, of which there is slight evidence in these statistics. In spite of these 
changes in the social profile of the parliaments of the Empire period and the Bonn democracy period, 
there is  a  remarkable  consistency  in the social  composition. 
In the sixth term  (1969-1972)  every  third deputy came from the public service.  This rise  marks  a 
clear over-representation of officials  in the German Bundestag. There is  also  a marked over-repre-
sentation of businessmen. In spite of the clear reduction in the number of farmers referred to above, 
these are  also  still  over-represented,  as  are retailers.  Although the category is  a  dubious  one,  the 
'workers and their officials'  are the  most  under-represented in the Bundestag. 
The heavy over-representation of  civil  servants is  exemplified by the 103  deputies  belonging to the 
Union of Public Service, Transport and Traffic which has the highest representation of any individual 
union, and typically by the fact that this  union is  followed  by the Education and  Science  Union 
with 41  deputies; the members  of the latter are  also  mainly public service  employees. 
The social structure of the Bundestag has  not fundamentally changed to date (the author quotes): 
1)  The Bundestag deputies come from the upper and middle classes, they are almost never recruited 
from  the lower classes ... 
2)  From  the  middle  and  upper  classes  certain  professional  groups  are  also  particularly  strongly 
represented: officials  and employees of the public service,  employees of  associations and parties 
(union  and party staff,  particularly in  the case  of the SPD),  lawyers,  journalists. 
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liament:  specialized  workers,  skilled,  semi-skilled  and  unskilled  workers,  paid  workers  and 
employees  in the services  industry and in  agriculture  and forestry. 
4)  About 25 %  of  the deputies  have  had only the standard state education compared with 82 % 
of the total population (1962 census). There is a disproportionate number of university graduates 
compared with the total population. 
II.  - Representation is  not an abstract quantity but involves representing, presenting and asserting 
interests. Economic freedom and private property were and are constituent elements in its formation. 
The increase in such activities in dealings with the state is  attributable to the increasing intervention 
of the modern state in the economic sector.  The restoration and preservation of the conditions of 
property  ownership  existing  prior to the  constitution  and the  granting  of privileges  to property 
owners during the period  of 'reconstruction' from  the ruins of the war, a period of reconstruction 
of  capitalism which was  only slightly tempered by  social  considerations, were  on the programme 
of the first Bundestags. Reconstruction,  the German 'economic  miracle', was based to a great extent 
on the legislative  guarantee of 
1)  privileges  for  small  and medium-sized  business; 
2)  social integration of the working class by a system of public aid expanding quantitatively rather 
than qualitatively to improve the  welfare  of  the 'masses'; 
3)  a  system of laisser-faire in the administration of  capital and, closely  associated with this; 
4)  a tax policy for concentrating wealth and safeguarding the existence of small and medium-sized 
businesses. 
The factors of economic concentration and the falling rates of growth since 1960 have,  on the one 
hand, increased the concentrated influence of big business. On the other hand, the increasing awareness 
of the •disparity in certain areas of life' i.e. the appearance of deficiencies in areas of the infrastructure 
such as  transport, health, education, housing - has brought in legislation since  1969  for  'internal 
reforms', but for  many reasons this has remained at modest levels.  The considerable achievements 
of the years  1949-1969  in the social sector include the integration of 12 million refugees  by mean; 
of the equalization of burdens scheme - 'an unprecedented, carefully administered social revolution's 
the war victims pension scheme; the introduction of the index-linked pension; co-determination in 
the iron and steel industry; the law governing  workers'  representation; the rules  on the payment 
of children's allowances and training assistance; the above-mentioned quantitative spread of wealth; 
publicly  assisted  housing.  The fact that this  has  been  combined with  strong economic growth is 
certainly no  mean  achievement,  however important the above-mentioned reverse  side  of the coin. 
The other side of the coin is marked not least by the fact that the large number of trade union mem-
bers in the Bundestag does  not exert a corresponding influence  on the legislative process.  Because 
of the diverging interests of the individual trade unions and the precedence which group discipline 
has been able to claim over trade union discipline in cases  of doubt, it is  not possible to speak of a 
'trade union group'  extending  through  all  parties. The fact that as  early as 1949 the leadership of 
the German Trade Union Association gave the parliamentary system precedence over the requirements 
of trade union interests can therefore be considered a decision  of historic importance. 
The review  of  the substance of the legislation therefore largely  confirms  the result  of  the outline 
of the social profile of the Bundestag. It cannot be said that the interests of the population are accurately 
reflected. 
III.  - How are interests looked after in the Bundestag? As  a  rule the government submits bills to 
Parliament in which  the compromises  between  the  civil  service  and interest  groups  have  already 
been  incorporated.  These compromise bills  are submitted to a parliament in  which again at least 
30%  of the deputies  represent  certain  interests.  For Loewenberg's  category  of  professional polit-
icians  (22 %)  it is possible with Hennis to proceed from the following  observation:  "With such a 
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no further use for mere group representatives at the higher levels. The party comes before the group." 
It is,  however,  exceptionally difficult  for  the leadership  of the groups to help  the party argument 
to prevail. In the assembly  itself the group establishment again holds the floor,  not least in  order 
to protect the compromises  which  have  been  reached  against  competing  claims  as  effectively  as 
possible. It is  an important difference from British and American practice that below the assembly 
level, on the other hand, members of the departmental administration not only have right of access, 
a right to speak and therefore a right to take part, but that the lobbyists themselves can even make 
approaches to the committees. It is very difficult to determine whether and to what extent this form 
of division of work secures achievement of the common good (in the sense used by Ernst Fraenkel), 
or is used as an instrument of an appeasement strategy to secure the loyalty of the masses who have 
been  'short-changed'. 
IV. - In any case the social ambivalence of the parliamentary system of the Federal Republic - on 
the one hand an instrument of sovereignty in the possession or at the disposal  of  a  minority and 
on the other hand an emancipation factor- cannot be denied. The verdict of the New Left is contained 
succinctly in the following  statement by Johannes Agnoli:  "The principle of representation - the 
core of the parliamentary system - was  conceived,  intended and implemented as  a constitutional 
standard with a  precise repressive function  which was, from  the very  beginning,  in the nature of 
an appeasement. It was intended to keep  the majority of the population away from the centres of 
power of the State, peacefully but effectively". It is exceptionally difficult to assess how the German 
Bundestag takes care of the expressive function.  There is  no 'prevailing opinion' of political science. 
On the  basis  of various premises  the  authors  arrive  at opposing views.  Those who  believe,  with 
Bagehot,  that there must be  government and that 'dominance as  such'  is  not  to  be  condemned, 
those who again believe  with Bagehot that a parliament fulfills  its expressive function  as  long as 
it prevents  social  civil  war in the country,  can  arrive  at a  predominantly favourable  conclusion. 
From this  point of view the German Bundestag, in contrast to the Reichstag of the Kaiser  period 
and the Weimar Republic, has fulfilled it's task- not perhaps despite, but precisely because of the 
powerful forces  of society which were represented in it.  On the other hand, those who dispute the 
need for dominance in principle and believe in a Rousseau-like concept of democracy, or that any 
agreement between parliamentary expression and the will of the majority is  due to a manipulated, 
objectively false  'awareness of the situation'  (Frank  Deppe)  on the part of the majority, will have 
a predominantly or wholly  unfavourable view  of the expressive  function. 
3)  The Teaching  Function: Does  the  Bundestag  activate  or delay  policy? 
The author agrees with Bagehot that the elective and expressive functions are the two most important 
parliamentary  functions.  For  Walter  Bagehot  the  teaching  function  of  Parliament  consisted  in 
instructing the Sovereign, and today the people, as to how the respective society could be improved. 
Bagehot made the following  assumption:  "A great and open council  of  considerable men  cannot 
be in the middle of a society without altering the society ... ". In this view therefore, Parliament ought 
to take the initiative:  " ...  It ought to alter it for  the better." 
Bagehot's comparatively strong emphasis on the teaching function can be explained in the author's 
view  by  the historical  context.  In  Bagehot's  time  Parliament - as  a  symbolic  institution for  the 
citizens' claim to participation - was still clearly indebted to the enlightening impetus and stimulus 
of civil revolutionary movements:  it was to be  the pacemaker of  'political'  development  (but  not 
encroach upon the autonomy of  social  economic development). 
The author discusses the more recent view of the teaching function and limits himself to some more 
general comments about this function, to references to the division of roles in this connection between 
Parliament and the government and - under the  heading  'Parliament and the Public'  - to certain 
remarks about the form in which the teaching function is  practised by the German Bundestag. 
I. - In the dualistic constitutional system of the Kaiser period the Parliament enjoyed a clear position 
of superiority and initiative was necessary if it was to be opposed. It is very much more difficult for 
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the smallest circles of leadership of the respective majority group(s). To take the initiative against 
them would mean taking the initiative against  oneself.  The teaching function  has  passed over to 
the opposition, but the latter does  not have  the majority of the population behind it - like the 
majority in the Kaiser period which provided even greater opposition to the government and admin-
istration. In Parliament the deputy of the majority group has become a government man, no longer 
primarily available to the elector  as  an advocate against the government.  The social divisions  are 
no longer so clear either. The compartmentalized society of former times no longer exists. 
II.  - Like  all parliaments in parliamentary systems  of government the Bundestag is  not so  much 
an initiator as a sounding board for what the people expect from the government. The West Germans' 
'misconception'  of  the  structures  of their  democracy,  which Wilhelm Hennis rightly emphasizes, 
is therefore due to the fact that the view of Parliament held by citizens and deputies, together with 
certain constitutional lawyers, is  still largely based on the dualistic (constitutional and presidential) 
model  of the pure division  of powers  between Parliament and government and thus the teaching 
function is  assigned  in the political system to Parliament. In fact this is  not so. 
The periods for which and within which decisions have to be made are becoming increasingly long. 
The administration  is  in a  much  better position  than Parliament for  obtaining claritv  as  to the 
premises for its  decisions.  The primary problem for the Bundestag today is  simply the question of 
its participation in the preparation of premises for  decisions  by the administration and no longer 
primarily the question of working out and formulating these premises itself. In this sense Parliament 
is much more representative than is  assumed as  a rule: like the majority of the citizens, Parliament 
'only plays a reactive part in the political process,  marking the  boundaries'.  As  Ralf  Dahrendorf 
aissumed, it can in fact be shown that 'parliaments are only capable of taking the initiative to a very 
limited extent'. 
III.  - The relation between the Bundestag and the public has been characterized on the one hand 
by  phrases  such  as  'Journalistocracy',  •Democracy  by  television',  or  •Democracy  by  interview'. 
On the other hand references were made at a very early stage to 'Parliament  in  secret'  and to the 
fact that in Bonn nothing remained secret except matters dealt with in the assembly of the German 
Bundestag. 
There is  no point nowadays in deploring the advantage which the mass  media have achieved over 
Parliaments  in providing  and obtaining  information.  The situation  cannot  be  reversed,  however 
complicated the schemes.  There is  also a positive side however in being  kept 'up to  date'  by the 
press about the Parliament. This probably also  applies to all other countries. In addition there are 
certain specific reasons in Bonn for the transfer of political discussion out of the assembly. In particular, 
the Federal Republic coalition groups constantly need to commit themselves  by public statements 
to a certain course, which they can then defend in Parliament as  far as  possible without challenge 
as  a joint course. Like the situation in the present opposition group: the CDU and CSU  and CDU-
Social Committees on the one hand and the Economic Council of the CDU e.V.  on the other, also 
put pressure on one another in public to reach  agreement. 
From the point of view of information theory the Bundestag, to quote Julien Feidy, extends, receives 
or recirculates  rather than innovates. 
A summary of the scientific discussion on the teaching function provides approximately the following 
picture: (ad 1)  Parliament is  'only capable  of initiative to a very limited extent' (about 10 to 20 %) 
(Dahrendorf).  (ad 2)  It leaves  this largely  (correspondingly 80 %) to the government and the civil 
service  and the large (and small)  business  associations.  (ad 3)  Compared with the basic concept of 
the teaching function, the degree of secrecy in the Bundestag has exceeded the tolerance limit (60 %  ). 
The agenda for parliamentary reform therefore includes the introduction of public committee meetings, 
as  demanded recently on excellent empirical or constitutional grounds by Heinrich Oberreuter and 
Heinhard Steiger. 
55 4)  The legislative  function : ioint government  by parliament  in  the  committees  of the  Bundestag 
Bagehot only lists the legislative function in fifth place. In the context of the remarks on the teaching 
function there was a great deal to be said for the informing function taking precedence as  it does 
over the legislative function.  On the other hand, the specifically German concept of parliamentary 
control cannot be implemented without a prior presentation of the legislative function and legislative 
practice of  the  German Bundestag. 
The legislative authority of the German Bundestag is  expressly guaranteed (Article 76 of the Basic 
Law), the issue of ordinances having the force of law by the government is subject to authorization 
by laws adopted by the Bundestag in which  the  'content, purpose, and scope of the authorization 
so conferred'  must be set forth (Article 80 of the Basic Law). These provisions, the re-establishment 
of a constitutional state, the securing of the means  of existence and  'reconstruction'  in  and from 
a country left in ruins in every respect by national socialism and the restitution and appeals which 
were  made necessary  by allied law explain the number of laws  with which the Bundestag had to 
cope,  particularly during the first  periods  of  legislation.  In addition there is  the constant growth 
of federal power at the expense of the federal constituent states shown by at least 20 out of a total 
of 31 amendments to the basic law by the end of 1972. Attention should also be drawn to the particular 
character of the development of  budgetary law in Germany.  The budgetary authority of the par-
liament was originally directed against the extravagance of the monarchs. Today it is the extravagance 
of the parliament, particularly in election years,  which is  a vital problem which England  and :the 
dominions hoped to overcome by withdrawing from the parliament the right of initiative for laws 
involving expenditure. Despite this British practice, as  a result of painful experience in the Weimar 
Republic the German Bundestag retained the right - as  a reaction to the removal of power from 
the parliament by national socialism - to prevent bills from the centre of the house having financial 
effect. 
The author then discusses: 
1)  problems of the practice of  'joint government by  Parliament'  which is  also specifically German; 
2)  problems  arising  for  the  legislator from  increasing  state  planning  and; 
3)  the removal of political decisions  to 'grey areas'  which remove  the seal of democracy from the 
political decisions  taken there. 
I. - The substantial amount of legislation issued by the German Bundestag is illustrated by tables. 
The  figures  confirm  the  findings  about  the  teaching  function:  almost  exactly  three-fifths  of  all 
proposals came from the government, something less  than two-fifths from  the Bundestag,  and the 
rest from the Bundesrat, the second German chamber. As  is  so  often the case,  however, the figures 
alone do not show the whole truth, since in the case  of a bill stemming from the majority of the 
house there is  no indication whether and to what extent it has  actually been prepared by the civil 
service.  This can be  assumed  in many cases.  Most proposals 'from the  middle  of  the  house'  of 
course  originate from the opposition and it is  equally obvious that they are regularly rejected  (or 
usurped !)  by the majority of the government coalition. This explains why, of the laws introduced 
by  the  parliament,  only  slightly  more  than one-quarter  have  been  adopted.  Compared  with  the 
provisions of the converse British parliamentary law, the number of independent motions by deputies 
which do not contain any bill - but do involve massive  financial  effects  under paragraph 96  (4}, 
is  rather high  (2188  !). The esteem in which its legislative initiative is  held and the value which the 
government places on its actually dominant role in the legislative process can be clearly seen from  . 
a  number  of  provisions  in  its  rules  of  procedure.  The strong  position  of the  government  in the  I 
legislative  process  is  expressed in a  form  which  not infrequently  offends  the legislative  authority 
of the Bundestag,  namely the large number of  departmental officials  which the government  sends 
to  meetings  of  the committees  of the Bundestag.  This  again  is  not comparable  with British  and 
American  parliamentary practice. 
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recent-show, for example for the Federal Association of German Industry, that 83 % of its opinions 
on draft bills were directed to the government and only 7 % to the Bundestag. Only when they are 
unsuccessful there, according to one of the most informative and frank deputies, when big business 
•has  been unable to push through its demands satisfactorily at the executive level',  does  .it  turn  to 
the Bundestag,  sometimes  even  at the instigation of  the civil  service. 
II.  - In substance the law of the modern intervention state is  'the  answer  (to  rapidly changing) 
situations,  measures,  plans,  and  instructions  for  the  administration'.  'Political  planning',  'state 
planning'  define  the latest development  trends.  Political planning seems  to  be  'the new form  of 
policy'.  The  plan, however, is  not covered by the traditional legal formulae:  'It is  neither admin-
istration nor legislation, it is  not a norm in the sense that the realization of an abstract set of cir-
cumstances  produces  certain legal  consequences;  it is  not intervention  in the  sense  of  a  definite 
change in the legal position of the individual. Nevertheless the plan •has a much more decisive effect 
on individual freedom  than intervention  as  covered  by  the principles  of  the constitutional state. 
While intervention affects freedom or property only here and there in the form of a definite act, the 
plan determines the limits and conditions of the possibility of individual freedom'. Particular emphasis 
is  placed on those problems of planning in which the other Member States of the European Com-
munity in particular can be assumed to have an interest because the Federal Republic of Germany 
is  the only country of the Community with a federal  state structure. The example of the Federal 
Republic can show how much the necessities of political planning lead to the centralization of decision-
making powers.  We  have  already mentioned the 20  amendments to the constitution out of a total 
of 31  which primarily transferred powers to the Bund at the expense of the constituent states. The 
trend, which is  shown in areas such as  'protection of the environment'  and  the provision  of infra-
structures as a whole, will increase. Other losses of autonomy at lower levels caused by the extension 
of state planning can be seen in the cooperation of the constituent states with one another and the 
cooperation  between  the  Bund  and  the  constituent  states  at conferences  of prime  ministers  and 
ministers, in which agreements and treaties are prepared and made  'ready  for  ratification'  for the 
parliament with parliaments  largely excluded. 
This all happens at the level  of the executive, so that the term  'government federalism'  has  been 
rightly applied to this form of removal of power from 11 constituent state parliaments. The Budgetary 
rights of the state parliaments are undermined by the 'dictation by supply'  (Seeger)  utilized  by  the 
central state: the Bund controls more than 75% of the revenue from the Bund and the constituent 
states and it can make the award of money to the individual states dependent on conditions  which 
the latter can only reject at the cost of total loss  of all payment. 
III. - Finally, increased intervention by the state leads to the transposition of a number of decisions 
from the traditional structures of parliamentary policy-making to bodies which are not democratically 
authorized or only inadequately so. Expressions such as  the Kressbronn circle, the Economic Policy 
Council, the Economic and Social Council, Fiscal Planning Council, planning committees for com-
munity tasks, conferences of ministers or prime ministers and concerted action indicate a constant, 
apparently incessant loss of authority by the political administrative system, especially its parliamentary 
component. The central institutions for reaching agreement, our parliaments, are weakened by such 
processes to precisely the same degree that they need to operate perfectly. The constantly increasing 
pressure of the problems with which we are faced makes it more necessary than ever to have open, 
i.e.  public ways  and means  of  achieving  effective  but peaceful  and social compromises. 
For the European colleague of  a  German member  of the European assembly it may be useful to 
recognize precisely those problems facing  a  German deputy,  as  distinct from his  European Com-
munity  colleagues,  when  the  democratic  lawfulness  of  European  Community  decisions  is  under 
discussion.  The problems  arise  to  a  great  extent  from  Article  235  of  the EEC  Treaty.  For the 
federalistic  structure of the Federal Republic this  means:  the Bund  (Central  state)  can also  make 
use of those sovereign rights of the constituent states (individual states)  which, under Article 79  (3) 
of  the Basic  Law,  cannot be  encroached  upon even  with a  qualified  majority  because  they form 
57 part of the indispensable substance of the federalistic individuality of the constituent states. European 
Community law is  therefore intervening in internal German constitutional law. There could be no 
objection  to this  - apart from  the  regulation  in Article  79  (3)  - if the  authority  of  European 
Community  decisions  were  at least  adequately  democratically  established.  This  is  not the  case, 
however,  since  the law of the European  Community is  not laid  down by  a  parliament but by  a 
Council of Ministers which, not being elected,  cannot be controlled by an assembly which is  only 
advisory  and has no power of legislation  and budgetary power, because  it cannot be  suspended. 
'Grey  areas'  of  acts  of sovereignty  without adequate,  democratic  authorization have  also  arisen 
in this  sense in the European Community's decisions. 
For the other European Community members it may be useful to note the following chain of develop-
ment of the loss of legal  authority in West German policy: the numerous transfers of power from 
the individual states of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Bund has clearly strengthened those 
land governments which cooperate with the federal executive. They have clearly lowered the status 
of  the  Land  parliaments;  but the Federal  Parliament  in Bonn  has  not been  given  any  adequate 
means  of influence to match the increase in the powers  of the Bund. If  power is  to be transferred 
in  the  same  way to the  Council  of  Ministers,  while  retaining  the  existing  European  Community 
decision  machinery,  we  would  then  inevitably  arrive  at the  'Europe  of  the  Technocrats'  which 
the  European democrats  cannot want. 
All  in  all  a  review  of the  legislative  function  of the  Bundestag  shows  that the government's pre-
eminence in the actual process of legislative policy-making is indisputable but that - in comparison 
with  Great  Britain  - there  is  a  large  measure  of  'joint  government'  by  parliament;  and  that 
planning  as  'the  new  form  of  policy'  has  not yet  been  given  adequate parliamentary authority 
and that the transfer of policy-making processes into 'grey areas' of  decision-making is contributing 
to the  loss  of  legal  authority not least in the  course  of  European integration. 
5)  The informing  function:  Is  the Bundestag a  corrupt guardian ? 
The informing  function  of  parliaments  is  shown  by  the  following  list  of rights  of the  German 
Bundestag. 
1)  Vote  of no  confidence. 
2)  Guarantees  of  free  mandate: 
- such  as:  Indemnity, 
- such  as:  Right  to  speak, 
- such  as:  Right to change  group. 
3)  Public  proceedings  of the Bundestag: 
- right  of  every  member  of  the  Bundestag  to  summon  a  federal  minister, 
- major questions,  minor  questions, 
- oral  questions  at question-time, 
- supplementary questions. 
4)  Budget: 
- budgetary and financial  control. 
5)  Joint government  by parliament and the Bundestag  Committee in legislation: 
- bill, 
- motions, 
- provision  of  information  by  the  government  and  the  implementation  of  parliament's 
resolutions. 
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7)  Petitions  Committee. 
8)  Defence  Commissioner. 
9)  Committees  of investigation. 
10)  Impeachment. 
1)  A  brief  survey  shows  that the  control  of  the  government  by  parliamentary  appointment  or 
dismissal  emphasises  the  considerable  stability  of  the  governments  of  the  Federal  Republic. 
The only vote of no confidence hitherto  (against Federal Chancellor Brandt on 27 April 1972) 
only just failed.  Only once was a  Chancellor  (Willy  Brandt on 20  September 1972)  forced to 
a vote of confidence on which he  obviously wanted a negative decision in order to obtain the 
right to dissolve parliament and thus find  a way out of the stormy situation in the summer of 
1972 described earlier. There has only been one motion of disapproval against a Federal Chancellor 
(Ludwig  Erhard)  which  was  rejected  by  a  majority.  Five  Federal  Ministers  have  successfully 
survived such a motion of disapproval, and in no case were they  abandoned by  'their'  majority 
in the house. On the other hand, three out of five  motions for the dismissal of a Federal Minister 
were passed by a majority in the house. Such sparing use of the most severe form of punishment 
in parliamentary systems of government bears witness to the solidity of parliamentary practice. 
2)  Deputies  of  the  majority  groups  - particularly  in  the  case  of  a  narrow  majority  for  the 
government coalition - can sanction the government very effectively,  after exerting their right 
to speak in the assembly, by changing to another group. The free  mandate, with its guarantee 
of a  change of group  membership,  has  proved to be  a  legally  guaranteed,  effective  means  of 
control which can be  used in anticipation,  ad hoc and ex-post. 
3)  The public proceedings  of the Bundestag suffer from the fact that, compared with the British 
Parliament,  the Bundestag  meets  much  less  frequently  and, therefore,  escapes  current ad hoc 
control in the mass media perhaps more than would be possible in the case of a large number 
of  sittings.  The complaint is  often  made that it is  rare for  anything  new to be  said in the 
Bundestag. The lack of a suitable chamber has  done a great deal to make it difficult to achieve 
a style of dialogue and controversy in the discussions between the Government and the Opposition. 
There is  too much declamation and lecturing. The reforms of order of speaking, speaking time 
and mode of speech in 1969 did not result in any decisive change. Political careers are certainly 
still  built  in  the  assembly  of  the  Bundestag,  but  there  is  a  lack  of  the  continuous  public 
controversy  in  which  day  to  day  parliamentary  control  is  effected.  The  restriction  of  the 
opportunity  to  speak  to  a  few  individuals,  as  a  result  of  the  hierarchical  structure  in  the 
groups,  has  contributed considerably to this  situation. 
The 'major questions'  have developed  primarily into an instrument for provoking wide-ranging 
public  discussion  and the  associated  control  of  direction.  Minor  questions  are  not designed 
to  obtain  information  but  to  provide  it,  the  purpose  being  to  provide  information  which 
directs,  corrects  and very  often  hastens  progress.  Information  on subjects  and  achievements 
takes  pride  of  place.  At  Question  Time  the  individual  deputy  can  put  oral  questions.  The 
number  of  oral questions  is  rising  constantly. 
4)  However,  much  (bureaucratic)  diligence  is  ascribed  to the  Bundestag,  even  in general  for  its 
committee  work,  most  of  the  studies  on the  exercise  of  its  budgetary  authority  come  to  a 
critical conclusion. In general it is  shown that parliament's influence on the preparation of the 
federal  budget is  diminishing. 
5)  Joint parliamentary government in the committees has already been described. Here, in connection 
with information, we find  that this joint government is  a two-edged matter: opposition which 
collaborates  in  the  'improvement'  of a  law - and in non-public sittings - becomes  jointly 
responsible  for  all  the  deficiencies  of the  law. 
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long-term planning and the allocation of  authority which is  limited in  time  by  elections  will 
continue  to  increase.  In the Federal  Defence  Ministry plans  had already  been  made  in  1969 
for the period  up  to 1985  and thus  decisions  had partly  been  taken in advance.  There  will, 
however, be at least 4 elections before then and at least potentially one or more party political 
changes  in the government. 
6)  The  development  from  merely  'reactive  opposition'  to  individual  evils  which  have  already 
occurred,  into the  comprehensive  'active  control  of  future  development'  has  led  to the use 
of comprehensive scientific  advice  on policy. This advice has been concentrated on the side of 
the executive.  The Bundestag has only been able to cover the most  essential  backlog  require-
ments by the extension of its scientific services.  The possibility, which  has  existed  since 1969, 
of establishing committees of enquiry, is in our view a potentially extremely powerful instrument. 
7-8) In contrast to the question of petitions, the Defence Commissioner is finding increasing approval. 
The number of the submissions to the Defence Commissioner is constantly rising and the figures 
for  favourable  decisions  show  a  positive  trend. 
9)  The effectiveness of the Committees of Investigation is far removed from the original intentions 
of the right of  enquiry. 
10)  There has not been an instance of impeachment in the Federal Republic. 
It is difficult to give a scientific assessment of the extent of the control exercised by Parliament over 
the government. Parliamentary control cannot be  quantified, in fact one could say that in the par-
liamentary system of government the majority at least are keen on allowing control to be completely 
non-measureable,  so  that  its  non-measurability  could  be  considered  as  an  essential  feature  of 
parliamentary systems of government. Anyone who expects parliamentary control to provide ad hoc, 
visible,  short-term  coercive  measures  has  by  definition  an unrealistic  view  of  the  parliamentary 
system of government of the Federal Republic.  Control by parliament does  not in fact take place 
in this way  or only to a  diminishing extent.  On the other hand, those who take account  of the 
many-sided  nature of control indicated in this  paper will  come  to a  different  conclusion. 
60 THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT 
Paper by  Professor Pierre  AVRIL,  University  of Poitiers, 
and M. Julien FEYDY,  Parliamentary  Study Centre,  University  of Paris 
A - General  observations  on the French political system 
Before considering Parliament itself,  some information must be  given  about the foundations  of the 
present system. 
1)  Primacy of the President of the Republic. The executive power is essentially presidential, although 
the 1958  Constitution established a parliamentary-type system  (distinction between the head of the 
government  and the  head  of  state,  answerable  to  parliament).  The election  of the  President  by 
direct  universal  suffrage,  instituted in 1962,  is  one of  the elements  of this  primacy. 
2)  Parliamentary majority. Since the October 1962 dissolution there has been a majority in the National 
Assembly  based  on an electoral  regrouping  defined  essentially  by  its  loyalty to the President  (the 
group fought the elections of 4 and 11 March 1973 under the name 'Union of Progressive Republicans 
Supporting the President  of the Republic'). 
Since  he  effectively  has  the right  of  dissolution,  the President  controls  the fate  of this  majority. 
3)  Ambivalence  of the  system: the  institutions  of  the Fifth  Republic  combine  two principles: 
- presidential  government,  implying  the independence  of  the President  (not  accountable  to Par-
liament)  and the  separation of  powers; 
- parliamentary  government  implying  a  disciplined  majority  loyal  to  the  government  which 
leads  it. 
These  two  principles  both  operate  to  the  advantage  of  the  presidential  government  which  can 
alternate the executive/legislative function, to ensure its independence, with the majority/opposition 
mechanism, to assert its  parliamentary leadership. 
B1  - Parliament and the executive 
The Constitution of 4  October 1958  was  based on a reaction against the abuses  of parliamentary 
sovereignty.  While  in theory  maintaining  a  parliamentary  svstem,  it severely  limited  the powers 
of  the national representatives  over the  executive. 
a)  Powers  of appointment 
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister and, on his proposal, the other members 
of the government (Article 8).  Parliament therefore has no say in the formation of the government, 
which  depends  on the Head of  State. 
b)  Responsibility  of ministers  to Parliament 
1)  The government is responsible to Parliament, but this responsibility can only be put into effect in 
the National Assembly and only according to the procedure laid down in Article 49, which provides 
for the following  three  possibilities: 
61 - pledge  by the government  of its  responsibility with regard to its  programme or a  declaration 
of general policy (Article 49,  1).  Theoretically this provision requires a vote to be taken on the 
programme after the government has been formed.  This procedure was  in fact followed  until 
1962  but has  since  been interpreted  as  being  optional. 
The government therefore has no need to ensure that it has the approval of the majority as  long 
as there is no majority censure. It may find it advisable to ask for a vote on a declaration of general 
policy,  either after its  formation  (Mr Pompidou, 13  December 1962,  Mr Messmer,  10  April 1973) 
or during its term of office  (Mr Chaban-Delmas, 16 September 1969, 15  October 1970 and 23  May 
1972). 
- a motion of censure  carried by  a majority: only the supporters of the censure take part in the 
vote (Article 49, 2); twelve such motions were tabled against the government between 1959  and 
October 1972. 
- a  'question  of  confidence'  raised on the adoption of a  bill according to a procedure which is 
a  combination of paragraphs 1 and 2 of  Article 49  (see  below B2-3).  Eight motions of censure 
have  been  tabled  under  these  circumstances. 
2)  The Constitution lays down that the Prime Minister must hand in his resignation after a motion 
of censure has been carried  (or  approval of his  programme or if a  declaration has been refused). 
This has  happened only once,  on 5  October 1962,  but the President  dissolved  the Assembly  and 
did not accept the Prime Minister's resignation until after the new elections when he reappointed him. 
Although this is  not laid down by the Constitution, the government is  primarily responsible to the 
President  of  the  Republic  through  a  sort  of  constitutional  custom.  The  replacement  of  Prime 
Ministers  has  been  decided  by  the President  alone:  twice  during  a  term  of  office  (Mr  Debre in 
April1962 and Mr Chaban-Delmas in July 1972), once after the parliamentary elections (Mr Pompidou 
in  July 1968)  and once  after  a  presidential election  (Mr Couve  de  Murville in  June 1969). 
3)  Outside the three possible situations laid down in Article 49, there is  no machinery which would 
bring  the  government's  responsibility  to  Parliament  into  effect  except  through  information: 
declaration without a  vote,  written or oral questions  with or without debate,  but never  followed 
by  a  vote.  The Assemblies  cannot pass  resolutions  on policy. 
c)  Compatibility  between the  parliamentary  mandate and ministerial  office 
Article  23  of  the  Constitution  lays  down  that  these  are  incompatible.  Members  of  Parliament 
appointed to the  government  must  resign  within  one  month; they  are  replaced  by  'substitutes' 
who must be put forward with each candidate at an election and who occupy the seats which fall 
vacant  through  promotion  to  ministerial  office  or  death  of  the  incumbent  until  the  end  of 
Parliament's current term of  office. 
In  fact,  almost  all  the  members  of  the  government  are  chosen  from  among  the  deputies  (very 
rarely from  among the  senators).  See  paragraph Dl. 
It should  be  added  that the incompatibility does  not apply to locally  elected  offices. 
B2  - Legislative  role of Parliament 
Both  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Members  of  Parliament  have  the  right  to  initiate  legislation 
(Article  39).  The number  of  laws  of  parliamentary  origin  (private  members'  bills)  is,  however, 
small  in  comparison  with  government  bills  as  is  the  case  in most European  countries. 
Of a total of 1,299 laws passed during the first four parliaments (1958-1973), 1,129 were government 
bills  and 170  private  members'  bills. 
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1)  Laws  are passed by Parliament  (Article  34},  but the Constitution limits their domain by listing 
the matters which must be settled in a legislative form.  Everything else falls within the competence 
of the government's  statutory power. 
Theoretically, therefore, Parliament cannot pass  any laws  which fall  outside this domain, and the 
government  has  the right to challenge  a  private member's  bill or an amendment as  being within 
its  own competence,  (Article  41)  and to refer  it  to the  Constitutional Council.  However on rare 
occasions  it does  not oppose such inadmissible  measures. 
2)  Parliament may authorize the government to take, through orders,  measures  that are normally 
within the domain of the law (Article 38). Such authorization must have a limited aim and duration; 
a  bill  for  the ratification  of orders  which come  into force  immediately  must  be  tabled  within  a 
period of time fixed  by the  enabling act,  otherwise they become null and void. 
The formal tabling of a ratifying bill is  sufficient to keep orders in force even if they are not ratified 
(as  is  generally the case).  An  unratified  ordinance can now be  amended  only  by  a  law but does 
not itself have force  of law: it retains the character of an administrative act and can therefore be 
challenged in the  administrative  courts. 
Since  1958  there  have  been  eight  enabling  acts  under  Article  38,  four  of  them  concerning  the 
implementation of  EEC  directives. 
3)  The pledge  of responsibility  by  the government can, however,  be  combined with the legislative 
procedure under Article 49, 3: if the government asks for a vote of confidence on a draft, the latter 
is  'considered  adopted'  unless  a  motion of  censure  has  been  tabled  and carried by  an absolute 
majority. A law can therefore be promulgated without having been positively approved by Parliament. 
This procedure which has been used for  four  bills,  has led to ten pledges  of  responsibility by the 
government  (twice  on three  readings)  and to the tabling  of  eight  motions  of  censure. 
4)  Parliament can  be  deprived of its  legislative powers without its  consent in  two situations: 
- when the President of the Republic decides  to put a  government or private member's  bill to a 
referendum,  as  provided for  in Article  11.  This has  been used  five  times. 
- when the President of the Republic decides  to invoke Article  16,  which gives  him the right in 
a serious crisis to take all the measures required by the circumstances in question. Article 16 has 
only  been  used once,  in  1961. 
b)  Role  of committees 
1)  All  government and private members'  bills  are  referred for  examination: 
- either to a special committee set up to examine a particular draft, by request of the government 
or by decision of the Assembly.  This procedure was introduced in 1958  and is  relatively rarely 
used  - up to December  1972  it had only been  employed 38  times  in the National Assembly 
and 17 times in the Senate. The standing committees are opposed to a formula which encroaches 
on their responsibilities  and the government  is  afraid  of the risks  involved. 
- or to one of the six standing committees of each Assembly (Article 43)  whose terms of reference 
cover the following  broad sectors:  cultural, family  and social  affairs;  foreign  affairs;  national 
defence; finance; laws; production and trade (in the National Assembly). Their limited number, 
which  is  intended  to prevent  excessive  specialization  and  encroachment  on the  Civil  Service, 
means that they are very large  (60  to 120 members).  Some committees therefore set up smaller 
working  parties,  but these  have  no  official  existence  or powers.  In  practice,  the  absenteeism 
of  committee  members  helps  to offset  the  disadvantage  of  their  numbers. 
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few  years also from public figures  or bodies concerned}, and then comes to a decision on the basis 
of  a  report by  one  of its  members.  The committees  do  not work in  public. 
In the  case  of  government  bills the committee can only propose amendments  in its report to the 
Assembly which has before it the original text (Article 42,4). On the other hand, it can amend private 
members'  bills  which  are  then passed on to the  Assembly. 
c)  Right of amendment and adoption of laws 
1)  Both Members  of Parliament and the government have the right of  amendment (Article 44,  1), 
but for Members  of  Parliament it is  limited: 
- by the restrictions  stemming from  the  definition  of the domain of law (see  a/1  above) ; 
- by  a  general  restriction  which  excludes  any  proposal  resulting  either  in  lowering  revenue  or 
raising  expenditure  (Article  40); 
- by the government's request for a single ballot on all or part of the draft under discussion, which 
· enables it to dismiss  an amendment or to link the  adoption of  one  article  with that of  other 
provisions of the text (Article 44,  3).  This  'package  vote'  which was very frequently used until 
1968-69, was requested 121  times in the Assembly and 137 times in the Senate between 1958  and 
December 1972. 
2)  Despite these restrictions, the number of amendments gives a more accurate idea of parliamentary 
initiative than might be apparent from the small number of private members' bills passed. In 1972, 
for  example,  the  National  Assembly  adopted  1,167  amendments,  685  of  which  came  from 
committees,  158  from deputies  and 324 from the government. 
3)  In theory, voting is  personal and proxy voting is  strictly controlled (Article 27).  Despite a recent 
attempt  to  enforce  compliance  with  this  constitutional  obligation,  it is  still  not  applied.  In fact 
when deputies from the majority group are absent, the government uses  their votes in open ballots 
(electronic  voting)  which  it  can  always  request  to  avoid  being  defeated  by  the  deputies  present 
voting  on a  show of  hands. 
4)  All bills are examined in turn by the two Assemblies with the aim of adopting an identical text 
(Article 45).  In case of dispute, the provisions still under discussion are  'shuttled'  between the two 
Assemblies.  The government, however, can end this process after two readings  by arranging for a 
meeting of a  conference committee consisting of an equal number of deputies and senators, which 
suggests  a  compromise text. If this  procedure fails,  the government can ask the Assembly  to take 
a  final  decision. 
Of the  1,299  laws  passed  between  1958  and December  1972,  the  conference procedure was  used 
in only 149  cases,  and the National Assembly gave a final  ruling on only 50 laws. These involved 
the  most  political  texts  where  the  different  composition  of  the  two  Chambers  made  agreement 
impossible. 
B3  - Budgetary powers 
Each  year  Parliament  passes  the  budget  law  which  plans  and  authorizes  deployment  of  all  the 
state's  resources. 
1)  The budget law is  divided  into two parts: 
- the first  part authorizes the collection of public revenue and lays down how the budget will be 
balanced; 
- the second part fixes  the estimates needed to carry through the legislation already in force over 
the next year  ('continuing services')  and the 'new measures'  correcting these. 
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passes  the  budget by  chapter:  it  takes  a  total vote  on the  'continuing  services'  and  adopts  the 
'new  measures'  according  to  title and ministry  (the  eight titles classify the estimates according to 
kind).  The  distribution  of  estimates  by  chapter  is  carried  out  by  the  government.  In  all,  the 
appropriation  bill  requires  just  over 250  votes  during  the  first  reading  in  each  Chamber. 
2)  The finance committee plays an important part in the budgetary procedure. It appoints a chairman 
who  leads  the  discussion  and  about 50  special  rapporteurs  who  are  given  extensive  powers  of 
investigation.  The  other  committees  appoint  an  equivalent  number  of  rapporteurs  for  opinions. 
3)  The passage  of the  budget law must  take place within very  strict time limits: 
- the National Assembly  must come to a  decision within 40  days  after the bill  has  been tabled; 
- the Senate then has  a  time limit  of  20  days. 
The conference procedure is  put into action immediately  after the first  reading. If Parliament has 
not taken a final decision within 70 days, the government can bring in the law by order (so that the 
budget  can come  into force  on 1st  January;  this  situation  has never  actually· arisen). 
4)  Between 24  October and 21  November 1973  the National Assembly spent a  total of 200  hours 
on budget debates.  This haste, which is  an annual phenomenon, provokes  much criticism,  all  the 
more  so  since  such intense  activity often seems  out of all  proportion to the results: 
- strict controls  on initiative  do  not allow  Parliament to amend the law submitted to it and it 
adopts  it  virtually  unchanged,  subject  to  some  adjustments  negotiated  with  the  Minister  of 
Finance; 
- control  at this  point is  limited  because  of  the  nature  of  the  budget  law,  which  is  the  main 
instrument  of  the  government's  economic  policy,  questioning  of  which  comes  under  general 
policy,  and  because  of  the  time  limits  which  hardly  allow  a  detailed  examination  of  Civil 
Service  activities. 
Grievances  can be aired during the budget debate; sometimes some of the provisions are dropped 
(especially relating to taxation)  and some of the estimates amended, but this is  not a true control. 
5)  The two other types of budgetary law give the same impression: the supplementary budget law 
which ratifies  the amendments  decided  during the year at the end of the financial  year,  and the 
budget discharge law which is  passed two years  after the budget, but does  not involve  a  detailed 
critical  examination of the  management of public  resources. 
B4  - Control of the Civil Service 
a)  Rights  of investigation  and enquiry 
"Is Parliament so blinded by the Constitution that it can only see through the government's eyes ?" 
Is it "condemned to know only what the government decides to tell it?", Joseph-Barthelemy asked 
forty  years  ago.  The  question  is  of special  importance  in  a  country where  the  Civil  Service  is 
centralized,  large  and for  the most part autonomous. 
The traditional forms  of control operate through ministers: Members of Parliament refer to them 
for information and the theoretical assent to this is  the political responsibility of the government. 
Parliament knows  only the  ministers  and therefore  has  no direct  relations  with the  Civil  Service 
departments. 
1)  Committees  of Inquiry  and  Control 
This  principle,  which  restricts  checks  on the  Civil  Service  to written or oral  questions,  has  two 
exceptions : 
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investigate any matter that is  sub judice:  their meetings  are  held in secret and only the Assembly 
to which they belong can decide to publish their reports. They do not have any defined powers, so 
that Civil Servants  may only give  evidence with the permission of their superiors  and no one can 
be  forced  to appear before them. 
However,  these  committees  have  acquired  considerable  importance  over  recent  years.  The  first 
committee of enquiry was set up within the Senate in December 1970 to look into the scandal of 
the La Vilette public slaughterhouses, and the Assembly set up one in December 1971  on building 
societies; seven committees of control have been set up, two in the autumn of 1973  (on the national 
telephone  service  and  on the  financial  management of French  radio  and television). 
In  order to get  over  the restrictions  on these  committees,  the  Senate  has  also  used  'fact-finding 
commissions'  which  enjoy  the  prerogatives  of the  budgetary  rapporteurs  sitting  on them. 
2)  The budgetary rapporteurs  'continuously  follow  and check the use  of appropriations, working 
on the spot and on the basis of records'. They must be provided with all information with the exception 
of matters  of  national secrecy  (defence,  foreign  affairs,  state security). 
The advantage of this form of control was shown in October 1973 when a minister refused to supply 
an Assembly rapporteur of an Opinion with a Civil Service document. The bureau of the Assembly 
decided that the privilege of direct communication would be  reserved for  special rapporteurs. 
The problem of the supervision of public undertakings is  more complex, since they are not involved 
in the budget except when grants or loans are involved, and do not come under the direct authority 
of  ministers.  For this  reason they  are  largely  exempt from  parliamentary control. 
3)  Mention must  also  be  made  of  a  new form  of supervision  relating  to the detailed  application 
of laws.  Sometimes the relevant texts drawn up by the Civil Service  only appear some years  after 
the laws  have  been  passed  and in this  way paralyse some  measures  and totally misrepresent the 
wishes  of the legislature.  The Assemblies  are  at present working  out appropriate procedures. 
b)  Defence  of personal rights 
Since the legal and administrative courts are normally in a position to ensure protection of personal 
rights,  resource  to Parliament is  very rare. 
1)  A private person can ask a  Member of Parliament to intervene on his  behalf either informally 
or by means of a written question; he can send a petition to the Assembly which is examined by the 
appropriate  committee  (in  spite  of  its  advantages,  this  procedure  has  rather  fallen  into  disuse). 
When matters are raised that go beyond individual cases, Parliament can use the investigation pro-
cedures described above. However, the restrictions prove to be particularly limiting when the matter 
has legal implications or when it questions state security or national defence secrets. Thus the Senate 
Committee set up in June 1973 on telephone tapping met with a refusal from the Prime Minister to 
allow it to carry out investigations in the departments concerned. It was  therefore unable to take 
any further  action. 
2)  The law of 3 January 1973  appointed a 'mediator'  to  receive  via  Members  of Parliament the 
complaints of anyone who  considered that a  public  body had not functioned  within its  terms  of 
reference in its relations with that person. The mediator is appointed by the government and is  only 
empowered  to make  recommendations;  however,  he  can  make them  public if  he  does  not get  a 
satisfactory reply. It is too early to pass judgment on this procedure; in any case Parliament is  only 
marginally  concerned. 
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Parliament's independence cannot simply be  evaluated from a formal point of view:  account must 
be taken of the political structures, and it will be seen that the influence of the majority added to 
government prerogatives  has  the effect  of reducing this  independence  considerably. 
a)  Timetable 
1)  Parliamentary  sessions:  Parliament  meets  by  right  in  two  ordinary  sessions,  one  opening  on 
2 October and lasting 80 days, and the other on 2 April and not exceeding 90 days, in other words, 
a  maximum total of 170  days. 
Special sessions  can be called by the Prime Minister or by a majority of the deputies.  In  this case 
the  President  of  the  Republic  recalls  Parliament  by  decree.  These  sessions  are  very  short  and 
infrequent; none  has  ever  been  called  on the deputies'  initiative. 
2)  Agenda: the government has a general priority in determining the use of Parliament's time except 
for one sitting per week which is  reserved for oral questions (but a motion of censure can override 
this priority). 
The Assemblies  cannot therefore determine how their time is  used, except within the limits  of the 
priority agenda: this is 'the supplementary agenda'  which  is  fixed  by the 'Presidential  Conference' 
(consisting of the President and the Vice-Presidents  of the Assembly,  the committee chairmen and 
party  leaders,  whose  vote  is  weighted  according  to  the  size  of  their  party).  The  Conference's 
proposals  are  submitted to the Assembly. 
3)  The Conference  may  also  decide how a  debate is  to be  organized,  i.e.  how long it should be 
and how speaking time  is  to be  divided  among the parties. 
b)  Role of the  President 
The President of the National Assembly is  elected for the whole term of office  of the government, 
the President of the Senate at the triennial elections. He is  advised  by  a •bureau'  which  is  elected 
each year. 
1)  The President leads the debates, makes sure that the rules of procedure are observed and takes 
the necessary  initiatives.  More specifically,  he can  consider the constitutionality of  a  matter,  and 
refer  to the  Constitutional  Council cases  of disagreement  with the government  on a  question  of 
legislature inadmissibility  or on the conformity of a  bill to the  Constitution.  He can  authorize  a 
speaker to reply to the government,  ask him to wind up a  debate and so  on. 
2)  The President does  not actually chair all the sittings, since he is represented in turn by each of 
the six Vice-Presidents.  This means that the extensive powers of the presidency are normally not 
fully  used,  since  the Vice-Presidents,  who are elected for a year at a time,  are not endowed with 
the  same  authority as  the President,  who is  elected  for  five  years. 
c)  Influence  of the majority 
All  the decisions taken by the Assemblies  are taken on the basis  of a  majority vote,  all Members 
of Parliament having equal status. Their sphere of autonomy as  laid down by the Constitution is 
therefore virtually controlled by the government majority, and the part played by the minority in 
the work of the Assembly depends to a large extent on this majority (matters are slightly different 
in the Senate,  where the government majority parties  are in a minority). 
The only statutory restrictions on this monopoly concern the Bureau which must 'reflect the political 
profile of the Assembly', and the legislative committees, which are set up on the basis of proportional 
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Conference  Committees,  the committees  of  control  and  enquiry,  the High  Court of  Justice,  etc.) 
are made by majority vote. The decision to set up a committee of enquiry or a committee of control 
is  taken in the same way. 
On the other hand, since the majority rule applies to the running of the bureau and its committees, 
the majority again prevails  both in fixing  the supplementary agenda  (including  the choice  of oral 
questions) and appointing committee rapporteurs. The scope given to the minority and their initiatives 
therefore  depends  on the goodwill  of  the  government  majority,  which  is  obviously  not likely  to 
encourage anything which could jeopardize one of its own policies.  The extent of this domination 
also  depends  on the ratio  of the various  forces  in  Parliament;  thus the composition  of  the fifth 
legislature  elected  in  March  1973  has  worked  in  favour  of  a  more  normal  participation  by  the 
minority  (appointment  of  rapporteurs  not  belonging  to  the  majority  group,  appointment  of 
Communist deputies  to the European Parliament for  the first  time  since  1958). 
C - Limits  of a  practical nature 
C1/a Differences  in  the  notion  of parliamentary  representation:  role  of the  political  parties 
The problem of the role played by the political parties in a parliamentary system implicates the very 
basis of this system, especially according to ].  L.  Parodi's model  (see  in particular the introductory 
paper read to the round table conference at the Fondation Nationale des  Sciences  Politiques held 
on 6 and 7 November  1970),  whereby 'flexible parliamentary government or parliamentary govern-
ment  by  representatives'  is  contrasted with 'structured parliamentary government or parliamentary 
government  by  parties';  each  parliamentary  system  combining  the  two  in variable  proportions. 
All  that will be  said here is  that since  1958  the French parliamentary process  has  been dominated 
by the maintenance in power of a stable majority coalition, and this situation has certainly tended 
to reduce the degree of autonomy of the parliamentary groups, and of the Members of Parliament 
in relation to these groups, with considerable variations from one parliament to another. However, 
it should be noted that this majority coalition is made up of three groups (UDR, RI and the majority 
centrists)  whose customs and party discipline  are very  different depending on their own particular 
traditions  and  short- and  medium- term  prospects.  The  bonds  that hold  them together are not 
parliamentary ones, since their last electoral campaign was centred on the figure  of the President. 
This  is  why  a  'majority delegation' has to try to achive a flexible  basis for cooperation which can 
be  developed  as  required. 
Cl/b Direct  consultation 
French parliamentary tradition was always  so  hostile to the referendum procedure (apart from the 
special  case  of  the  Constitution  referenda  of  1945-46)  that recourse  to  it  in  legal  texts  and in 
constitutional practice was rarely willingly made. The various legal battles which aroused particular 
public interest, such as in 1962, were in particular distinguished by the refusal of an entire political 
class  to accept that the national will could no longer be  expressed  exclusively within the bounds 
of Parliament. 
Today this conflict seems to have subsided, although it flared up again on the occasion of the failure 
of  the 1969  referendum  on regionalization. 
In particular  the  constitutional  controversy  on the use  of  Article  11  relating  to  revision  of  the 
Constitution may be considered as  closed; although it may be irregular, the procedure was clearly 
ratified by the electorate and even the failure of the 1969 referendum does not seem to have affected 
the position. 
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length of the President of the Republic's term of office has this time been approached through the 
'usual' channels  of  Article  89,  with the involvement  of both Assemblies. 
C2/a  Domain  reserved  to the executive: security and defence 
The  problem  of  the  difficulties  encountered  by  Parliament  when  investigating  matters  affecting 
national defence,  the police force  or 'State secrets'  calls for two observations: 
- The problem is  legally difficult to grasp since legislation laying down Parliament's right to look 
into these  affairs  is  either vague  or non-existent.  For example, the secrecy  of national defence 
is  covered by the provisions  of Articles  75,  76  and 78 c  of the penal code,  but nowhere is  it 
clearly stated how it should be applied to the parliamentary committees of enquiry and watchdog 
committees  (see  M.  Ceoara,  •Parliamentary  committees of enquiry under the Fifth  Republic', 
University of Paris I 1972),  and for the moment it is  a matter for the executive to decide; it is. 
not easy  to see  how a  disagreement on this point could  be  settled. 
This type  of impasse recently  arose when the Senate  committee of enquiry on the tapping of 
telephones was refused any opportunity of checking or proving the existence of suspected illegal 
practices  and could  only  report the  unhelpful  attitude  of the  executive. 
- These affairs,  including a good many problems of foreign  policy,  are largely under the control 
of the Presidency, which is  constitutionally and politically even further from Parliament than the 
rest of the executive.  This makes it all the more difficult to obtain any information. 
C2/b and c  Discretionary  powers  (economic  policy)  and multi-year decisions 
The problems raised by the participation of Parliament in Government planning and economic policy 
have not changed fundamentally since the studies carried out by Professor Delvolve and Professor 
Lesguillons  in  1964  '(Parliamentary  control  over  economic  and  budgetary  policy',  PUF  1964). 
Despite the government's obligation, since the law approving the Fourth Plan to submit a preliminary 
draft of the main options of the Plan, Parliament, though not entirely  excluded from participation 
in planning, scarcely has  a chance to intervene until it is  practically too late to alter the decisions 
proposed  by  the  government.  Without  prejudging  any  improvements  which  may  result  from 
discussions  in Parliament on the RBS  programmes (1), it must  be  admitted that in planning,  even 
more  so  than  in  strictly  budgetary  matters,  the  problem  of  possible  alternatives  to  the  choices 
proposed  by the  government  remains  technically  insoluble.  In  addition,  the fact  that planning is 
done  on a  multi-year  basis  reduces  the  scope  of the  Assembly's  vote  even  further:  the  constant 
rethinking of objectives presupposed by flexible economic planning such as  our own is  carried out 
by the government in the light of the changing economic situation, and it is  difficult to see on what 
basis  Parliament could sanction the various  divergences  at the end of the process.  Reference  may 
be made on this point and on the problem as  a whole to the paper presented by Professor Nizard 
to the round table conference at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques on 6 and 7 November 
1970  'Reflections  on the true reasons  for  Parliament's  inability to influence  the planning process 
effectively'. 
C2/d Membership  of the  Communities 
France's membership of the European Communities does not appear on the whole to have had any 
ill  effects  on the French Parliament's  exercise  of its  powers. 
( 1)  See  C3/a. 
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- Considerable  delegation  of  powers  to  the  executive  in  matters  concerning  European  policy, 
which  may  be  explained both by its  frequently  highly technical  nature and by the traditional 
discretion of the French Parliament on anything relating to foreign policy, as pointed out above. 
- The difficulties described by Mr Triboulet (Le Monde, 6 April1973); according to Mr Triboulet, 
who chaired the European Democratic Union Group at the European Parliament, of the 15 members 
of his  group, six have  not succeeded in obtaining re-election  despite  a  strong position locally, 
and it seems that the electorate took particular  objection to  their  'excessive'  efforts to defend 
and publicize European  attitudes. 
C2/e  Role  of the autonomous  public  bodies 
The problem of the extent and means of control exercised by Parliament over the public undertakings 
has existed since the introduction of nationalization (see in particular G. Vedel,  •Control by parlia-
mentary  committees  over  the  management  of  nationalized  industrial  undertakings  and of  mixed 
investment  companies', Droit Social,  3  March 1955,  pages  137-145). 
Under the Fifth Republic a number of texts have confirmed or defined Parliament's powers in this 
field.  For example, Order No. 58  1100 of 17 November 1958 states that  'committees  of control are 
formed  to  investigate  the  administration  and  the  financial  and technical  management  of  public 
services  or national undertakings, with the aim  of  informing the Assembly  which set  them up  of 
the results of their investigation',  and  Order No. 58  1374 of 30 December 1958 lays down that the 
committee responsible for auditing the accounts of public undertakings should send its annual report 
and other special  reports to Parliament,  and that Members  of Parliament  appointed to  evaluate 
the  management  of national undertakings  and mixed investment  companies  should have  right  of 
access  to  'any administrative document  of  whatever nature relating to the running of the under-
takings,  companies  or establishments  subject to their  supervision'. 
It must be emphasized that these committees are only in existence for four months at a time under 
the Fifth Republic, although under the Fourth Republic there was a standing sub-committee of the 
Finance  Committee which was  responsible  for  the national undertakings. 
It is,  however, within the budgetary sphere discussed above that supervision can in theory be most 
easily  carried out.  -
However,  the whole  subject  still  raises  delicate  problems  which  are  particularly well  outlined in 
Mr Griotteray's report on the national undertakings within the context of the 1972 Budget  (A.N., 
1st session 1971-1972, No. 2010). While accepting that Parliament was still 'a very good forum for 
debating the major technical problems of the national undertakings',  the  rapporteur noted the lack 
of cooperation given  by  some undertakings, the confusion of the legal statutes, and above  all the 
general absence of clear criteria for evaluating the activities  of  public undertakings, whose future 
development was  outlined only in the vaguest  of  terms  in the National Plan. 
C3/a  Technological  constraints:  new decision-making  techniques 
New techniques of decision-making at the level  of the executive,  in particular the Rationalization 
of Budget Selection  (RBS),  a French version of the American PPBS,  have for  the moment had no 
direct  effect  on the voting of the  budget in Parliament. 
However, from this year, three ministries will present an RBS  version of their financial programme 
as an appendix to their budget. It is  planned that this practice should be progressively extended to 
all the other ministries,  in the form of  an appendix,  and that within five  or six years the budget 
will be  discussed  with direct  reference  to these papers. 
Discussion on the RBS  programmes would theoretically be an advantage for Parliament, since they 
apparently give  some idea  of  the  possible  alternatives  and the associated  costs. 
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In  France,  as  apparently elsewhere,  the development of radio and television has  meant that basic 
political debates now take place outside Parliament at the expense of its traditional role as a platform 
and  a  'sounding  box'  for changes in opinion.  The trend has increased over the past four or five 
years  with  the  success  of  televised  confrontations  between  political  figures.  Although  little  less 
conventional than the ritual of a parliamentary forum,  the 'staging'. of  an exchange of ideas makes 
it very  much  more personalized  and,  at the same time,  more dramatic. 
However, it must be recognized that parliamentary debate is not very successful on television. The 
problem  of  broadcasting  parliamentary  sittings  was  studied  in  all  its  aspects  at the  symposium 
organized in 1968 in Geneva by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, but it would appear that no totally 
satisfactory solution has since been found in France. Neither the unduly brief extracts shown during 
television  news  programmes  nor the  direct  transmission  of some  of the  more  important debates 
- squeezed  in  between  the regular  programmes  and poorly advertised - give  television  viewers 
a  satisfactory idea  of the work of the Assemblies. 
D1  - Parliament and the  composition of the government 
a)  Influence  on the composition  of the  government 
1)  The government  is  formed  through  the President  of  the  Republic,  but this  principle  must  be 
combined  with  the  majority  principle:  the  ministers  are  almost  invariably  chosen  from  among 
those elected by the majority group  (in  1973  the Union of Progressive Republicans Supporting the 
President  of the Republic). 
Of its 27  members,  there were ten who were not Members of Parliament in the first  government 
of the Fifth Republic (1959),  but since the 1962 elections there have been fewer outsiders: there was 
only one in 1968,  none  between  1969. and 1973,  and three  since  then. 
The only structural change in the majority group since 1962 has been the inclusion in the government 
of deputies from the democratic and progressive Centre who supported Mr Pompidou's candidature 
in June 1969. Mr Messmer's government, formed in April1973, is made up of 24 UDR, 7 independent 
republicans,  three  democratic  and  progressive  centrists,  one  non-aligned  and three  non-members 
of Parliament  (there  are  no longer  any  senators,  although  there  was  one  until  1972). 
2)  Since the choice of ministers is discretionary, in theory Parliament can bring no influence to bear. 
However,  governments  are  always  made  up  of proportional numbers  of members of the majority 
parties, and efforts are made to encourage changes in personnel while at the .. same time 'neutralizing' 
the  more  turbulent  majority  deputies.  The incompatibility  rule  which  obliges  deputies  to  resign 
from Parliament on joining the government imposes a serious limitation on this change in personnel. 
b)  Access  to  government  posts 
The 120  or so persons who held government office  between  1959  and 1973  have  had very varied 
careers,  but some  common  characteristics  may  be  discerned: 
- Between 1959  and 1968  the ministerial posts relating to the President's domain  (foreign  affairs 
and defence)  were  held  by 'specialists'. Mr Jobert's appointment in 1973  is in keeping with this 
tradition.  The same  is  true of cultural  affairs. 
- of  the 38  members  of  the  present  Messmer  government,  two  (including 'the  Prime  Minister) 
were ministers before being deputies; 18  were elected for the first  time in 1967 or 1968,  which 
shows that a period of service in the Palais Bourbon is  not a decisive factor, even though from 
now on it will be  necessary in order to get into the government.  What they have  done before 
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and most of them had then worked in ministerial departments. 
On the whole,  three  categories  of ministers  may  be  picked  out: 
- the prominent personalities - men of standing in the Assembly or in their own party, or in both. 
These  stay in the government for  a  long  time,  and sometimes  leave  it to hold parliamentary 
posts  before  returning.  They form the elite  under the system; 
- the young  men,  normally senior civil  servants  who have gained their experience in  ministerial 
departments rather than in parliament, who get themselves  elected,  quickly become Secretaries 
of State  and, if  they  are  lucky,  graduate to the first  group; 
- the transient figures  - deputies appointed Secretaries of State who never get beyond this stage 
and are subsequently forgotten.  Their modest promotion is  either a  reward for long service or 
represents  an attempt to pacify the turbulent. There is  a  higher turnover among Secretaries of 
State than among Ministers. 
The National Assembly only superficially acts  as  a source of recruitment, since in reality it has no 
formative  function.  Parliamentary  experience  is  not on the  whole  considered  to  be  an  essential 
quality for  belonging  to  the  political  and  administrative  elite. 
D2 - Parliament and public opinion 
Because Parliament is  now in competition with the mass  media,  (many of the basic debates taking 
place outside Parliament), its most widely recognized and ancient role as  a forum being challenged. 
Generally  speaking,  within  the  constitutional  limits,  the  Assemblies  have  tried  to  keep  up  with 
events, especially by developing the system of current events questions which makes the oral question 
procedure slightly more flexible. However, it is unlikely that there will be any return to the old system 
of interpellation which allowed Parliament to summon a  minister at any time to justify his actions, 
as  suggested  recently  by  deputy  A.  Simon-Loriere.  However,  the  problem  does  not  perhaps  lie 
simply  in  a  technical  improvement  in  procedures,  but  also  in  rethinking  the  very  function  of 
Parliament. Should Parliament really be only a 'mirror of opinion' ? One might  be tempted to say, 
like Jean Cocteau, that perhaps mirrors 'do not reflect enough', and that the  most specific function 
of Parliament should be to maintain and develop  a  constructive dialogue  with the public,  rather 
than to limit itself to following the public's wishes.  It should be stressed that Parliament already 
plays  a  particularly constructive  role in this  respect - one which could be  developed  and made 
better known to the public - in the routine hearings that are carried out by committees for some 
important bills. It is  significant and encouraging for Parliament as  an institution that associations 
and groups with the most varied interests are literally jostling each other at the doors of the National 
Assembly's  Social  Affairs  Committee,  to put their  point of  view  on the proposed  reform  of  the 
abortion laws. Despite the temporary adjournment of the debate until the next session, the fact that 
public opinion has found its way back to Parliament on a matter which has been as widely debated 
in the press as this, is the sign of a trend that could be exploited by holding more frequent hearings 
of this  nature. 
D3  - Parliament and the Civil  Service 
How does Parliament contribute to the efficiency of the Civil Service ? This is  a  delicate question, 
since  it also  depends  on what is  understood by <efficiency'. 
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that it produces, it is  true that parliamentary discussion is  traditionally seen as  having a  clarifying 
function.  Some see it as  the intuition of a  body of non-specialists  restoring some commonsense to 
bureaucratic  jargon;  others  see  it  as  the  legal  competence  of  the  ruling  political  class  in  the 
Assemblies  and the quality of the specialized study services  of the parliamentary departments.  No 
doubt both can coexist.  It  may  be  observed  that, while  government  bills  sometimes  have  to be 
worked on and improved, this  is  done mainly at a  very  informal level, in the constant exchange 
between the rapporteur and the civil servants responsible for drafting the text when a report is being 
prepared for the specialized committee.  In actual debates  it becomes  part of the complex process 
of the right of amendment. 
If the efficiency of the Civil Service is  measured by its  abilities to 'persuade'  the  public,  the  help 
that it may receive from Parliament lies in the general 'legitimization'  given  by  the  parliamentary 
vote, and in the public relations work carried out in his constituency by each Member of Parliament 
in favour of the legislation he has passed. The help given to the Civil Service is therefore based on 
the. general  logic  of the  majority system. 
As  for  ensuring  the  equitable  government  of the  country,  French  parliamentary tradition  makes 
this the business  of each individual Member of Parliament. At any rate, this is  true if  the concept 
of equity is  understood as  bending  the  rules  in special cases.  Surveys  made of the official  corres-
pondence of Members of Parliament  (e.g.  Escarras  et al., the parliamentary  function,  Presses  Uni-
versitaires  de  France)  confirm that the  electorate  continue to expect  their  Member of Parliament 
to intervene with the government on their behalf on a wide variety of sometimes trivial matters in 
order to speed up the administrative machinery and make it more flexible.  It is  interesting to note 
that Members of Parliament are expected to have a  broad 'influence'  linked  with  the  status that 
they are assumed to have, as  much as, i£ not more than, taking specific action in Parliament (written 
or oral questions, tabling bills,  and so  on).  Although it is  not as  pronounced as  under the Third 
Republic,  this image of the parliamentary function has been encouraged by the return in 1958  to 
voting for  one Member only in each arrondissement. 
Parliament's basic problem with regard to the processes of change is how it can influence government 
decisions.  In fact,  since  the  new  definition  of the domain of the law in  1958,  many often  quite 
important decisions  do not even  have  to pass through Parliament. 
Parliament may intervene in a government bill after a prolonged period of administrative gestation 
during which the basic choices have been made, the necessary go-aheads given to the upper echelons 
of power, and negotiations with the interested parties (unions, various pressure groups, party leaders) 
have already been embarked on more or less informally. This may appear to be quite obvious, but 
it is still true that the debating and decision-making apparatus of Parliament often leads it to under-
estimate  the  'submerged  part  of the iceberg':  as  a  general rule the crystallization of decisions  is 
fairly  well  advanced  by the time  a  proposal reaches  Parliament,  so  that opportunities to change 
things at this stage are very limited. All this is  obviously accentuated in France by the fact that there 
has  been  a  stable majority coalition for  15  years,  backed by efficient procedural methods  (control 
of amendments and the agenda)  which allow a  text to be forced through if  necessary. 
Under favourable conditions and providing the government is so inclined, the Assemblies may become 
a very effective working instrument. A recent study (Alain Brouillet, The right of amendment under 
the  Constitution of the Fifth  Republic, PUF  1973)  has shown that the passing of the Land Bill  of 
1967, after a debate in which almost one thousand amendments were tabled in the two Chambers, 
gave  Parliament the  opportunity to exercise  all its  prerogatives  through the right of amendment 
(initiative or control)  and to modify the text under discussion extensively and constructively. 
However, because of the French majority system, the trials of strength which actually influence the 
government  in some  way tend  to take place  within the  majority-government  relationship,  rather 
than between the government and Parliament as  a whole. The recent postponement of the Abortion 
73 Law Reform Bill  is  a  particularly typical  example  of  this:  in all  probability the  bill  would have 
been  passed,  but it would have  been  against  the government  majority.  Similarly,  under  pressure 
from the UDR in December 1971 the government withdrew two drafts on the compulsory purchase 
of private property  (Le  Monde,  16  December  1971). 
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A paper on the Irish Parliament, if it is to be of value to this Symposium, should provide an assessment 
of the role which that Parliament plays  at the national level,  and examine the extent to which  it 
has  adapted to or been  modified  by  membership  of the  European  Community. 
I propose, therefore,  to divide  the paper into three sections: 
The  first  section will examine the role and effectiveness  of the Irish Parliament in the exercise  of 
the three principal functions  of  a  parliament, namely, 
a)  Political  orientation, 
b)  Legislation,  and 
c)  Control of Government. 
The  second  section  will  look  at the  exercise  of  power  outside  the  parliamentary  sphere  - in 
particular by  administrators - and the role of pressure  groups. 
The third section will focus on the adaptation of the Irish Parliament as a direct result of membership 
of the  Community,  and the  effect  which this  is  having  both at the national  and European level. 
The necessary background information on the composition and nature of the Irish Parliament,  as 
set out in the 1937 Constitution, is contained in Annex 1. I shall assume familiarity with this factual 
background for  the purposes  of the analysis  which follows.  A short Bibliography is  contained in 
Annex  2. 
Section  1 
THE FUNCTIONS  OF  THE IRISH  PARLIAMENT 
Political  Orientation 
The function of the Irish Parliament in providing political orientation must first be examined briefly 
in  its  historical  context.  The Constitution  of  the Irish  Free  State,  enacted  in  1922,  reflected  the 
complex  blend  of  the  success  of  the  movement  for  independence  and  the  special  Anglo-Irish 
relationship  so  deeply  influenced  by  British  constitutional norms  and  by  a  shared common  law. 
The sovereignty  of the people  was  proclaimed in Article  2,  which  declared  that •All  powers  of 
government and authority, legislative, executive and judicial in Ireland, are derived from the people 
of  Ireland'.  However, the Free State was to remain a  member of the British  Commonwealth and 
contained many of the symbols and institutions considered appropriate for a Commonwealth country, 
such as the provisions for a Governor General, for an oath of loyalty and for a system of government 
which  followed  the  British  pattern.  Some  attempt  was  made  at innovation,  by  provisions  for  a 
referendum, for the concept of  an 'extern  minister' outside the Cabinet and for the possibility  of 
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gradually removed by  a number of amending Acts  which reflected a tendency to accept the Cabinet 
system  of government  based  on the Westminster  model.  A further  series  of  amendments  excised 
from  the  Free  State  Constitution  the  trappings  of  a  Commonwealth  country,  and  provided a 
background to the enactment of the present 1937 Constitution with its emphasis on the republican 
nature of  the state. 
The 1937 Constitution reiterated that the basis of all governmental authority, including the authority 
to enact the Constitution itself, came from the people of Ireland. Consequently, although the Govern-
ment proposed the text of the Constitution, and secured its  approval in the Parliament, it was  in 
fact enacted by a plebiscite of the people. It was not, however, until1949 that the formal link with 
the  Commonwealth  was  broken.  The Republic  of  Ireland  Act,  1948,  provided  that the external 
affairs  of the country would be exercised by the President acting on the advice  of the Government 
and that •The  description  of the State  shall  be  the Republic  of  Ireland'. 
This  brief  historical  sketch  gives  some  indication  of  the  complex  threads  running  through  the 
development of the Irish Constitution and the influence which this has had on the evolution of the 
Irish Parliament. It is  ironic that, as  the emphasis on the republican nature of the State increased, 
the capacity to innovate in an institutional sense actually diminished, so that the present parliamentary 
system  is  a  rather unimaginative reflection  of  the British  model. 
Irish politics,  and the differences  between the political parties, must be examined in this historical 
context. The establishment of the Irish Free State was followed by a civil war in which the Govern-
ment of the time, which had negotiated the Treaty with Britain, subdued the more militant republican 
party  led  by  Mr.  de  Valera.  However,  this  party  won  increasing  support through succeeding 
elections, and came to power after the General Election of 1932. From this date the major amendments 
to the Free State Constitution concentrated on removal of reference  to the British Crown, until it 
was replaced by the 1937 Constitution. The Fianna Fail Party remained in power for 16 years, when 
it was  defeated  by  a  Coalition Government in 1948.  This Government lasted until 1951,  when it 
was  replaced  by  another Fianna Fail  Government.  In 1954  the  Coalition regained power but was 
defeated in early 1957 by Fianna Fail, which remained in power until March 1973  when the present 
Coalition Government came into office. 
The pattern which emerged  was  one of very stable government, in which  the appeal by the two 
main political parties was framed in this historical context. The electoral system, based on proportional 
representation,  did  not lead to the  emergence  of  a  number of  small parties representing minority 
interests. The third political party, the Labour Party - which is  a partner in the present Coalition 
Government - is in fact the oldest of the three political parties. It does not share the same historical 
reference; nor has it managed, however, to attract the support of more than a relatively small min-
ority of the Irish electorate. Professor Basil Chubb comments in his work 'A Source  Book of Irish 
Government',  that: 
"The existence of large nation-wide parties and the establishment of an 'ins and outs' pattern, 
combined with a cabinet system on the British pattern, would of itself make the resemblance 
between Ireland and some Commonwealth countries obvious enough. The internal organization 
of  the  major  parties  and  the  distribution  of  power  within  them  will  further  heighten  the 
resemblance.  The constitutions  and rules  of  the  three  major  parties  reveal  only  the  formal 
structure, of course, but this is markedly similar to the British parties. As in Britain; the branches 
and constituency organizations are primarily vote getting agencies  manned by local politicians 
and voluntary and unpaid enthusiasts. To a large extent dormant, sometimes almost moribund, 
between elections,  these local organizations spring to life  at election time.  While they receive 
guidance and advice from the centre, as  well  as  some material help, they must rely to a large 
extent on their own efforts  and resources." 
This pattern has led to a conservatism in Irish politics, in which political attention has only recently 
begun to concentrate primarily on social  and economic issues.  This was illustrated by the victory 
of the  present Coalition Government in  March 1973  on the basis  of  an election  manifesto  which 
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could give  new impetus  to  the  historical  perspective  and  revitalize  the  old causes  and divisions. 
However, the political solution which  appears  to be  emerging should release  the politiCal  parties 
from this historical vicehold, and enable them to concentrate on the practical implications for Ireland 
of membership  of the European  Community and the economic  and social problems  generated by 
the world power crisis. 
The  electoral  system,  based  on proportional representation  and the single  transferable  vote,  has 
eliminated the concept  of  a  'safe seat'.  This has  tended to discourage people of ability who are 
outside the political party structure from standing for election. Consequently there has been a certain 
inbreeding in Irish political life, allowing a seat to pass from father to son or to the political widow 
in trust for  a future  generation. 
Also,  a certain tension has  been building up as  a consequence of migration to the cities  and large 
towns in Ireland. Because of the strict constitutional proviso that Dail deputies must represent not 
less  than 20,000 or more than 30,000 of the population, there has been a decline in the number of 
rural  deputies  and  a  complementary  enlargement  of  the  constituencies  and numbers  of  deputies 
representing urban areas. This has led to a regional imbalance for which there is no direct institutional 
counterbalance in the Constitution itself. The resulting tension is one which cuts across party political 
allegiance  and has  heightened the demand for  regional  devolution with new  structures for  better 
control and participation  at the regional level. 
Legislation 
As is the case with other modern parliaments, the Oireachtas does not draw up and enact legislation, 
but rather approves  of draft legislation placed before it by  the Government.  This draft legislation 
will have been prepared by the appropriate Department of the civil service, and framed in technical 
language  by the parliamentary draughtsmen. The legislative process is  similar to that of the West-
minster Parliament, in that a Bill must pass through the various stages in both Houses, the Dail and 
the Senate. However, it is rare to find that any substantial or significant amendment is made during 
this  process;  and if  any  amendments  are  accepted  they  usually  relate  to  minor  aspects  or even 
grammatical points. There is  the possibility of individual or opposition party initiative in the form 
of a Private Members' Bill,  but, unhappily, the Irish parliamentary tradition has not favoured this 
mechanism and, with a few isolated exceptions, all legislative initiative has come from the government 
of  the  day. 
Since  the  Oireachtas clearly does  not legislate  in a  significant sense,  it's  main  contribution is  one 
of  providing publicity  and education through debate.  Any  Bill  which is  publicly debated in both 
Houses  over  a  number of weeks,  and commented on at length by political correspondents in the 
daily  newspapers,  will  come  to  the  attention  of  the  interested  individuals  and  groups  in  the 
community.  The particular interest  groups  will  probably have  been  aware of  the text of  the Bill 
before it was laid before the Oireachtas, and may have been consulted about its contents. However, 
it is exceptional to get a White Paper in advance of a Bill outlining the options open to the legislature. 
One  important  distinction  between  the  Oireachtas  and  the  Westminster  Parliament  is  that  the 
Oireachtas is  not a  sovereign  parliament but is  subject to the  Constitution.  Article  15,4  provides 
that: 
'1)  The Oireachtas shall not enact any law which is  in any respect repugnant to this  Constitution 
or any  provision  thereof. 
2)  Every  law enacted  by  the  Oireachtas which  is  in any  respect  repugnant to this  Constitution 
or to any provision thereof, shall,  but to the extent only of such repugnancy, be invalid.' 
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the date of its commission.  There is  power under Article 26 to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court 
for a decision as to whether such Bill or any provision of such Bill is repugnant to the Constitution. 
The Courts have the power to review legislation in order to determine whether it is  constitutional 
and there are numerous examples  of  sections  of Acts  which have  been found to be  repugnant to 
the  Constitution,  and therefore  of  no  validity and effect. 
Procedure 
The procedure in  both Houses  of the  Oireachtas  is  very  formal  and has  minimized  the  creative 
contribution  which  can  be  made  during  the  passage  of  a  Bill.  There  are  no  specialist  subject 
committees, and when the Committee stage of a Bill is reached in either House the normal procedure 
is  for that House to sit in committee. If the Bill is  particularly complex, there is  provision for the 
establishment of a special committee to examine its contents in detail and report to the House. The 
fact,  however,  that the whole House usually sits  in committee has  been  criticized  as  being time-
consuming and wasteful of the resources of the parliament. An informal Committee to review the 
procedure followed in Dail Eireann was established in April1971. It reported nearly two years later, 
but  confined  its  deliberations  to  minor  points  of  procedure.  Indeed,  paragraph  5  of  the  report 
confesses  by  implication  the  very  limited  nature  of  the  deliberations : 
'So  as  not  to  delay  our  report  unduly  we  decided  to  concentrate  on  putting  forward 
recommendations as to how the existing procedure and practice of the Dail might be improved. 
We do not say that new procedures might not be desirable to enable Members to participate 
more fully  in the affairs  of Government.  Indeed we  believe  that a  wide ranging examination 
might with profit be undertaken to establish how effectively the Houses of the Oireachtas are 
discharging  their  functions  in present  day  circumstances.  We  would  envisage  that any  such 
examination  would  comprehend  the  whole  relationship  between  the  Houses  and the  public 
at large and in this connection the question of the broadcasting of debates should be specially 
examined. Other matters that should be examined without delay should include the relationship 
between the Houses and State-sponsored bodies, and the effect on the work of the Houses of 
the  adoption  of  recommendations  of  the  Public  Service  Organisation  Review  Group.  It  is, 
also,  of  particular  importance  that  new  parliamentary  procedures  adopted  as  a  result  of 
participation in the  Parliament  of  the  European  Communities  should  be  kept  under  review 
and strengthened as  the  necessity  arises.' 
Control of  Government 
Article  28  of the Constitution provides that the Government shall be responsible to Dail Eireann, 
that it shall meet and act as  a collective authority, and that it shall be collectively responsible for 
the Departments of State administered by members of the Government.  The Constitution  goes  on 
to confer certain exclusive  responsibilities  on the Dail, for example, to consider the Estimates  of 
Receipts and Expenditure of the State, to approve international agreements involving charges upon 
public  funds  and to assent  to  a  declaration  of  or participation in war. 
Day to day control is exercised through the use of Parliamentary Questions, debates on the adjournment 
and substantive motions which may be put to a vote. It is in this area that certain useful recommend-
ations of the informal Committee on Dail Procedure have been implemented in order to make better 
use  of parliamentary time.  Deputies  are  still,  however,  hampered  by  insufficient iUformation  and 
resources  to probe  deeply  behind  the ministerial  reply,  and  by the  absence  of select  committees 
which  could evolve  the  necessary  expertise  in a  particular area  of governmental  activity. 
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The Dail has the major parliamentary authority in relation to the finances  of the State, the role of 
the  Senate  being  limited  to  a  delaying  power of twenty-one  days.  The annual  statement  of  the 
Minister for Finance, in which he submits his Estimates of Receipts and Expenditure for the current 
Financial Year has traditionally been made to the Dail in April or May of each year, but this will 
be altered to comply  with the commitment towards economic and monetary union. This statement 
outlines  the  Government's  proposals regarding  new  taxation,  and indicates  any variations  which 
it is proposed to make in existing taxes. It is followed by a debate in general terms and by the passing 
of the annual Finance Bill based upon the financial resolutions accompanying the Budget. The aura 
of secrecy  which precedes  the Budget,  and the fiction  that the Government could be  defeated  on 
a  vote,  no longer  seem  relevant  in  an  age  which  has  shifted  to long  and short term  economic 
planning,  and in which the major budgetary decisions  will  be  taken increasingly  at the European 
Community level. 
Committees 
As  has  already  been  stated,  although various  committees  are  appointed at the commencement  of 
each new parliamentary session - such as the Dail Committee on Public Accounts and the Committee 
on Procedure  and Privileges  - there is  no detailed  structure  of  specialist  subject  committees  to 
. allow  for  more  sophisticated  scrutiny  and  examination  of  Government  administration.  One 
surprising omission is  the lack of a Select Committee on nationalized industries, or state sponsored 
bodies  as  they are  called in Ireland.  This is  a serious defect  because of the range and diversity of 
these state sponsored bodies, and because of the substantial proportion of Irish industry and services 
so controlled. It is a sharp example of the failure of the parliament to exert its influence and control 
over a  vital sector of the economy.  There have,  however,  been positive indications recently  of  an 
intention to establish a Select Committee on state sponsored bodies during this parliamentary session. 
Absence  of Alternative  Controls 
The underdeveloped and inhibited nature of the control exercised by the Oireachtas is  more serious 
in view of the absence of alternative mechanisms. There is no equivalent in Ireland to the Ombudsman 
or  Parliamentary  Commissioner,  with  power  to  review  abuses  of  administration  or  individual 
complaints  against  maladministration  at central  and  local  levels.  Although  a  number  of  advisory 
bodies  have  been established in various  areas  of economic  and social  activity,  none of these  have 
real teeth with which to control or exert positive influence on Government or administration. There 
is  no equivalent to the Law Commissions which function in England and Scotland and which make 
such an important contribution towards law reform. There is no organised system of citizens' advice 
bureaux, so  that the Dail deputy must spend a large proportion of his time  as  'grievance  man'  in 
his  constituency  and hence  has  less  time or energy to devote to the legislative process itself.  It is 
more important for the advancement of his political career to get medical cards, agricultural grants, 
etc., than to research a particular legislative proposal or to examine governmental activity in detail. 
As  a result, the debates on legislation and on the performance of the Government are often poorly 
informed  and at a  superficial  level. 
Another limit to the extent to which the Oireachtas can  exert  control  over  the Government stems 
from the rigid operation of the party whips. As  we have seen, legislative proposals come before the 
Houses of the Oireachtas too late for there to be the possibility of seriously influencing the policy 
and contents of such proposals. The draft Bill  will have  been  agreed by the Government party or 
parties, and then viewed as a form of holy writ. Government prestige hinges on not allowing substantial 
amendments, and in using the majority vote if necessary to prevent any amendments being carried. 
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Government deputies - either of the performance of the Government in its  executive capacity or 
of proposed legislation. The whips in the parties exert great power, and there are numerous examples 
of  disciplining  which  are  enough to curtail any  members  who might wish to vote  by conscience 
rather than by party line. Hence, the possibility of a defeat for the Government on the floor of the 
House is  a mere fiction, and the vote itself is  reduced to a gimmick to augment the publicity value 
of the debate  which preceded  it. 
Section  2 
THE EXERCISE  OF  POWER OUTSIDE  THE PARLIAMENTARY SPHERE 
Administrative Power 
A detailed report was published in 1969 by a committee set up by the Minister for Finance with the 
following  mandate: 
'Having  regard  to the growing responsibilities  of  Government, to examine and report on the 
organization  of  the  Departments  of  State  at  the  higher  levels,  including  the  appropriate 
distribution  of  functions  as  between  both  Departments  themselves  and  Departments  and · 
other  bodies.' 
This report,  known as  the Devlin  Report, recommended the establishment of  a  new Department 
for the central coordination of organization, management and personnel within the public service. 
This Public Service Department was eventually established last November, and has begun the major 
task of  retraining,  reorganizing  and restructuring the public service. 
Chapter 11  of the Devlin Report deals with the strengths and weaknesses of the public service, some 
of  which  are  relevant to the  relationship  between  Government  and  administration.  It is  pointed 
out at paragraph 11,  3  (2)  that: 
'At the higher levels,  the work of the civil  service  consists  of: 
(i)  policy formulation, 
(ii)  execution of policy, 
(iii)  overall control and direction  of the organization. 
Secretaries  and  Assistant  Secretaries,  who  are  primarily  concerned  with  this  work,  are  so 
involved in the press of daily business that they have little time to participate in the formulation 
of overall policy for the Departments' functional areas. This involvement of senior officers  in 
day-to-day  business  follows  directly from  the  doctrine  of  ministerial  responsibility  embodied 
in the Ministers and Secretaries Acts. The acts of each civil servant are the acts of his Minister 
and can be questioned in public and in Parliament. The Minister is forced to concern himself 
with the details of executive  action and the Secretary  of  his  Department must, therefore,  be 
equally involved  to the detriment of his  role  as  policy adviser  and director and controller of 
the organization.' 
The impression which  emerges  from studying the analysis  in the Report is  that Parliament exerts 
a significant and cramping control over the Minister through the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, 
and that this forces both the Minister himself and his senior civil servants to pay too much attention 
to less  important matters of detail so that they have insufficient time for policy formulation.  The 
consequent recommendation is  that the Minister's responsibility to the Dail should be  limited  by 
a restructuring of the administration separating the functions of policy formation and its  execution. 
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making function  from the executive function - by  allowing  the Minister and his  closest advisers 
to be concerned with policy, overall direction and control and providing that the executive activities 
of the state would be carried out by 'the executive area' - this would increase rather than diminish 
the real scope of ministerial responsibility. It would enable members of the Oireachtas to examine 
and assess the policy formation in each Department and to demand real accountability for the planning 
and overall direction of such departmental policy.  This dimension of parliamentary control is  not 
dealt with in any depth in the Report because it was compiled from the perspective of administrators. 
What is now required is  a complementary assessment of the parliamentary function and how it must 
adapt to the gr<i!atly  expanded role of government in a  modern society. 
Administrative  Response  to Membership  of European Community 
Membership has placed a great strain on the public sector in Ireland. Many of the senior civil servants 
departed to fill  the Irish quota in the Community Institutions,  and others to man the permanent 
delegation in Brussels. At the same time, the work-load in particular Departments increased radically 
and became much more complex because of the European dimension. The response in the Depart-
ments has been one of gradual adaptation to new problems as they have arisen, rather than of more 
deliberate reform. The Department of Foreign Affairs has overall responsibility for coordinating the 
implementation of  Community directives  and has  established  a  separate enlarged  EEC  section to 
cope with these substantial new demands. The extent to which senior civil servants must commute 
regularly  between Dublin and Brussels  has  caused delay  and frustation  in implementing domestic 
policies.  It is  realised  that the  present  problem  will  be  greatly  aggravated  when Ireland assumes 
chairmanship of the Council of Ministers for the first half of 1975.  A strong recruitment policy has 
already begun, and the way in which Denmark coped during the latter part of 1973 has been examined 
in  detail. 
The Oireachtas is  largely unaffected  by  this challenge to the administration.  No overall study has 
yet been made of the precise changes in structure within the Departments, or the methods of sharing 
responsibility  for  European  policies  which  cut  across  existing  departmental  responsibilities,  such 
as the Community environmental policy. For the individual deputy or senator it may be more difficult 
to trace a particular official, or take longer to receive information requested, but there is no account-
ability in a general sense for structural adaptation - however radical - which may be taking place 
within the public  sector. 
Publicity 
It is possible to curtail significantly the role of parliament as  an organ of control over Governmental 
action simply by bypassing it. There has been a tendency for Government Ministers to make important 
announcements relating to their Departments, or affecting in a significant way the political or economic 
life of the nation, at venues outside the Oireachtas, such as formal dinner parties, seminars or public 
meetings. This is popular with the organisers of such functions because of its publicity value to them, 
and it is  an easy way to avoid the interrogatory questions which might follow if the announcement 
had been made on the floor of the House. The Minister can proclaim without having to justify; and 
it may be  many weeks  later, if  at all,  that the Oireachtas has  an opportunity to debate the issue 
either when considering the estimates of the Minister's Department or in the form of a parliamentary 
question or Motion. This tendency to use  organs of publicity outside the Parliament has increased 
since  Ireland joined the European Community.  Ministers  returning from  meetings  of the Council 
of Ministers prefer to. make statements at press conferences than on the floor of the House, where 
there would be a precise record of every such announcement and the possibility of real accountability 
through probing questions  from  Members  of the House. 
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One of the traditional functions of a parliament has been to provide a forum for the airing of individual 
grievances  or the  views  of  particular  pressure  groups.  Deputies  and senators  are  accustomed to 
receiving letters from constituents or more sophisticated lobbying from such pressure groups. However, 
there has been a tendency in recent years for pressure groups to bypass the parliamentary process 
altogether and to try more direct ways of achieving their object. The present operation of the doctrine 
of ministerial responsibility holds a Minister responsible for all acts by civil servants in his  Depart-
ment, and the corollary is that the Minister's word is law at every level in that Department and must 
be implemented without question. Pressure groups now realise that the most effective way of ensuring 
that their particular interest is  catered for is  to lobby the Minister directly, or to lobby one of his 
more senior civil servants in the hope that he will attempt to convince his Minister. If this succeeds, 
then the word will  be  passed  down through the Department to the particular official  responsible 
for the implementation.  Obviously, this form  of lobbying can be  much more effective than asking 
an elected representative to table a parliamentary question, or sending detailed memoranda to deputies 
and senators. Once again, if the recommendations contained in the Devlin Report were to be implem-
ented, so  that the Minister was confined to responsibility for the policy-making function, the pos-
sibility  of  exerting  this  form  of pressure  would consequently diminish. 
Section  3 
ADAPTATION  OF  OIREACHTAS  TO  MEMBERSHIP  OF  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
Constitutional  Change 
The  1937  Constitution  had  not  envisaged  participation  by  Ireland  in  a  supra-national  grouping 
such as the European Community. It conferred exclusive legislative power on the Oireachtas, exclusive 
judicial power on the Irish Judiciary, to be exercised in Irish courts, and exclusive executive power 
on the Government. It was obvious that if Ireland wished to assume the obligations of membership 
of the Community there would have to be an amendment of the Constitution, or else any subsequent 
domestic legislation in this area would be repugnant to the precise terms of the Constitution. Amend-
ment involves  the passage of a  Bill  through both Houses of the Oireachtas and its  approval by a 
majority of the people by way of referendum. The decisions was taken not to try to amend the specific 
articles  or sections of the Constitution which were in conflict with the obligations of Community 
membership, but to insert a general interpretative clause enabling Ireland to join the three Communities 
and stating that: 
'No  provision  of  this  Constitution invalidates  laws  enacted,  acts  done  or measures  adopted 
by  the State necessitated  by the  obligations  of  membership  of the  Communities  or prevents 
laws  enacted,  acts  done  or  measures  adopted  by  the  Communities,  or institutions  thereof, 
from having the force  of law in  the State.' 
This Bill,  the Third Amendment of the Constitution Bill  1971,  was passed by  both Houses of the 
Oireachtas on 8th March 1972 and approved by over 80% of the electorate in May of that year. 
Legal  Changes 
During the  debate on the Irish European  Communities  Act 1972  it was  realised  by  deputies  and 
senators that the Oireachtas was no longer the sole legislative body for Ireland, but was superseded 
in some  areas  by the Treaties  and Community Secondary Legislation.  This diminution of  parlia-
mentary control was felt more sharply in the case of a new Member State than by the existing mem-
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for the reinforcement of local parliamentary control, both through statutory mechanisms and through 
the  establishment  of  a  Joint  Committee  of  the  Oireachtas  to  scrutinise  Community  Secondary 
Legislation. Subsequently, when it was discovered that the original control mechanism in the Euro-
pean  Communities  Act  was  inadequate,  the new  Coalition  Government  introduced  an  amending 
Act  which varied this form of control and established on a statutory basis the Joint Committee on 
European  Community Secondary Legislation. 
European Communities  Act 1972 
This Act is short to the point of terseness, consisting of six sections, of which the first is  a definition 
section and the last gives  the short title of the Act.  The definition  section  defines  the  'European 
Communities'  and  the  'Treaties  governing  the  European  Communities'  of  which  the  dates  of 
entry into force  are dates  not later than the first  day of January 1973. 
Section 2 provides that these treaties, and the existing and future Acts  adopted by the Institutions 
of the  Communities  'shall be  binding on the State  and shall be  part of the domestic  law thereof 
under the conditions laid down in those  Treaties.'  This  section was  necessary in order to render 
Community law part of the domestic law of the State. The Third Amendment of the Constitution 
Act  1972  had amended the 1937  Constitution to enable  this  to be  done, but it was still necessary 
for the Oireachtas to pass implementing legislation in this way because of the provisions of Article 29 
of the  Constitution.  Article 29,  Section  6,  provides:  'No  international agreement shall be  part of 
the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas.' It is doubtful, therefore, 
whether Irish Judges would have been willing to recognize and enforce Community law in the Irish 
courts without such implementation  by the  Oireachtas, despite  the fact  that certain provisions  of 
the Treaties and Regulations  under Article 189  would be regarded  as  self-executing. 
Section 3 allows an Irish Minister of State to make regulations •for enabling Section 2 of this Act to have 
full effect'. The power is  a very  wide one, giving a discretion to the Minister as  follows: 
'Regulations  under  this section may contain such incidental, supplementary and consequential 
provisions as  appear to the Minister making the regulations to be  necessary for the purposes 
of  the  regulations  (including  provisions  appealing,  amending  or  applying,  with  or  without 
modification,  other law,  exclusive  of this  Act).' 
The only limit on the power of the Minister in making such regulations is  that he  shall not create 
an indictable offence.  This limitation was introduced during the debate in the Senate, where it had 
been argued that with such a wide enabling power given to the Minister it would be almost impossible 
to find  that he had acted ultra vires  or gone beyond the powers conferred on him by this Section. 
Section 4, which provided for a control mechanism over domestic regulations made under section 3, 
has been repealed by the amending Act and a new system of control has been introduced. The original 
system  provided that regulations  made  by  an Irish Minister of  State  under  section  3  'shall  have 
statutory effect,  and, unless they are confirmed by Act of the Oireachtas passed within six months 
after they are made or are regulations  merely  revoking  wholly regulations previously  made  under 
this Act, they shall cease to have statutory effect on the expiration of that period, but without prejudice 
to the validity  of  anything previously  done thereunder.' 
It was argued that this gave effective control to the Oireachtas, in that the regulations required to 
be confirmed within six months if they were to continue to have validity as part of Irish law. However 
the first - and indeed the only - confirmation Act under this section, The European Communities 
(Confirmation  of Regulations)  Act, 1973,  which was passed on the 1st June 1973, illustrated how 
minimal the role of the Irish Parliament was in reality. This confirmation Act consisted of two sections 
and a schedule. The first section referred to the 22 Ministerial Regulations in the schedule and stated 
that they were 'hereby confirmed'.  The explanatory memorandum to the Bill stated: 
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European  Communities  Act  1972.  Section  4 (1)  of  that Act  provides  that regulations  made 
under  the Act  shall  cease  to have  statutory effect  unless  they  are  confirmed  by  Act  of  the 
Oireachtas passed within six  months  after they are made or are regulations  merely revoking 
wholly  regulations  previously  made  under  the  Act.  As  the  first  regulation  under  the  Act 
requiring confirmation was made on 13th December 1972, it is necessary to provide for enactment 
of  a  confirmatory Bill  by  12th June 1973  at the latest.' 
There then followed a very brief note on each of the regulations. This did not give a clear indication 
of the particular department which had responsibility for its implementation, nor the effect on pre-
existing  Irish  law, nor the  extent to which  Irish  interests  had been  consulted  as  to the  mode of 
implementation nor indeed a precise account of the text of such regulations. The regulations themselves 
were laid in the library of the Oireachtas, but were not sent to individual deputies or senators. The 
debates  in  both Houses  revealed  that very  few  deputies  or senators  had bothered to look  at the 
complete text of these regulations, and were in fact confirming blindly regulations which had been 
part of Irish law for the previous six months - for the purpose of continuing them in force  ! It was 
as  a  result  of severe  criticism  of this  procedure, particularly in the Senate,  that the Government 
undertook to bring in an amending Bill  to give  the Oireachtas a  more positive role. 
Section  5  of the European  Communities  Act  1972  provides  that: 
'The  Government  shall  make  a  report  twice  yearly  to  each  House  of  the  Oireachtas  on 
development in the European  Communities.' 
This in effect  means that there must be four debates each year in the Oireachtas on developments 
in the European Communities,  and as  such it provides  a  useful  opportunity to comment both on 
such developments and on the performance of Irish representatives at the Council of Ministers. The 
first Report was circulated and debated in both Houses in June. It was criticised for giving the sort 
of  minimal  information  on the  Communities  which  is  available  from  other sources,  and for not 
indicating the particular problems facing this country in different areas, or outlining the actual state 
of negotiations.  The second Report, laid in  November 1972,  gave fuller  disclosure  of Government 
policy in relation  to the  Community proposals. 
The European Communities (Amendment)  Act 1973 which was tabled on the 18th July and passed 
by both Houses of the Oireachtas on 26th July 1973, introduced a different system of parliamentary 
control. It amended the earlier Act by deleting Section 4 and substituting a section providing expressly 
for a Joint Committee. The new Section 4 (1)  states that ministerial regulations will have statutory 
effect  and  dispenses  with the need  for  a  confirmation  Act,  of  which we  had the  single  example. 
Instead, sub-section  (b)  refers  to the Joint Committee to be set up  and provides  as  follows: 
'If the Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities recommends 
to  the  Houses  of  the  Oireachtas  that  any  regulations  under  this  Act  be  annulled  and  a 
resolution  annulling the regulations  is  passed by  both such Houses within one year after the 
regulations  are  made,  the  regulations  shall  be  annulled  accordingly  and  shall  cease  to have 
statutory effect but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously  done  thereunder.' 
Sub-section 2 allows for the recall both of the Dail and of the Senate on the motion of at least one 
third of the members  of either House to implement this procedure if the Houses stand adjourned. 
The effect of this amending Act has been to substitute for the original procedure of having ministerial 
regulations  operative for  six  months,  and then lapsing  unless  confirmed  within  that period  by  a 
confirming Act, a procedure whereby these regulations have statutory effect but are subject to possible 
annulment if the Joint Committee so recommends. Attempts were made to give  a power of recom-
mending amendment as  well  as  annulment to the Joint Committee  but this  proposal was  refused 
by  the  Government. 
84 Joint Committee  on European Community Secondary Legislation 
This Joint Committee consists of twenty-six members, including the ten Irish delegates to the Euro-
pean Parliament, ten representatives from the Dail and six from the Senate. The terms of reference 
of the  Joint  Committee  are  as  follows: 
•That the  Joint Committee shall examine: 
(i)  such drafts, prepared by the Commission of the European Communities and submitted to the 
Council  of  those  Communities,  of  regulations,  directives,  decisions,  recommendations  and 
opinions,  of the Council. 
(ii)  such  acts  of the institutions  of  those  Communities, 
(iii)  such  regulations  under the European  Communities Act,  1972  (No.  27  of  1972),  and 
(iv)  such  other instruments made under statute and necessitated by the obligations of membership 
of those  Communities. 
as  it may  select  and shall report thereon to both Houses  of the  Oireachtas.' 
The Joint Committee had its first meeting at the beginning of August 1973 at which certain procedural 
decisions were taken. These included a decision to have a verbatim report of the sessions of the Joint 
Committee itself, but with a possibility of having private sessions and a general rule that meetings 
of the various sub-committees would not be reported. It was appreciated that the work of this Joint 
Committee would be two-fold: on the one hand to examine the draft proposals from the Community 
as  to how they would affect  Ireland and as  to what domestic legislation  or regulation would be 
involved:  and on the other hand to analyse the domestic ministerial regulations issuing from time 
to time, as  to whether there might be a recommendation to annul them under the powers given by 
the European  Communities  (Amendment)  Act  1973. 
At  a  subsequent meeting  of the Joint Committee a  structure of sub-committees  was  agreed  upon. 
There are four such sub-committees  dealing  with the following  matters: 
1)  Regulations under the European Communities Act 1972 and such other instruments made under 
statute and necessitated  by  membership  of the Communities; 
2)  Matters falling within the purview of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Depart-
ment of Lands; 
3)  Financial,  industrial, legal,  scientific,  educational and related  matters; 
4)  Political matters and second stage European policies, for example, regional policy, social policy, 
environmental policiy,  transport policy,  etc. 
The membership  of these four sub-committees reflects  a  political  balance, but it is  clear from the 
views  expressed  at this  and subsequent meetings  that there will  be  a  bipartisan approach by  the 
political  parties  towards  draft  proposals  from  the  European  Community.  There  was  constant 
repetition of the theme that the primary concern of members of the Committee would be to examine 
the effect  of such  proposals  on Ireland,  the advantages  or disadvantages  which  might ensue,  and 
the  consequences  for  domestic  legislation  and  regulations.  Having  ascertained  the  volume  and 
complexity of these draft proposals from the European Community, together with the backlog which 
had piled up, it was decided that the Joint Committee would meet at very regular intervals in order 
to be  able to report within a time scale that would allow it to influence the attitude taken by the 
Irish  Ministers  when  the particular subject  matters  came  up for  consideration  at the  Council  of 
Ministers. 
First Report. The Joint Committee's First Report, laid before the Dail and Senate in early November, 
examined and reported on the Communities'  draft proposals for  the establishment of a  Regional 
Development Fund,  namely: 
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25.7.73. 
b)  Draft  decision  by  the Council on the creation of a  Committee  for  Regional Policy.  COM (73) 
1171-25.7.73. 
c)  Proposed  Financial  Regulation  to special  provisions  to  be  applied  to the  European  Regional 
Development Fund.  COM (73)  1218-25.7.73. 
The format of the Report is  interesting, in that it has established a precedent for future reports of 
the Joint Committee, and in that it is  based on the European model rather than the Irish tradition 
of  reports  by  parliamentary  committees.  It begins  by  'Having Regard' to specific documents: the 
Preamble to the EEC Treaty and Article 2 of that Treaty; the Paris communique; the Commission's 
proposals contained in the Thompson Report of May 1973,  and Protocol No. 30 to the Treaty of 
Accession  which  made  specific  reference  to Ireland.  The report then expresses  the Opinion that: 
'The  Commission's  proposals for a Regional Policy are inconsistent with the guiding principles 
outlined  above  and represent  a  radical  departure from what until now  has  been  universally 
accepted  as  fundamental  Community philosophy;' 
It then lists  specific  criticisms  of the proposals  themselves,  followed  by  a  final  paragraph which 
refers  specifically  to the role  of  the Commission  and states: 
'Whereas  the  Treaty of Rome  places  a  solemn  obligation  on the Commission  to  propound 
policies  which  are genuinely  based  on Community principles,  and to protect the interests  of 
smaller  countries,  and  whereas  it  is  more  difficult  for  the  Commission  to  carry  out  this 
obligation when it cannot rely on specific provisions of the Treaty but must, as  in the case of 
the regional  policy  proposals,  rely  on the general  authority of  Article  235,  the Governments 
of the Member States must ensure that the Commission retains its freedom to act in the interest 
of  the  Community as  a  whole.' 
The object of this Report was to provoke an informed and relevant debate in both Houses of the 
Oireachtas on the  Community proposals for  Regional Policy,  and also  to strengthen the hand of 
the Irish Foreign Minister at the Council of Ministers when the matter came up for decision. 
A second Report is in the final stages of preparation by the sub-committee concerned with domestic 
ministerial  regulations  consequent  on  membership  of  the  Community.  This  will  make  general 
observations  on and  criticisms  of  the  ministerial  regulations  issued  subsequent  to the  European 
Communities (Confirmation of Regulations) Act which was passed in June 1973. It is npt anticipated 
that there will  be a  recommendation for  annulment of  any of these  regulations  at this stage,  but 
there is sharp criticism of the lack of uniformity as  between the various Departments of State in the 
method and language used to implement Community directives.  This Report may also be debated 
in either House of the Oireachtas, or it may achieve its purpose merely  by being published. 
Growing Pains 
The Joint  Committee has  aroused considerable  attention both in the  Oireachtas  itself  and in  the 
press and public debate. It is the first such committee with power to examine the merits of proposals, 
and with power to recommend the annulment of domestic regulations. However, it lacks the specialist 
staffing  and back-up service to enable it to discharge fully  the statutory functions  conferred on it. 
The sub-committees cannot function effectively without the assistance of expert officials and adequate 
secretarial staff. There is some doubt about the degree to which civil servants in the various Depart-
ments can cooperate with these sub-committees, and the exact relationship between the Joint Com-
mittee and the administration has not yet been clarified. As  a result, there is  a danger that the Joint 
Committee will take too long to report on a specific issue, so that its  reports will lack impact by 
missing  deadlines  at the European  Community level. 
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the Oireachtas, and will undoubtedly be a fore-runner for other similar committees relating to Irish 
domestic legislation. The members of the Joint Committees have a sense of relevance and have begun 
to acquire a useful expertise.  Outside interest groups, such as  the Confederation of Irish Industries 
and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, have sent representatives to hearings of the Joint Committee 
and submitted memoranda for  the information of its  members. If the present  momentum can be 
maintained, and if the staffing problem is  resolved, this Joint Committee has a vital role to play in 
helping to carve out the relevance  of the Irish Parliament to the process  of  European integration 
and in  revitalising  that parliament  at the domestic level. 
Irish Delegates  to the European Parliament 
Ireland sends  ten  delegates  to the European Parliament under the interim procedure provided for 
in Article 138  of the EEC Treaty (as  amended by Article 10 of the Act of Accession and modified 
by Article 4 of the Adaptation Decision), pending the introduction of direct elections. Each political 
party has  a  quota for  which it can choose its  own deputies  or senators, and the present ratiO  is 
5 Fianna Fail, 3 Fine Gael and 2 Labour. The three political parties have not tried to provide a united 
Irish front at the European level,  but instead each  has joined a  different political grouping in the 
European Parliament. Fine Gael joined the Christian-Democratic group, Labour joined the Socialist 
group  and Fianna  Fail  joined the  European  Progressive  Democratic group. 
The major problem for these delegates in adapting to their new role as  members  of the European 
Parliament has been a physical one. The distance between Dublin and either Strasbourg or Luxem-
bourg,  aggravated  by  the  absence  of direct  flights,  involves  tedious  and time wasting  journeys. It 
is easier to attend the Committee sessions in Brussels, but even an hour-long session there necessitates 
an overnight stay. Consequently, the strain of the double mandate is  felt  more severely by the Irish 
delegates  than by their  counterparts from  other Member States;  and this  strain is  augmented  by 
the knowledge  that the system  of  proportional  representation  rules  out the  comfortable prospect 
of a  secure  majority at home.  The ten 'missionaries'  - as  they are called  by their colleagues  -
also complain of a lack of secretarial assistance and of the necessary information to discharge their 
parliamentary functions  satisfactorily  at the  European level. 
Communications between Dublin and Luxembourg/Strasbourg have proved to be totally inadequate, 
so  that often the unfortunate delegate is  en route to Europe while the necessary documentation is 
en  route the other way to his  home in Ireland ! The combination of coping with new languages 
and procedure, adjusting to a different parliamentary tradition and suffering from a lack of adequate 
briefing  has  diminished considerably the attraction of  a  seat in the European Parliament. The ten 
delegates,  of  course,  are  also  members  of the Joint  Committee of the  Oireachtas,  and perform a 
useful  liaison  function  between  the  two  parliaments.  However,  their  impact  is  lessened  by  very 
irregular appearances,  and by  the temptation to air their frustrations  and grievances  to the other 
members of the Joint Committee in the hope of rallying support for improving the conditions under 
which  they  labour. 
Conclusion 
In assessing the role played by the Irish Parliament, both at the national level  and in adjusting to 
membership of the Community, it has been necessary to be critical. The Oireachtas is  still basically 
a 19th Century debating forum, which has failed to adapt to the greatly expanded role of government. 
Its methods of control are much too primitive to impinge effectively on the complex structures of 
modern administration. Because of the absence of alternative institutional devices, too much of the 
average deputy's time is taken up resolving individual grievances and complaints against mal-admin-
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procedures which surround their parliamentary life, reduces them to the unhappy status of amateurs 
playing  on the fringes  of  the complex  business  of  government. 
There are lessons to be learned from this critical appraisal. It is frequently stated that national par-
liaments  are the bulwarks of democracy in the Member States,  and that the European Parliament 
must be modelled accordingly. It  is clear from the Irish example that this would be a totally inadequate 
approach, and that care must be taken not to repeat at the European levelthe defects and limitations 
which  exist in  the parliamentary system  at the national level. 
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BACKGROUND  MATERIAL  ON IRELAND  SUPPLIED  BY 
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
Nature  of Constitution 
The Constitution is  unitary; the executive  is  Parliamentary; the Parliament is  bi-cameral  (Seanad 
and Dail Eireann). 
Nature  of Electoral  System 
By the Constitution, no Member may represent less than 20,000 or more than 30,000 of the population. 
The constituencies  are  revised  by the Dail at least every  12  years. 
The electorate for the members of the Seanad comprises the members of the Dail and Seanad and 
the members  of every  county or county borough council.  In addition 11  members  of the Seanad 
are  nominated directly  by  the Prime  Minister and 6  are elected  by two Universities.  The elected 
Members of the Seanad are chosen by the system of proportional representation (single transferable 
vote)  and by  secret postal ballot; Members of the Dail are elected  by the single transferable vote 
system  in multi-member  constituencies. 
Number  of Members 
Dail:  144  to be increased to 148  by  Electoral  (Amendment)  (No.  2)  Bill  1973. 
Seanad:  11  nominated by Prime  Minister, 
6  elected  by 2  Universities 
43  elected from panels of candidates possessing knowledge and experience in certain fields. 
Qualifications  for  membership 
Electors require to be Irish citizens, ordinarily resident in their constituency, and to be 18  years of 
age to qualify to vote for elections to the Dail. There is  no such residence qualification for election 
to the Dail or Seanad, but the holders of certain public offices and many civil servants are not permitted 
to stand for election. 
Salaries,  Expenses  and Pensions 
A salary is  paid to Deputies  and Senators.  All  Members living  more than 10  miles  from the Par-
liament House receive an accommodation allowance; others receive an attendance allowance. Salaries 
are  taxable with the exception of the first  £ 1,000.  Allowances  are tax-free. 
Only the leaders  of the two Opposition parties receive  an allowance in respect  of office  staff.  Al 
Members receive  unlimited free  travel between Dublin and their home or constituency. 300 letters 
a  week may be sent free  of postage from the Parliament House and there are free  postal facilities 
from  Members'  homes. 
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10  years'  service:  Ministers  receive  non-contributory pension  payments  after  5  years'  service. 
Facilities 
There is  insufficient  office  accommodation for  Members. 
Members of both Houses are assisted in general by the Secretariat in each  House.  The Chairman 
of  each  House supervises  the organisation and working  of  services. 
Length  of Sessions 
The Constitution provides that at least one session should be  held every  year.  Between  1958  and 
1962,  the Dail met for  372  sittings  and the  Seanad for  123. 
Timing of Sittings 
By Standing Orders the Dail meets every Tuesday and Wednesday at 15.00 hours and every Thursday 
at 10.30 hours and adjourns not later than 23.00 hours on Tuesday and Wednesday and 17.30 hours 
on Thursday. The days  and hours are, however, subject to variation depending on business. 
By  Standing Orders the Seanad meets  on Wednesday and Thursday at 15.00 hours and on Friday 
at 10.30 hours. Sittings  are largely dependent on the volume of business sent from the Dail. 
Reports of Debates 
A verbatim report of debates is  normally published within two days  of the relevant sitting. 
Bodies  responsible  for  organisation  and procedure 
The Chairman of the Dail (Ceann Comhairle) is the sole judge of order while presiding over sittings. 
The  Chairman  examines  every  question,  motion  or amendment  to  ensure  that it complies  with 
Standing  Orders; if  it does  not,  he  may  amend or disallow it. 
The Chairman is  also in control of and responsible for the Secretariat of the Dail. He is  ex officio 
Chairman  of the  Committee on Procedure  and Privileges. 
The  Chairman  of  the  Seanad  (Cathaoirleach)  exercises  powers  and carries  out duties  similar  to 
those  of the Ceann  Comhairle. 
Voting  procedure 
Decisions  in the Dail are usually taken by  verbal  assent.  When a  difference  of  opinion occurs,  a 
division is held and Members' names and votes are recorded as they pass through two lobbies. 
Committees 
Committees  are  of three main types: 
a)  Special  Committees  are  appointed as  necessary to consider legislation. 
b)  Select  Committees  consider  Bills  also  on  occasion,  but  are  normally  committees  of  enquiry, 
appointed to make  a  detailed investigation  of the matter referred  to them.  Witnesses  may  be 
summoned from the public  and from  Government Departments,  and the evidence they give  is 
usually published.  A  Committee of Selection  nominates Members  of Select Committees, in pro-
portion to Parliamentary strengths  in  each  House. 
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Parliamentary  matters,  and others from  time  to time  to investigate  Bills  or other  subjects  of 
enquiry,  such as  EEC  legislation. 
Committees do not normally meet  outside Parliament. 
Broadcasting 
None. 
Staff 
Selection,  nomination,  control of staff administration,  retirement,  etc.,  are governed  by  two Acts 
of Parliament.  The total staff serving  both Houses  is  142. 
Parliamentary  Commissioner  (Ombudsman) 
None. 
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92 THE ROLE  OF PARLIAMENT IN ITALY 
Paper by  Professor  Andrea  MANZELLA,  Italian  Chamber  of Deputies 
I - Introduction 
The Italian constitution makes no functional differentiation  between the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate of the Republic. The two Chambers occupy exactly the same position, even to the extent 
of having the same life of five years since the 1963 constitutional reform which abolished the Senate's 
six year  term of  office. 
The punctilious  maintenance  of  equality in the political  weight  of  the two  Chambers  which  has 
hitherto impeded any practical moves towards functional specialization is  tied up with the essential 
similarity in electoral systems. Electoral law does, in fact, provide for majority elections of senators 
but, in practice, this procedure is rarely used since it requires a quorum of 65 % of voters not often 
obtained. In the absence of such a majority, the Senate resorts to a proportional system which produces 
essentially the  same political  results  as  the Chamber's list system. 
The present political composition of the Italian Chambers, after the 1972  elections, is  as  follows: 
CHAMBER 
Christian Democrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  266 
Communist Party  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  175 
Socialist Party  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61 
National Right  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56 
Social  Democrat Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29 
Liberal Party  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
Republican Party . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .  15 
Independent Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
Others  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
630 
SENATE 
136 
82 
36 
26 
12 
10 
5 
11 
4 
322 
(including  7  life  Senators) 
The difference in the number of Members elected to the two Chambers (630  for the Chamber, 315 
for the Senate) has had no influence on their roles, neither has the fact that the Senate also includes 
five  life members chosen by the President of the Republic amongst citizens who have distinguished 
themselves in the social, scientific,  artistic or literary fields  (in  addition to former Presidents of the 
Republic). 
The practical introduction of the regional system in 1970 lent a certain credibility to the view of the 
Senate as  a 'regional chamber',  an  idea  based  on Article 57 of the Constitution, but no practical 
results  have  yet  been forthcoming. 
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representing  the  same  party,  makes  a  serious  conflict  between  them  unlikely;  there  may  be 
differences of opinion over technical matters but not over the actual political content of a given issue. 
The Chamber and the Senate  also  occupy the same position in relation to the government.  After 
being  appointed by the President of the Republic and sworn in,  the government must, within ten 
days,  obtain the support of  both Houses.  A vote  of  no confidence  in either  of  the two Houses 
brings down the government. All these factors seem to justify a single treatment of the working of 
the  Chamber  and Senate  in  the Italian  parliamentary system. 
II  - The Role  of Parliament 
A.  - The  political  role 
1)  Parliament's  part in choosing the general  political line  and the  composition  of the government 
The political role consists of defining the broad lines of national policy and choosing the appropriate 
solutions  (governmental,  legislative  or administrative). 
This  role,  rightly  considered  to  have  a  unifying  influence  with  respect  to  other  state  activities, 
rests  mainly with the political parties.  Parliament's position here is  secondary to that of the party 
and, in  fact,  derives  from  it. 
In Italy, in the normal case of  a coalition government, the first general indication of policy emerges 
from  the  agreement  by  the  majority  parties  on a  political platform.  They  commit themselves  to 
collaborating in a  government  based  on this  platform before  deciding  on the allocation  of  posts 
to individuals. 
After  the  Prime  Minister  and  other  ministers  have  been  appointed,  the  agreement  on which  the 
government  is  based  is  spelt  out  in  the  government's  programme,  which  is  introduced  in  the 
Chambers by the Prime Minister. Article 94 of the Constitution requires that the Houses vote on the 
programme in a reasoned motion of confidence. In practice, however, after the debate on the question 
of confidence  a simple vote by  roll-call is  taken on a parliamentary document which refers  to the 
government's  points. 
The fact that the aims and the means by which they are to be pursued are chosen outside Parliament 
is  not counterbalanced by  any real parliamentary involvement in choosing members of the govern-
)Uent.  After  the parties forming  the coalition  have  agreed on the number of posts  (ministers  and 
under-secretaries)  to be  allocated to each  of them,  a  further  sharing out takes  place  within each 
party according to the weight of each faction. The need to share out the spoils twice explains, while 
not of course  justifying,  the  excessive  number  of  members  in the Italian  Government  (86  - of 
which  28  are ministers  and 58  under-secretaries)  which,  owing to its  size,  has  on occasion  been 
referred  to as  a  third Chamber. 
This  situation  could  perhaps  be  improved  to some  extent  by  implementing  the recent  proposals 
of the CD  secretariat. The Christian Democrats have obtained a  relative majority of votes for the 
last 28  years.  The proposed reorganization would make Parliament the real judge of the ability of 
politicians and the parliamentary group an accurate reflection of the dedication and political acumen 
of its deputies or senators. Unless Parliament acquires this power of judgement as a positive precaution, 
the  door of government will inevitably remain  barred. 
This line of argument makes it clear that, of the three demands on the time of an Italian member 
(his constituency, party faction and parliamentary work), the last is not always the most important 
criterion for  getting  into the  government.  The  most  important factor  is  the  importance  of each 
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minimum  conditions  which,  according  to  a  tacit  but firmly  respected  convention,  are  based  on 
parliamentary  seniority.  This implicit  code  can  be  summed  up by the following  rules: 
(i)  only those who have  been Members  of Parliament for  at least two terms  may  belong to the 
government  (although  the  constitution  allows  non-parliamentarians  to  hold  posts  in  the 
government); 
(ii)  only former under-secretaries  or the national leader of the party can become a  minister. 
2)  Parliament's  powers over the enforcement of the government's programme.  Parliamentary time-
table 
Though Parliament's role in establishing the political orientation of the government and choosing 
ministers  and  under-secretaries  has,  at  least  up  to  now,  been  negligible,  it acquires  important 
decision-making powers over the planned policy once the government assumes office. This happens 
primarily because the rules  of  procedure of the two Chambers give  the Conference  of the group 
presidents  the  authority to fix  the plan  and time-table  of parliamentary  work. 
If the conference reaches a decision unanimously, it is binding on both the assembly and committees. 
Strange  though  it  may  seem in a  difficult political system  such  as  the Italian, this  unanimity on 
procedure is  obtained fairly frequently  (though for  shorter periods  than envisaged in the rules  of 
procedure, i.e.  generally less  than 15  days).  There are  a  number  of  reasons  for  this: 
- In Italy today, it is  less  difficult to agree on the priority to be given various  problems than on 
how to solve  them. 
- The Presidents of the Assemblies make a special effort to mediate between the groups and between 
the groups  and the government. 
- It is  in the interest of the opposition to come to some agreement rather than being dominated 
by  the  majority in the Chamber. 
- Even  at the expense of making some concessions  to the opposition, it is  in the interest of the 
majority groups to establish a period of planned work not liable to be  upset by surprise votes 
on the agenda since  its  members  would otherwise have to be  permanently mobilized to guard 
against this  risk. 
For  all  these  reasons,  Parliament  which,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  is  almost  excluded  from  the 
determination of the government's political tendency, has significant powers, which may be exercised 
by  agreement or through compromises between the majority and opposition, over the chronological 
order of legislation,  a factor  capable of influencing the political content. 
3)  Parliament's  powers  in defining  the  line  of sectoral  policies 
However, if we consider the timing rather than the content of measures, Parliament's influence on 
overall policy remains essentially extraneous whereas in the case  of sectoral policy, the Chambers 
can  intervene  in  the process  of  fixing  the broad political  content. 
Article  117  of the  Chamber's rules  of  procedure,  which corresponds to Article  50 of the Senate's 
rules of procedure, may be considered the basic rule in this field. It stipulates that each parliamentary 
committee  may vote on resolutions  illustrating general tendencies  or defining  aims  for  particular 
matters which fall  within its  terms of reference.  The use  of this instrument is  reconciled with the 
need for  an overall approach by giving the government the power to place the question  (and the 
vote  on the  resolution)  before  the  Chamber  again  whenever  it considers  that  general  policy  is 
involved. 
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the reform of the rules of procedure in 1971. However, they did not spring out of the blue and some 
evaluation  of  the associated  practices  and their first  applications  is  possible. 
a)  Parliamentary resolutions have been most widely used in the field  of public administration, and 
nationalized industries  in  particular. 
These resolutions  may  be  tabled under the following  circumstances: 
After a hearing with the minister or those responsible for  specific  sectors  of public administration 
and public  corporations; 
After checking data on public financial management provided for the Parliament by the audit board; 
After  considering reports  presented  by the government  or other public  bodies  on progress  in  the 
sectors  falling  within  their terms  of  reference. 
In all these cases, the Chambers are endowed with an instrument for influencing overall administrative 
policy  in  the  various  public  sectors  with  the  possibility  of  de  facto  involvement  in  drawing  up 
governmental  directives  on public administration  and nationalized industries. 
It should be noted that the government tends to resist this sort of parliamentary intervention in the 
traditional  sectors  of  central  public  administration,  i.e.  the  sectors  in  which  there  is  efficient 
hierarchical cooperation between the minister and the upper echelons of the ministerial bureaucracy. 
On the other hand, the government's reluctance is noticeably less marked where autonomous public 
corporations and nationalized industries are concerned. The weakness of the government, in relation 
to this type of administration, endowed with considerable social powers  (money,  press, links with 
the opposition  and other technostructures  ... ) gives  cause for concern.  Parliament's intervention at 
least enables the minister responsible to re-acquire mediatory powers and therefore effectively helps 
the government in that directives ratified or even drawn up by Parliament acquire greater authority  .. 
b)  The political consequences of the findings  of exploratory investigations may also be a committee 
resolution, though, in theory, they should result in the simple adoption of a document stating results. 
This affords the parliamentary committees the opportunity to perform the important task of aggregating 
political  demand,  since  they  can  use  proposals,  opinions  and suggestions  from  those  outside  the 
traditional sphere  of  influence  on general policy in  fixing  the lines  of sectoral policy. 
4)  Parliament's  powers in defining  the line  of policy in Community affairs 
Use of the resolution instrument is, however, excluded in the case of preliminary debates on Community 
matters  which  in  the  Chamber,  take place  in  the  appropriate standing committee  and, if several 
fields  are covered, in a special ad hoc committee and in the Senate, in the Standing Committee on 
European  Community affairs. 
Eight  senators  or,  in  the  Chamber,  a  group  representative  may  make  the  official  request  for  a 
preliminary debate on the  Commission's  proposals  published in the  Community Official Journal, 
pending the insertion of these proposals and other points in the agenda of the Community Council 
of  Ministers. 
Owing to a  desire  to  avoid  tying  down the government  by  peremptory formulations  when it is 
preparing for Community negotiations, the possibility of concluding these debates with a resolution 
is  explicitly  excluded. 
Despite  this  limitation,  the  debates  give  Parliament  an  effective  means  for  intervening  in  the 
definition  of the  broad lines  of national policy in Community  affairs. 
It should be  stressed that, in these  debates and the annual debate on the government's report on 
Community  problems,  Members  belonging  to the  Italian  delegation  to the European  Parliament 
96 are invited to attend the meeting of the Chamber's committee (or the Senate's Standing Committee) 
in which the discussion  takes place.  This is  the only case in which the Rules  of Procedure of the 
two  Chambers  provide  for  members  to  attend  a  committee  by  virtue  of their  role  rather  than 
membership  of  a  group.  The functional  link  between  the  national Parliament  and  the European 
Parliament therefore  actually supersedes  the structural characteristics  of the parliamentary system. 
In addition,  this  emphasis  on the  difference  of  their institutional role  certainly  tends  to give  the 
behaviour  of  European  members  a  different  value  to that of  national  members. 
Therefore, in this important field  as  well, Parliament plays its part in determining the lines of policy 
by using areas of jurisdiction and experience acquired outside the classic environment of government 
- Parliament - parties which, in this context, leads to a  significant decrease in emphasis on the 
majority-opposition  struggle. 
5)  Parliament's  powers  in  defining  the  line  of constitutional  policy 
Parliament's role in  determining what may  be  called the  constitutional tendency  is  in  some  ways 
similar. This role has become more substantial and increased in importance since the regions were 
set  up  and the present transformation  of the  centralized state into a  regional  state  begun. 
At  this  stage,  it became  clear  that institutional relations  between  the  central state  apparatus  and 
the regions could not be satisfactorily arranged by legislative formulae or verdicts of the Constitutional 
Court. Between the two extremes of a legislative framework and the intervention by the Constitutional 
Court,  a  power  vacuum  has  emerged  in  which  Parliament  mediates  between  state  and  regional 
politico-legal  bodies.  The result of this liaison  can  be  seen  in  advice  concerning the government's 
legal  behaviour, which certainly comes under the category of acts with constitutional implications. 
This is  reflected,  for  example, in the motion, adopted by the Senate on 18  December 1970 which 
provides  a  guideline  for  relations  between  the  central  and  regional  administrations,  defining  the 
respective  levels  and means  of  decision-making in the exercise  of  administrative  roles. 
Another notable example (though arising in a legislative context) is furnished by the opinions which 
the ]oint  Committee  on Regional Questions delivered  on the criteria for transferring the adminis-
tration  (and  various  offices)  from  the State  to the regions  and the ensuing reorganization of the 
central State  administration. 
Another important example is furnished by the Senate Budget Committee's exploratory investigations 
and the resulting document on the relationship between state and regional budgeting and planning. 
In all these cases involving large hearings with regional representatives, Parliament tends to assume 
an impartial role with the tacit consent of both regions and government. The general policy which 
emerges from this role  as  arbitrator is  not therefore a  'majority'  policy,  at  least in the technical 
parliamentary sense of the word. The regions governed by the opposition, whose political autonomy 
is guaranteed by the constitution, would obviously reject a majority policy; Parliament's intervention 
in  its  new  role  of  a  mediator  seeking  compromises  between  constitutional  entities,  hitherto 
unknown in Italian parliamentary history, falling as it does outside the traditional pattern of relations 
between  government and parliament,  prevents  this  from  happening. 
6)  Possible  developments  in  connection  with  the  new planning  procedures 
Parliament's  role  is  therefore  minor  and  extraneous  in  defining  the  lines  of  overall  policy  but 
significant in determining the lines  of sectoral, Community and regional-constitutional policy. 
This picture, however,  seems  bound to  change  when  and if  planning is  introduced. 
Planning policy suffered a serious setback in Italy after the first plan (1967-1971)  was legally adopted. 
This  was  due  more to an awareness  of  cultural inadequacies  of  a  politico-juridical  nature in its 
initial  stages  than to the crisis  of  the  centre-left  coalition  or economic  and  monetary difficulties. 
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complex and bind economic behaviour for  no clear purpose. It therefore became evident that the 
document should set out to establish a  coordination procedure.  As  a  result,  no procedure capable 
of  shaking  the  administration  out of  its  pigeon-hole  mentality  and  encouraging  Parliament  to 
produce legislation designed  and timed to fit  in with the plan's aims  emerged from this law. 
It seems  that the Ministry for Budgets  and Planning has now become aware of these errors and is 
turning to  a  different  approach,  stressing  procedure  and instruments  rather than aims. 
In this  new perspective,  Parliament's role in defining the lines  of policy will increase to the extent 
to which the  Chambers  play a  part in drawing  up  and adopting the general  programme choices. 
In a planned economy, the government's programme and overall policy must necessarily fall within 
the  wider framework  of the 5-year  plan and be  designed  largely  to implement it. 
If Parliament played  a  significant part in drawing  up  and choosing the plan, the situation would 
therefore  change  in  the  same  direction  as  the tendencies  noted for  some  sectoral  policies.  Apart 
from balancing the system for economic decision-making which at present centres on the triangular 
relationship between the government, trade unions and large firms,  the part which Parliament could 
play if granted powers over drawing up the plan would in many ways  be restricted by the greater 
urgency  of  the problems  of the government  in  office. 
Since  the  logically  superior  pattern  of  one  government,  one  plan,  one  legislature  does  not seem 
feasible in practice, it might be logical to choose a plan which, insofar as  it had the stamp of par-
liamentary approval, was legally and politically binding on the programmes of future governments. 
Though the  conflict  between  the government  majority and opposition would abate when  making 
planning choices,  it would  always  revive  when,  deciding  on the lines  of  policy  of  the individual 
governments,  either  within  the  framework  of  the plan or its  revision. 
B.  - The legislative  role 
1)  The  plurality  of the  sources  of parliamentary  legislation:  the  problems  of coordination.  Some 
remarks  on the  relations  between the  majority and the  opposition 
As  is  well  known, the Italian  system for  making  laws  is  characterized  by the possibility  of  their 
adoption by· parliamentary committees. 
As there are 14 of these committees in the Chamber and 12 in the Senate (apart from the possibility 
of setting up special committees), there are 28  centres for producing legislation in thetwo Chambers 
of the Italian parliament. 
Under  the  circumstances  it is  difficult  to  coordinate  legislative  work.  The government,  which  is 
only  now beginning  to realize  the  value  of  the  Ministry for  Relations  with Parliament,  is  often 
helpless  in  the  face  of  'corporative'  committee  pressure  unanimously  supported  by the  majority 
and opposition. In order to introduce some logic and mutual compatibility into the legislation pro-
duced,  the  binding opinion of the Budget Committee and the Committee for Constitutional Affairs 
and Public Employment has  been  made a necessary condition for proceeding, as this seems the best 
method available.  By  checking the opinions  of these  two horizontal committees,  the government, 
and the  majority  and opposition  who have  similar  problems  in  supervising  legislative  initiatives, 
can in practice keep track of the most important draft laws.  Mistaken or unsuitable draft laws are 
nevertheless often corrected and amended in the other House. The perfect bicameralism of the Italian 
system thus shows its use,  since,  as  the bill shuttles from one Chamber to the other, the legislator 
has  a  chance to reconsider  his  deeision. 
The extreme  disorder  in ·lawmaking,  which seriously  affects  the  quality  of the  laws  adopted and 
the coherence· of the system,  would certainly not be  alleviated  by  making less  use  of the advisory 
committees  which,  at present,  produce  80 %  of  Parliament's  legislation. 
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therefore,  even  the smallest  modification  or deferral requires the adoption of  a  law.  In the same 
way, new analogous situations are logically covered by law. The enormous number of corporations 
which depend on public subsidies, including those granted by law must also be mentioned in this 
context. 
Therefore, despite the large productive capacity which results from the pluralism of the system (on 
average, 1,800 laws are adopted in each legislature), the demand for legislation is largely unsatisfied. 
In addition,  requests  for  minor legislation,  backed by  administrative  and corporative pressure on 
committee members are more easily met than the demand for major laws, though the political and 
cultural commitment should obviously be  stronger and more responsible in the latter case.  Quality, 
therefore,  tends  to be  sacrificed  to quantity. 
Faced by this situation, most students of the system have wondered whether there was a tendency 
to sectoral delegation,  empowering the government to control by administrative rules certain fields 
hitherto  controlled by  law.  The opposition has  always  strongly  resisted  any  such  proposals.  The 
technical  reasons  for  this,  viz.  the complete  lack  of  any guarantee  of democratic  involvement  in 
normative  administrative  procedures,  are  at least  partly  acceptable.  It is  also  recommended  that 
the  regions  should  completely  fulfill  their  legislative  role,  though this  is  probably  over-optimistic 
and not founded  on any clear idea of the true reasons for legislation  (see  Sec.  2). 
The  technical  objections  to  such  delegation,  though  well-founded,  can,  however,  be  overcome 
whereas the political objections  which also  explain the opposition's hitherto  mediocre fate  in  the 
Italian parliament,  are  less  easily  dismissed. 
The opposition has, in fact, refused to deprive the parliamentary committees of any authority over 
the details of legislation and has made itself felt through the power to amend legislation (according 
to  the  constitution,  an opposition of  one tenth of the Members  of the Assembly  or one fifth  of 
committee members is enough to force a draft law to follow the longest passage through Parliament) 
rather than by providing plans for alternative government,  though faced  by  a  majority incapable 
of formulating  programmes  or implementing  them. 
Parliament's working therefore fell back into the pattern of administration by law, though it should 
be stressed that tradition has  been followed  and the detailed  administration of these laws  left to 
the ministry,  whose  power is  progressively  declining. 
The rising public sectors,  which have considerable political importance, rely  on formal legislation 
only  for  endowment funds.  The necessary  parliamentary  proceedings  are  carried  out at a  speed 
which never fails to amaze observers and, once they are  over, normal administration is  carried out 
• by the  use  of wide  discretionary  powers. 
The advisory committees are therefore a key element of the Italian parliamentary system and essential 
to understanding of the true nature of the relationship between majority and opposition.  On one 
hand, it is  widely known that at least 80 %  of Italian legislation is  adopted with the opposition's 
broad agreement, indicating a closer identity of interests than analysis of national society generally 
suggests.  On the other hand, the nature of the opposition is indicated by its resistance to plans for 
rationalizing the system  of legislative production, which affects  the extent of parliament's realized 
powers. 
2)  The legislative  role  of the  regions 
Article 70 of the Italian constitution states that 'legislative  duties are carried out jointly by the two 
Chambers'.  This  seems to make this role exclusively Parliament's domain but, on the contrary, the 
constitution  also  gives  the  regions  legislative  authority over a  number of  fields  (Article  117)  and 
makes collective labour agreements negotiated by the trade unions binding for all persons belonging 
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have  emerged  in practice - the European  Community and,  on a  special  level,  the Constitutional 
Court. 
Therefore  it is  obviously  not possible  to  make  an  accurate  assessment  of  Parliament's legislative 
role  without  first  establishing  how  the  existence  of  these  other  sources  of  legislation  affects  it. 
This is all the more important because there is  a noticeable tendency for these constitutional organs 
to intervene  indirectly  in  the legislative  process  by  playing  a  part  in or amending  parliamentary 
procedure. This indirect intervention is  often considered to be  of greater political importance than 
their direct normative  influence. 
The regions furnish the most obvious example. Within the limits of the fundamental principles estab-
lished  by  the  laws  of  the state,  the region  legislates  in  regard to the following  matters,  provided 
that such legislation is  not contrary to the interests of the nation or of other regions: organization 
of  the  offices  and administrative  bodies  dependent  on the  regions ;  town  boundaries ;  urban  and 
rural  police;  fairs  and  markets;  public  charities  and  health  and hospital  assistance;  professional 
and artisan training and scholastic assistance; museums and libraries of local bodies; town planning; 
tourist  trade  and  the  hotel  industry;  tram and motor-coach  services  of  regional  interest;  roads, 
aqueducts and public works of regional interest; lake navigation and ports; mineral and spa waters; 
quarries  and  peat-bogs;  hunting;  fishing  in  lake  and  river  waters;  agriculture  and  forestry; 
artisanship  and other matters  indicated  by  constitutional law. 
Clearly, for some of these matters, in particular, health and hospital assistance, town planning and 
agriculture,  it is  very  difficult  to identify  a  regional  interest  as  distinct from  a  national interest, 
especially  when the latter is  defined  in  a  context of  supra-national cooperation  (e.g.  agriculture). 
This  is  why  the  regions  tend  first  to exercise  their legislative  policy  in Parliament which  has  to 
adopt laws establishing the fundamental principles which provide the framework for all subsequent 
regional legislation. The range  covered  by 'regional matters' is also so wide that terms of reference 
frequently  overlap even in the case  of laws which mostly operate in fields  not usually covered  by 
the region's legislative  authority. This leads to further requests for indirect legislative intervention 
by the regions in fields  not included in the above list but which have  some effect  on them. 
It might be said that the discussion of all laws of any importance in Parliament now leads to a request 
by the regions for a legislative hearing. The presentation of draft laws (often the result of collaboration 
between  several  regions)  or,  of  proposed  amendments,  through the channel  of  local  parliaments 
to texts  under  discussion  may  be  considered  other forms  of indirect  regional  intervention. 
This phenomenon was  to be  expected.  The constitution itself  emphasizes  the need  to  adapt  'the 
methods  of legislation to the requirements  of local  autonomy'  (Article  5).  Now that the regions 
have been set up and the extent of their participation in Parliament's legislative process is  known, 
the Chambers are trying to find a better system for rationally organizing such regional intervention. 
It seems  most rational to give the Committee for  Regional Questions, consisting of 20 deputies and 
20 senators, general preliminary competence since, though its original terms of reference were fairly 
restrictive,  it soon  showed itself to be  a  useful  link in relations  between  the  regions,  Parliament 
and government. 
In any case the most important point in this context is  that the Parliament's legislative role is  now 
extensively conditioned by the existence  of the regions.  As  we  have seen, this is  largely the result 
of indirect intervention by the regions  in the process  of  state legislation  rather than the inability 
to legislate  over  regional  matters  unless  fundamental  principles  are  concerned. 
3)  The  powers  of the trade  unions  to  intervene  in the  legislative  process 
The trade unions are also able to intervene in a similar way in the parliamentary legislative process. 
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legislative  powers in their own field.  This possibility has  however never  been  exploited since  the 
trade unions have always refused to conform to the legal control (registration, personality, checking 
of membership)  which it requires. For some time a second best measure was used and the right to 
give  collective  agreements legislative form delegated to the government.  The Constitutional Court 
soon stopped this practice which  was  evidently contrary to the constitution. 
This leaves open the road of indirect participation and the trade unions have used it widely parti-
cularly  since,  in  1969,  they  withdrew their  leaders  from  Parliament,  unilaterally  declaring  trade 
union office  incompatible  with a  parliamentary mandate. 
The  trade  unions'  influence  on the  legislative  process  is  particularly  strong,  and  detrimental  to 
Parliament's decision-making autonomy when it concludes a normative agreement with the govern-
ment, which the latter presents as  a draft law. This occurs most frequently in the fields  of pensions 
and public employment. In such cases, the Chambers can choose between rubber-stamping decisions 
made elsewhere or amending the text of  the agreement, which  may,  and often has provoked anti-
government  strikes. 
There is  in practice a  third possibility.  Parliament may invite the contracting parties  (government 
and trade unions)  to further  meetings  to amend  specific  points  of the  agreement  in which  case, 
parliamentary procedure is suspended pending the new terms  of the contract.  Clearly,  under these 
circumstances, the traditional concept of the legislator as supreme, bound only to respect the consti-
tution  within  the  limits  of  possible  interpretations,  is  sacrificed.  These  procedures  seem  more 
acceptable and justified if they are considered  as  a  substitute for  a  constitutional mechanism  (the 
collective agreement being universally binding without any intervention by Parliament)  which does 
not function  for  the reasons  cited  above. 
By  contrast, intervention through legislative hearings falls  under normal legislative procedure, open 
to the parties involved. These hearings are frequently informal and take place in a select committee 
charged to present a  sufficiently  detailed text to the committee. 
The same phenomenon may occur here as in the context of regional intervention. Almost all legislative 
processes  of  any  importance  are  accompanied  by  requests  for  the  trade  unions  to  participate, 
particularly since  their interests have expanded from the conditions of the proletariat to the more 
complex problems  of the  quality of life. 
An  optimistic  appreciation  of  Parliament's  r6le  would  be  to see  it as  the political  arbitrator on 
points  not resolved  at the  first  encounter  between  trade  unions  and government. 
The trade unions have  so  far  made  only negative  contributions.  In other words, they have urged 
the Chambers not to pass laws, prejudge talks in progress, or force matters which should be settled 
by  collective  agreement  into  a  rigid  legislative  framework.  According  to  the  trade  unions,  the 
constitution implicitly  reserves  such  fields  for  contractual settlement. 
All these considerations seem to indicate that the drawing up of legislation and, in certain sectors, 
even  legislative  policy,  is  largely  conditioned  by  the  trade  unions  and  Parliament,  in  any  case, 
accepts  their intervention,  leaving  procedure wide  open to them. 
4)  The  Community's  role  in  making laws 
The increasing  importance  of  Community  regulations  and directives  is  another  important factor 
which  conditions  the  system  of legislative  decision-making. 
Two problems  arise  here:  the limitation  of legislative  authority  and the method  of legislation  in 
fields  relevant to the Community. 
Parliament has tackled the first problem and, in its 1971 rules of procedure, seemed to have accepted 
that the Community's normative acts  should be automatically included in the Italian system.  This 
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on this point and, in any case,  reflects  the opinion of most students who justify the limitation of 
legislative authority by the Treaty of Rome by recourse to Article 11  of the  Constitution.  ('Italy ... 
agrees,  on conditions  of  equality  with  other  states,  to such  limitation  of sovereignty  as  may  be 
necessary  for  a  system  to ensure  peace  and  justice  between  nations'.) 
The rules of procedure of the Chamber and Senate consider that it is quite unnecessary for Parliament 
to take any action as a result of the Community's normative acts and that what steps it does take 
need not be legislative. They deal with the possible need for administrative or direct legislative measures 
to harmonize the rules introduced by the Community, with juridical situations not directly covered 
by them.  Where  it does  not occur  automatically,  the parliamentary  rules  of  procedure therefore 
describe a procedure for further adaptation for additional consequences peculiar to the Italian system. 
The problem of which legislative method to use in fields  relevant to the Community, with or without 
Community  directives,  presents  greater difficulties. 
The Chamber's rules of procedure establish the possibility of appointing a special committee, consisting 
of two deputies  from  each  Standing  Committee  and the  18  deputies  belonging  to the  delegation 
to the European Parliament, to consider  draft legislation which  concerns  several sectors  of  Com-
munity activity.  Consideration of draft legislation relating to individual sectors is  entrusted to the 
committee under  whose  terms  of  reference  it falls  and the  Standing  Committee  for  Community 
Affairs recently set up within the Committee for Foreign Affairs  delivers  an opinion.  The Senate's 
rules of procedure, on the other hand, require the special Commission  for  affairs  of the European 
Communities, consisting of 22  senators, to deliver an opinion on any draft laws on the application 
of  agreements  concerning the European  Communities. 
The organs  of Parliament  are largely entrusted with running this  mechanism  and they  must give 
an opinion on conformity which,  in  every  field,  defines  the fundamental criteria for compatibility 
with Community policy.  Given  the complexity of the reference  points and the lack of  objectively 
defined  parameters, this task is  obviously not always  easy.  It is  becoming increasingly clear that, 
in  addition to taking  steps  to improve  internal  organization  (technical  staff  capable  of following 
the  main  aspects  of  Community  policy),  Parliament  must  make  it possible,  through the  Under-
Secretary for Community Affairs,  for Community officials to be summoned to committee hearings. 
In any case, Community requirements condition legislation just as  much as the other factors hitherto 
considered.  Though the Community as  a political force is  not yet comparable with the regions  or 
trade unions,  its  essential  nature has  important consequences. 
The horizontal element cutting across  the sectoral terms of reference  of the various parliamentary 
committees, acts as  a most effective means of breaking or at least splitting the corporative and class 
interests  harboured in them. 
Due to petty anti-Community rearguard battles, the opposition on the left has taken some time to 
awake to these points but is  now aware of them and is  therefore trying to transfer its critical role 
to the establishment of the  Community's  normative  policy.  Parliament's legislative powers,  which 
have become a lost cause with regard to national committees and assemblies must now be defended 
at the level  of the European parliamentary institutions. 
5)  The  powers  of the  Constitutional  Court  to  intervene  in  the legislative  process 
The Constitutional Court decides  whether contested laws  are constitutionally admissible.  When it 
declares  that a  law is  constitutionally inadmissible,  the law ceases  to apply from the day after the 
decision, is published. The Chambers are informed of this  'so that, should they consider it necessary, 
they  can  provide for  constitutional  means'  (Articles  134,  136  of the  Constitution). 
This COJ1Stitutional definition of the court's activity would not seem to justify describing it as a source 
of  legislation.  However,  it  does  not confine its  decisions  to  choosing  between  a  declaration  of 
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one of the possible  interpretations of the law in question is  constitutionally admissible,  or mani-
pulating the actual substance of the law by deleting particular sections of the original text or actually 
supplementing the contested legislative provisions which would be ineffective without an accompanying 
provision of this  nature. 
The Court justifies its free  interpretation in terms of constitutional policy by saying that it wishes, 
as  far  as  possible,  to avoid leaving  dangerous gaps  in the legislative  system. 
This  justification is  certainly  well-founded and the part played by the Court in rationalizing and 
democratizing  the  Italian legal  system  should  also  be  appreciated. 
In  our terms  of  reference,  however,  the  Constitutional  Court's influential  role  is  clearly  another 
factor  which  qualifies  Parliament's legislative  authority, particularly if it is  noted that the Consti-
tutional  Court  has  used  excessive  legislative  power  as  grounds  for  a  contested  provision  being 
constitutionally  inadmissible.  In  seeking  to  establish  these  grounds  (mutually  contradictory 
provisions,  only formal  compliance with the constitutional rules,  etc.)  the Court covers  the same 
ground as  the legislator  and therefore  acts  as  a source of legislation. 
The number of rulings issued  by the Court gives  some idea of the importance of its  activity:  129 
in 1957,  127 in 1962,  156  in  1967  and 224  in  1972. 
The 1971  rules  of parliamentary procedure included provisions  which  established  a  link  between 
the  Court  and  Chambers  so  as  to  eliminate  the  danger  of  gaps  in  legislation  and,  hence,  the 
justification  for  the  Court's  quasi-legislative  activity.  The  appropriate  parliamentary  committees 
are entrusted with examination of the Court's verdicts,  after which,  in the Chamber, they deliver 
an opinion on the need  for  a  legislative  initiative,  indicating the reasons,  whereas ·in the Senate 
they may adop a  resolution inviting the government to take the appropriate legislative or adminis-
trative  action. 
These rules, like all those introduced in 1971,  are still at the experimental stage and may come too 
late  in  the  day to change the tendency  of  such  important constitutional  behaviour. 
6)  Possible  developments  in connection  with the  new planning  procedures 
Parliament's performance of its legislative  role is  therefore greatly conditioned by external factors 
which  are  difficult  to  coordinate  within  the  Chambers.  The  picture  becomes  more  complex  it, 
rather than merely surveying the bodies involved in the legislative process, one attempts to classify 
the laws  adopted,  which  leads  to  a  more  diverse  functional  classification.  There is  inevitably  a 
crisis  of identity in  the  laws  corresponding to that .of  the legislator. 
Under  these  circumstances,  planning  procedures  seem  to  be  the  only  way  to  introduce  some 
rationality into the legislative  machine  without changing the entire  system. 
After  initial  mistakes  in planning, it seems  that the new plan will  consist  of  a  number of  social 
projects,  with exactly quantified costs and adequately articulated procedures. In other words, there 
will be a  complex of provisions easy to translate into full draft laws once the plan is  adopted. 
The national plan thus conceived would be a plan of plans. Much trade union and regional pressure, 
at present exercised on Parliament, would be brought to bear at the moment of drawing up the plan. 
For these ·coordinated projects it would also be politically advisable to delegate  extensively to the 
government. The reluctance to use this instrument could be completely overcome by increasing the 
powers of the special parliamentary committees set up  to watch over delegated legislation,  which 
at present have only consultative powers, even to the extent of enabling them to recall a  draft to 
Parliament. 
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beneficial effect on the committees' control over the details of legislation. The horizontal committees 
previously referred to  (see  note 1)  would have  infallible  means  to arrest any action incompatible 
with the choices of the plan. The present system for organizing parliamentary work in the 28 centres 
referred to would find a logical line of communication and the Chamber and Senate would be able 
to act in conjunction at the preliminary investigatory stage of 'planning legislation'  in  the informal 
context of the select  committees. 
It is  obvious, however, that even when all this has been achieved, Parliament will never regain its 
mythical  monopoly over  the legislative  r6le. 
This  sort of  plan  conceived  outside the  Chambers,  would further  limit  Parliament's freedom  to 
make laws, though this might be politically and legally rational. Every project becomes merely  an 
element in carrying out a  plan which is  more extensive than the powers  of the Assembly  or the 
committee responsible for  adopting it. 
The constitutional circumstances under which the legislative role is exercised have therefore changed 
irreversibly.  Parliament is  no longer  the  supreme  legislator  but has  its  own special  force  in  the 
privileged  capacity  of mediator,  coordinator  and aggregator  of  legislative  demand. 
C.  - Supervisory  Role 
1)  Changes  in  the  traditional idea  of parliamentary  supervision 
Parliament's  marginal  r6le  in appointing the government  and defining  the lines  of general  policy 
(see  A,  1.),  also  accounts for the crisis  in the concept of parliamentary supervision. 
The traditional idea  of parliamentary supervision  of the government's  activity  was  based  on the 
assumption that two factors  existed:  a  political responsibility to assert  and a  sanction  (dismissal) 
to enforce  it. 
Today these factors  are  only found outside Parliament.  The political parties involved in devising 
the coalition platform are usually entrusted with the task of ensuring that the government is politically 
responsible  by  use  of  the  dismissal  threat.  The  governmental  crisis  provoked  by  Parliament's 
supervisory procedure  (which,  in the Italian  system,  should obtain majority  support)  now hardly 
exists  outside  school text books. 
It would, however,  be wrong to conclude from these remarks that Parliament does not perform a 
critical watchdog r6le which may lead to dialectical opposition between the Chambers and govern-
ment. On the contrary, the present parliamentary system can be seen to allow most of these changes 
for  opposition. 
This partly depends  on objective conditions which have  been spelt out by modern sociology  and 
politics. The difference in institutional roles between the government apparatus with its technostructure 
and concentrated powers of decision-making and the Assembly with its diffuse non-executive power 
creates  a  real  split  of  political  classes  within  a  party,  between  members  of  the government  and 
Members of Parliament. 
The political system is  also such that cracks tend to appear in the government - majority continuum 
whereas, if  it were solid, the opposition would be left with nothing but residual and hypothetical 
possibilities  for  parliamentary  supervision.  The Italian  norm  of  coalition  governments  made  up 
of parties which are extensively split into factions  means that Parliament always  tends to be split 
beyond the group level.  For example, it is  easy  to find  a  government faction  and  an opposition 
faction, (left or right) adopting the same position in the Chambers, contrary to the official coalition line. 
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confidence  which  are taken  by  open  ballot).  So,  they  cannot be exploited to give  teeth  to insti-
tutionalized  supervisory  procedures  by  raising the threat of a  vote  of no  confidence. 
Instead,  these tensions  result in government supervision  and criticism  of  a  form  which  may  lead 
to dismissal  by indirect means,  by creating  unrest in the governmental team, public opinion and, 
hence,  the political parties which occupy the key position in the system. 
This criticism of the government's activity usually leads to changes in particular aspects of general 
policy.  The resolution  instrument  (see  A,  3.)  provides  a  formal political expression  of the results 
of investigation which, apart from the disproportionate and unwieldy weapon of the motion of no 
confidence,  would not otherwise exist. 
Two  aspects  of  Parliament's  role  of  government  supervision  may  therefore  now  be  detected: 
criticism  of  governmental  activity  which  m;ty  indirectly  lead  to dismissal,  and  criticism  resulting 
in  procedures  which  partially  change  overall  policy. 
2)  Ministerial  responsibility  and relations  between the  parliament and  public  administration 
This review of the concept of supervision in the light of the results of procedure must be accompanied 
by  an equally  profound  revision  in the  light  of  the  government's  political  responsibility. 
The major problem which arises here is  the relationship between Parliament and the public admin-
istration, the latter being taken to cover both the traditional administration organized in ministries 
and the  autonomous  corporations  and  public  industries.  The  differences  between  public  sectors 
are,  however,  extremely  relevant in this  respect. 
The scheme of the government's political responsibility still retains  a  certain credibility in relation 
to ministerial activity. The Italian central administration is still mostly organized in the 18th century 
pyramid structures which were  in use  when the theory of ministerial responsibility was  asserted. 
So  far,  not  even  the  establishment  of  the  regions  has  changed  it.  Owing  to  the  absence  of 
modernization its  workings  are so  unclear that it is  impossible to establish the responsibilities  of 
those  put in  charge  of  the  decisions  of  the  overall  machine.  The power  of  the  bureaucracy  is 
naturally widely  recognized  but Parliament is  the only outside force  which  can pin it down and 
make  it politically  responsible.  The myth  of  ministerial responsibility  therefore  lives  on, strongly 
defended  by the ministers  (see  A,  3.). 
The situation  as  regards  autonomous  corporations  and  nationalized  industries  is  very  different. 
Ministerial responsibility naturally also exists here on the part of the minister charged with surveillance 
of the corporations or the minister for state partnerships. Nevertheless, in these cases, responsibility 
for  management is  clearly  attributed.  The limits  of ministerial responsibility for  corporations and 
industries  which  enjoy  wide  autonomy  and  often,  as  a  result  of  their  structure  and  economic 
importance, are much more important than the minister who is  in theoretical control of them are 
also  very  clear. It is  therefore  natural that, under these circumstances,  Parliament should seek to 
establish the direct responsibility of the managers  of these  corporations or industries  who,  above 
all,  have  a  much longer  term of office  than most  ministers,  rather  than the  responsibility  of the 
appropriate  minister. 
Having set aside the scheme of ministerial responsibility, we see that Parliament controls the new 
type of political power exercised by the great public managers. This control can in many ways be 
seen as  supporting the government's efforts  to reintroduce operative unity into the intricate world 
of  autonomous public undertakings. 
The results of this supervision must, however,  be passed on to the government. Parliament has no 
institutional powers  over  corporations  and industries  despite  increasingly  insistent  requests  to be 
consulted by right on the  appointment of their directors.  Since the  Chambers  cannot use  powers 
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of influencing the bodies which have the authority to dismiss the directors or, more often, to change 
the lines  of  policy  pursued. 
3)  Parliament  as  a  constitutional guarantee 
The classical scheme of political responsibility also needs to be revised in respect of relations between 
Parliament  and  other  constitutional  bodies.  In the Italian  system,  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
the Judiciary, the  Constitutional Court, the regions  and political  parties  are certainly  not tied  by 
any  political  responsibility  to  Parliament  so  that  it  would  be  technically  wrong  to  talk  about 
Parliament's  supervisory  role  over  them. 
It is  nevertheless  indisputable that, despite  all  the formal  provisions  to the  contrary in the Rules 
of Procedure,  Parliament has  always  tried to ensure that these  constitutional bodies  were  making 
correct  use  of  their  constitutional powers, particularly through the indirect use  of instruments  of 
inspection  (particularly  questions  and interpellations). 
Parliament's role as  a constitutional guarantee which is  linked to, but distinct from, the supervisory 
role may also be identified. This is  an important role in the Italian political system and Parliament's 
ability  to  fill  it,  providing  a  safeguard  against  authoritarian  degeneration  of  public  power,  has 
probably been  its  most important contribution in the 25  years  of the Republic's  existence. 
In the period immediately  after  the  constitution  was  established,  a  climate  of  great international 
tension  prevailed  so  that Parliament's position as  a  frontier  in  the civil  cold war, which justified 
obstructionism, resulted in a series of agreements between the majority and opposition, all the more 
important  because  any  opposition  came  to be  considered  off-side. 
Later,  there  was  an internal  constitutional thaw corresponding to the  relaxation  in  international 
tension  and  Parliament  became  a  balance  between  constitutional  powers,  as  originally  intended, 
rather than a safeguard in the conflict between political forces.  This restrictive stabilising influence, 
appropriate to a  body which  is  the direct  expression  of  popular sovereignty,  has  been illustrated 
both in practice and theory, in a number of constitutional difficulties involving Parliament's intervention 
as  a  guarantee. 
Parliament has  acted  as  a  guarantee over  the  exercise  of various  powers  by  the President  of  the 
Republic (for example, power to grant pardons, powers held ex-officio as President of the Supreme 
Defence Council, etc.)  by means  of  both 'indirect'  questions and Parliamentary enquiry. The latter 
course of  action was taken in the crisis of July-August 1964 and in relation to the activities of the 
Secret  Service  since,  in both these  cases,  the opposition was interested in  establishing the respon-
sibility of the current President. There have also been many interventions in relation to the activities 
of the judiciary. In particular, a  large  number of questions  relating to the judges'  increasing  poli-
ticization and division into factions have been tabled, but the parliamentary enquiry into the mafia, 
devoted  to  the  behaviour  of  the  Sicilian  judiciary,  should  also  be  remembered.  More  recently, 
questions have been asked about the political stand adopted by the President of the Constitutional 
Court.  Instruments  of inspection  are also  used  in  relation to regional  activity - the two parlia-
mentary enquiries on local criminality conducted in Sicily and Sardinia for example also concerned 
the  behaviour of regional  bodies.  Questions about the activity  of political parties have been  used 
in particular to denounce  the continuing existence of organizations of  a  military character,  which 
are  forbidden  by  Article  18  of  the  Constitution,  or  attempts  to  reorganize  the  Fascist  party, 
forbidden  by  Final  provision  XII  of the  Constitution. 
This type of action makes it possible to regard Parliament as  defender of the constitution, ensuring 
that the state  organs  and other  bodies  make correct  political  use  of  their  constitutional powers, 
even  those  not bound to Parliament  by  any  specific  responsibility  and,  over  which  it,  therefore, 
has  no  real  control. 
106 4)  The instruments  for  parliamentary  inspection 
The Chambers can only establish ministerial responsibility, politico-administrative responsibility on 
the  abuse  of  constitutional powers referred to above  (3)  after they  have  used  the instruments  of 
inspection  at their  disposal to ascertain the exact details  of the  behaviour question.  The various 
instruments  of  inspection  must therefore  be  examined  in  order .  to  discover  the  effectiveness  of 
Parliament's  supervisory  procedure. 
This problem can be  tackled in a  number of ways  but the most useful  is  to distinguish  between 
the  instruments  which  require  the  government's  cooperation  to  establish  facts  and those  which 
do not. 
a)  The government's  cooperation  is  not  required  when  the  inspection  is  carried  out through a 
Committee  of Enquiry;  a  watchdog  committee;  the  examination  of reports  on the  management 
of corporations audited by the Audit Board; requests to the Audit Board for information, clarification 
or documents; examination of government expenditure which the Audit Board has declared illegal; 
examination  of the  progress  reports  on various  sectors  which  are  required  by  law. 
aa)  A  parliamentary inquiry,  described  by Article  82  of the constitution,  may  be  conducted into 
any matter 'of public interest'. It is carried out by a parliamentary committee specifically appointed 
for  this  purpose  and composed to represent  the proportions of  the various  groups. 
The Committee of Enquiry carries out its investigations with the same powers as the judicial authorities 
and is,  therefore,  the  most  powerful  instrument  of  inspection  available  to  the  Chambers.  It is, 
however, subject to the same limitations as judges' powers of investigation i.e. the barrier of political 
and military  secrecy  and the additional requirement that a  majority resolution is  needed  before a 
parliamentary inquiry  is  initiated.  ('minority'  inquiries  are not allowed). 
These restrictions  have  led  to the recent  advancement  of  the  somewhat paradoxical theory that, 
in  the Italian  system,  the  parliamentary  inquiry  is  an  'instrument  of  majority  government'.  In 
reality, the fact that the Republican Parliament has  so  rarely initiated an inquiry  (12  times in the 
25  years, from  1948  up to the present,  of which only 6 were supervisory i.e.  to establish political 
and administrative responsibility)  shows  that it is  an instrument which exceptional circumstances 
(e.g.  pressure  from  public  opinion,  division  on behaviour  between  the  coalition  parties,  requests 
from the grass roots of the governmental parties) force the parliamentary majority to use with all 
the  appropriate precautions. In any case,  the sporadic nature of the inquiry makes  it a  politically 
undesirable  and inefficient  systematic  organic check on political  and administrative  activity. 
ab)  The action initiated by the watchdog committees in relation to certain sectors is,  on the other 
hand, both organic and systematic. Their permanent powers to inspect the services  being checked, 
the ability to contact the managers of the sector and, in some cases, to interfere with administrative 
decisions,  all  make them a  modern instrument of parliamentary inspection. 
The committee for  supervising  radio  and television  possesses  the same  characteristics  except that 
its  powers  are limited  by the private character  of the  concessionary  firm  for  radio transmission. 
The other watchdog committees in the Italian parliamentary system, which deal with public debt, 
the  broadcasting  institution, the deposit  and lending  fund  and  provident funds  and the  national 
board for  nuclear  energy,  are  much less  prominent. 
ac) The Audit Board issues reports on the management of corporations which benefit from an annual 
state  financial  contribution.  By  examining  these  reports  in  committee  Parliament  can  therefore 
carry out a  systematic check on the activity of the enormous  sector  'outside  the  budget', ranging 
from  the large  corporations  which  distribute social  services  to the powerful public  holdings  (but 
not the operating firms  which  depend  on the  latter). 
If the  committees  consider the  data given  in the report to be inadequate they  may,  in addition, 
'invite'  the  Audit  Board  to provide further information or relevant material.  In other words the 
parliamentary committees may request use  of the Audit Board's considerable investigatory powers 
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istrators of the most important corporations, i.e.  those which get  a  capital contribution from the 
state.  The committee may conclude its examination with motions for a  resolution  concerning the 
running of the corporation. In the Senate, the Budgets Committee may also present a general report 
to the  Assembly  giving  an  economic  and financial  outline  of  the  management  of the subsidized 
corporations  and assessing  their  adherence to the plan for  economic  development. 
As  a result of the number of reports presented every year (now 119), the inability of  the Chamber 
and Senate to agree on any division  of labour or obvious lack of interest, compared to the problems 
of  supervision,  from  the  committees  responsible  for  corporative  legislation,  this  form  of  parlia-
mentary inspection after a promising start ran into a number of organizational difficulties.  In this 
context, it is  significant that the Chamber's rules  of procedure forbid the committees to meet the 
legislature,  during the period devoted to examining the budget, the general state report and other 
documents concerning national economic policy and the management of public funds. 
ad) The request to the Audit Board for information, clarification and documents, within the framework 
of  the powers  of  inspection  into public  administration  attributed to it by  law,  is  also  a  general 
instrument and may  be  used  regardless  of  the existence  of a  Board report. 
In the Chamber the request may be made by a committee chairman or a group president whereas 
in the Senate this delicate instrument may only be used by a committee majority. However, the pos-
sibility of a  complementary  relationship  between the  Audit Board and Parliament has  not so  far 
been  sufficiently  exploited in this  field  either. 
ae)  The examination of decrees  registered with reservations by the Audit Board is  a more marginal 
instrument. The Board finds  the administrative outlay illegal  but nevertheless registers  the decrees 
pursuant to the order of the Council of Ministers, reserving the right to inform Parliament of them. 
These  decrees  are  examined  in  the  appropriate  committee  which,  after  hearing  the  minister 
responsible,  may conclude its examination with a resolution. As  already mentioned, this procedure 
is  very  rarely used  though a  recent case  which led  to a  resolution  condemning the government's 
behaviour  brought it once  more  to general  attention. 
a£)  The examination of reports on the running of certain sectors is  by contrast a normal instrument 
of  parliamentary  inspection.  In many  bills  organizing  or advocating  financial  contributions,  Par-
liament inserts a clause obliging the government or corporation in charge of the sector to prepare 
a report (usually  annually)  giving  the results  obtained, criteria  used  and prospects.  Recently,  Par-
liament  has  adopted  financial  bills  which  explicitly  make  prior  presentation  of  a  report  a  pre-
condition for  receiving  the  annual  contribution from  the state. 
This instrument is effective insofar as it forces the administrators responsible to explain administrative 
policy in the sector and therefore present programmes and parameters which can be easily checked 
from one year to the next. The planning report on state partnerships is  particularly important. As 
in the case of the Audit Board's reports, the Chambers have not yet found a method of organizing 
their work. The Chamber's rules  of procedure allow these reports to be considered together with 
the state budget or separately. In the latter case, the examination may conclude with a resolution. 
However,  Parliament does  not yet  treat these  documents  with sufficient  application. 
b)  In contrast to the above instruments of inspection, government's cooperation is required to obtain 
access to data when carrying out investigations by means of questions and interpellations; committee 
hearings  with  ministers;  requests  to ministers  for information;  news  and documents; hearings  of 
the directors  in  charge  of  publicly  administered  sectors  and public  corporations. 
ba) Questions are the most frequently used instrument of inspection. There are three types of questions: 
(questions  presented in the Assembly, questions  requiring a  written reply  and questions  requiring 
a  reply  in  committee)  which,  between  them,  account  for  the  greatest  number  of  parliamentary 
initiatives.  In  recent  Parliaments  there  have  been  on average  more  than 7 000  per  annum in the 
Chamber and 2 500 in the Senate. 
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which they more or less explicitly contain. There are so many demands that it is impossible to reply 
to them all - only 30 % actually obtain a reply in the Assembly  and the remaining 70 % obtain 
a  written reply. 
Interpellations differ from questions in that they are designed to discover the government's attitude 
in a  certain field,  rather than some particular fact,  and therefore to lead to a  brief discussion  of 
overall policy which,  according to the Chamber's rules  of procedure,  may then widen to include 
the whole Assembly  and presentation  of  a  motion. 
On average, 260 interpellations are presented each year in the Chamber and 140 in the Senate. About 
20%  of these  actually obtain a  reply. 
The government may declare that it is unable to reply to a question or interpellation but it uses this 
right very rarely and often chooses to remain silent. In any case, questions and interpellations preserve 
visible  and comprehensive  contacts  between Parliament and government,  and between parliament 
and public opinion, but have lost any real supervisory value. The political and administrative intricacies 
of the modern state can no longer be unravelled in occasional exchanges of repartee in the Assembly. 
bb)  Article  64  of  the Constitution also  obliges  ministers  to  attend the meetings  of parliamentary 
committees if called upon.  Committees may also ask ministers to attend to clear up administrative 
and political questions which fall within their field of reference. Hearings with ministers are generally 
sought  by  making  mutual  concessions.  Though a  minister rarely refuses  a  request for  a  hearing, 
he  frequently accepts  only subject to the exclusion of certain subjects  or to certain deadlines.  The 
hearing is one of the instruments most favoured by parliamentary committees and is certainly useful 
for obtaining an overall picture of the running of the sector from the point of view of administration 
or legislative  policy. 
be)  The request  to  ministers  for  information,  news  and documents  was  only  introduced in  1971 
and is  therefore,  as  yet,  difficult  to assess  in practice. 
It differs from the question, which is put by an individual, in that requests are made by a committee 
and that it is  directed  at the administration, through the minister, rather than at him personally. 
A request may also be made directly to be given  documents, in this case without the intermediary 
of the Audit Board.  The minister  may  of  course  reject such requests,  but when he replies  in the 
affirmative, he in practice authorizes direct contact between his administration and the parliamentary 
committee. 
This new instrument, which is the subject of recent research, is characterized by the fact that, pursuant 
to the Chamber's rules of procedure, the committee's request follows  automatically from a request 
by  a  group  representative,  though in the Senate  the usual  requirement of  committee  majority  is 
applied. If this rule is adhered to in practice, this will be the one instrument of inspection by means 
of which  a  minority request can initiate collegial  activity. 
bd)  The instrument of hearings with managers in charge of public administration sectors and public 
corporations even if autonomously run was introduced in Parliament's rules of procedure in recog-
nition of the crisis  in ministerial responsibility referred to above.  It represented,  however,  a  very 
prudent reaction  which respected  the scheme  with which  it largely  overlapped.  In fact,  it allows 
the appropriate ministers to organize the attendance of officials  and administrators. Hearings with 
administrators of the major public holdings, which are the most common and politically significant, 
have in practice demonstrated full  recognition  of the political role performed by these  managers. 
In any case, there have been no complete refusals of ministerial authorization - the minister would 
have to give his reasons for any such refusal. More recently, committees have tended to obtain hearings 
with officials  and administrators in the framework of exploratory investigations  (see  CS)  involving 
a  free  procedure,  i.e.  the  parliamentary  rules  of  procedure  do  not  require  prior  ministerial 
authorization. 
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The instruments of parliamentary investigation which have been examined so  far all possess  some 
coercive  force,  as  distinct  from  Parliament's  other instruments  for  obtaining information. 
This coercive force has been seen to vary widely, ranging from the judicial powers of the Committee 
of Inquiry to the simple obligation for the government to explain its refusal to attend a hearing or 
reply to an interpellation or question. Any procedure for obtaining information initiated by Parliament 
on the other hand has no obligatory nature. The Chambers may, however, obtain information which 
can be  used  in future  supervisory processes. 
The prominence  which  exploratory  investigations  by  parliamentary  committees  have  in  practive 
recently  acquired  in  the Italian  Chambers  must,  therefore,  be  stressed. 
They may be used for any matter of public interest. The procedure is very simple since the committee 
may  decide to carry out an exploratory investigation subject only to the organizational condition 
that it provides  a  programme which obtains the support of the Assembly's  president. 
Statements  from  representatives  of  public  and  private  interests,  documents,  contributions  from 
experts  and on the spot investigations  enable the parliamentary committee to reach  a  conclusion 
on the question in a relatively short space of time.  A document giving the results obtained should 
be adopted after  the investigations  are  finished. 
The procedural flexibility  of exploratory investigation has its counterpart  in  the absolute freedom 
of the subjects  questioned and absence  of sanctions  in the case  of false  declarations,  which  some 
consider  to be  a  negative  factor. 
So  far  as  the first  matter is  concerned, it should be  noted that, in seven  years  of experience,  (the 
first  exploratory investigation was  conducted in the Chamber in 1957)  there has  been no case  of 
unjustified  refusal to appear before  a  parliamentary  committee.  The second  objection is  to some 
extent met  by  the fact  that, though the  investigation  is  conducted to obtain information  and is 
expressly forbidden by the Senate's rules of procedure to attempt to establish guilt, it has  a cross-
examination structure which  makes  false  statements fairly  risky  and relatively  useless. 
The lack of coercive powers in itself means that the exploratory investigation reflects  the true role 
which Parliament has assumed in the system.  This role gives it an authority in dealing with public 
and private subjects greater than any power which it could hope to wield by conducting exploratory 
investigations  with coercive  powers. 
Other formal procedures for obtaining information enable the Chambers to use  the services  of the 
Central Statistical Institute  (!STAT), which some have seen as the first  step towards destroying the 
institute's traditional dependence on the government and making it a  neutral body guaranteed by 
Parliament, and the studies and investigations of the National Council for Economics and Employment 
(CNEL). These procedures are, however, rarely used, partly because the activities of these institutes 
have,  at present,  run up  against  certain  objective  limits. 
Parliament may also obtain information through its own internal services - i.e.  by informal means. 
The parliamentary bureaucracy is  continually being organized and adapted, to divide its  staff into 
specialized  categories  responsible  for  research,  preparing  data,  drafting  dossiers  etc.  contrary  to 
the  old image  of the  generalist official  clerk. 
The internal organization of the Chamber and Senate is  based on departments and special  offices 
which  are  minor  entities  with  horizontal terms  of reference  cutting  across  departments. 
The  Chamber's  organization  consists  of  14  departments  (Assembly;  parliamentary  committees; 
prerogatives  and  immunity;  relations  with  European  Community  institutions;  verbatim  reports, 
shorthand; research,  legislation  and parliamentary investigations;  library;  archives;  parliamentary 
statistics  and documentation;  administration  artd  supplies;  personnel;  treasury;  international  and 
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historical  archives,  general  electronic  register;  legal  affairs;  general  affairs  and  public  relations). 
The Senate's organization consists of 8 departments: (secretariat; parliamentary committees; verbatim 
reports; research; library; police; personnel; accountancy)  and four special offices  (general  affairs; 
current  documentation  and  press  information;  relations  with  the  European  Community  bodies; 
electronic  classification  of data and parliamentary information). 
The Chamber  and Senate's  departments  and offices  are  run by  the  respective  Secretaries-General 
who  are  responsible to the  President. 
6)  The  national limits  of Parliament's  supervisory  powers.  The  role  of the European  Parliament 
Despite the number and variety of the means of investigation available to the Chambers, parliamentary 
information suffers  from  serious  deficiencies  and delays. 
This is certainly largely the result of inefficient use of the means available, and scepticism by members 
concerning  the results  of  investigations  and supervisory  activities. 
The main cause of defective information is, however, the difficulty of obtaining a good grasp of the 
international causes  and dimensions of the phenomena in question. It is  immediately obvious that 
any public action directed at the fundamental issues  of Italian society - regional  policy,  type  of 
industrialization, planning etc.  is  to a  gr,eat  extent, conditioned by the international context.  Lack 
of information about this context implies inadequate knowledge of the national facts related to them. 
But,  even  in  the  rare  case  where  there  is  sufficient  information,  Parliament  does  not possess  the 
means to enable it to use this information for  supervisory purposes. The examples ·cited above are 
illustrative. 
Regional policy, typified by the problem of the Mezzogiorno, certainly cannot be judged outside 
the framework  of  European  attitudes  in  this  matter.  This  framework  must include  not only 
the  Community's  official  decisions  but also  the legal  and incidental factors  which in various 
countries  are  now  encouraging  the  tendency  for  production  to  concentrate  in  economically 
over-heated  zones.  If Parliament  is  to  control  these  phenomena  it  must  use  instruments 
capable of  operating outside  the national sphere. 
The choice of the type of industrial development in a country such as Italy, where the inadequacy 
of  investment  is  added  to  the  country's  structural  weakness,  is  largely  conditioned  by  the 
problem of  multinational firms.  It is  a  serious  political  matter that it should be  necessary to 
choose between inadequate investment and an industrial plant which destroys the environment; 
this  problem  can  only  be  satisfactorily  solved  by  developing  methods  of  controlling  and 
influencing  the  behaviour  of  international  capital  by  public  action.  Though  it  may  seem 
paradoxical,  parliamentary  control  over  nationalized  industries  also  suffers  from  a  lack  of 
information on the policy  which nationalized industries  often conduct abroad where they are 
safer from  indiscreet inquiries  than in  their own country. 
The extent to which the influence of multinational firms  and foreign behaviour of nationalized 
industries escape from public control will also have an effect on Parliament's chance to influence 
planning choices. 
All  these  phenomena  are  therefore  examples  of the  disequilibrium  between  the  level  of politico-
constitutional  powers  and the  level  of  economic  power defined  by  recent  theories.  The national 
dimension is  the limit in practice now most likely  to lessen  the constitutional significance  of the 
supremacy  of  democratic values. 
The  national parliament cannot  restore  this  balance  by  its  action  alone  and,  at present,  neither 
parties  nor trade  unions  are  able  to help  it.  Limited  economic  sovereignty  can only  be  restored 
within economic and fiscal sovereignty over a larger area i.e. the Community. The supervisory powers 
of the national Chambers must ally themselves to the powers which the European Parliament can 
exercise  over  a  multinational area. 
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its new role, its capacity to absorb all social phenomena and authority in leading public and private 
autonomous  bodies  to a  common discussion. 
It is  interesting to note that though, in relation  to the  policy  and legislative  roles,  the European 
dimension acts as an effective limit on autonomy in relation to Parliament's key role (viz. supervisory), 
it is  an aim which must be  achieved in order to perform this function effectively. 
This means that the development of the parliamentary institution in every Community state is  now 
closely  linked  to the  development  of  the  European  parliamentary  institution. 
III  - Conclusion 
The analysis  of  the  changes  in  the  Italian Parliament's  roles  therefore  leads  us  to the  following 
conclusions. 
- In defining the lines of overall policy, Parliament merely ratifies decisions taken by other bodies 
elsewhere. Its powers of codetermination are confined to sectoral procedure in an overall framework 
which has already been defined. A chance arises for Parliament to recover its political importance, 
in relation to the government, the regions, trade unions and large public and private firms, through 
its  involvement  in general planning procedure. 
- Parliament's  legislative  activity  is  increasingly  conditioned  by  the  existence  of  new  centres  of 
aggregation  of  legislative  demand.  The normative  choice  is  therefore  reduced to coordinating 
the demands  made by these new centres (the regions and trade unions, and, most conspicuously, 
the EEC).  In most cases,  legislative  choice is  therefore arbitrary and the parliamentary solution 
emerges  as  a  compromise  between  the  'maximum'  requests  of  both  sides  of industry. The 
concept  of  Parliament  autonomously  deciding  the details  of the problem becomes  increasingly 
remote from  reality. 
It is  therefore rare for a question to be first raised in Parliament, though when it is, the question 
may still  be  important.  On the contrary, this is  often how major diffuse  interests,  which lack 
cooperative  representation  but have  a  wide  effect  on the life  of  individuals,  suddenly  cluster. 
- The naive  concept generally held  of Parliament's  supervisory  role  is  the main difficulty  which 
arises.  The ideas  of  ministerial  responsibility  and dismissal,  the  traditional  lynch-pins  of  the 
procedure  for  Parliament's  supervisory  procedure,  no  longer  describe  the  tendencies  in  the 
Chambers which though not institutionalized, involve significant  political responsibility.  Parlia-
ment attempts to rectify  political  conduct rather than bring  about dismissals,  presenting  itself 
as  a  guarantee  of the general  politico-constitutional  equilibrium. 
This important development in Parliament's  role  suggests  an image which,  in many ways,  differs 
from  the  usually  accepted  model. 
The fiction  of Parliament as  producer of  original decisions  in  relation to political demand which 
is diffuse or aggregated through parties and groups, is replaced by the reality of Parliament mediating 
and  arbitrating  between  demands  previously  aggregated  by  institutional  centres  other  than  the 
party or group. 
The fiction  of Parliament as  a  privileged  watch-dog of the government is  replaced  by the reality 
of a centre coordinating the autonomous public organizations and constitutional powers and seeking 
to destroy the scheme of ministerial responsibility to establish the political responsibility - which 
has not been institutionalized - of the effective  wielders  of public power. 
The fiction  of Parliament as  a representative organ is  replaced by the reality of a Parliament which 
has  become  an instrument of direct  participation  by  classes,  interests  and competencies  in public 
decision-making.  The  exploratory  stages  of  parliamentary  procedure  have  become  so  important 
that they actually  affect  the quality of the final  decision. 
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complexity of  democratic decision-making procedures in an industrial state, it acts  as  a guarantee 
by exercising its supervisory powers, referred to above, ensuring the correct procedure and hearing 
interests and, at the same time, providing a centre where the demands of the government and other 
political forces  involved  in the  proceedings  may  be  compared  on equal terms. 
In  technical  legal  terms  the Italian Parliament's  recent  development  fits  perfectly into  the line  of 
procedural evolution of the democratic system which theory singled out some time ago as the logical 
line  of  legal  development  of the system. 
In the terms of political science, there seems to have been a reversal of the tendency for Parliament 
to become progressively less powerful, which at a certain point seemed irreversible. In recent stages, 
Parliament has effectively been accumulating power, though not in the decision-making field,  and 
exercises  a democratic authority which cannot be confused with other types  of public supremacy. 
The present meaning of governing with Parliament's consent is  certainly different and more complex 
than  the  traditional  description  of  the  relationship  between  the  government  and  parliamentary 
majority. 
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I  - INTRODUCTION 
While it is true that the size of a country does not determine its political system or the character of 
its parliament, in trying to understand Luxembourg's political system, its functioning and its problems, 
we  cannot remind  ourselves  often enough of  the fact  that it is  a  very  small country. 
1.  Outline of geography  and economy (1) 
Luxembourg extends for 57 km from west to east and 82  km from north to south. It has an area 
of  2,586  km2  and a  population of 348,000. 
Its  population statistics are catastrophic. The birth rate (9.6%  in 1972)  is  the lowest in the Com-
munity, and since 1967 deaths for the native population have exceeded births. This has resulted in 
( 1)  Georges Als, Le Luxembourg: profil geographique et economique, Ministere d'Etat, Service Information et Presse, Luxembourg, 1973. 
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net annual immigration exceeded 1,000 persons; the  figure  rose to over 2,000 from 1960 to 1970; 
and must now be around 2,500. The number of foreign residents rose from 29,000 in 1947 to 41,500 
in 1960  and to 62,800  in 1970.  Today it must be in the order of  72,000.  Foreigners  thus account 
for 20 %  of the total population but do not participate in the country's political life. 
Luxembourg's  prosperity  dates  from  the  late  19th  century  and  is  due  to the  establishment  and 
development of the large iron and steel industry. In the second half of the 20th century successive 
governments  have  deliberately  and successfully  pursued policies  of  diversification,  but  metallurgy 
remains  by  far  the country's  most important industry. 
The rate of economic growth has been relatively modest, the rise in GNP averaging 3.2 % over 1950-
1970.  It is  subject to considerable fluctuations,  reflecting  mainly the situation in the steel  market. 
Despite  this  unspectacular  rate  of growth,  Luxembourg  has  been  able to attain an exceptionally 
high standard of living. The per capita GNP is  among the highest in the EEC, 3,600 dollars in 1971. 
At the beginning of 1972 Luxembourg held the leading place in the EEC for the proportional number 
of private cars (289 per thousand inhabitants), telephones (324 per thousand inhabitants) and hospital 
beds  (1174  per  hundred  thousand  inhabitants).  Housing  statistics  show  a  similar  picture:  all 
dwellings  have  electricity,  nearly  all  interior  running  water,  and  approximately  two-thirds  have 
a  bathroom.  Approximately  60 %  of  households  are  owner-occupiers. 
In the services  sector attention must be drawn to Luxembourg's rapid rise in the financial  market. 
Between 1955  and 1973  the number of banking establishments nearly quadrupled, increasing from 
13  to over 70,  and leading  to the  creation  of  many  new  jobs. 
Overall,  Luxembourg  can  be  described  as  a  prosperous,  highly  industrialized  country,  with  full 
employment  and  a  remarkably  calm  social  atmosphere.  Despite  its  large  foreign  population,  it 
represents  a  homogeneous  whole. 
2.  Constitutional structure (1) 
The state of Luxembourg is  a representative democracy in the form of a  constitutional monarchy. 
The political system is  based essentially on the separation of powers which, without being formally 
written  into the  constitution,  is  implied  both by  its  arrangement  and context: 
- the exercise of executive power pertains to the Grand Duke backed by a responsible government; 
- legislative  power is  exercised  jointly by the Grand Duke  and the  Chamber of  Deputies; 
- judicial  power is  exercised  by  the courts  and tribunals. 
The Luxembourg parliament is  unicameral,  but the Council of State functions  to  some  extent  as 
the deliberative  chamber. 
a)  The  Council  of State 
The Council of State - patterned on the French  model  but with  a  far  more important role -
sits primarily as  a legislative assembly when it issues its opinions, which are an obligatory require-
ment,  on all  bills  sponsored  by the government or the deputies. 
The Council cannot initiate,  but it can amend - and uses  this  right  frequently.  No  bill  can  be 
voted by  the Chamber before the Council of  State has given its  opinion. It must be  consulted on 
(')  Pierre Majerus,  Les  Institutions de  l'Etat luxembourgeois,  Ministere d'Etat, Service Information et Presse,  Luxembourg, 1973; l'Etat 
luxembourgeois,  Saint  Paul,  Luxembourg,  1970. 
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course  of debate.  Thus, any bill amended  during the first  reading must  automatically go  back to 
the  Council  of State for its  new  opinion. 
In addition, to compensate for the absence of a second chamber, the constitution provides that aU 
bills  must be put to a  second vote in the  Chamber,  unless  the Chamber,  by  agreement with the 
Council  of  State,  decides  otherwise.  If the  Council  refuses  to dispense  the  Chamber  from  the 
constitutional obligation of the second vote, at least three months must elapse between the first and 
second voting.  The Council of State thus enjoys  the right of an effective  suspensive veto, since it 
can impose on the Chamber a period for reflection - which, however, in practice does not exceed 
three  months. 
In theory the Council of State even  has  an indirect right of prolonged or indefinite veto.  For if it 
failed,  or refused, to issue  an opinion on a  bill, it would be  quite impossible for the Chamber to 
vote  on it.  Although there  is  no time-restriction  on the  Council's  suspensive  power,  such  a  case 
has  never  occurred in practice. 
b)  The  Chamber  of Deputies 
Under  the terms  of  the  constitution  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  represents  the  country. 
The number of deputies is  at present 56, to be increased to 59 at the May 1974 election. Elections 
are normally held every 5 years. Ruling coalitions have generally been able to sit out their term of 
office.  Agreements  between  the parties forming  them have  enabled  them  to resist  pre-dissolution 
pressures. 
The country is divided into four electoral districts of very unequal size and there is  one deputy for 
5,500  inhabitants. 
Direct elections  to the legislature  are  by  universal suffrage  and electors  cast their votes  for  a  list 
of  candidates.  Voting  is  compulsory  and  secret.  Seats  are  distributed  according  to the  rules  of 
proportional representation,  on the principle  of  the lowest electoral  quotient. 
Th~ugh voting  is  compulsory,  abstentions,  blank  and  spoiled  ballot  papers,  and  incomplete 
utilization  of  the votes  on valid  ballot papers,  mean that the effective  valid  vote  is  of the order 
of  80% (1). 
Until  1971  the  deputies  generally  belonged  to  one  of the  four  so-called traditional parties: The 
Social  Christian Party, the Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party (POSL),  The Democratic (liberal) 
Party and the Communist Party. After a  split in the socialist party in 1971  the socialists  are now 
represented  by  both the POSL  and the Social  Democratic Party. 
II- THE NATURE  OF  THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
or the levels  of democratization 
The history  of parliamentarism in Luxembourg  has  been  marked  by thorough-going pragmatism 
and deep suspicion of sudden change.  The system has been changing from within, with no sudden 
jolts.  It  has  been  able  to  evolve  mechanisms  for  adaptation  and  adjustment,  whereby  a  well-
established body of practice has been grafted onto the  formal  constitution.  The 'democratization' 
of public life  has  been  an orderly process in which the parliament, the political parties, the trade 
unions  and the  bodies  specifically  concerned  with  social  partnership  have  all  played  their  part. 
( 1)  Ministere de l'Economie nationale, Service  Central de Ia  statistique et des  Etudes Economiques, Bulletin du  ST  A  TEC  'Les elections 
!egislatives de  1945  a 1968',  No  8/1969. 
116 A  - Historical  development 
The governed  democracy. 
1)  Despite as  many as  four revisions, in 1919, 1948,  1956 and 1972, the text of the constitution of 
1868  remains to a  large  extent a  document  of its  age. 
In the political history of the country this has been reflected in: property voting qualifications limiting 
the electorate to the well-off strata of the population; the exclusion of women from public life; the 
absence of political parties, in the sense of stable organizations with permanent channels of influence 
and the will to exercise power directly by seeking popular support, and not simply of factions  or 
ad hoc electoral committees (
1
). 
In  1868  the  Parliament  was  a  simple  counter-weight  to  the  Grand-Ducal  power.  The  essential 
prerogative of this truncated chamber  was  the  exclusive right to approve taxes  and to determine 
the budget appropriations from year to year.  The functions  of the Chamber, the Government and 
the  Crown were  confined  respectively  to those  of control,  governing  and reigning. 
This  was  the  system  called  'governed  democracy'  which  is  characterized  by  the  absence  of 
organized political parties  with well-defined  doctrines (2). 
1919  marked the turning point when liberalization of  the constitution emancipated social  groups 
which  until  then  had been  denied  access  to the  machinery  of parliamentary representation.  The 
right to vote was extended to all men and women aged 21; the property qualification was abolished. 
This was soon to result in a re-shaping of the parliament's social configuration. Before reform there 
were few  members who were not either lawyers or landowners. In  1918  landowners accounted for 
one-fifth of  all the members  of Parliament; three years  later there were  only 4 out of 48. 
2)  The influence  of usage 
In a  study intended to describe  and analyse the Grand Duchy's parliament it is  essential to draw 
attention  to  the  decisive  role  played  by  usage  in  the  development  of  cooperation  between  the 
executive and the legislature.  Adjustments in the functioning  of the parliamentary institution have 
not been recorded in the statutes. The constitution is  not very explicit on the internal procedures 
of interaction between the government  and the nation's representative  body. 
In Luxembourg, probably even more than elsewhere, the extension of the executive's scope of action 
and intervention and the increasingly technical nature of bills presented in Parliament, have not been 
accompanied  by  a parallel increase in the possibilities  of investigation,  information-gathering and 
control for  the  legislature.  Members  of  the  Chamber of Deputies  know  all  about  the  crisis  of 
parliamentarism now affecting  all  the countries  of Europe ! 
B - The political parties - The role  of parties 
1)  Parties  not recognized 
The constitution does not recognize the fact that the process  of democratization of the institutions 
has advanced through the specialized agency of the political parties. It  perpetuates the fiction according 
to which  'the  deputies shall vote without referring to their constituents  and solely in the general 
interests  of  the Grand Duchy'  (Art.  50). 
( 1)  La Palombara Joseph, Weiner, 'The origin and development of Political Parties', La Palombara,  Weiner,  Political Parties and Political 
Development,  Princetown,  N.J., Princetown  University  Press,  1966. 
(')  Charles-Leon Hammes. 'Le Gouvernement du Grand-Duchc!',  Le  Conseil  d'Etat, Livre iubilaire, Bourg-Bourger, Luxembourg, 1956, 
p.  484. 
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mention  of  them in the constitution  and  no  legislation  to regulate  the structure  and finances  of 
political  parties.  In  recent  years  such  legislation  has  repeatedly  been  asked  for.  These  proposals 
have so far met with little enthusiasm from the majority of those directly concerned.  Nevertheless, 
one  or two  political  parties  tend  to  bring  up  the  question  of the  parties'  legal  status  in  their 
programmes. 
2)  A  dominant  Catholic  party 
The peculiar party-political structure in Luxembourg is  another factor which  tends to explain the 
long survival of  'governed democracy'. The erosion of the Crown's power was completed in 1919, 
when Article  32  was  revised  to state formally  the principle  of  national sovereignty  and limit the 
powers  of  the sovereign  to  those  laid down in the  Constitution. 
The introduction of universal suffrage hastened the decline of organizations lacking popular support, 
such  as  the liberal  party.  It favoured,  on the  other hand, the progress  and  consolidation  of  the 
Catholic party which in  an explosive social  situation - there were  largescale  strikes  in 1917  and 
1921  - took the  name  of the party of  the right. 
It is  interesting to examine the meaning of this label which to a Frenchman, used to the idealogical 
•leftism'  of  his  country's  political life, seems paradoxical. The party of the right, which is the party 
of consensus, is  above all the party of the ordinary people.  A historian put it like this:  'From the 
start the right  made  a  point of  presenting itself  as  an aggregative party, with supporters ranging 
from the middle classes,  through the country folk,  to the working proletariat ... '  { 1).  He goes  on: 
'Only the  high bourgeoisie and the upper fringes  of the middle bourgeoisie escape its  grasp.'  This 
observation  is  interesting,  and while  the  analysis  is  on the  whole  correct,  it  requires  somewhat 
subtler shading. In particular, it should be noted that, even in the past, old bourgeois families never 
made any  secret  of  their allegiance to the Catholic party and that certainly today the author's last 
reservation  no longer  applies. 
A  lasting  consonance  has  set  in  between  the party of  the  Right  and the basic  system  of  values 
prevailing  in the  Grand Duchy. (2)  Catholic  education  flourishes  in  a  society  where  95 %  of  the 
population is  Catholic, if  only in name; (3)  it instils  unbounded loyalty to the  Crown; it models 
the country's social institutions in the image of co-operative participation preached by the Church. 
The party of the Right has  a reliable communications network covering the whole country and is 
seen to be present in all the constituencies, whereas the influence of rival groupings is more localized. 
Consequences  for  the Parliament 
Continuously in power since  1919,  with the exception of a  brief interlude in 1925-1926, the party 
of the Right - transformed into the Social Christian Party in 1945 - has been meeting a functional 
need of the  political system by providing it with stability and continuity and by uniting, within a 
coalition held together by Christian sociological beliefs, individuals representing nearly all the classes 
of the population. 
At the  parliamentary  level,  the pre-eminence  of such  a  political  set-up  could not fail  to produce 
direct  consequences.  The country  is  dominated  by  one  party.  Therefore the  structure  of  power 
within this organization must also condition the functioning of the political system. Thus the chairman 
of the party and the leader of the parliamentary group are subordinated to the real  chief  of the 
organization, that is, the Prime Minister. This leads of necessity to some diminution of the legislative's 
( 1)  Gilbert Trausch, 'De !'opposition au pouvoir. Aux origines du parti chretien·social 1912-1922', Luxemburger  Wort, 20  January  1974. 
(')  Michel  Delvaux  in  'La paix sociale; le  Parti chretien-social'; Letzeburger Land No 50/1973  and No 1/1974 develops, with reference 
to the Grand Duchy, the arguments, propounded by Frank Parkin.  (See  'Working-Class  conservatives',  British  journal of Sociology 
(Sept.  1967)  and Class  Inequality  and Political  Order,  Mac  Gibbon and Kee  Ltd., 1971. 
(')  Andre Heiderscheid, Les  Luxembourgeois, Un  peuple epi:is  de securite, Universite Internationale de Sciences comparees, Luxembourg, 
1970,  pp.  126-141. 
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voting  discipline  to  moderate their  criticism  of those  they  have  entrusted with authority. 
3)  Role  of the  other  parties 
The Social Christian Party has been the unquestioned leading political force since 1919 and the other 
parties, which recognize its superior strength, have had to self-identify in relation to the major partner. 
In any analysis of the role of the parties according to their functions in the country's political system, 
and particularly with respect to the parliamentary institution, the Social  Christian Party becomes 
the constituent (1)  group, in that it provides the political framework  within which the inter-party 
struggle  takes  place. 
Here too, as  we  have seen, the letter of the Constitution leaves great scope for custom and usage. 
The remaining three traditional parties - the democratic/liberal party, the socialist party and the 
communist party - have by their other functions - latent and manifest - made their contributions 
to the system.  (For the sake of clarity, in a  description which does not claim to be exhaustive, the 
disfunctions  will  not be mentioned.) 
The democratic party, heir to the liberal tradition, had a structure best adopted to preserving a con-
siderable autonomy of the Parliament. Its looser organization allowed the deputies scope for more 
independent action and greater latitude in expressing criticisms  or opinions. The democratic party 
has been essentially performing a recruitment function since 1919, in promoting to the Government 
or to the Chamber men whose personal qualities enabled them to transcend their party's electoral 
score. Since the end of the Second World War the democratic party, the home of proponents of a 
liberal policy, has taken part in half the successive governments and has had to adopt a more closely-
knit structure to become  a  party of the voters. 
The socialist party, formed in 1902, has benefited less immediately from the introduction of universal 
suffrage than the party of the Right. It is  a party of the masses, in which local organizations and the 
national conference  are  the principal  authorities. 
A party of the workers,  the socialist party remained isolated in an uncompromising attitude until 
1937,  when it agreed  to share governmental  responsibilities  with the Right on which it had just 
inflicted a heavy blow by leading the opposition against the referendum on a public order bill aimed 
against allegedly subversive organizations. The socialist party has repeatedly taken part in post-war 
governments,  acting  both as  an initiator of policies  and performing  a  recruitment function. 
Following the last elections there was  a  split in its ranks, the right wing reforming as  the Social-
democratic Party.  The Luxembourg Socialist Workers'  Party,  which remains  the main opposition 
force,  has  embarked on a  thorough reorganization. 
The Communist Party,  the only one among the traditional parties opposed to the system as  such, 
has throughout its history closely adhered to the principles of democratic centralism and has always 
defended the Soviet  model  of socialism.  It is  as  much an opposition of principle  as  on principle. 
C  - A  stable  political  scene 
Luxembourg's  parliamentary  history  has  evolved  against  the  background of  a  remarkably stable 
political scene. (2) 
(1)  Theodore Lowi,  'Party Policy and Constitution in  America',  Chambers, Burnham,  The American Party  Systems, Stages  of Political 
Development,  London,  Oxford  University  Press,  1967,  pp.  239-241,  275-276. 
(')  See  Annex  I.  See  also  Andre  Heiderscheid,  Les  Luxembourgeois,  un peuple  epris  de  securite  pp.  116-123;  Gilbert  Trausch,  'Un 
demi-siecle  d'histoire  contemporaine  luxembourgeoise',  (1914/1918-1973),  Cinquantenaire  Chambre  du  Travail  Luxembourg, 
Chambre du Travail  Luxembourg,  1973,  pp.  105-109. 
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parties  embodying these persisting currents are concerned, their relative  strengths have undergone 
only minor alterations. It should be remembered, however, that the proportional vote is less sensitive 
to variations  in the voters'  political attitudes than the straight majority system. 
The fluctuations  registered  in 14 elections  point to a falling  trend in the Social  Christian Party's 
support, which has been much more apparent in a rise in the floating vote than in any steady and 
permanent ascent  of another political force. 
Up to the present, all attempts to launch a new political party (with the exception of the formation 
of the  Communist  Party  in  1921)  have  failed.  As  a  general  rule,  short-lived  newcomers  on the 
Grand Duchy's political scene have not been able to escape absorption by one of the larger parties. 
Political observers  at this moment are wondering whether the lowering of the voting age  from 21 
to 18  years  and of the age  of eligibility from 25  to 21 years, introduced in 1972 and to come into 
effect for the first  time in  the 1974 elections,  will  change the pattern.  The reform must certainly 
produce some effect, but from past experience we should expect modifications of trends rather than 
political upsets. 
D - Institutional  social  integration 
Since 1924 the Grand Duchy has had an elected Labour Board, composed entirely of workers, through 
which  the  working  population  can  participate  in  the  drafting  of  laws  and  regulations  which 
particularly concern it. Its formation was inspired by the social thinking of the Right which would 
like  to  see  in  Luxembourg  the  emergence  of  a  corporate  organization  on  a  vocational  basis 
(Standestaat). This is  opposed by the socialists who see  in it a threat to trade union prerogatives. 
In addition to the Labour Board there is  the Private Employees' Board, the Chamber of Trade, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Rural Association acting as  an Agricultural Board, and the Civil Service 
Board. 
Between  the Trade Boards  and the  professional  organizations  which together  account for  nearly 
the  whole  active  population  of the country,  there  is  an interaction which  strengthens  the social 
consensus.  Other  mechanisms  for  conciliation  and  concertation  are  being  gradually  introduced, 
such as the National Labour Council created in 1936, which in 1945 became the National Arbitration 
Board and whose task it is to settle collective disputes or the Economic and Social Council, a consul-
tative  body set up in 1966,  on which both employers  and trade unions are represented. 
There is  a  high  level  of  union  membership.  In  1970/71  the  overall  level  was  64 %,  with  higher 
percentages in metallurgy and among private employees (1). 'Social partnership' exists in Luxembourg 
at all levels. The political parties, divided as they are by ideological differences, find in addition that 
their  scope  for  action  is  curtailed  by  well-organized  pressure  groups  acting  in  narrowly  defined 
economic  and professional interests. (2) 
The French sociologist, George Lefranc, made a prediction about the future of trade unionism which 
seems  to be coming  true in Luxembourg. (3)  From a  movement,  it might be transformed into  an 
institution on the pattern of the evolution of the communes which began as  a  'league'  of  the bour-
geoisie against authority to become an organ of administration in conjunction with authority. Trade 
unionism,  which set out to become  integrated with the state, is  becoming integrated within itself 
in the twin names  of  unity  and duty. 
(1)  Jules  Stoffels,  Le Syndicalisme  au  Luxembourg et  en  Europe,  Universite  Internationale de Sciences  Comparees, Luxembourg, 1972, 
pp.  106-108. 
(')  Gilbert Trausch, 'Un demi-siecle  d'histoire contemporaine luxembourgeoise'. 
(')  Georges  Lefranc:  Le  Syndicalisme dans  le  monde.  Que sais-je ? No.  356,  Presses  Universitaires de France, Paris, 1969. 
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be the competition of other institutions rather than lack of interest in things public. And the major 
trade-union organizations' growing preoccupation with the future of society as a whole might increase 
the confusion  between  institutions  and areas  of  responsibility. 
III  - THE PARLIAMENT 
Compared  with the vocational institutions,  Parliament has  by  its  nature, the  advantage  of  being 
the sole representative of the whole nation. The deputies are expected to concern themselves solely 
with the general good, over and above their particular ideological differences.  They share with the 
people the enjoyment and exercise of legislative power, for Article 51 of the Constitution provides 
that 'the  electors  may  be  asked  for  their  opinion in  a  referendum  in  cases  and  circumstances 
to  be statutorily defined'.  This  referral to the people, having the force  of a consultation, has only 
been used on two occasions,  both critical for the political future of the country, in 1919 and 1937. 
A - Statutory functions 
As  in all the countries of Western Europe, the constitutional functions  of the parliament are those 
of  law-making and control  over  governmental  activity. 
Law-making 
Article 46  of the Constitution states that 'every law requires  the assent  of the Chamber'. 
In fact a distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, the right to initiate laws  and the 
voting of the laws themselves, and, on the other, between internal legislation and supra-national laws. 
1)  The  right  to  initiate 
Both the Executive and the Chamber of Deputies have the right to initiate laws.  In fact,  the ratio 
of  members'  bills  to government  bills  has  been  steadily  decreasing.  Not only  are  there  few  bills 
emanating from  the  Chamber  but those  that are  ultimately  passed  are  fewer  still. (1) 
2)  Voting  of laws 
Parliament does have the final word on the content of every act, both by its right to vote it and by 
the  auxiliary  rights  to  consider  individual items  of a  bill  and propose  amendments. 
It is  the Executive's task to draft the regulations  and decrees  necessary for the implementation of 
the act.  In Luxembourg,  regulations  have the nature of subsidiary  normative  measures.  'Enabling 
laws'  or  'special  powers'  may  confer  on  the  Grand Duke  exceptional  statutory  powers  for  a 
specific  matter. 
As regards international treaties, there is no provision for 'agreements in simplified form'. To become 
effective,  treaties  must be  implemented consistently with the Constitution, but, once in force, they 
are - according to recent judicial interpretations - above the law.  •The  powers exercised by the 
Chamber in this case are the powers of control over an act accomplished by the Grand Duke and 
not,  as  in the  case  of laws,  discretionary  drafting powers.' (2) 
( 1)  See  Annex  II. 
(')  Pierre Pescatore, 'Essai sur Ia  notion de loi',  Le  Conseil  d'Etat, Livre iubilaire,  p.  401.  See  also  by the same author, Conclusions et 
effects  des  traitt!s  internationaux  selon  le  droit  constitutionnel,  les  usages  et  Ia  iurisprudence  du  Grand-Duche  de  Luxembourg, 
Office  des  Jmprimes  de l'Etat,  Luxembourg,  1964. 
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of Deputies  should vote  on it four times:  the bill is  voted article by article,  there is  the vote  on 
amendments, the vote on the whole of the bill and finally  the  second  'constitutional'  vote,  if  the 
Chamber  and the Council of State cannot agree  on dispensing  with this. 
In  fact,  here,  too,  practice  has  deviated  from  the  letter  of  the  Constitution.  According  to  the 
Constitution, the second 'constitutional' vote (1)  is the rule and its omission the exception.  Actually, 
the reverse is the case: it is  today customary to dispense with the second vote and it is  only in very 
exceptional cases  that the Chamber is  required to give its  decision by means of the second consti-
tutional vote (
2
). 
The following  usage  has  become  established  between  the  Council  of  State  and  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies as regards omission of the second constitutional vote. If the Council of State in its opinion 
declares  itself  absolutely opposed to a particular measure, Parliament knows that to disregard the 
opinion will entail refusal of the dispensation. The Council of State uses this weapon very sparingly 
and the Chamber for its part, does its best to avoid conflicts with the Council on such issues. These 
may  concern  both the form  and content of the bill. 
3)  Disruption  of the  legislative  function? 
Under  the Treaties  of Paris  and Rome,  Luxembourg,  like  other Member States,  has  been  obliged 
to accept a reduction of its powers of autonomous decision and even a transfer of some sovereignty. 
This  was  expressly  sanctioned  by  the  constitutional revision  of  1956,  on the  eve  of  the  Grand-
Duchy's accession to the Treaties of Rome. Article 49 b, written into the Constitution at that time, 
provides that 'the exercise of the prerogatives reserved by the Constitution to the legislature, executive 
and judiciary may be temporarily vested by Treaty in institutions established under international law'. 
Extensive use has been made of this provision in the course of the Community's development. This 
is particularly so for economic questions and notably in the agricultural area. The transfer of powers 
from  the national to the  Community sphere  has  been  mainly  at the  expense  of the legislature's 
power. Community decisions are essentially acts of the executive - of the Commission and, above 
all,  of the Council - since the European Parliament's powers  are at best embryonic.  The highly 
technical nature of the greater part of Community regulations gives  exceptional importance to the 
national  and  Community  bureaucratic  nexus.  The  role  of  the  'techno-structure'  is  therefore 
particularly  great in the ·Community  and  is  not calculated  to  contribute to the openness  of  the 
decision-making  process.  This  is  obviously  not  a  peculiarly  Luxembourg  phenomenon,  but it is 
resented  by Luxembourg deputies  for  the  same  reasons  as  by their  colleagues  in  the parliaments 
of other Member States, and goes  to explain the feelings  of frustration sometimes aroused by  the 
Community in parliamentary circles. 
To this  must be added the fact that a  small country is  economically dependent on its neighbours. 
Luxembourg's direct dependence has meant that since 1921 its monetary fortunes  have  been linked 
with the Belgo-Luxembourg monetary  union; its  less  direct  dependence  arises  from  the fact  that 
the country needs not only external markets but also foreign labour, capital and know-how. It might 
therefore  be  supposed  that the  policy  of industrial  diversification  pursued  by  the  Grand  Duchy 
since the end of the Second World War, relying as it does on multi-national enterprises, would lead 
to conflicts  between national and foreign legislation or prevent  the  introduction  of  'inopportune' 
social  legislation  'in advance'  of  other  countries.  While the stable social climate has  always  been 
one of the country's assets,  and while the Luxembourg approach has  always  been  one of reason, 
the Grand Duchy has not been  afraid to be  an innovator in social legislation and is  preparing to 
introduce a system of worker participation in management which will be one of the most progressive 
in the  Community. 
( 1)  It will  be  remembered  that the second  constitutional vote  cannot take place  before  three  months  have  elapsed  from  the  vote  on 
the whole  of the  bill.  See  p 3  above. 
(')  Alex  Bonn,  La  Constitution  oubliee,  Imprimerie  Centrale,  Luxembourg,  1968,  pp.  3-16. 
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1)  Information and warning 
Because,  as  there is  hardly need to remind you, Luxembourg is  a very small country, its Parliament 
is  very close to the citizens. Its role has been compared to that of the municipal council of a large 
town in a highly  decentralized state.  All  the political parties are deeply  attached to the principles 
of parliamentary democracy. 
The Chamber of Deputies,  which meets  in public session,  performs  the traditional parliamentary 
function  of 'the voice of the people'  and often draws the government's attention to the complexities 
of a problem or to the inopportuneness of a proposal. Thus a number of bills never complete their 
passage through the House (see  Annex II), others are amended, usually in committee, others again 
are redrafted  by the government in the light  of their reception in  the House. 
Parliamentary debates are regularly  reported in the press  of the traditional political parties which 
have  dailies  promoting their  cause  .. There  is  no  'independent'  newspaper in  the  Grand Duchy. 
After  Japan,  Luxembourg  is  the world's  greatest  per  capita  'consumer'  of  printed news.  Every 
household receives  a  summary record  of parliamentary debates  free  of  charge. 
The Chamber of  Deputies  is  also  a  political  sounding-box,  used  increasingly  as  such  by  groups 
which  have  remained  outside  the  established  organization.  For example,  students'  and  women's 
movements  have recently  turned to Parliament to obtain a  hearing for  their  case. 
2)  Organization  of the  Chamber 
The business of the Chamber of Deputies is  managed by a Bureau elected at the beginning of each 
session  and consisting  of a  President,  three  Vice-Presidents,  five  Secretaries  and the  Clerk  of the 
Chamber. The Bureau decides the agenda, is  responsible for the entire internal management of the 
House and fulfils the tasks which in other countries are the responsibility of the treasurers (questors). 
The Procedural Committee, consisting of the chairmen of the political groups, or their representatives, 
has the important task of coordinating the Chamber's work. In some  circumstances  (special  acts, 
some Grand-ducal decrees)  it can exercise real legislative power in the Chamber of Deputies' stead. 
Votes in the Procedural Committee on such a decision are then weighted according to the strength 
of  the  political parties'  representation. 
It is only recently that the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies has acquired a structured organization. 
Until  1965  the section system was used: the House divided itself by lot into three sections which 
debated all the bills in parallel. This had a detrimental effect on Parliament's work, since the highly 
specialized government departments were dealing with general committees whose composition was 
a reflection more of the laws of chance than of their members' particular competence. It is  worth 
noting that in Great Britain the Committee of the whole House - an archaic  usage  most closely 
resembling  the  Luxembourg  system  before  1965  - comes  in  only  after second reading,  before 
final  approval. 
Under the new rules of procedure of 1966 a system of committees, both standing and special, was 
introduced. On the whole, spheres of interest of the permanent committees parallel the competences 
of the various ministerial departments, but the correspondence is not exact. The special committees 
are set up rather infrequently to deal with bills which are either highly technical or do not precisely 
fall  within the  scope  of one  (or  of  only  one)  standing committee. 
3)  Making and breaking  governments 
A deputy's  mandate is  incompatible with membership  of  the  Government.  Since  members  of  the 
Government  are  appointed  and  dismissed  by  the  Grand  Duke,  non-elected  personalities  can  be 
123 included in the government. Recent governments have thus been able to call in a number of experts, 
who presented  themselves  for  election  only  after  having  held  office. 
The choice of Prime Minister and the coalition configuration are determined by the result of the 
general election. By common consent, the Grand Duke is  effectively bound to call first on the leader 
of the party which obtained the largest number of votes. In practice only on one occasion, in 1964, 
could there  have  been  room for  discussion  when  the  socialist  party polled  more votes  than the 
social-christians, who, however, retained a larger number of seats. Inter-party negotiations are always 
carried on by reference to the parliamentary majority which constitutes an essential condition for 
any government  activity. 
In formal  terms,  the Parliament can  exercise  great power over  the Government,  whose  members 
are answerable before it.  They can be called to appear before the Chamber; conversely,  ministers 
have access to the Chamber when they ask for it. Lastly, it is the Chamber alone which has the right 
to impeach Government members.  These constitutional provisions should, however, be seen in the 
light of practical politics and particularly of the strength of the dominant party. Even  so,  in 1967 
the  coalition  government  of  social-christians  and  socialists  was  overthrown  on the  issue  of  the 
abolition of  conscription,  with the aid of votes  of deputies  belonging  to majority parties. 
C - The Deputy 
1)  Social  background 
In general the political parties (with the exception of the Communist party) are careful to put forward 
socially  •balanced'  lists  of  candidates  at  election  time.  They  feel  that a  broad  'representative' 
spectrum of the population will ensure a fairer deal for the interests involved. The choice of personalities 
eminent in their walk of life  is  of  considerable  electoral importance. 
Nevertheless, the composition of the Chamber (1)  gives  a rather distorted image of the social cross-
section of the country.  While it is  true that the number of lawyers,  traditionally over-represented 
in the House, was halved from one election to the next (there were 13  lawyers in 1964 and only 6 
in 1969), non-salaried persons  (representing only about 12% of the active population) account for 
40% of the parliamentary deputies. But if the number of workers remains low, that of civil servants, 
employees and trade unionists is  constantly increasing, indicating that the Grand Duchy is gradually 
becoming a  •white collar' country. It  might be added here that 43% of the active population (35% 
in  1947)  is  employed  in the tertiary  sector,  47 %  in the  secondary  (industrial)  sector,  and  10 % 
(25 %  in 1947)  in the primary sector  of  agriculture  and viticulture. 
The  most  obvious  'under-representation',  however,  is  that of  women:  at the last elections  only 
three  women were  elected  to the  Chamber. 
2)  The deputy  within  his  party 
It will be evident that since electors vote for  a list of  candidates, deputies  are elected on the basis 
of their party's political programme which they are committed to pursue. By the same token it could 
be  said that,  broadly speaking,  it is  the parties,  and particularly their leaders, who hold political 
power: it is  the parties who make the important political choices, who take part at all levels  and 
in all areas in political decision-making, who make and break majorities and governments and who 
draft the government's programme. 
Government-sponsored bills  are essentially instruments for the implementation of this programme 
and it is  not often  that deputies  are  allowed  a  free  vote. 
( 1)  See  Annex  III. 
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on the party and on how tightly it is  organized. Accepted and clearly proclaimed in the Communist 
Party,  it is  certainly  more apparent within  the Luxembourg Socialist Workers'  Party  than in  the 
Social  Democrat,  Social  Christian,  or Democratic parties. (1) 
Conversely,  but  as  part of  the  same  trend,  the  role  of  the  parliamentary  group  in  the  party's 
decision-making process varies  according to the party's internal organization and the structure of 
its controlling bodies. It is  a fact that the role of the parliamentary group (or of a Min,ister even if 
he holds no particular office  within the party)  in decision-making is  greater in the Social Christian 
or the  Democratic  party than in  the Luxembourg Socialist  Workers'  party. (
2
) 
The question of the party's control over the deputies became highly topical in recent years in connection 
with the split within  the Socialist Party. 
Not long ago  the chairman of  each political  party was  asked  in an interview whether candidates 
standing in parliamentary elections  would  undertake to tender their  resignation to their party if, 
as  deputies,  they find  themselves  in  disagreement  with the party leadership.  The Social  Christian 
party,  the  Democratic  party and  the  Social  Democratic  party replied  in  the  negative. 
It is  significant  that the  Luxembourg  Socialist  Workers'  party,  whose  statute  contained  such  a 
provision, decided to delete it after the 1971  split in the conviction that should a conflict arise the 
provision would not be respected in any event. As for the Communist party, it let it be known that 
'the activities  of  members elected to the Chamber ... are subject to the guidance and control of the 
party. They follow the guidelines laid down by the party authorities. Their mandate is  in the hands 
of the  Central  Committee'. (3) 
We  thus  see  that in Luxembourg,  as  elsewhere,  an increasingly important role  is  played  by  the 
political  parties  which  have  become  firmly  established  as  essential  components  of  the  political 
machinery. Parliamentary institutions and practices have largely evolved in relation to what is  laid 
down in the constitution. 
3)  The office  of the deputy 
The duties of a Luxembourg Deputy essentially consist of his participation in the drafting of laws. 
He does,  of course, serve  his  constituents, take up individual cases  of every kind,  but - since  he 
has been elected from a list - he is far less strongly identified with a local electoral group than he 
would be  in a  country where  candidates  stand singly  before the voters. 
The parliamentary session begins on the second Tuesday in October and continues until the following 
July,  and  often  into  September  or even  October.  There  are  short  adjournments  for  Christmas, 
Easter and Whitsun, and a longer one in the summer, lasting theoretically from mid-July to mid-
September.  The committees normally meet in the morning.  Plenary sessions  are held on Tuesday, 
Wednesday  and  Thursday  afternoons.  Evening  sittings  are  rare  and  continuation  into  the  night 
almost unheard of. The business is thus transacted at a regular pace with astonishingly little drama. 
Against  that  must  be  set  the  fact  that a Luxembourg Deputy is  required to attend sittings three 
times  a  week for eight to nine  months of the year. 
Even so, it is still generally considered that the office of deputy is a secondary occupation. It is thus 
that deputies are paid not a salary but a  tax-free allowance of 100,000 B.F.  per annum at a  base 
index of 100, and are not granted further expenses or facilities  (as  for example postage costs). This 
is  roughly equivalent to 200,000  B.F.  a  year. 
(')  On the problem  of banning the imperative  mandate, see  Alex  Bonn,  La  Constitution  oubliee,  lmprimerie  Centrale,  Luxembourg, 
1968,  pp.  17-24. 
(')  Nico  Schaeffer,  'Les  Forces  po!itiques  au  Grand-Duche  de  Luxembourg',  Memoire  presente  it  l'lnstitut  d'Etudes  politiques  de 
l'Universite de  Paris,  Paris,  1961,  unpublished. 
(')  Jean  Jaans, 'Luxemburg,  deine  Parteien',  Revue,  No. 7,  7 July  1973,  pp.  22-23. 
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to  the  Luxembourg  Deputy  - though  they  have  been  substantially  improved  over  the  last  ten 
years - are  practically non-existent. 
He is  allocated no assistant  and no funds  for hiring  one.  Parliamentary political groups  do have 
appropriations which should enable them to function.  In practice, these  are only sufficient to pay 
for  the  services  of an assistant  and/  or a  secretary. 
The office of the Clerk to the Chamber of Deputies has been substantially expanded in recent years. 
It now consists of the Clerk and the Assistant Clerk,  five  assistants responsible for the secretariat 
of the committees and for editing the summary reports, two officials dealing with general office work 
and the verbatim reports, and four secretary-typists. This staff is fully occupied by the preparation 
and current work for the sittings and it is  not their task to help deputies in drafting their reports. 
There is  no  proper documentation  and information service  and no reference  library. 
Such a state of affairs serves to strengthen the dominant position of the executive as far as information 
is  concerned. The deputy has to rely to a large extent on his  personal knowledge and contacts and 
for  any information he  may  need  he  is  dependent  on the executive  or on pressure  groups.  This 
leads to a dilettantism which, while undoubtedly courageous, is  not necessarily in the best interests 
of the exactitude and objectivity which should characterize the drafting of legislative texts intended 
to govern economic, legal  and technical matters as  complex as  they are extensive in scope. 
IV  - CONCLUSIONS 
The first  conclusion to be drawn from even a  brief account of the Luxembourg Parliament is  that 
it is  an institution on a human scale. The Chamber of Deputies is  a down-to-earth assembly, close 
to the people  and their  daily  problems,  comprehensible  to the  outside  observer  and the  citizen. 
It fits  the country. 
The trends in the composition of the Parliament since 1919,  shown by the figures  in Annex III,  are 
interesting and significant in several respects. While, as  already indicated, lawyers no longer occupy 
the dominant position which they held at the beginning or in the middle of the twentieth century, 
it is  still true that non-salaried  classes  are  heavily  over-represented.  Since  the  war,  however,  we 
have been witnessing a new development, a new generation of  'full-time politicians'  among whom 
must be included both trade unionists and civil servants (the latter by the Act of 5 August 1968 have 
been granted the right to stand in elections with the provision that if they accept a parliamentary 
mandate they shall automatically be retired with a right to a special pension and the possibility of 
re-joining their department in a position similar to that occupied when they were elected, once their 
mandate ceases (1). Other professions are also coming very close to 'full time politics'  for  example, 
journalists and workers, most - if  not all - of whom combine their parliamentary mandate with 
the functions  of  trade-union  officials  and/or membership  of  workers'  delegations. 
Other factors,  which are not obvious  from  the  statistics  of Annex III .  are nevertheless  important. 
Thus, while it can be said that the influx of workers who arrived from Italy at the end of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth century and their descendants have been now completely integrated 
at the general and social level, the same is  not true of the political domain. They have not become 
part of the political body of the country. But it cannot be long before they take up their responsibi-
lities  in this  field  too. 
More importantly, Luxembourg has  experienced in recent  years  a  certain change,  a  radicalization 
of the social climate. 
(1)  Local  authority  employees  who  are  allowed  to continue in office  are  shown in the 'civil  servants'  column  of  Annex  III. 
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political - of their role and task. Trade union struggles have also taken on a more radical aspect, 
both in  the public  and the private sector.  Parliament  and government are  faced  with a  growing 
number of increasingly far-reaching  demands,  presented  ever  more vigorously  not only  by  trade 
unions  and professional associations  but also  by various  movements - students, womens'  move-
ments,  and associations  for  the defence  of the interests  of various  citizen  groups. 
We  are witnessing, in this respect,  a  change in mental attitudes,  a  desire to catch up with earlier 
developments in neighbouring countries in the relationship between the social partners on the one 
hand and the trade unions  and government  on the other (1). 
Despite the deficiencies  described  (over-representation  of certain social  and vocational classes,  the 
absence of foreigners  from the parliament of a  country with a 20% foreign  resident population), 
and despite the changes in the concept of social relations - the Chamber of Deputies seems to be 
broadly representative  of the country. 
What is  more, it is  so  perceived  by public opinion as  a whole.  It is,  of course, vaguely recognised 
that the Assembly is  not particularly well equipped to discharge its legislative duties in the modern 
world  and that institutional  reform  is  needed,  but the  existence  of  the  institution  itself  is  not 
basically  opposed  or questioned. 
It is  sometimes  argued in Luxembourg,  as  elsewhere,  that Parliament is  no more than a  rubber-
stamping  body.  It is  true  that very  frequently  the  Chamber  confines  itself  to  adopting  without 
amendment bills tabled by the executive. But, as has been already indicated, the Chamber does more 
than rubber-stamp.  For  one  thing,  there  is  an important  amount  of  discussion,  adjustment  and 
amendment in committees; for another, deputies belonging to the majority are often able to modify, 
readjust, or clarify projected policies at the  'inter-group'  sessions  at which ministers and majority 
deputies  meet  before  crucial  stages  in  the  legislative  process. 
In  short,  it can  be  stated  that the Chamber  of  Deputies  does  fulfill  its  essential  task.  It is  the 
institutional projection of a  stable,  rational,  moderate and individualistic society. 
At the same time, it is  a safety barrier, not devoid perhaps of a certain amount of demagogy,  but 
,  reliable nevertheless, against grandiose projects conceived without reference to the realities of practical 
problems.  It is,  above  all,  a  transmission  channel  relaying  to the government the feel  of  public 
opinion,  but,  at the same time,  passing information and guidance in the opposite direction, from 
the government to the  people. 
The real  importance of the parliament - that traditional, though  not exclusive,  training-ground 
for  the responsibilities  of government - is  to be  seen essentially in a  two-way movement which 
constitutes the background to a fruitful interaction between the legislature and the executive. 
The Chamber of Deputies, in a word, is  an accurate institutional image of a people that sets great 
store by  security,  no doubt,  but also  by  freedom,  fairness  and common sense. 
(
1
)  See  on  this  subject  the  more  recent  trade  union  publications,  particularly:  Confederation  Generale  du  Travail,  Arbecht,  Der 
Proletarier;  Confederation lnxembourgeoise des  Syndicats  chretiens, Soziale  Fortschrott;  Federation des  Employes  Prives  du Grand-
Duche  de  Luxembourg,  I' Employe;  as  well  as  editorials  and reports  on social  problems  in the general  press. 
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Percentage  votes  polled  by  the  vanous political  parties:  1919/1968 (
1
) 
Party of  the Right/  Luxembourg Socialist  Liberal/Democratic  Party  Communist Party 
Social-Christian  Party  Workers'  Party 
Year 
Electoral  Districts  Electoral  Districts  Electoral  Districts  Electoral  Districts 
Centre  South  North  East  Centre  South  North  East  Centre  South  North  East  Centre  South  North  East 
1919  45.2  36.8  64.5  75.1  20.8  25.1  9  - 30.5  18.7  - -
1922  43.1  - 59  - 12.7  - 8.3  - 42.3  - - - 1.8  - - -
1925  36.1  32  53.1  57.9  12.5  34.7  9.4  - 9.2  16.5  - - - 3.1  - -
1928  32.4  35.9  - 63.3  - 48.2  - - - 9.3  - - - - - -
1931  38.2  37.3  56.1  - 23.9  43.8  13  - 12  - 2.6  - 1.3  5.5  - -
1934  - 33.9  - 60.5  - 41.6  - - - 14.5  - - - 7.3  - -
1937  36.6  - 58.4  - 30.5  - 16.5  - 16.2  - 8.7  - - - - -
1945  39.8  35.5  61  58.2  25.7  30.6  16.3  7.3  25.9  9.9  19.7  19.5  8.3  20.7  3  2.3 
1948  - 31.6  - 50.4  - 43.6  - 20.5  - 6.5  - 26.6  - 18.3  - 2.5 
1951  36.3  - 51.5  - 39.9  - 24.1  - 19.7  - 22.7  - 4.1  - 1.7  -
1954  42.3  36.5  60.7  56  33.7  40.0  24.9  20.5  17.4  4.8  12.9  21.8  3.5  15.1  1.5  1.7 
1959  37.5  33  47.4  49.6  30.8  40.2  28.8  21.6  27.7  10.2  23.8  28.8  4  15.3  - -
1964  34.1  29.8  45.6  46.4  33.7  41.8  33.1  25.1  16.5  5.3  15.6  19.4  9  17  2.5  3 
1968  36.6  31.8  46.4  47.6  28.3  35.8  30.1  22.7  25.2  10.1  19.1  23.9  9.4  22  4.1  5.1 
( 1)  Andre Heiderscheid, Les Luxembourgeois, Un  peuple t!pris  de st!curitt!,  Universite Internationale de Sciences  Comparees, Luxembourg, 
1970, pp. 116-123. 
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Parliamentary  business  smce 1922 
Bills  emanating  from  Bills  emanating  from  Bills  for  Grand-Ducal 
tiJe  Government  the  Chamber  Decrees 
Session 
Tabled  Passed  Tabled  Passed  Tabled  Passed 
22/23  40  25  8  1 
23/24  25  27  6  0 
24/25  29  20  9  2 
25/26  17  11  19  1 
26  extr.  6  0 
26/27  39  35  21  5 
27/28  17  22  18  5 
28/29  47  34  18  1 
29/30  36  33  15  4 
30/31  17  13  7  0 
31/32  18  15  15  3 
32/33  14  17  13  1 
33/34  14  21  6  0 
34/35  16  15  11  2 
35/36  26  23  20  4 
36/37  16  15  18  1 
37/38  31  27  19  4 
38/39  20  19  5  3 
39/40  16  14  7  0 
45  extr.  4  - - -
45/46  28  17  7  - 25  31 
46147  35  28  12  - 33  33 
47/48  25  21  11  1  19  14 
48  12  4  5  - 1  4 
48/49  43  41  5  1  17  7 
49/50  34  42  5  - 8  8 
50/51  33  16  4  1  3  6 
51  extr.  5  10  2  1  3  2 
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Parliamentary  business  since  1922 
Bills  emanating  from  Bills  emanating  from  Bills  for  Grand-Ducal 
the  Government  the  Chamber  Decrees 
Session 
Tabled  Passed  Tabled  Passed  Tabled  Passed 
-
51152  27  29  5  1  5  5 
52/53  49  47  1  - 4  3 
53/54  43  27  2  - 5  4 
54  extr.  - 1  - - 2  1 
54/55  26  36  3  - 2  5 
55156  36  28  3  1  1  1 
56157  52  32  3  - 2  2 
57158  44  56  3  - 5  5 
58/59  14  7  - - 2  2 
59  extr.  28  20  2  1 
59!60  50  43  4  - 5  5 
60/61  43  49  3  1  12  11 
61/62  38  27  6  - 10  9 
62/63  51  59  - 1  5  5 
63/64  77  53  2  - 2  2 
64  extr.  7  - - - 2  2 
64!65  59  69  12  2  3  4 
65/66  47  52  3  - 4  3 
66167  51  52  5  - 3  3 
67/68  98  65  3  1  1  1 
68/69  4  6  1  1 
69  extr.  44  39  4  -
69170  58  44  1  -
70/71  78  64  9  -
71/72  69  78  11  -
72/73  86  - 6  1 
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Composition of the Chamber of  Deputies 
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18/19  3  11  3  - 3  - 6  2  11  5  1  - - 1  8  -
19/20  5  11  3  - 3  - 6  2  10  5  1  - - 1  7  -
20/21  5  10  3  - 3  1  6  2  10  6  1  - - - 7  -
21/22  4  12  2  - 1  3  4  - 4  9  8  - - - 1  -
22  extr.  4  13  2  - 2  4  3  - 6  7  7  - - - 1  -
22/23  5  12  2  - 2  4  3  - 6  7  7  - - - 1  -
23/24  5  12  2  - 2  4  4  - 6  7  6  - - - 1  -
24/25  5  10  1  - 2  3  4  1  7  6  5  - - 1  - 2 
25/26  5  10  1  - 2  3  4  1  7  6  5  - - 1  - 2 
26  extr.  5  8  1  1  1  4  4  1  7  6  5  - - 1  - 2 
26/27  5  8  1  1  1  4  4  1  7  6  5  - - 1  - 2 
27/28  5  8  1  1  1  4  3  1  8  6  5  - - 1  - 2 
28/29  6  8  1  - 1  5  4  - 9  7  6  - - 1  2  3 
29/30  6  8  1  - 1  5  4  - 9  7  6  - - 1  2  3 
30/31  6  8  1  - 1  5  4  - 9  7  6  - - 1  2  4 
31/32  5  9  1  - - 5  4  - 9  6  7  - - 1  3  3 
32/33  5  10  1  - - 5  4  - 9  6  8  - - 1  3  3 
33/34  6  10  1  - 1  4  3  - 9  5  8  - - 1  4  3 
34/35  6  9  - - 3  3  3  - 7  6  11  - - 1  3  3 
35/36  5  9  - - 3  4  3  - 7  6  11  - - 1  3  3 
36/37  4  8  - - 3  5  3  - 7  6  12  - - 1  3  3 
37/38  5  10  - - 2  2  3  - 6  6  14  - 1  1  3  2 
38/39  5  10  - - 2  2  3  - 6  6  14  - 1  1  3  2 
39/40  5  9  - - 1  2  3  - 5  7  15  - 1  1  4  2 
1945  4  7  - - 1  2  2  - 1  5  11  - 1  - 3  2 
1948  6  6  - - 1  2  3  1  - 7  10  5  1  1  4  4 
1951  6  6  - - 2  1  4  1  - 8  9  3  2  1  5  4 
1954  3  9  - - 3  1  2  3  - 8  10  5  1  - 4  3 
1959  4  14  - - 2  1  2  1  - 8  8  3  3  - 4  2 
1964  3  13  - - - 2  2  1  - 6  13  2  1  - 7  6 
1969  5  6  1  - 2  1  2  3  - 4  11  3  7  - 6  5 
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and Dr.  Jacob Jan VIS,  University  of Groningen 
1 - INTRODUCTION 
The major changes  which  occurred in Dutch society after the Second World War have not been 
without effect  on the position and function  of the Dutch Parliament. So  long  as  the Netherlands 
enjoyed the tranquil existence of a traditional society with more agriculture and trade than industry, 
the political  situation too evolved  in  a  calm  and leisurely  fashion.  It is  interesting  to note  that 
even after the introduction of universal suffrage  (1918  for men, 1922 for women)  the political map 
of the  Netherlands did not change  to any great extent. 
Post-war political developments (loss of colonies, abandonment of the policy of neutrality) and social 
and economic  changes  (industrialization,  urbanization,  higher  birth rate)  brought  an  end to this 
stability.  Now the  post-war  generation has  reached  voting  age,  large  sections  of the population 
seem  to have  become  more politically involved than before; the  balance  between  political forces 
now shifts fairly quickly; modern media (T.V. !)  have made Parliament a more familiar institution; 
the different  political  currents  are  now more  clearly defined.  Traditional parliamentary functions 
are performed differently,  sometimes  less  punctiliously than before,  and new functions  have been 
added to the old. 
The rules of the game, sanctioned for a long time, don't count any longer or at least are being tested 
for  relevance;  structures  unquestioned  are  under  assault  and  some  of  them  erode  rapidly.  It 
probably needs  no explanation that the role and function of parliament cannot remain unscathed 
in such a system in flux.  In the search for new ideas and forms Parliament at times plays an active 
role,  and once  in  a  while even  an initiating one; in other aspects  it is  more passive  or reacts  to 
movements  taking place elsewhere  in  the system. 
The purpose  of  this  study  is  to focus  attention  on the problems  arising  in  connection with the 
performance of traditional tasks, and on the new functions  and their implications for the position 
and role of Parliament. We shall also consider a number of proposals and suggestions recently put 
forward for  solving  the problems that have  emerged. 
In the following we shall consider the role of the Dutch parliament and some aspects of its position 
within three subsystems  of the wider political system,  the constitutional system,  the party system, 
and the policy  system. 
The constitutional system relates in particular to rights and duties, and to the delimitation between, 
for  instance,  the Crown,  the  Ministers  and  the two  Chambers  of  'the States  General'. 
The basic  rules  of  the  constitutional  system  are  some  times  taken  rather seriously  by  practising 
politicians and not only by professors  of  constitutional law.  In  that respect  such  rules  constitute 
stable guidelines for political behaviour. In other cases the rules are reinterpreted under the pressure 
of new demands  and new situations.  Often,  however,  existing rules  do  not furnish  solutions  for 
the problems men  of politics are having to face,  or else  new power equations, a new codification 
of  lines  of demarcation  between  the  organs  of  State  are  required. 
133 Apart from  those  realities  (and  fictions)  of  constitutional law,  politicans  are  confronted with the 
realities  (and  sometimes  the  unrealities)  of party politics. 
In the Netherlands party political system with all its parties, many of them represented within Par-
liament, intersecting in all manner of ways, with sometimes stable, sometimes unstable government 
coalitions, Parliament is  very sensitive to movements and unrest within the party world. It registers 
movements between the parties precisely and if they seem to be of a serious nature, those movements 
will  be  of consequence  for  parliamentary  behaviour  sooner  or later. 
In the third place, but not to be underestimated, Parliament has to face the realities  of the world 
of  policies  and poiicy  demands  and changes  taking  place  there.  While  often  not easy  to detect, 
such realities are nevertheless quite fundamental, since they form the hard core of what politics is 
about.  One of the underlying tendencies here seems to be that a traditionally rather de-politicized 
world of policy-making  becomes  in many respects  more political and this  both behind the scenes 
and in public. 
Naturally this sketch will be a limited one, mentioning only a few of the more conspicuous elements. 
The facts  and figures  quoted are taken from a survey of all Members of Parliament made in 1968 
by  the  University  of  Leyden,  with  assistance  from  the  Dutch  Organization  for  Pure  Scientific 
Research  (ZWO). 
2- PARLIAMENT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
2.1.  Main characteristics 
The Dutch constitution is rather complicated in structure and is also rather complicated in the way 
it works.  It is  not easy  to gain  an  idea  of  how the policy  works  from  constitutional rules  and 
conventions.  Firstly,  the structure is  characterised  not so  much  by separation  of  powers,  but by 
cooperation of powers,  which  often  means  an overlapping of responsibilities  and duties  - what 
is known as  'common determination'.  Secondly, there has be.::n  a tendency to record new develop-
ments in constitutional texts. Because the procedure for such adaptations is of a rather rigid nature, 
the  time-lag  between  actual  developments  and codification  is  considerable.  This also  means  that 
very important rules  do  not figure  in  constitutional texts,  while others  are  quite  outdated. 
Parliament consists  of two Chambers, the  more  powerful one being the Second  Chamber, elected 
directly on the basis  of universal suffrage (18 years and older), for a period of four years. It consists 
of 150 members, elected nationally in accordance with a system of pure proportional representation. 
The First  Chamber,  consisting  of  75  members,  is  elected  indirectly  on the  basis  of the  political 
composition of the (directly)  elected Provincial Councils. The political composition of Second and 
First  Chambers  may  for  that  reason  be  different,  but  until  recently  any  such  difference  have 
generally  been  minimal. 
Membership of the Second Chamber has for all practical purposes become a full-time job, a process 
which was hastened by a salary arrangement which has since 1969  made it rather unattractive for 
an MP  to have  additional  paid functions.  Membership  of  the First  Chamber is  unsalaried;  most 
of its  members have their primary employment elsewhere in  the public sector  (e.g.  as  mayors)  or 
private sector  (many  professors). 
Government ministers in Holland have no seat in Parliament. They have access  to both Chambers 
and speak but do not vote.  The general  practice is  that ministers  attend  meetings  of Parliament 
only when a subject for which they bear responsibility is  on the agenda. The Prime Minister only 
defends the general governmental programmes at the beginning of each annual session,  and a few 
matters having to do with the Crown. Otherwise he only attends at times of great political tension. 
134 But even  then he seldom speaks. Government ministers are nominated and discharged by the Queen, 
in  accordance  with the political will  or acquiescence  of Parliament.  Ministers  are responsible for 
their  respective  Departments:  together  they form the Government. 
The Prime Minister, as  chairman, has for the most part the status of  'primus  inter  pares'.  While 
ministers are responsible in Parliament for their departmental affairs, the Government is responsible 
for its general policy.  Where there is  conflict with Parliament, the Government can decide whether 
to make an issue a matter of collective responsibility: that is to say the Government may decide that 
one minister should be dismissed or that the life of the Government as a whole is  at stake. A basic 
constitutional rule is  that a  minister  who loses  parliamentary confidence  has  to resign  (the  same 
holds  for the  Government as  a  whole). 
Government  and Parliament  together  exercise  the law-making  function.  Parliament  controls  and 
has  the power of the  purse,  the government is  responsible for the execution  of  policies  from  a 
constitutional point of  view.  On the practical level,  it initiates  and  prepares  almost  all  govern-
mental  actions. 
2.2.  Parliament and the formation  of the Government 
The formation of the Government is one of the most crucial events in Dutch political life. The part 
played  by  Parliament  in  this  process  has  gained  in  importance  in  recent  years  and  influences 
considerably the way in which the traditional tasks are carried out. While it is true that the written 
Constitution does not contain any specific provisions concerning the formation of the Government 
and, formally, this process is  effected under the direction of the Head of State, in practice it is  the 
will  of  Parliament that proves  decisive.  The confidence  on which,  according  to the fundamental 
rule  of the  parliamentary system,  every  Government  should  be  based  is  normally  developed  (or 
perhaps  one  should  say  'organized')  in  what  are  usually  lengthy  and complicated  negotiations 
between the main parliamentary groups, which will eventually be the pillars of the coalition - the 
latter  always  being  composed of minority parties. 
The negotiations concern the programme of the Government to be formed, the political key governing 
the  allocation  of  the  different  ministerial  posts  to  the  aspiring  coalition  partners  and  staff 
appointments. The prodecure varies from case to case,  but the basic pattern remains more or less 
the  same.  The  Queen  appoints  a  •formateur'  or, if the  political  situation  is  very  complicated 
-which is  usually the case- an 'informateur', who is  less closely involved in party politics than 
the  formateur.  As  a  result  of these  negotiations,  a  certain  equilibrium is  eventually  reached,  but 
only  after  considerable  time  because  of  the  number  of  partners  taking  part.  That is  why  the 
formation  of  the Government  may  be  considered  one of the weakest points in the constitutional 
system. In fact there has been no shortage in recent years of suggestions as  to how to remedy this 
weakness. The present Government has announced its intention to reform the Constitution so that 
it will provide for the direct election of the formateur, i.e.  he would no longer be appointed by the 
Crown. But there is considerable opposition to such a reform on the grounds that it could undermine 
the parliamentary system:  might the elected formateur not invoke the mandate given  him by the 
voters,  thus  placing  Parliament in  a  position  of  constraint ? What would  happen if  a  formateur 
had the  confidence  of the voters  but not of the majority of Parliament ? 
The introduction of proportional representation  (in  1918)  meant that it was  no longer  the result 
of  elections  that  determined  the  formation  of  the  Government..  Elections  no  longer  produced 
majorities  among  parties  forced  by  the  system  to  cooperate,  and  that is  why,  since  1918,  the 
decisive  negotiations  have  always  been  held  after  the elections. 
It was obvious that this  change would increase the role played by Parliament in the formation of 
the Government. The fact that this did not happen immediately was partly due to the distribution 
of  forces  and  the political  structures  prevailing  at  the  time.  The denominational  parties  of the 
135 centre  dominated  the scene,  especially  since  the Social  Democratic  Labour Party  offered  only  an 
'opposition  of  principle',  the  main features of which were pacifism and a latent anti-monarchism. 
Unlike  the Socialists  in the other countries  of Western  Europe,  the Dutch Socialists  had to wait 
until 1939  before penetrating to the centre of political power: the Government. 
During the period of reconstruction after 1945, a strong spirit of cooperation prevailed among the 
different  political movements.  This came to an end only in 1958  when the PvdA  (Labour Party), 
the successor  to the SDAP  (Social  Democratic Labour Party)  became  the opposition party.  As  a 
result  of  the increased  number  of  political  currents,  of  keener  political  commitment,  of  greater 
interest on the part of political parties and voters, Parliament in subsequent years  acquired a very 
important role  in the formation  of the Government  (Parliament  in this case  meaning the Second 
Chamber; the First Chamber is  not involved in the formation  of governments. 
The important  nature of  this  role  can be illustrated  by  a  number  of  factors: 
1)  By-elections 
In the past, the Monarch had the prerogative of dissolving the Government in the event of conflict 
between it and Parliament.  Although this prerogative is  no longer  used,  this  does  not mean that 
Parliament always lasts out its constitutional 4-year term of office.  Since  1958  the Government has 
been dissolved prematurely and new elections called three times as the result of a Government crisis. 
Twice it was argued that the general elections were due to be held shortly afterwards anyway but 
in  1972  they  had  taken  place  just  a  year  before.  Although  the  crisis  was  not  the  result  of  a 
parliamentary defeat but of internal disagreement, no serious effort was made to resolve the conflict. 
It was  considered  necessary  to  appeal  to  the  voters,  thereby  acknowledging  by  implication  the 
important role to be played by the (newly elected)  Parliament in the formation of the Government. 
It  remains to be seen whether this single instance of recognition of Parliament will become an unwritten 
constitutional rule. 
2)  More  publicity  in  regard  to  Government  formation 
Until  1965,  the  formation  of  a  Government  always  took place  behind  closed  doors.  The official 
reason was always that any publicity, such as publication of recommendations made by party leaders 
to the Queen, might endanger the principle of the Monarch's inviolability. It should be remembered 
in this  connection that any action taken by the Monarch during the formation process cannot be 
attributed to a  politically responsible  minister - the outgoing Government bears no responsibility 
for the formation  of the new Government. 
There  was  also  an  important  political  reason:  increased  publicity  would  reduce  the  scope  for 
political manreuvre of the political leaders, not so much because the public would know what they 
were  doing  but above  all  because  their political  colleagues  would be  better informed. 
The introduction of a certain measure of publicity has in fact reduced the scope of political leaders. 
In the sixties  and seventies, unlike in the forties and fifties,  it has no longer been the party leaders 
who have  succeeded  in forming  Governments  but rather politicians  not so  closely  involved  with 
Parliament.  Of the 14 formateurs  or informateurs  appointed  over  the last 11  years,  only 2  have 
been  party leaders;  neither  of  them was  successful  in  forming  a  Government. 
It is  becoming increasingly clear that publicity in the formation of the Government  (above  all the 
publication of proposals concerning the government's action programme) gives the different political 
currents  in parliamentary  groups  a  greater  opportunity  of  influencing  proceedings. 
3)  Responsibility  for  the  formation  of a  Government 
The Second  Chamber is  showing an increasing interest in the question  of  who is  responsible for 
certain essential factors in the formation of a  Government.  Although the neutral, but occasionally 
136 important, role played  by  the  Queen is  accepted,  ways  are  being  sought of calling  the formateur 
to account in Parliament itself.  (The role played by the Head of State varies in accordance with the 
degree of unity existing between the parties - the greater the dissension, the more scope for personal 
initiative  on the part of  the  Queen.) 
In 1971 an unsuccessful attempt was made to have the formateur appointed by the Second Chamber. 
After  the lengthy  process  of formation  in  1972/73,  it was  suggested  that the formateur  be  given 
the status of Minister without portfolio, thus  making it possible for the Second  Chamber to call 
him  to account during the process  of formation. 
The role played by  Parliament in the formation of a  Government is  illustrated by the number of 
formateurs  having  a  parliamentary background. 
Table 1 
Background  of (in)formateurs  in  the  period  1946-1971 
'Formateur'  'Informateur'  Total 
Parliamentary  background ........................  11  5  16 
Governmental  background ........................  12  2  14 
Outsiders .......................................  5  11  16 
-- -- --
Total  ............  28  18  46 
As  table 1 shows,  as  a  source  of recruitment,  Parliament is  on equal terms  with the government 
sphere  and with  outsiders. 
The total of 46  refers  to 20  persons involved in the formation of 15  cabinets since  1946,  because 
some of them figured several times in this role: one Roman Catholic 'cabinet-maker'  even  9 times, 
one  socialist 5  times,  another Catholic 4  times. 
When  formations  are  lengthy  the  number  of  'outsiders'  grows:  when  the  professionals  do  not 
succeed,  others  may  have  a  better  chance  (e.g.  politically  active  academicians !). 
Parliamentary  parties  and  the  result  of the  formation. 
The involvement  of  parliamentary parties  with the result  of  the formation depends on the degree 
to which  bargaining has taken place  on  the  basis  of programmes,  and the  extent  to which  the 
parties have to stick to the outcome of that process. 
Of the 15  formations since 1946,  6 turn out to be 'after consultation', that is  to  say  that parties 
are not definitely tied to the result of the formation, and 9 'in agreement with', that  is  to say  they 
are stuck with the result. 
On one occasion it was said that only the leaders of the parliamentary parties (who carried out the 
deliberations)  were  bound to the  result  of  the formation,  and not their  groups.  In  practice  this 
meant, however, that the groups also  were tied to the Government they had supported. 
Sometimes these agreements are of a rather general nature, which leaves  the parliamentary groups 
with some leeway; at other times these agreements are quite detailed, which means that little room 
is  left for the groups  later in the  Government period. 
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Programmatic  agreements  during  formation  process 
In  favour ...............•...................................... 
In favour,  on broad lines  ......................................  . 
Depending  on the  situation .....................................  . 
Not in favour .................................................  . 
Second  Chamber 
% 
. 29 
17 
39 
15 
First  Chamber 
% 
24 
24 
41 
11 
As  can be  seen  from the data in table 2 a large majority in both Chambers is  in  favour  of some 
kind of programmatic agreements  during tho!  formation  process. 
How do Members of Parliament themselves evaluate their influence  on the formation process ? 
Table 3 
Influence  of the  Second  Chamber  on Government  formation 
Too much ....................................................  . 
Adequate .....................................................  . 
Too little .....................................................  . 
Second  Chamber 
% 
6 
49 
37 
First  Chamber 
% 
14 
50 
23 
A little less  than half of the MPs are of the opinion that the influence of  the  Second  Chamber  is 
sufficient.  More than one-third feels  this influence  is  not enough. 
From these data one might conclude that no great pressure can be expected from Parliament itself 
to  change  the  basic  rules  according  to  which  the  formation  process  is  being  played.  Some 
parliamentary groups - especially on the left - carry some of these changes in their programmes,. 
but too much  should not be expected  of that. 
The major role played  by. the Second  Chamber in the formation  of  Governments  has  a  number 
of disadvantages. 
The holding of by-elections in the event of a Government crisis has rendered precarious the existence 
of  many  parliamentarians,  particularly  as  this  practice  was  introduced  in  a  period  characterized 
by rapid changes in political forces.  The more insecure their existence becomes,  the more inclined 
members  are to leave  Parliament~ as  a. result of which its  quality inevitably suffers. 
Besides,  elections  tend to halt  or slow  down legislative  activities.  The consideration  of  essential 
Bills is  repeatedly postponed, either because the existing Government is  on its way out or the new 
one still  has  to get  settled in. 
The  prospect  of  elections  also  weakens  parliamentary  control:  Parliament  becomes  one  of  the 
arenas  of the  election  campaign. 
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hands  tied  •during  the ride'  as it were. Parliamentary control in these cases amounts to little more 
than  supervision  of  whether  the  agreements  made  are  respected.  Parliamentary  groups  are  co-
responsible  to  a  considerable  extent  for  the  implementation  of  policy,  They  tend  very  much  to 
identify themselves  with the Government and are not very keen or able to assess  things critically. 
It is this attitude in particular which often leads to extensive delegation of power to the Government. 
Of course the Opposition complains, and accuses the majority of a sell-out of Parliamentary powers. 
However,  once  the  Opposition  comes  into  power,  it often  resorts  to the practices  which  it had 
accused  others  of  using.  The result  is  a  sort of downward spiral. 
2.3.  The day-to-day contest between Parliament and Government 
When a  Government has  been formed,  the daily confrontation between Government and the two 
Chambers develops.  In practice it is  a  many-sided relationship, with the Government enlarging its 
sphere  of influence,  and then Parliament hitting  back.  Crisis  and conflict  situations  occur in the 
contact between these two branches of government and they receive much attention. More frequent 
however,  and more  natural in a  way  is  a  pattern of  cooperation,  a  mutual effort  to come  to a 
satisfactory solution of  political problems  and issues. 
Ways  and means  of parliament 
From the start of the constitutional system as  a parliamentary democracy in the middle of the last 
century, Parliament has gradually gained a number of formal resources it can bring into the battle 
with the Government to get what it wants. Obtaining a formal right is one thing, using it is another, 
and using it effectively is still another matter. This last point in particular gives rise to doubts among 
many observers of Parliament at present and, as we will see,  M.P.s themselves share some of these 
doubts. 
The most important of Parliament's resources is the right to ask for information and the duty of the 
Government to answer. Parliament is  quite dependent on the Government for its information. For 
that reason  this  right  is  of  central  importance  for  the proper functioning  of Parliament. If this 
channel were closed, or confidence in its trustworthiness were lost (of course, taking political techniques 
to evade exact answers,  etc., into account)  a  heavy  bill would be  drawn upon the working of the 
parliamentary  system.  For  that reason  one  sometimes  sees  adherents  and  opposers  of  a  certain 
Government  stand out  jointly  for  the  right  of  Parliament  to  receive  necessary  and  appropriate 
information. This does not mean, of course, that the information provided will always give satisfaction. 
It is then possible, however, to seize more powerful tools, if that is felt to be necessary and politically 
appropriate. 
The simplest  way to  get  information  is  through questions.  They can  be  put in  written  or oral 
form.  The written form is  the most usual, the oral form not so common. 
Oral  questions  are  considered  to  carry  more  weight  politically  than  written  ones.  Additional 
questions may be asked  (which within strict limits may lead to a miniature debate), and the press 
pays  more  attention to oral questions. Interpellations carry still more weight.  Approval is  needed 
from  the  chamber to hold  an interpellation,  which,  however,  is  almost always  given.  The inter-
pellation  as  such  has  become  the  key  means  to get something  on Parliament's  agenda  at rather 
short notice which otherwise would not get there. The agenda is  usually quite full,  predominantly 
with subjects prepared by the Government. Using interpellations, Parliament itself takes the initiative, 
however. Usually the interpellation ends with a motion, submitted for a vote. For that reason alone, 
interpellation  is  politically  a  more  significant  resource  for  use  by  Parliament  and  especially,  but 
not exclusively,  by the  Opposition.  A rather rarely  used  constitutional instrument at parliament's 
disposal is  the so-called parliamentary inquiry. With the inquiry an elaborate procedure is  set  up 
(like  hearings  in  the American  Senate)  and witnesses  can  be  examined  under  oath.  The inquiry 
139 has  rarely  been  used: the last time was  about the conduct of the Government in exile  during the 
Second World  War. 
Hearings can also be held by parliamentary committees on special subjects. This is  not a right, but 
something  Parliament  itself  introduced  some  years  ago.  It  serves  predominantly  as  a  means  of 
gathering information, independently of the Government. As  such it is  in the nature of an indirect 
weapon  against the Government. 
Besides  these  means  of  acquiring  information,  Parliament  is  able,  if  it  wishes,  to  express  an 
intention or an act of will, to submit motions and  amendments,  to  reject  proposals  for  laws,  in 
part or as  a  whole,  and to change  or reject  the  budget. 
As regards motions as  a weapon, there has been a tendency to make more use of them, as  of written 
questions. 
A  motion  can  be  used for  different  purposes: 
- to get  something done  by  the  Government, 
- to embarrass the  Government  or the  other side  of the  House, 
- to underscore one's own intentions as  a political gesture chiefly for the world outside. The use 
of  motions for  this  purpose has  grown rapidly. 
Finally, the House has the right of initiative. In practical politics this has not proved to be  a very 
powerful weapon.  To prepare initiatives  the  House  (or  groups)  has  few  resources  at its  disposal, 
although the recent introduction of staff for parliamentary groups,  has  helped to meet their need 
for  assistance. 
Altogether since the introduction of the right of initiative in its present form in 1888  till 1971, 132 
initiative legislative proposals have been introduced, of which 23 % were successful; 66 % of those 
came from the Opposition side of the House. The most successful have been initiatives coming from 
a  'mixed'  background,  in  cooperation between Government and Opposition  members. 
Table 4 
Use  of traditional  rights  of the  Second  Chamber 
Written question  ...............................  . 
Oral question ..................................  . 
Interpellation ...................................  . 
Motion ........................................  . 
Inquiry ........................................  . 
Amendment ....................................  . 
Initiative .......................................  . 
too much 
% 
49 
1 
1 
68 
1 
5 
2 
Second  Chamber 
sufficient 
% 
45 
30 
61 
32 
40 
93 
39 
too little 
% 
4 
67 
35 
49 
2 
58 
The  only  rights,  according  to  the  MPs,  that  are  used  to  an  adequate  extent  are  the  right  of 
amendment and the interpellation (Table 4).  Too much use is  being made of the motion, while the 
140 written question is  also felt  by  many to be  over-used.  According to them, the oral  question  and 
the parliamentary inquiry are not used enough by Parliament in its confrontation with the Government. 
Thus Parliament itself does not seem to be altogether satisfied with the way it uses its own powers 
and  traditional  rights,  a  dissatisfaction  which  varies  depending  on  which  groups  the  members 
belong to. 
The parties forming the government coalition at that time believed  there had been  misuse  of the 
traditional rights of Parliament. The Opposition on the left is  not of the opinion that any of these 
rights of parliament are being used too much. It should be noted here that at the time of the survey 
these  parties  had been  in opposition for  about ten years. 
The Opposition on the right agrees  with the left  on this  score. 
Ways  and means  of the  government 
Confronted  by  the  resources  Parliament (1)  has  at its  disposal,  the  Government  does  not  stand 
helpless.  Its mightiest weapon is  the fact that the initiative almost exclusively has to come from the 
Government:  it  takes  the  practical  steps  needed  to get  policies  introduced  and decisions  taken. 
In  answer to the intentions,  wishes  or demands expressed  by  Parliament, the Government has  to 
implement the necessary  actions: its  simplest defence  is  not to take such  actions,  although rarely 
is refusal made in direct and blunt terms. If Parliament really wants to have its way, it has to bring 
heavier  weapons  to bear,  to retaliate,  with all  the inherent risks.  In the Dutch situation, kicking 
a  Government out (as  a  last resort)  is  not so difficult,  but forming  a  new Government is. 
If a  minister feels  that he  cannot bear the responsibility for what Parliament wants him to do, he 
will declare Parliament's demand to be unacceptable. This is  a heavy weapon: if a majority imposes 
its will, he, the minister, or if the Government so decides,  the Government as  a whole, will resign. 
Most of the pressure used by the Government is  aimed at its  'own side'.  Only  when desertion to 
the Opposition is  a  menace  are such methods of last resort employed.  A  minister who uses  those 
weapons  does  harm  to  the  rule  of 'common  determination'  and loses  his  political  credit  quite 
quickly.  The same - albeit less  pronouncedly - can be  said of a  minister who regularly ignores 
the wishes of Parliament. Parliament will often find ways of penalizing such ministers sooner or later. 
Table 5 
Use  of the  Government's 'weapons' 
Second  Chamber 
too frequent  sufficient  too little 
%  %  % 
Ignoring  motions ................................  39  59  2 
Declaring 'unacceptable'  ••••••••••••••••••••••••  0  42  53  5 
Threat with personal  mandate ....................  18  39  43 
Threat with  collective  mandate ....................  43  51  6 
(
1
)  'Parliament', as  used  ill;  ~his paper, is .synonymous with the Second Chamber, which is composed of the directly elected representatives 
of the  pe~ple. The posltlon  of the First  Chamber, elected indirectly and less  bound  by party politics, is  in many respects different. 
The relatiOn  between the pro·Government majority and the Government itself is  less  rigid.  Yet it is not true that this gives the First 
Chamber more  scope.  Being  indirectly elected, it seeks  to avoid  any  confrontation with the Government. No Government has ever 
fallen because it  lost  the  confidence  of  the  First  Chamber. 
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use  of the  means  Governments  have  at their disposal  are rather divided.  That ministers  can put 
motions  aside and the frequency with which this occurs  is  approved by a sizeable majority of the 
Members;  one-third disapproves  of this  practice.  · 
Of the other three weapons,  a  majority considers  their  use  either too great  or too little. 
As  far  as  the threat  of  the  'unacceptability'  of motions or amendments is  concerned, 40 % of the 
members  of the House feel  that this is  a  procedure  used  too frequently.  This  can be  seen  as  an 
expression of the fact that in Parliament there is a tendency to believe that ministers should be more 
sympathetic to the wishes of Parliament.  They should not throw their political weight in the scale 
too rapidly in matters where more often than not Parliament is not convinced that what a majority 
really wants  does  not agree  with the policy line  of the minister.  · 
The same can probably be said of the heavier weapons  of ·the threat with collective  mandate.  As 
can be seen from the data, about 40% of members feel that the Government is  using this excessively. 
Too little  use is  made of the possibility that a minister may leave if he does  not get his way, and 
too much use of the threat that the life of the whole Government is  at stake. One gets the impres-
sion that within Parliament the view is rather widespread that the Government, often unnecessarily 
according to its Members,  wants to crack nuts  with sledgehammers.  This happens  - as  we  will 
see  later  - in  a  situation  where  the  Government  is  already  quite  dominant  in  its  relation  to 
Parliament. 
2.4.  Constitutional tasks  of Parliament 
In  the  foregoing  we  have  given  an  outline  of  a  few  aspects  of  the  place  of  Parliament  in  the 
constitutional  system,  especially  in  relation  to its  role  in the  formation  of  Governments  and  in 
working with the Government. 
Seen  from  a  different  angle,  three  traditional  constitutional  tasks  are  given  to  Parliament:  law-
making,  budget control  and supervision  of the administration. 
Co-legislative  role 
Parliament's role  as  co-legislator  is  becoming  increasingly  difficult: 
a)  because  of  the complexity  of  the subject-matter  and 
b)  because  the Government  is  obliged,  when  determining  many  of  its  policy  aims,  to give  more 
heed to the aid forthcoming from certain sectors  of  society than to that from Parliament. 
In general it can be said that Parliament's co-legislative role is limited by the fact that the information 
required  is  monopolized  by  the  Government.  More  than once,  Parliamentarians  have  urged  the 
Government - with little success - to provide alternatives. Parliament's co-legislative role is further 
restricted  by  the fact  that governments  tend to have  short lives. 
Protracted negotiations to form Governments also  result in much loss  of time. Since the end of the 
sixties there has been an increase in the number of private member's bills. This is  due in no small 
part to the emergence of new political groups keen to infuse new life into the parliamentary system. 
A current bone of contention is the question of how Parliament should meet the problem of its own 
lack of expert knowledge. Should parliamentary staff be increased or should the various parliamentary 
groups  engage  more  personnel ? In  practice  there  is  a  marked  inclination  to  opt for  the  latter 
solution. 
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The exercise  of  budgetary  powers  has  in  fact  shrunk to an annual  exchange  of  views  between 
Parliament  and  Government  on  proposed  expenditure  and  income  - an  exchange  of  views 
concentrating  more on the  material  content than the financial  aspects.  The discussion  begins  in 
October, before the beginning of the new fiscal year, and continues until far into the new year. The 
First  Chamber often only gives  its  fiat  after the first  three months  of the  new year.  All  attempts 
to begin  the  budget debate  earlier in the year  have  so far  been  unsuccessful,  mainly  because  of 
Civil Service opposition. Attempts to synchronize budget debates in the various European Member 
States  have  also  had  a  detrimental  effect.  The  same  applies  to  efforts  to  conclude  multi-year 
agreements  on certain important categories  of expenditure. 
The Dutch Parliament has never shown much interest in analysing expenditure. This is  partly due 
to the important role played  by social  pressure groups in  the political parties.  Experts  in  parlia-
mentary groups often have close ties with pressure groups and therefore incline towards increasing 
expenditure rather than decreasing  it. 
A new development is  the introduction of 'counter-budgets'  by  opposition  groups  in  Parliament, 
which makes for a more responsible decision-making process. Lack of information, however, appears 
to  have  misled  the Opposition  more than once. 
Another recent  development is  the tendency  among political parties  during  election  campaigns  to 
put forward  programmes  containing  not  only  proposals  for  expenditure  but  also  proposals  for 
obtaining funds  to cover such  expenditure.  Although this  does  introduce a  more realistic  element 
into election promises, it also reduces the politicians' freedom to manreuvre during the negotiations 
to form a Government. It is  doubtful whether the political parties will ever again put forward such 
detailed  financial  policy  plans  as  they  did  for  the last  elections  (1971  and  1972). 
Control 
Parliament's function  of control is  seriously hampered by  the lack of genuine powers of sanction, 
which  means  that  Parliament  is  in  fact  powerless  whenever  it  finds  itself  in  conflict  with  the 
Government. Withdrawal of confidence in individual members of the Government will lead almost 
certainly to a  Government crisis,  probably followed  by new elections,  but certainly  by  a:  lengthy 
process  of  Government formation  with uncertain  outcome. 
Dissolution  by the  Monarch and  an appeal  to the  voters  by  Parliament  and the  Government  is 
impossible because the Government collapses in the event of a  crisis  and can no longer appear as 
a  single  entity before  the  voters. 
The parliamentary majority - composed of different parties - regards as its highest duty the main-
tenance  in  power  of the  Government  coalition;  the  minority  applies  itself  to  overthrowing  the 
coalition, but is  handicapped in this by the knowledge that, in any future coalition, it will have to 
cooperate  with  one  or  more  former  opponents.  Concern  for  their  individual  tactical  positions 
predominates in the various groups in Parliament; as  a result, concern for the controlling function 
of Parliament is  considerably reduced. 
In  fact,  the dualism  required  by  the constitution  between  the  Government  on  the one hand and 
Parliament on the other exists  only in  theory. 
The existence  of many small groups - the result of proportional representation - also  hampers 
performance of the controlling function.  Small groups wish to be represented on as  many parlia-
mentary committees  as  possible,  which  makes for  very  large  committees  (hence  less  likelihood of 
agreement)  and little expertise  (hence  poorer opposition to the government). 
As  a result of the uncertainty regarding Parliament's life, there has been an increasing tendency for 
the latter to concentrate its  control function  on issues  with good publicity value,  whether or not 
under  the  influence  of  pressure ·groups. 
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also  affects  the control situation.  The Government can frequently  defend  itself  when criticized  by 
claiming that talks have still to be held with social groups or have not yet been concluded, and that 
the Government is  consequently  not yet  in  a  position to adopt a  definitive  standpoint. 
A further obstacle to control is  the increasingly interwoven nature of the different  components of 
Government policy, as  a result of which it is  unclear just which ministers are responsible for what 
part of  government  policy.  Efforts  are  made  during  the formation  of  Governments  to achieve  a 
clear demarcation of departmental responsibilities,  but occasionally they seem  to conflict  with the 
claims  of  the aspiring  coalition partners. 
Outside responsibilities of high government officials  are not compatible with the dogma prescribing 
political  neutrality for  members  of the Civil  Service. 
Table 6 
Constitutional  tasks  of Parliament 
Second  Chamber  First  Chamber 
Budget  Influence  Influence  Budget  Influence  Influence 
Control  Law  Making  Administration  Control  Law  Making  Administration 
%  %  %  %  %  % 
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As  can be seen from table 6 only influence in law making is  considered by a large majority of the 
members (79 % of the Second Chamber, 87 % of the First Chamber) to be sufficient.  (The alternative 
answer 'too much'  got only one or two points.) 
A majority in the Second Chamber feels  that influence on the administration (control of execution) 
is insufficient; for the First Chamber the result is the exact opposite. A large majority of the Second 
Chamber feels  that its  influence  on the budget  is  not enough. 
Altogether the Second Chamber feels  that in two of these three constitutional functions, it presents 
an insufficient  counterweight  to the  influence  of  the  Government.  The First  Chamber  (probably 
within the limited tasks it has)  sees  Parliament in a  better position on this score. 
3- PARLIAMENT AND  THE PARTY-POLITICAL SYSTEM 
3.1.  Developments  within party politics 
Relations  between  parties  in  Holland  are  complicated  and in  considerable  flux.  Since  the intro-
duction of proportional representation in 1919 there has been something like an equilibrium between 
the existing parties, with five  regularly dominating the scene, with smaller ones coming and going. 
Basically the situation is that three 'confessional' parties constitute the political centre, the Catholics 
(KVP),  the Anti-Revolutionary Party  (ARP)  and the Christian Historical Union  ICHU).  Their total 
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now, mainly through the decline of the Catholics. The left  (in  socio-economic terms)  consists of a 
Communist Party (around 4 %), a  small Pacifist-Socialist Party and the Labour Party (PvdA).  The 
last one is  the largest party in the country now and has varied in strength between 20  and 30 % 
of the vote. 
Two new  smaller  parties  figure  in  the  progressive  sector,  the  Democrats  '66  (with  constitutional 
reform  as  their main issue)  and a  Radical  Christian Party  (PPR),  originally  a  splinter party from 
the Catholics,  at the  moment dominated  by  radical  calvinists. 
The right  consists  of  a  Liberal/Conservative  party  (VVD)  with  around 10 %  of  the  vote,  and a 
number of smaller right-wing parties like a Farmers Party and two sectarian calvinist parties. A new 
party in  this  sector is  the  Democratic Socialist  Party  (DS'70),  a  split-off  from  the  Labour Party. 
Lijphart suggests persuasively that 1967 might have been the winning point in which the 'accommod-
ation'  era  came to a  conclusion and,  according to his theories, the transition to  another type of 
democracy,  'the cartel',  might  have  set  in.  Even  if one does  not necessarily  wish  to agree  with 
Lijphart about the future,  it seems  sound enough to assert that in the mid-sixties drastic changes 
were taking place in the party-political system. And one may assume that some of these are of such 
a structural nature that a realignment of political power may well be expected in the years to come. 
Four aspects  can be  mentioned: 
- the erosion of the political centre formed by the three confessional parties, especially the break-
down of the Catholics; 
- the  electoral  success  of  new parties ; 
- the hardening  of  party-political  differences; 
- the growing politicization of  aspects  of  social life. 
Some  of these  developments  originate  in  the political system  itself  (e.g.  the changing function  of 
political  parties),  others  stem  from  changes  taking  place  in  the  social  system  (changes  in  value 
patterns)  or in  the economic system. 
For the  party-political  system,  all  this  means  new  relationships  within  the  parties  themselves  (a 
new Left within the Labour Party), new parties (Democrats '66, Christian radicals 1968, Democrats 
socialists  '70)  and new relationships  between parties  (closer  cooperation between the confessional 
parties themselves  and among  the progressives). 
On the one hand more fluid  elements can be  detected,  such as  new parties and great fluctuations 
of electoral strength. On the other hand a greater toughness and rigidity is  noticeable in the system 
because  of  a  trend  towards  political  polarization. 
These tribulations within the party field  have their ramifications for the functioning  of Parliament 
as  a  whole,  such  as  a  more  difficult  policy-formation  process,  and  growing  dependence  on the 
Government. But also at the level of the parliamentary groups, the fluctuations - and the resultant 
high  degree  of  uncertainty  within  the  party  system  - influence  their  work,  e.g.  causing  greater 
dependence  on party bodies  during  the formation  of  Governments,  etc.  Events  are  also  affecting 
the  position  of  individual  members.  In connection  with  the  movements  within  the  party  system 
mentioned above,  other expectations arise  and other behaviour patterns can be  discerned,  notably 
in regard to the pattern of internal  and external parliamentary activities. 
3.2.  Recruitment for Parliament 
Recruiting  for  Parliament takes  place  almost  exclusively  through  political  parties.  The system  of 
proportional  representation  encourages  this.  If somebody  'wants  to  go  into  politics'  the  most 
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is  abundant. But it is  also  quite possible, in the Dutch situation, to start a party of one's own. At 
most elections  several new parties take part, some of them with fair  success.  Several  one-member 
parties  are formed in  most sessions  of  Parliament, some long-lived,  others ephemeral.  Besides  this 
coming  and going  of small groups,  within the more established parties the flow  of new members 
into  the  two  Chambers  of  Parliament  is  quite  considerable.  At  the  last  elections  (1972),  almost 
one-third of the  seats  in  the Second  Chamber  changed  hands. 
A number of factors  may  influence  candidates for  membership  of the Second  or First Chambers. 
There are three main channels: functions within parties, functions as  representatives of lower public 
bodies,  and other non-representative functions  of relevance,  however,  to the  political arena. 
In the case  of  both  Chambers, ,about  one-third  of  members  have  been  on the national board of 
heir party. Members of the First Chamber have been more active at regional party level, and members 
of the Second  Chamber  at local party level. 
Many members  hold - as  might be expected - more than one party function  at the same time. 
Altogether,  only one-third of the members  of both Chambers  have  never  been  on a  party board. 
The second main channel for the recruitment of MPs is through membership of lower representative 
bodies. Studies in other countries have shown that a great many MPs have been local councillors 
mayors  or members  of  regional  councils.  The same  is  true of  the  Netherlands. 
A little less  than half  of  the members  of the Second  Chamber  have  been  (or  still  are)  members 
of such a lower representative body. For the First Chamber this number is  even higher. Almost all 
of them have been (or still are) members of a local council or provincial board. Members of the First 
Chamber  have,  in  this  respect,  more  experience  than  their  colleagues  in  the  Second  Chamber. 
In  the  First  Chamber  there  is  an  even  greater  accumulation  of  representative  functions.  This  is 
understandable if it is  remembered that membership of the Second  Chamber is  these days  a  more 
or less  full-time  job,  while  being  a  member  of the First  Chamber means, in general,  one or two 
days'  work a  week. 
Comparing party activity and on other representative bodies experience, it can be  seen that in the 
Netherlands there is  a  higher recruitment from  pure party politicians in the Second  Chamber and 
a  much  higher  percentage  of persons  with  accumulated political  and  representative  experience  in 
the First  Chamber. 
Considering  the  other factors  which  may  lead  a  person to seek  membership  of  Parliament,  it is 
possible  to distinguish the following  trends: 
- Members  of  the  First  Chamber  not  only  are  or have  been  political  officials  like  mayors  and 
aldermen,  but also  p_ersons  who  have  been  Government  ministers  before; 
- In the Second Chamber there are, relatively speaking, rather more persons who have  been civil 
servants  before  becoming  MPs; 
- Members of the First Chamber have been  (or still are),  strongly affiliated  with organizations in 
the  social-economic  sector,  like  trade  unions  and employers'  groups.  In  the Second  Chamber 
the number of  members  with  an  affiliation  to farmers  groups  is  striking. 
3.3.  Candidacy  and role of parties 
Parties  differ  quite a lot in the way they organize their recruitment.  Recruiting candidates used  to 
be - and still is - an important function of parties - certainly in the past when local party bodies 
were  often  called  'electoral  organizations'. Representatives of political groups were more than just 
representatives;  they  were  leaders  at the  same  time,  who  in  'accommodation'  democracy had to 
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divided.  In  such  a  situation  recruiting  within  the  socio-denominational  groups  was  not left  to 
chance, but selection took place very carefully. As  regards the final  result of the recruiting process, 
the central organs of the parties had, and still have in most parties, a relatively strong hold on the 
selection  of  persons  making  a  political  career  within  those  parties. 
Besides  these  centralizing tendencies,  decentralizing  pressures  are also  encountered.  In addition to 
tensions  between  central  and local  organs  which probably exist  in  all  political parties,  moves  to 
give  the grassroot followers  more say  in party matters  have  led in several  parties to diminishing 
influence  of the  'smoke-filled  rooms'  where  party leaders  used  to dt>cide  who was  going to run. 
It can  be  said  that MPs  themselves  favour  a  more  decentralized  or,  at least,  a  mixed  form  of 
nomination  procedure within the  parties.  Only  14 %  of them favour  a  more  centralized  way  of 
recruitment for Parliament. This does not mean, however, that ideas to extend popular nomination 
in the form  of 'primary  elections'  are  also  favoured.  When questioned  on this  matter, very few 
MPs were in favour. The same is  true of suggestions to make it easier for cani.idates to be elected 
on 'preferential votes',  which  is to say that voters, by not voting for the candidate heading the list 
(which is  quite usual in practice), vote somebody into Parliament who is  low on the party list, and 
in  so  doing  change the  order determined  by  the party. 
There has been some debate in the Netherlands about making the rules  for  a  'preferential'  election 
of this kind easier, to diminish the control of the party bodies on the composition of its representation, 
by giving the voters a greater say in the matter. In practice, MPs themselves seem to be fairly satisfied, 
however, with the existing regulations on this questions. Only about one-third of them favour giving 
the voters  more  say  in this  matter in  one  way  or another. 
3.4.  Consequences  for  MPs  of the changing role  of parties 
The role  of political parties  within the wider political system seems  to be  changing somewhat in 
the  Netherlands.  While  considering  the  traditional  preparation  of programmes  for  the  elections, 
the  composition of lists  of candidates  and the organization  of campaigns  to be their  main tasks, 
new and other activities are coming more and more to the forefront.  These are especially intended 
to remedy what is  called  the  'alienation'  of the average citizen from political life: lack of interest 
in, knowledge of and even contempt for the work of parties, politicians and political life in general. 
Parties are taking this phenomenon rather seriously and many of them are taking measures - not 
all  of  them  entirely  successful,  however  - to remedy  this  situation. 
This changing role of the parties  has  certain consequences  for  the  work parliamentarians do.  As 
the  communicating link  between  citizens  and the world  of  politics,  MPs  play  an ever-increasing 
role.  Party work takes up a great deal of the time available, especially on the days when Parliament 
is not in session  (usually on Mondays and Fridays and during the time around Christmas, Easter and 
in the  summer).  Such  activities  consist  not only in sitting on party boards  locally,  regionally  and 
nationally,  but grassroot activities  also  take  up  more  and more time  of the  average  Member. 
In constitutional texts it is  stated that representatives may act without 'instruction or consultation'. 
Because political parties do not exist in the Constitution, this  rule is  hardly  more  than a  fiction. 
The same  is  true  of  the  maxim  that parliament  represents  the  whole  Dutch population.  In. the 
practice of politics, these rules are valuable in so far as the first one gives the representative a certain 
degree  of independence  and the second one  may provide some little protection against an unduly 
centrifugal  tendency.  Although  practice  is  less  definite  than  the  constitutional texts  would  seem 
to wish, stress is  clearly placed on the 'representation' of groups and strata  of  the  population 
sometimes  in an extreme  form  - in  the Dutch political  and parliamentary culture. 
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take up a lot of time, especially where members of the Second Chamber are concerned. Not all the 
time spent on other than regular parliamentary work is  connected with party activities,  but most 
of it will  be  related in some  way  or another with the  'representative'  role. 
Table 7 
Time  activities  take 
%  mentioning  as  'quite  time  consuming' 
Attendance  plenary sessions  ....................................  . 
Attendance  committee meetings •................................. 
Attendance  meetings  parliamentary groups ........................  . 
Preparation of  meetings ........................................  . 
Attendance  meetings  of party  boards ............................  . 
Speaking  engagements ..........................................  . 
Correspondence  ...............................................  . 
Talks with social  groups/organizations  , .........................  . 
Visiting  hours for  members  of the public ........................  . 
Second  Chamber 
39 
36 
30 
55 
11 
30 
25 
12 
13 
4- PARLIAMENT  AND  THE POLICY  SYSTEM 
4.1.  Patterns  of policy-making 
First  Chamber 
21 
3 
9 
39 
20 
11 
1 
7 
4 
In the foregoing  discussion  about the relation between Parliament  ~nd Government, the focus  has 
been on the conflict rather than on the cooperation between them. The more regular pattern, however 
is  that Parliament  needs  the  Government  (with  the  civil  service  and its  enormous  resources)  for 
information,  initiative  and  preparation  of  its  work.  The  Government  needs  Parliament  not  only 
for the formal approval of its plans and actions, but also for support and legitimization of its policies. 
Especially  in  the  case  of  important legislative  measures  it  needs  to have  broad  support.  So  the 
Government will not only take into account the views and wishes of its own side of both Chambers, 
but also  the  Opposition.  It is  not only  Parliament that counts,  but even  more  so  public opinion, 
or  the  many  specialized 'public opinions' existing around policy areas.  No Government will wish 
to alienate important opinion sectors, and most of the latter have their bridgeheads within Parlia-
ment; often on both sides  of both Chambers. Experts in Parliament, and they are the persons the 
Government or the ministers  have to deal  with in day-to-day political life,  quite often come from 
specialized  areas  of social  life  and keep  their  contacts  there. 
148 This intermixture of functions  inside and outside the immediate field  of politics contributes, in the 
highly  segmented  political  system  in Holland - although  probably less  now than previously -
to a more or less  flexible  policy machinery.  Matters are not unnecessarily taken to extremes, while 
basic  principles  like  proportionality are  not pushed  into  a  corner  too much. 
An  important element in all this,  especially in the socio-economic area, is  the institutionalizing of 
contacts  between  the  partners  in  the  game:  employers,  trade  unions  and  the  government.  All 
important  matters  in  this  area  are  in  accordance  with  procedures  fixed  by  law,  the  subject  of 
extensive organized bargaining between those partners. Matters which in other countries are subjects 
of heavy political infighting over many years were largely taken out of the immediate political arena 
in Holland some 20 years ago and 'prepared'  in those institutional settings. Solutions reached within 
those  structures,  particularly  when  they  are  unanimous,  carry  great  weight  in  the  political  and 
parliamentary world.  On the one hand this means that Government and Parliament can sometimes 
stay clear  of difficult  problems and, on the other hand, important areas of policy are removed from 
the responsibility and thus from the power of Parliament (and to a lesser extent from the government). 
What applies  to the socio-economic world also  applies to other areas of social life - though less 
systematically.  Much  is  prepared  in  official  or  unofficial  committees  and  councils.  Members  of 
Parliament seldom take part in those deliberations; they  are  often not even  aware of them.  That 
would, according to the accepted norms, mean an undesirable mixture of politics and administration, 
of preparation and legitimization.  It is  also  true in this  sphere that the  more  unanimity  between 
the partners, the less  influence parliament will have in its review of the final  product, presented as 
'proposals'  to  parliamentary bodies.  Intermixture of functions  and the creation and maintenance 
of communication channels between the social and the political arenas are what makes a  member 
either an informed MP  or  an  outsider - which is  sometimes a question of political life or death. 
Undoubtedly the other side  of the coin is  the separation of responsibilities,  which  becomes  more 
difficult.  This erodes  the  prestige  of Parliament as  an independent organ within  the political  and 
policy system. Some recent trends in thinking on the role of Parliament brings this particular aspect 
to the forefront.  Democrats '66 and other groups within the progressive camp make quite an issue 
out of the separation of functions of Parliament as a body and of members individually. One result 
of this drive has been that members  (on a voluntary basis)  are requested to declare all their outside 
functions. 
In the following pages we shall say something about the position of Parliament in the policy system 
in  the contexts  of: 
- parliament and policy formation, 
- parliament, pressure groups  and their institutionalization, 
- parliament and the centre  of policy  making. 
4.2.  Parliament and the policy  process 
In practice - as  already mentioned - the preparation of policies is almost exclusively in the hands 
of the Government with the help of the civil service.  Long-term planning and policies, for instance 
in  the form  of white  papers  on special  subjects,  also  come from the Government.  This practice 
does  not meet with everybody's  approval.  Some people argue that it is  the task of Parliament to 
set out the main lines of policy, and the task of the Government to implement those guidelines and 
eventually carry them out. As  can be seen from table 8,  this opinion is  not shared by the majority 
of  the  members  of both Chambers. 
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Parliament,  government and  policy-making 
Government  makes  policies, Parliament judges ....................  . 
Government and Parliament make policies  together ...............  . 
Parliament  makes  policies,  Government carries  them out ..........  . 
2nd  Chamber 
% 
62 
20 
18 
1st  Chamber 
% 
74 
13 
13 
The great majority of the members  of both Chambers  agree that the Government is  predominant 
in the  area of policy-making. 
4.3.  Parliament, pressure  groups  and institutionalization 
As  we have already mentioned, a remarkable aspect of the relationship between the political arena 
and the social environment is  the high degree  of institutionalization of the contacts between them. 
In  the  socio-economic  area  the  Social  and  Economic  Council,  one-third  of  whose  members 
represent  employers,  one-third  the  unions  and  one-third  the  government  ('Crown  Members'), 
plays  an important role.  Being  primarily an advisory institution for the government, the question 
may  be  asked to what extent such a  body  (surrounded by  a  whole structure of sub-councils  and 
committees)  influences  the  work  of Parliament.  Does  it  make  its  work easier  or  more difficult; 
does  the  SER  strengthen  the  government's  position  or  does  it  make  its  position  weaker  by 
entrenching  pressure  groups  in a  fixed  structure  of  procedures ? 
A notable section of parliamentarians  are  of the opinion that bodies like the SER  strengthen the 
position  of the Government, and that, in respect  of Parliament, their  activities  do not make too 
much  difference.  The importance  of  pressure  groups  in  such  a  pattern  of  institutionalization  is 
certainly  not diminished. 
What in .general  is  the opinion of  MPs  about the influence  of pressure groups ? 
Earlier we noted that linked with the socio-denominational, segmentalized pattern of Dutch politics, 
social  groups  and  organizations  belonging  to a  given  'segment'  could  easily  find  representation 
within the parties and parliamentary groups and, for that matter, within the parliamentary arena. 
But not only there.  They also  have their representation in the  structures of consultation we have 
just described.  They thus gain  access  to the sphere of government and official  policy centres. 
In  which  direction  can  their  influence  be  rated  as  most  effective:  with  the  parties,  with  the 
Government or in Parliament ? 
Looking at the Second Chamber in its totality, opinion seems  to be that the influence of pressure 
groups  is  greater  on Parliament  than on the  Government.  The least  influence,  according  to the 
Chamber, is exerted on the parties. The First Chamber does not see much difference as far as exertion 
of influence on the Government or on Parliament is concerned. They also feel the influence on parties 
ranks third. 
Aside from the amount of influence exerted by pressure groups, it can be  asked how this influence 
is  evaluated. 
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towards  this  phenomenon,  e;g.  is  it regarded  as  supporting parliamentary activities ? 
The largest group of the members of the Second Chamber seems to have a positive attitude towards 
pressure  groups  in  relation to the work of  parliament. 
Members  of the First  Chamber are  more  outspoken in  their  opinion  as  to the value  of pressure 
groups.  They have  in  general  a  more  positive  opinion about what pressure  groups  contribute to 
Parliament's  work. 
4.4.  Who has the principal say in policy-making 
Finally, the questions may be  asked: looking at the policy process in general terms, where would 
the main point of decisional political powers be located ? In two centres, according to constitutional 
theory: Government and Parliament. Political theory (and reality)  say that parties, pressure groups 
and the civil service too play a  role,  although different trends in such theories put more emphasis 
on one  or other  of these  'other branches  of  government'. 
As  table 9  shows,  one  conclusion  emerges  quite  clearly:  Members  of  Parliament  have  no  doubt 
that the greatest  say  in  political  policy-making  is  with the  Government,  with Parliament itself  a 
good  second.  As  far  as  the next three  choices  are concerned,  no  such  unanimity  exits.  For the 
Second  Chamber in its  totality,  the  influence  of pressure  groups  and the  civil  service  are  rated 
equally in the third and fourth place; parties come last. For the First  Chamber the order is  more 
as  follows:  civil  service  third, pressure groups fourth,  parties  last. 
The  parliamentary  groups  differ  in  their  opinions  on  this  question.  In  the  First  Chamber  the 
members  of  the  confessional  parties  rate the  influence  of parties  relatively  high. 
The Left attributes weight to pressure groups, the right to pressure groups and 'to the civil service. 
In  the First  Chamber the differences  of opinion  on the role  of the  parties  are not very  marked, 
unlike  those  on the  influence  of pressure  groups  and  the  civil  service. 
It is  interesting to note that, especially where the members of the Labour Party and the Liberals in 
both Chambers  are concerned,  opinions  on the influence  of  pressure  groups  and the civil  service 
are  (relatively  speaking)  almost the exact opposite. 
Table 9 
Principal  say  in  policy-making 
Second  Chamber  First  Chamber 
Position  on  a scale  from  1  to  5 
Government ...................................................  .  4.4  4.3 
Parliamentary  groups  ..........................................  .  3.6  3.6 
Party  board ...................................................  .  1.9  2.1 
Pressure  groups  ...............................................  .  2.4  2.2 
Civil  servants  ..................................................  .  2.4  2.4 
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In the foregoing we considered the role of Parliament within the political system from certain aspects 
of its position within three sub-systems: the constitutional, the party-political and the policy system. 
In this final section we should like to combine these three to a certain extent in the form of answers 
to a question put to the members of the Second Chamber. In this question they were asked what, 
in  their  opinion,  was  the  most  important function  of  the Second  Chamber:  the formation  of  a 
Government, law-making, pronouncing  on  government policies,  scrutinizing budgets  or expressing 
the  special  wishes  of  groups  or individuals. 
They were  also  asked which function they personally performed best. 
Table  10  shows  the  results  which  reveal  the  following  trends: 
- Looking  at the function  of the Second  Chamber in its totality, law-making  was  considered to 
be  the most important function followed by pronouncing on policies, while budget control and 
government formation were rated less  important. The expression of special wishes as  a function 
of the Second  Chamber was  not mentioned  by  anyone. 
- Looking at the functions as performed by the parliamentarians themselves, quite a different picture 
emerges if compared with the functions  of parliament as  a  whole. 
- Personally, members of the Chamber accord first place to pronouncing on policies, thus ousting 
law-making, which for most members personally comes second. The same goes for government 
formation  and scrutinizing  budgets  in  the  third  and fourth  places. 
It is  rather striking that almost 10 % of the members, while not regarding expression of wishes  of 
groups  and individuals  as  a  function  of  Parliament,  credit themselves  with talents  on that score. 
We  present  these  data,  because  these  discrepancies  between  the  functions  as  perceived  to  be 
important for  Parliament as  an  institution and for  members  on an  individual  basis  seem  to be  a 
rather good indication of  built-in tensions  in the functioning  of the  Chamber, tensions  stemming 
from the fact  that the Second  Chamber  (and to a  lesser  extent probably also  the First  Chamber) 
functions  over  a  cross-section  of  the three  subsystems,  as  described  above,  and that at the  same 
time the members  themselves  have to function  in these  three different  worlds. 
Evaluating  the  data  in  this  paragraph  (against  the  background of the  data presented  above)  we 
would suggest that the members, individually,  seem to have a  rather good idea  about where they 
stand in the  world  of parliamentary  politics;  that,  in  their  opinion  the  Second  Chamber  as  an 
institution, however, lags behind considerably in adjusting itself to the realities of its role and function 
in the political system  of today. 
Table 10 
Functions  of the Second  Chamber  and of the  individual  Member 
Functions  of  the  Functions  of  the 
Second  Chamber  member  himself 
%  % 
Important role  in Government  formation  •........................  10  6 
Law-making  ........•..........................................  41  29 
Pronouncing  on government policies  .......  : ....................  .  29  36 
Scrutinizing  budgets  •...........................................  6  9 
Expressing  wishes  of groups  or individuals  ......................  .  9 
All  equally  important ..........  : ..........................•.....  14  6 
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In  the foregoing  we  have  attempted to outline the  posltlon  of  Parliament in the Dutch political 
system  by indicating its  role and function  within,  and in relation to, three more or less  separate 
spheres, that of constitutional rules,  that of party-political reality and that of policy.  All three are 
in a state of flux and, in some cases, Parliament itself plays an active role in developments, in others 
it remains  passive. 
In conclusion, we  should like to summarize briefly the position of Parliament by defining its place 
within  the  context  of  these  developments  and  the  opportunities  which  the  latter  hold  out  for 
Parliament. 
Constitutional rules generally fulfil a consolidating rather than an innovating function.  Occasionally 
they  are  used as  a  means to stimulate a  certain development,  but examples  of this  are rare.  Just 
recently, however, there has been a tendency to see amendment of the Constitution as  an instrument 
for drastically influencing the political situation. The Democrats '66 Party even  makes  it the main 
plank in its platform. Yet these efforts meet with little response from politicians or from the people. 
It is  not therefore wise to expect too much from these attempts in the way of fundamental changes. 
Changes  are conceivable and, perhaps, politically feasible  in certain sectors: giving voters a  rather 
greater say in the formation of the Government, or modifying the electoral system so as to promote 
cooperation  between  parties,  for  instance.  Parliament  is  not very  enthusiastic  about  these  ideas, 
and will not in fact be much affected  by them.  Parliament's views  on these proposals are dictated 
to a large extent by the party-political situation. Changes in this field affect parliament considerably. 
It is  there that developments are strongest. Election results differ  more widely than they have done 
for tens of years; positions which seemed virtually unassailable are now gradually crumbling.  But 
even  in  the field  of  party politics,  reality  prevails  over  theory,  Attempts  to promote cooperation 
between  the  parties  have  met  with  more  difficulties  than  many  anticipated.  While  there  is  a 
willingness  to establish clearer-cut  majorities  in order to facilitate  the formation  of Governments, 
the parties are at the same time anxious to keep their identities as  distinct as possible. That is  why 
the various  forms  of cooperation which have  arisen recently  have  hardly ever  proved viable. 
It seems,  however, as if the trend in Dutch politics towards a more definite division into two sides 
is  going to continue. There is  a need for clearer definition of political positions, which it seems can 
only be achieved at the expense of the political centre, the confessional parties.  This development 
is  encouraged  by the effect  on politics  of the secularization of  society,  which  has  removed some 
of the power of attraction of parties with a  religious  basis.  Finally, this increased polarization is 
likewise  a  reflection  of  social  currents which,  whether  neo-Marxist or not,  will tend to intensify 
social  polarization, for  instance  in  the social  and economic  sphere. 
These  trends  will  have  a  marked  effect  on parliament.  Uncertainty  in  the  party-political  sphere 
serves to link the groups more closely t,O  the Government. Life is  becoming  'tougher' in Parliament, 
the trend towards polarization of political parties continues inside the very walls of the parliament 
building. 
Parliament has hardly any influence on the more fundamental developments. It registers to a certain 
extent in the political composition of the parliamentary groups what is  going on outside Parliament 
in the party-political field.  Obviously the groups support their parties in this game, but the margins 
are fairly narrow. Lengthy periods of the formation of governments have reduced considerably the 
public's  goodwill vis-a-vis  elections;  this  means  a  close  link between government parties  and the 
Government, a strong sensitivity on the part of Parliament to happenings in the immediate present, 
and a high degree of uncertainty as to the consequences of certain political measures. It is  evident 
that, in these circumstances, the traditional tasks of Parliament, such as law-making and controlling 
Government policy,  have  suffered.  Nor has  the  none  too  strong  position  of  Parliament  vis-a-vis 
the  Government been  improved. 
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as  'the structural  weakness' of present-day parliaments is found in this sphere. Lack of information, 
highly  complex problems, over-full agendas,  all these are problems that weaken Parliament's grip 
on essential developments. In the case of the Netherlands there is an additional factor: the traditional 
frameworks  within  which  important problems  were  initially  processed,  the  socio-denominational 
segments,  are  crumbling.  Within  this  segmentalized  structure  Parliament  had a  safe,  albeit  non-
dominant, place.  In a  period of transition to different social  structures,  of  controversy about the 
direction in which society will evolve, it is much more difficult for Parliament to find a firm foothold. 
As  the forum for central debates on such issues it is  inadequate, the subjects are less  well suited to 
such  debate,  and political  dissension  is  also  too great.  Too rarely  are  the  'major'  issues  really 
dealt with in debate.  Occasionally a glimpse is  caught of possible new political alignments on such 
matters as prosperity versus well-being as the aim of society or a society concerned with well-being 
versus  one concerned with performance. 
The advisory structures, particularly those in the social and economic sphere, are under discussion. 
In this sphere there are possibilities for Parliament to regain lost ground, and to acquire a place of 
special importance. 
But the problem of pressure groups that negotiate directly with the government, thus pushing Par-
liament aside, is a difficult one to solve. An important element in this context is the fact that many pres-
sure groups have close contacts with political parties. Parliamentarians whose careers began in a pres-
sure group  setting  are  generally  not very interested in judging too critically the role played by their 
previous employers.  Moreover, it is  noticeable that the combined roles  of a pressure group leader/ 
Member  of  the Second  Chamber  occur  much less  frequently  now than  before. 
Weighing  up the different  developments  and possibilities,  we  come  to the conclusion  that Parlia-
ment's most serious problem is  that of party politics in the current sense.  In addition to a  certain 
structural  weakness,  which  can  be  observed  in  parliaments  of  other  countries  too,  the  Dutch 
Parliament has to contend with a confused and uncertain party-political scene,  whose development 
Parliament can influence to a limited degree only. At all events, Parliament's role and function would 
certainly  benefit  if Parliament  were  to  define  clearly  its  responsibilities  vis-a-vis  the  Government 
and the pressure groups, as  this would in turn improve its communication with the people of the 
country.  A  certain  amelioration  can  be  expected  from  procedural  measures,  but these  will  only 
be  marginal. 
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155 THE  BRITISH  PARLIAMENT 
Paper  by  Mr John P.  MACKINTOSH 
A major problem in understanding the British Parliament is that much of the description and many 
of the forms  date from previous periods when the British political system was quite different and 
therefore when the role of Parliament was different.  But because the language and procedures  are 
often  unaltered,  it is  hard to distinguish  the  underlying  changes  of  substance. 
In Britain there has always been a strong executive and for some six hundred years of Parliament's 
existence,  this  executive  was  the  Crown.  The  Crown  governed  the  country  with  and  through 
ministers,  the  early  functions  of  Parliament  being  to  agree  to  taxes,  to  approve  new  laws,  to 
present popular petitions and grievances and to act as a focus of loyalty to the sovereign. The disputes 
of the seventeenth century, as far as  Parliament was concerned, turned on the extent to which the 
Crown could ignore or even  act contrary to the interests of the groups represented in Parliament. 
The  defeat  of  the  Crown  meant  not  that  Parliament  governed  or  appointed  the  executive  but 
that the  Crown would  not retain  ministers  who  did  not have  the  confidence  of  Parliament  nor 
would the Crown act in a manner fundamentally prejudicial to interests of those represented there. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Crown appointed its ministers, occasionally changing them 
under  Parliamentary  criticism  though  Parliament's  real  power  was  to  make  or reject  legislation, 
to vote taxes and to scrutinise expenditure. As  a result, the expression of grievances in Parliament 
received  very  careful  attention. 
The move towards a wide right to vote based on property (achieved in 1832)  led to changes in the 
composition  of  the  House  of  Commons,  a  strengthening  of the party system  and a  reduction in 
royal powers  of patronage so  that the  Crown (in  the  1840's)  ceased to be  able to choose its  own 
ministers.  From this  period onwards, the effective power of the  Crown ceased and ministers  were 
chosen  by  Parliament. 
If being  governed  by Parliament means  a  situation in which the popularly elected  house appoints 
and can dismiss  the executive,  then Britain  was  governed  by  Parliament only from the 1840's to 
the 1880's.  After  the Reform  Act  of  1884,  the  electorate  was  large  enough and the party system 
sufficiently formalised for the choice  of governments to pass from the House of  Commons to the 
electorate. For virtually a hundred years, people in Britain have voted at elections in order to choose 
a  government and normally this  government lasts  either till its legal  limit  (since  1911,  five  years) 
expires  or it decides  to submit itself  to the electorate  once  again  at an earlier election. 
Many of the current descriptions of the British political system and of Parliament's role date from 
the period between the 1840's  and 1880's  as  this was  a  period of success  for  the country and of 
great  pride  and  interest  in  its  institutions.  But,  in  practice,  the  conditions  prevailing  since  the 
electorate  took over  the  power  to  make  and  unmake  governments  have  been  very  different.  In 
reality,  Parliament's relationship  to the executive is  now not unlike its  previous  relationship  with 
the  Crown  only  the  present  executive  is  in  Parliament  and,  in this  way  and  through the  party 
system,  has  a  more  direct  control over the House  of  Commons. 
Thus Parliament is  best  understood  to-day  as  a  supportive  institution.  It is  elected  at the  same 
time  as  the executive  and  a  majority  of  the members  consider that their primary task is  to back 
156 up  the government.  They  must  attend  constantly,  give  the  government  a  majority  in  every  vote, 
speak for  it,  ask  sympathetic  questions  at question  time  and keep  explaining  and promoting its 
policies  in their  constituencies. 
For  the  opposition,  the  basic  task  s  not to defeat  the government  (normally  that is  impossible) 
nor to amend or improve its laws (they are the responsibility of the government) but to keep explaining 
to the electorate outside Parliament why the government is  making mistakes and why the opposition 
should  be  returned  to  power  at  the  next  general  election.  The  members  of  parliament  in  the 
opposition support their  leaders  in  the  same way  as  the  majority  supports the government. 
Thus the chief function  of  parliament is  a  supportive one.  The government, for its  part, operates 
through  Parliament  using  the  outlets  there  as  a  means  of  explaining  its  policies  and  of  rallying 
support  among  its  followers  in  the  country.  For  many  British  MPs,  their  activities  between 
elections  is  merely  a  way of preparing for the next one.  The House of Commons is  about power 
and its task is  to enable the opposition to campaign against  and the  government to defend  itself 
again  and again till the issues  at the next election  become  clear  and familiar  to the public.  The 
House is  organized to make this possible, its best moments being clashes between the party leaders 
on the great questions of the day and all other forms of legislative activity are subordinated to this 
basic function. 
Compared to many other parliaments the influence  of  the average  British  MP  is  low  because of 
this basic supportive role and because of the strength of party allegiance. A number of factors both 
illustrate  and  reinforce  this  position.  Britain  is  a  small,  largely  homogeneous  country,  very  few 
MPs  having  local  connections  which  are  so  strong  that  they  are  more  important  than  party 
loyalties.  Thus what matters is  the party nomination which is  given  or withheld by local activists 
for  whom loyalty  to the party leadership  is  a  prime  consideration. 
British  MPs  almost  all come through the party system, having been keen party workers and often 
candidates  in  unwinnable  seats  before  they  are  chosen  for  a  seat  where  they  can  win.  Their 
interests and those of the party leadership are therefore virtually identical. They want to see  their 
leaders succeed  and their party go  from strength to strength.  The chief credit they will get locally 
and  from  their  parliamentary  colleagues  will  be  for  excelling  in  supporting  their  party  and  in 
scoring  points  off  the other side. 
Within Parliament,  while  some  MPs  have  no further  ambition,  many  hope to become  members 
of the executive. It is  this rather than any posts  as  committee chairmen that attract the able  and 
ambitious members.  Governments now have some eighty members in the Commons so that about 
one  in  four on the majority side  has  a  ministerial  appointment of some kind.  As  many or more 
aspire to such  posts.  On the opposition side,  almost  as  many 'shadow'  appointments  are  made. 
Criticism  or disloyalty  may  occasionally  win  an  MP  a  post  but  more  often  this  will  lead  to 
permanent exclusion. 
So  all these forces  combine to keep MPs in line behind their leaders. They are so  strong  that it is 
barely necessary to use  any pressure, though machinery does exist to organize support and, rarely, 
to employ sanctions.  This machinery consists  of the party whips who are  appointed by the party 
leader  (or,  in  the  case  of  the  Labour  Party  in  opposition,  elected  by  the  parliamentary  party). 
The  whips  keep  MPs on their side informed of business, summon them to vote, keep a record of 
what happens,  advise  the party leader  about tactics  and put pressure  on any  dissident  members 
who might be inclined to step out of line. The ultimate sanction is  'withdrawal of  the  party  whip' 
as  this  means  the  MP  cannot  be  renominated.  But  it  is  rarely,  if ever,  used  as  normally  the 
constituency  party takes  action  long  before  this.  In  the  rare  cases  where  the  local  party is  not 
prepared to act  (as  over the many rebellions  of Mr Enoch Powell),  there is  no point in  external 
pressure from the whips. 
This  then  is  the  primary  function  of  Parliament  and  the  control  of  members  through  a  party 
system  which is  in the hands  of the government on one side  and the shadow government on the 
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control which those accustomed to other legislatures often find  it hard to appreciate. For example, 
the Government controls the timetable of the House. Every Thursday the minister in charge of the 
House  announces  the  business  for  the following  week.  By  use  of  the  Government's  majority,  he 
can impose this  timetable  bringing in closure  or guillotine  motions  which ensure that business  is 
concluded  at the prescribed time.  The opposition find  this  tolerable because it is  allotted ·  30  days 
a  year  on which  it can choose the  subjects  for  debate;  but the House as  a  whole  or individual 
backbench members  can  do little to alter or delay the Government's announced programme. 
Similarly, the Government, by use  of its  majority can decide whether there are to be any changes 
or reforms in Parliamentary procedure.  The executive  thus decides  whether the House is  to have 
any select  committees to scrutinise the work of the executive,  what powers such committees  will 
have,  who are to be  the members  and the chairman, what terms of reference  will be given to the 
committees and how long they will last. At present, the House has no settled procedure (see below) 
for scrutinising or debating legislation  by the European Community.  The Government had to get 
opposition  agreement  (which  was  withheld for  some  months)  before  it appointed  a  Select  Com-
mittee  on  this  subject.  The  Government  chose  a  majority  of  the  members  and  the  opposition 
nominated  the  minority.  The  Committee  has  reported  but  it  is  not  (in  January,  1974)  known 
whether  the  Government  has  accepted  its  recommendations  or  what  it intends  to  do.  Till  the 
Government  makes  up its  mind and tables  proposals,  the British Parliament will  be without any 
form  of  procedure to deal with Community decisions  which  have  the force  of law in Britain. 
Because  of these powers  over  Parliament, the executive  can control the information which it wil 
give  to members  and the  conditions  in which they work.  It is  because  it is  inherently easier for 
governments to work in secret and because Parliament has virtually no powers to extract information 
that British government is largely conducted behind closed doors - unlike  the  'open  government' 
practised in Brussels. Thus all negotiations between pressure groups and the civil service (Whitehall) 
preceding legislation occurs  in secret and if pressure groups divulge what has  happened, they  are 
punished  by  being  excluded  from  the  negotiating  process.  The  British  Parliament  without  an 
established  committee  system  dealing  with  the  major  departments,  with  no foreign  affairs  com-
mittee,  no economic policy committee and  no defence  committee  is  no better informed than any 
private person who studies the newspapers and such information as  is  divulged in· official  reports. 
Finally,  the  executive  determines  the  pay of  members  of parliament,  whether they  may  have  or 
share  an office,  whether  they  can  have  a  part-time  secretary  or a  car  allowance and this  is  one 
reason  why  Scottish  MPs  are,  in  all  these  respects,  the  least  satisfactorily  equiped  of  any 
parliamentarians  in  the major industrialised  countries  of  the west. 
Now that the  distribution  of  power  has  been  set  out it is  appropriate  to  consider  the  current 
working of the traditional functions of Parliament; those which were built up in the many centuries 
when Parliament aided, advised and occasionally checked the Crown in the running of the country. 
One of the principal functions  was to legislate.  The procedure of the House was  designed to suit 
a  period  when legislation was fairly  simple  and was  often introduced  by private  members.  As  a 
result, there is a First Reading when the title is read out, warning MPs  that a  Bill is being produced. 
Then the Bill is  printed and a Second Reading debate takes place on the principle of the measure. 
When this  stage  has  been  passed, the Bill  is  either taken  (if  very  important)  in Committee of the 
whole House or is  sent to a Standing Committee.  These Standing Committees have no powers  of 
investigation  or  interrogation.  They  are  simply  a  smaller  reproduction  of  the  full  House,  the 
membership is  not specialised  on the subject of the Bill,  there is  a government majority led  by  a 
minister, an opposition minority led by a shadow minister, a chairman in place of Mr Speaker  and 
the normal rules  of procedure apply.  The Bill  is  debated by  the Committee and passed clause  by 
clause.  There is  then a  Report Stage  when the whole House can  consider the Bill  as  amended in 
Committee and a final Third Reading Debate. If the House of Lords makes any amendments, these 
also  have  to be  debated and accepted. 
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Bill  has  been  published  and dates  from  the period when  Parliament did not approve  or appoint 
the  executive  and  when· legislation  was  not therefore  treated  as  a  matter  of  confidence  in  the 
government.  Now that  Governments  bring  in  virtually  all  important  legislation  and treat  every 
major vote as  an issue of confidence, all this elaborate procedure has become simply an opportunity 
for the Government to explain its case for the legislation over and over again and for the opposition 
to repeat,  equally  often,  its  objections. 
The real process  of legislation has  moved back into the period before a  Bill  is  actually published. 
The sources  of legislation are mixed.  In many cases,  civil  servants find  they cannot proceed satis-
factorily  with  their existing  powers.  They want them  altered  and this  has  to be  negotiated with 
outside interests involved and with other departments  (with the Treasury, if  money is  to be spent). 
When an acceptable conclusion is  reached, this is then given a place in the legislative timetable and 
published  as .  a  Bill.  Other  sources  are  Royal  Commissions or Committees, usually nowadays of 
outside experts  or prominent persons  rather than  of  MPs  and the  Party programmes.  Parties in 
opposition  work  out  proposals,  include  some  in  their  manifestos  and then,  if  elected,  these  are 
negotiated  by  the  civil  service  in the normal way. 
Parliament does have some effect on legislation but it is  relatively small. A Government clearly has 
its supporters in the House of Commons in mind when it is  preparing legislation; after a life-time 
in  the  same  party,  ministers  know  how  their  colleagues  will  react.  Most  legislation  on  non-
political topics can be altered if  unexpected gusts of public opinion arise. When the topic is  highly 
controversial, amendments are less  likely to be  accepted.  A recent study of a three-year period (by 
Professor John Griffith)  has shown that of over 3,000 amendments moved by  private  MPs,  about 
a hundred were carried while of over 900 moved by the government, all but one were carried. The 
Labour Government of 1964-70 withdrew two Bills, one before it was published and the other during· 
its passage through the House. The first was on Industrial Relations where pressure from the trade 
unions and trade  union  MPs  led the Cabinet to change its  mind and the second  was  on  reform 
of the Lords where the government never lost a division but found that the Bill was taking too much 
time.  In fact,  it feared  it could not carry the usual motion for limited debate (a guillotine motion) 
because  the Conservatives were not officially  opposing the measure  but there was  much unofficial 
opposition  on  both  sides.  The Conservative  Government  of  1970-1974  has  been  defeated  twice, 
once on a motion about the export of live animals to Europe and once on immigration regulations, 
both  matters  of  great  moment  to  the  Conservative  party  rank  and  file.  These  defeats  of  each 
government  have  to  be  set  against  the  mass  of  controversial  issues  between  parties  and  across 
parties,  which were  carried in the form  that the Government  desired. 
There is  a  small  amount  of  Bills  introduced  by  private  members,  a  handful of  which  pass  each 
year  but few  even  of these are the idea  of  the  MP  who is  successful in the ballot for  the  right 
to introduce such a Bill. A  mass  of  MPs  enter for the ballot and most of those who are successful 
accept a  minor measure drafted ready for  them by their whips'  office.  A few  accept  major items 
ofsocial reform  (on  abortion, homosexuality, capital punishment and divorce)  because the parties 
do not like to take official stands on such matters of conscience but here again the Bills are prepared 
by Government Departments or by the special pressure groups concerned. It is  a mistake to regard 
this  as  in any way  a major function  of Parliament or one restoring any real  measure of influence 
or capacity to  act to the  private  MP 
The second  main function  of Parliament was to sanction taxation and scrutinise expenditure. The 
procedure  in  this  case  was  built  up  in  the  eighteenth  and nineteenth  centuries  of  the  House  of 
Commons, the House of Lords (see below) having always been excluded as taxation was, in theory, 
levied  and  granted  by  the  Commons.  The procedure  as  established  by  the  1860's  involved  an 
. annual  'circle  of  control'.  The civil  service  departments  laid their estimates before the House in 
the Spring  of each year.  The Commons could,  and in the earlier part of  the century  did,  debate 
and  sometimes  cut  down  (it  was  prohibited  by  standing  order  from  increasing)  such  estimates. 
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the taxation to pay for it. The House went into a  Committee of Ways and Means, later called the 
Finance  Committee to scrutinise the taxation proposals  and into a  Supply  Committee to look at 
the  expenditure.  This  Supply  Committee could sit at any time during the year as it could consider 
any policy which involved spending money.  By  the end of the  summer, the two aspects  were put 
together in a Finance Act and an Appropriation Act.  The last stage in the  'circle  of  control'  was 
when  the  Public  Accounts  Committee  went  over  the  previous  year's  accounts  to  see  that  every 
penny was  spent as  authorised by law. This Committee, set up in 1860,  was chaired  by  a  leading 
member of the opposition and serviced  by  the staff  of the Comptroller and Auditor General. 
By  the end of the century, the estimates had become too complex to be dealt with on the floor  of 
the House and the days in Committee of Supply (now 29  a year)  were used as  opposition days on 
which the opposition could choose any aspect of government policy which it wanted to debate and 
criticise. To fill  in the gap this left, a Select Committee on Estimates was created in 1913. However, 
this  Committee  had  no  staff,  it  was  precluded from  summoning  ministers  or considering  policy 
and its  sub-committees  were not allowed to specialise.  They looked at different  random items  of 
expenditure each year.  As  a result, no body of specialist knowledge was accumulated and little was 
achieved. 
In the early 1960's, the Treasury largely gave up planning expenditure on an annual basis and went 
over  to a  five  year  rolling programme,  each year the government taking hard decisions  for  year 
three ahead while years four and five  were simply projections. The Select Committee on Procedure 
of the House pointed out that as  a  result of all these developments in this century, Parliamentary 
control  over  expenditure  had virtually  ceased  while  control  over  taxation was  very  limited.  The 
Committee recommended a Select  Committee on Expenditure  (in  place of the old Estimates  Com-
mittee)  with  a  staff,  permission  to  call  ministers,  to  consider  policy  and  to.  specialise.  It also 
recommended that the Government should publish the five  year rolling programme of expenditure 
and the medium term economic survey of expected resources available and that there should be an 
annual two-day debate  on these  two documents. 
On the taxation side,  the Committee recommended that the Finance Bill be split, issues  of general 
principle  being  considered  on the floor  of  the  House  while the  detailled  proposals  were  debated 
in a normal non-specialised standing committee of the House but they also proposed that an extra 
sub-committee  be  added to the Expenditure  Committee with proper staff to examine the  broad~r 
aspects  of  existing  and projected taxation.  · 
The Labour Government agreed to publish the two documents, to have an annual two-day debate 
and to split the Finance Bill  between the whole  House and a  Committee while  the  Conservative 
Government after 1970 accepted the Expenditure Committee but rejected the proposal for a special 
sub-committee on taxation. 
It would be hard (though the author was a member of the Committee on Procedure that called for 
these changes) to say that the result has been an unqualified success or that it has in any substantial 
way restored the House of Commons' capacity to scrutinise expenditure or taxation. The Government 
has felt free, on embarrassing occasions, to refuse to publish the Medium-term Economic Assessment. 
The annual two-day debate on planned public expenditure has not become a major parliamentary 
occasion largely because the implications of the changes  are not always clear and they are,  in any 
case,  a little too far of£  to feel  the kind of immediate flare-up  which is  the forte  of the House of 
Commons. The division of the Finance Bill has proved helpful in that it has saved some of the time 
of the House at a  crowded period in the session·· though this  does .  nothing for  the powers of the 
Commons; rather it aids the Government to get through the rest of its legislative programme. But 
it must be  said  that governments  have  given  way to suggestions  and amendments  in the Finance 
Bill  Committee more than they have done on the floor  of the House or in other committees. The 
reason is that with  detailed  tax changes, the Treasury refuses to indulge in prior negotiations with 
the pressure groups for fear  of leaks.  Thus the negotiations take place  and difficulties  are ironed 
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on the Committee and when the Government changes its mind on some points or irons out anomalies, 
this  looks  like  and in some  cases  may  be  concessions  to points  actually put in debate  across  the 
floor  of  the  Committee. 
On the  other hand,  the  Expenditure  Committee  has  forced  the  Treasury  to  explain  and clarify 
the information it publishes  while  specific  sub-committees  have had an impact  on officials  in the 
special areas allotted to them. Together with the old Public Accounts Committee which has swung 
more  to  'value-for-money'  and  'sound  policy'  rather than mere legality audits,  a fairly constant 
pressure is  maintained on Whitehall. But the overall political control of expenditure and taxation 
remains  with  the  Government  while  the  House  of  Commons  reacts  in  its  usual  fashion,  the 
opposition  attacking  and  the  majority  defending  the  proposals  of  the  Cabinet  as  part  of  the 
Government's  general  record  and evidence  of  its  philosophy. 
The final  traditional function  of  the House of Commons, the voicing of grievances  and the trans-
mission of popular complaints to the executive is  by far the most effective,  largely because it can 
easily  be  combined  with the  existing  main  function  of  being  the  focus  of  the  political  struggle 
between the two principal parties. This function is  fulfilled  at a number of different levels.  At the 
highest level  of  controversy, it arises  in the major clashes  in  debates  on the Queen's Speech  (the 
annual legislative  programme  of the Government),  in debates  of  censure,  the Budget  Debate  and 
on the  chief  topics  selected  by  the  opposition for  Supply  Day  debates. 
This same atmosphere pervades most of the debates on the floor of the House. Emergency debates 
can be called for on a special procedure (Standing Order No 9)  and some four or five  occur each 
year. Question Time used to be mainly an occasion for private  MPs  to press specific cases but now 
batches of questions are organised by each side and the exchanges rapidly develop into party battles 
between  the two  front  benches. 
At a  rather different level,  all  MPs,  government  and opposition, seek to represent the grievances 
of individuals in their constituencies. The bulk of this is done by letter, the MPs  often writing direct 
to the appropriate senior civil servant. Some of this spills over into question time, most of the half 
hour adjournment debates  and occasions  such as  Consolidated Fund debates  and debates  on the 
motion  that the  House  should  go  on holiday  are  dominated  by  MPs  presenting  individual  or 
constituency cases.  At  this  level,  working through an MP  does  not  usually  produce a  change of 
decision  but  it always  speeds  up the  process  of  administration,  it provides  an  answer  from  an 
authoritative  source  and it does,  from time to time,  uncover  genuine  abuses. 
There  is  a  third  level  at  which  this  function  is  performed  and  that  is  within  the  parties.  The 
Conservative  and  Labour  Parliamentary  Parties  each  have  their  own  organisation.  For  the 
Conservatives,  it is  called 'The 1922 Committee' and no ministers are present. It divides into subject 
committees each with some staff and these committees can be fairly influential. The Parliamentary 
Labour Party elects its own officers as well as the Leader of the Party and the Chief Whip but though 
it too has subject committees, these are far less  coherent and therefore less  important than those 
in the  Conservative Party. These forms of organisation enable MPs  to put pressure  on their own 
leaders  but to them must be  added all the myriad avenues  of contact which exist when over  six 
hundred people work for a considerable portion of the day in the same building. There are official 
deputations  to see  ministers,  unexpected  encounters  over  meals  or drinks  and  the  clear  sense  of 
approval or disapproval which ministers  (real  and shadow)  get when they perform in the House. 
In assessing the efficacy  with which the House discharges this function, the answer depends on the 
objective intended.  On the floor  of the House, the object is  not to change proposals or to defeat 
the government in the subsequent division;-it is  to build up a climate of opinion outside the House 
which  will support the persons  and party trying to put their case.  For these purposes, the House 
is  admirably  organised.  It can put on a superb show. Most leading politicians in Britain are good 
debaters, quick on their feet  and they enjoy the cut and thrust. The media revel in such encounters 
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clashes.  It is  this that keeps  alive  the public's lingering notion that Parliament must be  influential 
because  it is  the centre  of so  much  of  the controversy  about public issues  in  Britain. 
At  the level  of  constituency grievance  presentation,  the system  is  also  reasonably effective  in  that 
most constituents seem better pleased with their  own  MP  than with politicians in general.  Careful 
constituency work is  increasingly common among  MPs  (called  community  politics by the Liberals) 
and  rapid and reasonable  answers  are  poured  out to constituents. 
But if the purpose of this function  of grievance  presentation is  to affect  changes  in  public policy, 
it is  far  less  satisfactory.  Governments  seldom give  way to  criticism  in  the House.  If this  is  the 
criterion, however,  then backbench pressure largely in private from within the governing  majority 
is  far more likely to produce results than any amount of open attacks by the opposition across the 
floor  of  the  House.  The  reason  is  that  pressure  from  inside  the  governing  party  is  often  an 
indication of alarm or disagreement  among the party's supporters in  the country and if they  are 
alienated, then the next election might be in  jeopardy.  Thus a Labour Government pays far more 
attention. to rebellions  by  normally loyal,  middle of the road Labour  MPs  as  this  will only  arise 
if there is real disaffection among solid party activists. Similarly, the Conservatives do pay attention 
to  any  strong-voiced  doubts  held  by  their  regular  and reasonable  members. 
There  are,  in  addition  to  these  ways  of  pressing  the  Government,  some  other,  less  significant 
methods  available.  The House of  Commons has no system of committees specialising in the work 
of the various departments. An experiment of this kind was tried after 1966 but largely abandoned 
in 1970  (see  below).  As  a result, though the House does have a variety of committees, they are all 
on rather special  subjects.  The first  of these  was  the Select  Committee on Nationalised Industries 
set  up  in  1956.  To this  was  added  a  Select  Committee  on  Statutory  Instruments  (to  scrutinise 
secondary legislation), a Select Committee to watch over the work of the Parliamentary Commissioner 
(the  Ombudsman),  a  Select  Committee  on  Race  Relations,  a  Select  Committee  on Science  and 
Technology  and  a  Select  Committee  on Scottish  Affairs.  Although  all  these  are  supposed  to  be 
permanent, that is  standing committees, the last of them was not reappointed in the 1973-4 session. 
The distinguishing feature of these committees is  that none of them scrutinises the normal working 
of a Whitehall department and its policy-making. They all tend to follow the older pattern of Select 
Committees  in  that  they  take  up  specific  problems  (in  the  case  of  Nationalised  Industries,  one 
particular industry or aspect of an industry)  and conduct an investigation producing a report with 
recommendations for future  action.  As  a result, they do something to keep  civil  servants working 
in these fields  alert, they help their members to acquire a certain expertise and they do produce some 
valuable suggestions for future policy but they do not add in any substantial way to the House of 
Commons'  capacity  to press  grievances  or policies  upon the Government. 
In addition to these three traditional functions of Parliament, legislation, control of finance (Commons 
only)  and pressing the views  of the populace on the Government,  there are  some  other functions 
which  have  been  performed  in  the  past  as  well  as  the  present  but  which  are  sometimes  now 
described  separately. Such  headings  are  'the  educative  function'  'the training  function'  and  'the 
legitimising  function'.  The first  of these is  the function of explaining important issues to the public 
and of casting them in a manner which makes it easier for public opinion to form and be  brought 
to bear on the Government. In this role, the House of  Commons is  aided by its  capacity to stage 
major political clashes  on the important issues  of the  day.  These  are eminently newsworthy  and 
though the popular press  no longer prints extensive reports of speeches  in the House (as  it did a 
hundred years ago),  all collisions  between the parties  and government announcements are covered 
and the leading members  are invited to repeat their performances on radio and television.  Indeed, 
the House of Commons is  such  an  important single  source of news that when  it is  in recess,  the 
coverage  of  domestic  political  problems  in  the  media  virtually  ceases.  On two  occasions  in  the 
last five  years, the question of whether the proceedings of the House itself should be televised has 
been put to a free  (that is  non-party) vote and lost. The basic reason for this was that the majority 
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and party workers would be critical if they failed to see their member regularly and yet, inevitably, 
most coverage would go to the front bench speakers and other star performers.  But it is  doubtful 
whether televising the House could do much to increase the House's capacity to dramatise, clarify 
and bring home issues to the public. It is possibly true that as an educator, the House over-emphasises 
the immediate  and exciting  issues  and  also  those  that lend themselves  to two-party  controversy 
while it may under-emphasise long-term issues on which the parties are agreed or confused or which 
they do not wish to discuss. But it is  hard to catch public attention on such issues in any case  and 
the Commons probably performs this function as well as it could given that the more vivid excitement 
of seeing a proposal defeated is  very,  very rare while to see  a government overthrown is  virtually 
unknown except in times  of dire peril during a  world war. 
The training function arises from the fact that the executive is  chosen from  among  MPs,  the  vast 
majority  of ministers  being members  of the House of  Commons.  In some countries,  the political 
system permits men to be drawn into political leadership after prominence in other fields.  In Britain, 
Prime Ministers have usually been members  of the House of Commons for over twenty years.  As 
a result, British politicians are highly political and articulate in the manner encouraged by a debating 
chamber  where  quick-wittedness  is  at a  premium. The difficulty  of  acquiring these  characteristics 
later in life has been shown by a succession of men who have been taken in after successes in other 
fields  and who have  not done as  well in the House of Commons. It can be argued that there are 
disadvantages in this system in that British politicians, who have often spent almost all their adult 
life in Westminster, may lack contacts outside politics. Also, the days when prominent industrialists, 
trade unionists  and professional men were ready,  at a  later stage, to take seats  in the House has 
largely disappeared. As a result, British cabinets do contain numbers of men and one or two women 
who have  no experience  of managing large  organizations  and,  as  has  been  said, little  experience 
of other occupations. Their capacity for communication may  be  good and their political antennae 
well-developed but this may not equip them well for dealing with able senior civil servants nor may 
it give  them the breadth of knowledge  and judgment necessary when governments  have  to work 
so  closely with and through the other power blocks  in the community. 
The legitimising function is hard to pin down but it was held to be that authority and acceptability 
given to laws and policy decisions just by the fact that they had been taken by ministers and had 
then received the approval of a majority elected by the public at large. There is no doubt that some 
sense of such legitimacy does exist. A government which is  in difficulties  and then holds and wins 
an election does receive an accession of strength. However, it is not clear that there is any particular 
respect for  law just  because it has passed through Parliament.  Governments  in recent times have 
tended to make policy announcements over television direct to the people rather than in the House 
of Commons. When powers are needed to operate new policies, they tend to carry out the policies 
at once  while  they  are  in  process  of  guiding  the  necessary  legislation  through  Parliament.  The 
public's attitudes to politicians  and Parliament have  now been  studied systematically for the first 
time  and are  mixed.  There is  some respect for  the  local  MP  and some disrespect for politicians 
as  a  whole.  People  respect  the  old  kind  of laws  about  crime,  financial  probity,  prohibitions  on 
anti-social action and so  on but do not accord the same respect to laws regulating matters which 
had hitherto been left to private agencies  or forces  such  as  laws on wage  restraint.  Governments 
now  accept  far  more  wide-ranging  duties  in  the  community  and  failure  discredits  not only  the 
persons and parties concerned but also the institutions. Thus while Parliament does legitimise govern-
mental actions, the approval thus ensured is not absolute; the approval will decline if the regulations 
or laws are not clearly necessary and advantageous or if the government's overall policies are failing. 
Parliaments  are  accepted  as  the  best  way  of conveying  legitimacy  but they  arouse  little  positive 
enthusiasm. 
To complete this picture of the existing operations of Parliament, it is  necessary to look briefly at 
the House of Lords. A chamber with equal powers to the Commons in all matters except finance, 
it had been of considerable political importance in the eighteenth century. Once the Commons began 
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1832),  the power of a hereditary House was  bound to wane.  The difficulty was that the House of 
Lords  had an  automatic  Conservative  majority.  For  some  decades,  it took the  view  that matters 
clearly and definitely demanded by the electorate - that is  policies reendorsed by a second election 
victory  - should  be  let  pass  even  if  they  were  disliked  by  the Lords.  If this  did  not happen,  a 
constitutional  and  political  crisis  arose,  the  only  way  out  being  a  wholesale  creation  of  non-
Conservative peers  so  as  to reverse the majority in the Lords. This was threatened in 1832 but the 
situation did not recur in the nineteenth century as  the Liberals, when challenged by the Lords  (in 
the  1880's  and  1890's)  failed  to win  the  subsequent  general  election. 
The House of Lords emasculated most of the legislation of the Liberal Government elected in 1906 
but when it rejected the budget of 1909, two general elections followed and the power of the Lords 
was  permanently reduced  to a  delaying period of two sessions.  In 1949  this  was  cut to one  year 
and in 1963, powers were taken to create life peerages.  As  a result, the House of Lords seldom, if 
ever,  defeats  proposals which are a definite part of government policy.  The work of the House is 
done by some hundred and fifty peers,· a majority of whom are life peers, men and women appointed 
because of some special capacity or experience.  The House is  useful in that it allows governments 
to employ some  ministers  who would not wish  to go through the hurly burly of elections to the 
Commons. It is a place to which members of the Commons can be promoted, thus creating vacancies 
for  special incomers in the  Commons.  In the Lords, the Government can introduce and do most 
of the work on non-controversial legislation and can review and tidy up controversial Bills  which 
have  already passed through the Commons. The debates in the Lords  are often of a high  quality 
though they have little impact and are virtually unnoticed by the media.  To sum up, the Lords is 
useful  as  a  kind  of  legislative  committee  where  ministers  can get  through  much  work for  which 
the House of Commons has  little time  but it has no significant place in British politics  or in the 
struggle for power which is  the chief function  and interest of the House of  Commons. 
The question that remains is  how adequately Parliament performs these functions  and what is  its 
place  and role in the British  political  system.  On this,  two broad views  exist,  with  some  minor 
variants. The first view is  that Parliament still has considerable power in Britain. There has always 
been a strong executive except for the short and abnormal period from the 1840's to the 1880's when 
the House of Commons could and did dismiss the executive and re-write its proposals. For the last 
hundred years, the position has been back to normal with the House providing a political arena in 
which the supporters and critics of the government conduct their struggles. According to this school 
of  thought,  the  House  may  not often force  changes  in personnel  or policies,  but its  influence  is 
pervasive.  Governments  know instinctively how far they can go,  weaknesses  are probed, men and 
policies are tested and the scene is  set for the struggle for power at the next general election. This 
view  would be accepted  with some  modifications  by most ministers.  Some  of them emphasise the 
lack  of  information among  members  and how seldom  they find  anything useful  coming out of a 
debate.  Others find  the House positively tedious and a waste of time but all agree that they want 
to perform well there and that they do try and anticipate  any political trouble, particularly from 
their own side. The ardent devotees of this school of thought and those who take a far more positive 
view of its powers are the star performers outside ministerial ranks such as  Mr. Enoch Powell and 
Mr.  Michael Foot.  They have  no time for legislatures  that want to become  involved in  decision-
, taking  and endless  committee work and factfinding.  For them,  politics  is  about power.  The real 
politicians, in their opinion, are those who can sense the issues that will rouse the public and dwell 
on these time and time again till a political point has been made and one party or the other obtained 
a  real  advantage.  For them,  the procedure of the House is  admirable  as  it allows  the maximum 
opportunity for this kind of exchange and indeed subordinates all other activities to such clashes. 
At times these 'Chamber Men' have indicated worries but they have been about declining attendance 
in the Chamber, the tendency of ministers to ignore the House and speak to the people directly over 
television and the reduced standing of the House in the eyes  of the public.  As  has been said, their 
attitude to changes in procedure coincides with that of most ministers who recognise that the supportive 
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powers to penetrate the largely secret process of administration enjoyed by some other legislatures. 
The critics of this school may  be broadly described  as  the parliamentary reformers.  They became 
prominent in  the late 1950's  and included a  number  of the most prominent academic students of 
Parliament, much of the quality press and many of the younger  MPs  elected  in  1964 and 1966  as 
well  as  some  more  senior  members.  Their general view  was  that there was  no point in trying to 
undo the effect of strong party bonds. It was impossible and perhaps undesirable to try and return 
to the  brief  period of  genuinely  parliamentary government when the executive  was  appointed by 
the House of Commons and not by the electorate. But since that date, the central government had 
expanded so  much in size and in points of contact with the citizenry and the process of legislation 
had  become  an  elaborate  negotiation  between  pressure  groups  and the  bureaucracy  and yet  the 
House of Commons had confined itself to one major function alone, that of supporting and attacking 
the overall political position of the government. The reformers in no way denigrated the importance 
of this function  and they wished to retain it in its  pre-eminent position.  But they argued that the 
civil service lacked an adequate countervailing power which could question its  methods as well  as 
its policies and take up grievances and approaches to particular problems irrespective  of the overall 
merits of the government.  In  addition,  in  the  process  of legislation,  it  was  important that some 
organised body represented the unorganised,  the citizens,  taxpayers  and consumers  and  this could 
only be  done by Parliament. Their case was  that government  had  become  complex  and included 
many  centres  of power  and  policy-making  in  addition  to the central  political  direction  provided 
by the Cabinet. It was therefore necessary for Parliament to develop a variety of  different  methods 
of scrutinising  in addition  to its  main  activity  of  defending  and attacking the  Cabinet. 
The main method proposed by the reformers was the creation of a series of select committees. These 
committees were to be  'standing'  - that is  permanent - and were to have powers to consider 
policy  and  to  interrogate  witnesses  including  civil  servants  and  ministers.  They  could  produce 
reports but this was not the main objective. Previous select committees had been set up to examine 
a single topic on which ideas or recommendations were needed so that a report and a debate on the 
report by the House were essential but the object of these new committees was not one report, or 
a series  of reports, but the effect of their work. The effects were supposed to be first to expose the 
workings  of departments and their relations with pressure groups to the public; that is  to remove 
the  web  of secrecy  so  that the public could find out what was happening and react before the final 
decisions were taken. Secondly, pressure groups might then be encouraged to state their views openly 
and come to the House of Commons (or the appropriate committee) instead of confining themselves 
to Whitehall. Thirdly, it was  hoped that the result would be  to produce a group of well-informed 
M.Ps.  whose questions and contributions would be improved by  the knowledge they had acquired. 
If this  happened, then ministers  would face  more competent critics  in the House and oppositions 
in  forming  their  policies  would also  have  an expert group  on  whom to draw. 
The reformers had other ideas as  well.  Some wanted the timetable of the House altered so that it 
sat in the mornings rather than late at night. A further demand was for easier alterations of the timetable 
so that emergency debates could be held on immediate topics of great moment. There was a general 
demand for facilities for M.Ps. so that they had at least an office, a telephone and a secretary. More 
important was a suggestion for developing the proposed select committees so that they also handled 
the  committee stage  of bills.  This would have  been in place  of  the existing  standing committees 
which are non-expert microcosms of the House and debate the published bills exactly like the full 
House.  In their  place,  the select  committees  would contain M.Ps.  who  had specialised  and  who 
had powers of interrogation and examination so that the whole tone and nature of the committee 
stage would alter from being a repetition of the party political battle which takes place at the second 
reading  debate  into  a  re-examination  of  the framework  and content of the measure. 
The disingenuous  point about the reformers'  case  was  their claim that while such changes  would 
make Parliament more effective,  they would not alter or weaken the position of the executive.  In 
fact,  unless this happened, the whole exercise would be  pointless. What the reformers  meant was 
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anticipate and want the changes  to make  all  sections  of the executive  more responsive  to public 
opinion and this was bound to increase the burdens of the executive. Explaining one's actions and 
justifying them is always hard work and irritating. It  would require extra staff in the main departments 
and take more  of busy  ministers'  time. 
Throughout the late 1960's, the argument between the two schools continued.  The case  made  by 
those content with the existing situation varied between assertions that the political conflicts which 
could be so  well  staged in the Commons were all  that mattered and the further,  more elaborate 
case, that to make the changes demanded by the reformers would spoil this major virtue of the House. 
It was  argued  that service  on committees  prevented  MPs  from  attending  debates  in  the House 
and thus  weakened the  primary function  of  the House.  It was  said  that committee  work led  to 
consensus  politics  because  MPs  on the  committees  heard  all  the  reasons  for  the  Government's 
actions  and if  they  made  no  great  outcry,  their party colleagues  could  scarcely  do  so  when  the 
matter  reached  the  whole  House.  Committees,  it was  maintained,  actually  helped  the  executive 
because  matters  could  be  buried there  till  all  concerned  had been  convinced  or mollified.  What 
Governments really feared was a blow-up in .the House and there would be less of these if the com-
mittee  system  was  introduced.  The whole  idea  of introducing .the  MPs  to  the  process  of  prior 
bargaining and policy-making was to make them into quasi civil servants rather than the spearpoint 
of opinion as  they should be.  And for this purpose, more information was not necessary. A reading 
of  the papers  plus  real  political intuition was  all  that was  required. 
The reformers replied that  MPs  failed  to  come to debates in the House not because they were at 
committees  (attendance was as  thin whether committees were sitting or not)  but because what was 
said was so ill-informed and the results  of debates were not evident. They pointed out that while 
much  political  controversy  could  be  based  on average  general  knowledge,  proper  investigations 
were  necessary in some cases  before the political dimensions  of an issue could be  made known. If 
governments could conceal the cost of projects, or actions taken against expert advice or collusion 
in secret with foreign powers, then no political reaction was possible.  Only a  few  MPs  could take 
part in the great clashes on the floor  of the House and there were so many more capable of good 
work yet living pointless lives. As the executive was now able to act in so many ways on the public, 
the public's representatives had to develop  an equal number of points of  contact and supervision. 
Parliament's reputation was  declining  just because its  work was  not evident to many people  who 
encountered the executive  but saw no  process  of  popular control. 
In practice, some reform proposals were tried between 1966  and 1970.  Mr. Richard Crossman,  as 
leader  of the House, persuaded the Cabinet to agree  to changes  on the general principle that for 
every reform that gave more powers to the backbench  MPs,  another reform  would make it easier 
for the government to get its business through the House. An experiment was attempted with morning 
sittings, but it proved too unpopular. Emergency debates were made more obtainable and this proved 
to be a success though it was disliked by the Party Whips. The passage of the Finance Bill was made 
easier by dividing it and sending the less  contentious sections to a committee. But by far the most 
important innovation was  the appointment of  two select committees,  one  on agriculture and one 
on science and technology'. These were on an experimental basis though Crossman told a backbench 
group of reforming Labour  MPs  that he  hoped that they would become permanent and that each 
year  two more would be  appointed. 
In fa.ct,  the  committees  aroused  great  resentment,  especially  the  Agriculture  Committee.  It began 
to probe the work of the Ministry, to press on tender points and to seek to travel to Brussels, thus 
annoying the Foreign Office.  Ministers became hostile and Crossman was forced to accept that the 
Committees  were temporary.  Science  and Technology  was  not aimed  at a  particular department, 
so it was allowed to remain but Agriculture was abolished and replaced by one on Education. Then 
it was  abolished  and replaced  by  one  on Scottish Affairs.  In the end, the incoming  Conservative 
Government in 1970  gave  up the experiment, though it is  almost certain that .if the Labour Party 
had won the election, it would have done likewise.  The one committee reform that was  accepted 
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by a more specialised Expenditure Committee largely because the Treasury as well as the Conservative 
Cabinet felt that it might be marginally useful in explaining the need for restraint in public expenditure 
to the  Commons  and the country. 
Thus the outcome of  a  decade of pressure and five  years  of experimental reforms was two gains 
for  the  Commons  - easier  emergency  debates  and the Expenditure  Committee - though these 
were offset by gains for the executive (chiefly the easier process on the Finance Bill). The total result 
was simply to underline the points made at the start of this paper. The executive controls the procedure 
of the Commons and naturally does not wish to allow changes which increase the pressure backbench 
MPs  can bring to bear.  MPs  of  both parties - though they almost all liked the select committee 
experiment - failed  to resist  the cancellation of these  reforms  because the ablest  of  them were 
more concerned with joining the executive than with restricting it and because  a  majority agreed 
that the primary task of the Commons was to fight  the party battle. It is  unlikely that there will 
be any further  major effort to alter the balance of power in Parliament for a  long time to come. 
The situation is  well revealed by considering the proposed arrangements for the scrutiny of E.E. C. 
secondary legislation. A select committee was set up to look into this matter and reported almost 
a year  after Britain had been a  member.  The Committee was dominated by traditionalists on the 
Conservative  side  and by anti-reformers  on the Labour side.  As  a  result,  they were concerned to 
gear E.E.C.  legislation into the primary task,  as  they saw it, of the House; that is  the staging of 
political battles. They proposed a permanent select committee with a staff to look at all regulations 
and directives  coming  fr<:>m  the Community. The Committee was  not to debate the merits of the 
legislation but simply to decide whether it was politically contentious. If it said this was the case, 
the matter was to be debated directly on the floor of the House.  Otherwise it was to be accepted 
without  comment.  In practice,  this  would  mean  between  six and a  dozen  major  debates  a  year 
when something happened which the opposition wanted to use to press the government or where 
the government felt it could claim a great victory; there would be, for example, debates on the size 
of juggernaut lorries to be allowed on British roads, on the size of the regional fund, on the latest 
C.A.P.  price levels  and on the level  of the British budgetary contribution. In addition,  a  minister 
was  to be  set up  to answer questions  and make statements on events  in Brussels. 
The fascinating  aspect of this  is  the way each of the E.E.C.  Parliaments has  reproduced its  own 
strengths  and weaknesses  in dealing with its  own executive  when it has fashioned  its  method of 
handling European legislation. It is to be noted that though a Committee of the Commons has made 
these proposals, their acceptance or amendment depends on the government which has not, at the 
time of writing (January 1974), indicated its views.  In addition, the Commons cannot give detailed 
scrutiny to the mass  of E.E.C.  legislation as  it has no specialist committee system  and such work 
cannot be done on the floor  of the House. So,  of necessity, the majority of the regulations cannot 
be gone over and have to be accepted by the House in the same way as it has, in practice, to accept 
the secondary legislation of the British executive. Also and perhaps worse, the House has no machinery 
for examining E.E.C. policy where no legislative proposals are being made so  that it cannot come 
forward and point out to the British Government where initiatives ought to be taken, where regu-
lations  are  not  'political'  just because nothing is  being done and opportunities are  being missed. 
In this again, the proposals mirror the Commons' inability to make positive proposals on domestic 
matters  and the House's position as  an agency  for  defending or attacking the policies  emanating 
from  the executive.  But  what the  Commons  would do under such  a  procedure  (probably  better 
than  other  national  parliaments)  is  to stage  a  limited  number  of  highly  dramatised  clashes  on 
disparate E.E.C.  proposals which were open to attack.  A weakness  of this, from the Community 
point of view, is  that while this approach on domestic matters always finds the executive defending 
its own policies and backed by a majority of loyal  MPs,  on E.E.C.  matters, there may be attackers 
but no defenders as the Government may deny responsibility or keep saying simply 'this is  the best 
we could get'.  The result which is  often negative enough even in national politics may be to focus 
attention  on those  Community policies  least  suitable for  Britain  while  failing  to highlight  those 
that  are  beneficial. 
167 Thus it cannot be said, in conclusion, that the British Parliament is  at a particularly happy period 
in its  history.  There has  been,  over twenty-five  years,  an increasing tendency for governments  to 
deal more and more directly with the major pressure groups in the country; with the trade unions, 
with industry and the principal professions.  Then it announces its  decisions  directly to the public 
over the media and looks for approval to tests of electoral opinion such as by elections and opinion 
polls  and finally  to the next general election.  The more this  happens, the  more  men  and women 
of ability in industry prefer to work there rather than go  into Parliament. Leading trade unionists 
have  more  influence  in national affairs  by  becoming  the general  secretaries  of  their  union  rather 
than by  becoming  Labour  MPs  Britain  is  run increasingly  by  the  leading  of  the  major  interest 
groups working with senior civil  servants  under the supervision  of the Prime  Minister and a few 
senior colleagues.  In all  this, Parliament acts  as  a  consultative council,  a  sounding board, a place 
in which policies can be  explained, defended or attacked but it is  neither the forum of the nation 
or is it essential for effective government. It is there and it can be useful to the politicians competing 
for public support but this is neither a central nor a very glorious role for the Mother of Parliaments. 
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THE ROLE  OF PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS 
IN EUROPE INTERACTION BETWEEN  PARLIAMENTARY  INSTITUTIONS 
AND POLITICAL  FORCES  e) 
Paper  by  Mr. Gianni BONVICINI,  Institute  of International  Affairs,  Rome 
In  the process of European integration, begun as  long ago  as  1951  with the creation of the ECSC 
and continued in 1957 with the launching of the European Economic Community, political progress 
has not kept pace with economic development. This is  now a well known and universally acknow-
ledged  fact.  Multinational  concerns  of  considerable  size  have  emerged,  powerful  pressure  groups 
have  arisen  at  Community  level,  but  the  political  vacuum  remains  and  there  is  no  significant 
indication to give  us  hope  that things  might  change.  The inertia  of European  political forces  is 
creating  paradoxical situations:  there  are  demands  for  new  authority  and powers  for  the  Com-
mission and the Council at the expense of the national authorities, yet no serious attempt is  made 
to establish an effective and binding political control at Community level. The European Parliament 
is  left  with the  crumbs  of  power transferred from  the  national to the  Community domain. 
Such is  the case, for instance, with the introduction of the Community's own resources  (and hence 
the beginnings  of a Community budget)  provided for in the Treaty of Luxembourg of April 1970. 
Under its terms, by 1978 the financial contributions of Member States are to be gradually replaced 
by agricultural levies,  by revenue from duties under the Common Customs Tariff, and, from 1975 
onwards,  by  a  proportion  up  to 1  per cent  of value  added  tax  (VAT).  Who is  to control  the 
utilization of these vast resources? The Luxembourg Treaty states that this task should be entrusted 
to the European Parliament, but with an important restriction viz.  that the Parliament's power of 
final  decision  shall  be  limited  to the  Community's  administrative  expenditure,  which,  according 
to reliable estimates, will amount to 4-5 per cent of the total budget. The remaining 95-96 per cent, 
including all the expenditure of any political significance, such as that of the Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)  or of the Social Fund (ESF),  are, removed from Parliament's control 
under Article 4 of the Luxembourg Treaty, thus detracting from its theoretical right to amend the 
final draft of the budget presented by the Council which remains the sole master of the situation { 2). 
Another problem will arise in the years to come over the plan for Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), launched laboriously by the Council on 22 March 1971  and designed- if it goes ahead-
to  set  in  motion  a  number  of  common  policies  - monetary,  industrial,  fiscal,  regional  - not 
envisaged fully, if at all, by the Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community. 
These policies, and the machinery devised for their implementation, will increasingly limit the freedom 
of choice  of individual Member States, making large inroads into their powers  of  decision to the 
(
1
)  The final draft of this contribution was  prepared in collaboration with Adriana Sabini Ruggiero who did the bibliographical research. 
(')  For further information  on  the  question  of  control  over  the  Community's  budget  see: 
European Parliament Secretariat: The European Communities' own resources and the budgetary powers of the European Parliament, 
October 1972,  or: 
David Coombes and Ilka Wiebecke, The Power of the 'Purse in the European Communities London, Chatham House and PEP, 1972. 
171 advantage of the Community. But this inevitable loss  of sovereignty will be  accompanied by  a loss 
of political control by the national Parliaments, without any provision for a corresponding transfer 
of  powers  to  the European Parliament. 
This move to delegate powers from the national to the Community sphere, even if it remains limited 
and  tentative  for  the  moment,  has  lately  been  compounded  by  another  dangerous  trend in  the 
Community decision-making process; this is the trend towards increasingly frequent Summit meetings 
of  heads  of state or government and the creation of diplomatic  or political committees  operating 
outside the Community framework.  All of which, obviously serves  only to exacerbate the problem 
of  control by  European political forces,  and the uncertainty which  surrounds  it. 
This apparently dual and in some respects irreversible tendency of the Community, first  to involve 
all  our  individual  interests  ever  more  directly  in  a  decision-making  process  that  is  gradually 
slipping from the national into the Community sphere, and secondly, to move  away  this  selfsame 
Community sphere towards a Europe of diplomacy, prompts one question: to what extent are the 
political forces in Europe aware of the situation and, above all, how far are they trying to remedy 
it ?  In  other  words,  is  there  anyone  today  capable  of  ensuring  that  the  process  of  European 
integration evolves  according to a pattern of greater political and democratic control ? Or, in the 
final  analysis,  which political grouping is .  at this point able to propose and hence  promote at the 
European level  a  genuine  political  discussion  inducive  to  integration,  and,  more  important  still, 
to act  accordingly ? 
Any survey of the current political situation in Europe must begin with what are the political forces 
par excellence, the national political  parties.  Their role in the process of European integration was 
discussed in November  1968  at a  meeting  in Bruges (1)  organized by  the Association of Institutes 
of European Studies  (AlEE).  Not unexpectedly,  the conclusions reached  were rather discouraging: 
the part played  by  national political parties in tackling  and resolving  European problems  is  very 
much  superficial  and  haphazard.  Superficial  - because  real  political  activity  for  these  parties  is 
confined to the acquisition and control  of power in the national sphere - indeed it is  only at this 
level that they can share in the exercise of power. Haphazard,  because they are only reminded of 
the existence of Europe at election-time, when a small part of the electoral programme is given over 
to general  professions  of European faith,  or when  national parliaments  are  asked  to ratify  some 
new  European treaty.  In the latter  case,  as  Sidjanski  pointed out at the Bruges  meeting  "having 
taken an interest in a particular subject or a proposed reform, the national parliaments, and hence 
the national political parties, lose track of the problem and the  whole matter is  passed on to the 
Community institutions  and escapes  all  control". 
But it should be made clear at this point that in practice control passes to the Council, and to some 
extent to the  Commission,  but  not to  the  European  Parliament;  apart from  its  severely  limited 
budgetary powers mentioned above, Parliament has no more than a purely consultative say on the 
Community matters envisaged in the Treaty of Rome.  Control by  national political parties can at 
most  be  exercised  through  the  governments  that are  directly  concerned,  in  the  Council  or at a 
Summit, in formulating  the principles  or details  of  Community policy.  Undoubtedly,  however,  in 
the  present  Community  institutional  framework,  so  fundamentally  different  from  that in  which 
they are  accustomed to working,  the political parties  are  much  less  forceful  and far-sighted  than 
socio-economic  groupings  and  business  interests  which  succeed  in  bringing  stronger  and  more 
effective pressure to bear on national administrations and hence on the governments themselves (2). 
The political parties, on the other hand, have never  so far  undertaken a real campaign or exerted 
pressure  at Community level,  at least not on the  scale  that one might expect. 
(1)  Association  des  Instituts  d'Etudes  europeennes:  Les  partis  politiques  et  /'integration  europeenne,  Colloque  de  Bruges,  Annuaire 
1969-70,  Geneve. 
(')  On  the  role  and  organization  of  pressure  groups,  see:  Sidjanski  and  Meynaud:  Les  groupes  de  pression  dans  Ia  Communaute 
europeenne,  Institut d'Etudes  europ6ennes,  Bruxelles,  1971.  · 
172 There have  been  sporadic  attempts  to establish  a  European programme or a  European  political 
platform,  but  bold  political  action  has  never  followed  the  words.  For  instance  in  France,  the 
Independent  Republicans,  Giscard  d'Estaing's  party,  have  on  several  occasions  sought  to  make 
clear their own concept of Europe. As early as  October 1966 there  appeared  in  •France  moderne' 
an outline of a European programme which set against the Gaullist concept  of  a  'passive  Europe' 
from the Atlantic to the Urals the idea  of  an  'active  Europe'  based on common political action 
and a  common ideological  message:  it was  thus  proposed to create  a  European Senate with the 
task of giving a second reading to all national legislative bills which it was considered desirable to 
harmonize  or approximate.  As  a  result  of  their  interest in Europe,  the Independent Republicans 
formed  a  'Europe  group'  led  by  Jean  de  Broglie,  Bernard  Destremeau,  Michel  d'Ormang  and 
Roland Boscary-Montseverin, which in March 1969  adopted a  complex programme of  studies on 
the  most urgent European problems. 
Nor is this kind of interest confined to the minor French parties, since the three major international 
movements  represented in Europe - liberal, christian-democratic and socialist - all  say they are 
'in favour'  of  European  integration. The trouble is  that each national party is  content to delegate 
one or more experts to deal with European problems and considers that it has thereby fulfilled its 
European duty.  This gives rise to a  •kind  of  federalist  (or confederalist)  conformism' -to  use an 
expression coined by Brugmans - capable of stifling the best of intentions. The result is  that every 
attempt so far made by the political parties to project themselves on the European scene has failed, 
leaving  them with everything  still  to be  done. 
What, then of inter-party co-operation in international political movements ? Here too, as  we  shall 
see,  results  have  so  far  been extremely  disappointing to say  the least  and there  are  many  voices 
calling for  profound changes  in  strategy  and organization. 
The three principal ideological movements,  apart from belonging to the Internationals which have 
virtually no influence on the European scene, have for some time been associated in European trans-
national party organizations. 
The  Christian-Democrats  have  formed  the European  Christian-Democratic  Union  (ECDU)  which 
in  1965  succeeded  the  'Nouvelles  equipes  internationales'  (NEI).  The ECDU  has  a  fairly  well-
developed organizational structure, with a Congress which is the general assembly, a Political Bureau 
which  formulates  the  Union's  policy  and implements  the  directives  established  by  Congress,  an 
Executive  Committee,  a  President  and a  General  Secretariat. 
The organization of European socialist parties is  not very different.  The standing Bureau  (Bureau 
of the  Social-Democratic  Parties  in  the  European  Community)  is  the  hub  of  the movement  and 
occasional  congresses  are  held  to decide  on the broad policy  lines  of European  socialists. 
The Liberals belong to the 'Liberal Movement for  a United Europe' which was formed by the liberal 
parties of the countries represented in the Council of Europe. The organization has a special youth 
section  and is  a  member  of the Liberal  International. 
The performance of these trans-national organisms,  however,  has fallen  far  short of expectations; 
conscious of this, the christian-democrats and the socialists have been trying ever since the end of 
the war not only  to strengthen  their  organizations  but to  associate  themselves  with other,  more 
active,  bodies  or with political pressure  groups. 
As  far back as  1958,  for example, the christian-democrats of the NEI  (now the ECDU),  set up a 
'Conference of Presidents and Secretaries-General of the Christian-Democratic Parties' to co-ordinate 
party activities. The conference could be convened by the President and, in addition to the presidents 
and secretaries-general, members of the Executive and group representatives had the right to attend. 
The irregularity of the meetings and the lack of a clear strategy soon made the limitations of such 
an arrangement apparent, and on 27  April  1970  it was  decided  to convert the  Conference into  a 
permanent body (the Permanent Conference of the Six).  This new organ met at least three times 
a  year  and included,  in  addition  to party officials  and  representatives  of national parliamentary 
groups, representatives of the corresponding group in the European Parliament. Since the Permanent 
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in the ECDU (Art.  11)  as  the 'Political  Committee of Christian-Democratic Parties in the European 
Community',  thus  realizing  the  double  aim  of strengthening  the  ECDU  organizationally,  and of 
concentrating to some  extent at least on Community problems. 
The approach of the socialists to European cooperation has been somewhat different.  Their efforts 
were mainly directed at setting up movements parallel to the official organization of socialist parties. 
In February 1947 on the initiative of the Independent Labour Party (a small British party, not to be 
confused with the Labour Party) there appeared in London the  'Movement for the Socialist United 
States  of Europe'. 
One of the original aims  of the socialist  movement  was  the creation  of  a  'united'  and  'socialist' 
Europe, the  two  adjectives  being considered  synonymous  by  definition. 
This forthright and dogmatic view was  reappraised when in November 1948  the organization was 
re-named  the  'Socialist  Movement for  a  United States  of Europe', with the Movement, and not 
Europe, labelled as  socialist. The change of name was the result of  a change in tactics: the prime 
objective became European unity, while party interests took second place. This new course brought 
the Socialist Movement into collaboration with other European organizations, and more particularly, 
prompted a  co-ordination  of  effort  with the  European Movement. 
Yet another name, as well as a fresh impetus, came from the Tenth Congress of the Socialist Movement 
held in Luxembourg in February 1961,  at which the  •European  Left  Movement'  was  born.  The 
rejuvenated  movement,  now  with  a  name  even  further  shorn  of  political  connotation  ('Left' 
instead  of  'Socialist')  considered  its  chief  goal  to  be  the  construction  of  a  federal  Europe  on 
socialist  foundations.  Organizational  changes  were  made,  the  supreme  authority  now  being  the 
Congress,  under  whose  supervision  the  national  Committees  exercise  authority  on the  regional 
plane. The 10 national sections (in addition to the six original countries of the European Community 
the movement comprises Austria, Greece, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), meeting in congress, 
appoint the International  Committee and the Executive  Bureau.  In  theory,  Congress  meets  every 
year,  though in practice this  rule  is  not strictly observed. 
Despite an attempt by the Italian Executive Bureau in July 1970 to put fresh life into the 'European 
Left'  (1),  the movement has  never  succeeded  in  becoming  more than a  simple  pressure group.  Its 
relations with the Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EEC  have remained informal, though there 
is  a  certain amount of interdependence. 
At the same time efforts were made to strengthen the Bureau: much was expected of the Eight Euro-
pean Socialist Parties' Congress which, after many postponements, was held in Brussels from 28  to 
30  June 1971.  But because  of  strong internal  resistance  the only  change  to go  through  was  the 
removal of the word 'Liaison' from the official title of the Bureau (it had been 'the Liaison Bureau' 
until then). 
Here it should be  said that, as  christian-democratic and socialist representatives themselves  admit, 
the ECDU and the Bureau have so far had very little impact, even though as  we have seen and will 
again  see,  attempts  have  been  made  to improve  the  organizational  machinery  of  the  ECDU  by 
adopting more  sophisticated  methods  of  action  and a  new  approach. 
It is  perhaps  worth  quoting  the  observations  of  that  reputed  fighter  and  Dutch  socialist  MP, 
H. Vredeling,  who  was  also  a  member  of the European  Parliament  until  recently: 
"How does the Liaison Bureau work and what does it do? The answer is: nothing; if we disregard 
the occasional declaration, of  the kind recently made in connection with the Hague Summit Conference, 
it does nothing at all ... From time to time the Bureau meets; to these meetings the national executives 
( 1)  On the 'new start' programme of  the European  Left, see:  Iniziativa Europea, Rome, year XIII,  No.  141,  March 1971,  p.  16. 
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in European affairs. Half the participants arrive generally an hour and a half late, the others an hour 
and a  half too early.  Sometimes  the Congress  actually takes place: the last was  held in Berlin in 
1966. These gatherings have no powers of decision, their resolutions, even when passed unanimously, 
have  to be  approved by the national executives.  No one  has  yet dared to propose introducing a 
majority rule,  but as  things  are this  would be meaningless,  since  the decisions  are  not binding in 
practice  on anyone. 
There  is  no common programme.  At  one time  an  agricultural  plan proposed  by  Vondeling  was 
under discussion.  Many meetings were devoted to it, but it has never been adopted by  any of the 
parties  in the EEC  countries,  nor has it ever  appeared on their agendas; it has all· been  shadow-
boxing,  nothing more' (1). 
The fact is that the European party organizations lack a unifying factor such as would be provided 
by some form of supra-national or national power. They have no direct and valid link either with 
the  European  'top',  which  at the moment is  represented by the EEC  Council and, partly, by  the 
Commission,  or with  the  national 'base', that is  the national political parties, which  are still not 
bound by  decisions  taken by  the European and international bodies to which they belong and are 
still free  to relegate  to the limbo of  pious  intentions  all their resolutions  and declarations. 
In view of the futility of the efforts made at national and European level, some theorists and politicians 
have on various  occasions  tried to  'conjure up' and launch a political party with a supra-national 
structure.  Of these  more  or less  realistic  projects,  all  aimed  at constructing  that  great  political 
force which would at last attain the dimension demanded by the times and the economic situation, 
we shall mention three of the most important and recent. The first  arose from a proposal by  Rene 
Montant, who, with others,  started in 1968  within AGEN  'Action  Committee for the Formation 
of  a  European Socialist  Party',  which  has  now  been  succeeded  and given  fresh  impetus  by the 
'Study  Committee  on  the  Federation  of  Socialist  Parties  in the  European  Community' (2).  The 
second project, for a European progressive party, was championed by the socialist Vredeling at two 
separate  meetings,  in  May  and  October  1969,  held  in  Bemelen  (Holland) (3).  Finally,  the  third 
proposal was put forward on 20 June 1970 by Westerterp at a seminar of the Dutch section of the 
European  Christian Democratic Union (4). 
All  three documents start from the same premise: that there exists a political vacuum and that the 
political forces  in Europe are too weak to stand up to multinational economic groupings. But the 
strategies  chosen to resolve  the  difficulty  are  different. 
Vredeling  and  Montant  consider  that  it  would  be  virtually  impossible  to  reach  the  national 
socialist  parties  through  the existing European  bodies,  the Bureau  and the  Congress,  and would 
like to begin with an action group or committee whose task it would be to gather together, singly 
and gradually, the socialist and progressive  forces  at national level.  Vredeling  defines  the aims  of 
the European Progressive Movement, or the Party of European Progress (PEP in its English abbrevia-
tion)  as follows:  'The main purpose in launching the PEP  idea was to create a shock effect in the 
national parties.  And  then it was  hoped  to form  the nucleus  of  a  group  which  could  establish 
European links between national progressive parties. The PEP  has always tried to be  a  movement 
in which existing parties could in the first  instance recognize their own image  and in which they 
could  ultimately  be  absorbed' (6). 
(
1
)  H.  Vredeling:  'Verso  un  partito progressista europeo' in Socialismo  70,  June-July  1970, No 17-18, pp. 93-94. 
(')  Information on Rene Montant's initiative will be found in  Vincenzo Guizzi,  'Un tentativo di rinnovamento della sinistra in Europea'. 
in Socialismo  '70, June-July 1970, No  17-18.  p.  73.  Full details of Montant's project were l?ublished  in cyclostyle form by Agen on 
2 September 1968  under the auspices of the  'Comite  d'initiative  pour Ia  creation d'un part! socialiste europeen', and another more 
recent  version  was  published on 29  October  1973  by  the 'Co  mite  d'etude  pour  Ia  federation  des  pards socialistes  de  Ia  CEE'. 
(  ')  Information on this  project is given  by the author H.  Vredeling in:  'The  Common  Market of Political Parties', Government and 
Opposition,  No 3, 1971  and in Socialismo  '70,  op.cit. 
(')  The Westerterp project has been published in the C-D Europa bulletin of the Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament, 
Doc.  315/70,  Luxembourg,  C-D  Group Secretariat. 
(6)  H.  Vredeling:  'The Common  Market of  Political  Parties',  op.  cit.  p.  452. 
175 Apart from  the frequently  irreconcilable  differences  of opinion on programmes  and their content, 
the crux of the problem is how this kind of party could integrate itself into the national and European 
power  structures  (on  the  assumption  that the  latter  do  exist),  having  started life  outside  them. 
Vredeling himself, in fact,  admits that the exercise of power will be a problem of vital importance 
to the future European political parties. Criticism was soon forthcoming on this  and other points. 
In Italy,  too, the problem raised  by Vredeling found  an echo.  In an article  published  in  'Critica 
sociale',  Gianfranco  Speranza, already an opponent of the programme and its  "progressive" label, 
too vague and politically vacuous to his mind, came to grips with the thorniest question of all, on 
which he wrote: "A party has a valid raison d'etre if it sets out to provide leadership in a particular 
organized political sphere, such as the national state has been until now, and such as  does  not yet 
exist, except in matters of marginal importance, in the European sphere ... The creation of a European 
party becomes an almost desperate venture if the aims of leadership cannot be thoroughly defined: 
general aims which can equally well be pursued by movements or loose associations are not enough 
to make its  existence  essential'.  And Speranza  adds  later:  'one  cannot expect  a  European party 
to be  formed  purely  to  "promote" or  "encourage"  or advance  objectives  which  can  be  attained 
by  other means' (1). 
Be that as it may, the idea of forming a European socialist party (or at least a federation of European 
socialist parties)  was  subsequently taken  up  by  the  Bureau itself,  which  early  in 1972  sent  out a 
questionnaire to all the socialist parties in the Community, including those in countries which were 
soon  to  accede.  The questionnaire  asked  the following  three  questions: 
1)  Would the formation  of  a  European Socialist  Party  be  timely  or premature? 
2)  If timely,  in what practical  way could more  fruitful  cooperation  between the Socialist  parties 
in the European Economic  Community be  achieved ? 
3)  What  changes  must  be  immediately  effected  to  improve  the  functioning  of  the  Bureau  of 
the  socialist parties ? (2) 
The way in which the questions were formulated left the respondents free to opt either for creating 
a new European party from scratch  (as  proposed by Vredeling)  or concentrating on strengthening 
the existing inter-party machinery. The Bureau's iniative found a certain response, at least in Italy, 
where  the  review  •Critica  sociale'  published  reactions  in  Italy  (Lionello  Levi  Sandri,  Luciano 
Bolis, Antonio Valeri, etc.) and abroad (Pierre Rimbert and Vredeling himself) (3). The issue, however, 
turned  not  so  much  on  the  above  alternative  as  on  the  exercise  of  political  power  and  the 
dilemma of whether this was to be achieved before or after the formation of a political party: in 
other  words,  was  the  establishment  of  effective  political  power  at  European  level  a  necessary 
prerequisite for  marshalling  the political forces  in  Europe ? 
The Christian-Democrats seem to have no hesitations on that score. The plan by their Dutch colleague 
· Westerterp,  already  referred  to,  relies  essentially  on  strengthening  the  existing  European  bodies, 
while  leaning  also  on  national  political  realities.  Westerterp  recognizes  the  Community  bodies, 
particularly the Council, as  the seat of one form  of effective  power - power transferred to them 
by  the Member States  in  virtue  of the Treaties.  'This  situation in which  Community  legislation 
comes  into  being  without the  intervention  of  either the representatives  of  the peoples  of  Europe 
(the  European  Parliament)  or of the  representatives  of  individual  nations  (national  parliaments) 
certainly cannot continue in the long run' (4).  Sooner or later, therefore, the European Parliament's 
consultative function  will have  to be  transformed into  a  joint exercise  of  law-making power.  At 
(1)  Gianfranco Speranza: 'Partito progressista  partito socialista europeo' in  Critica  Sociale,  Year  61,  20  December 1969, p.  733. 
(')  Critica  Sociale.  Year  64,  5-20  May 1972, p. 314. 
(')  See  the following  issues  of Critica  Sociale: 
Year 64,  No  13,  p.  428; 
Year 64,  No 16-17,  p.  538; 
Year  65,  No 3,  p.  59; 
Year  65,  No 14-15,  p.  341. 
(')  C-D  Europa,  op.  cit.,  p.  2. 
176 that point the members of the European Parliament, invested with effective powers of control, will 
emerge from the state of political non-responsibility which at present tends to make it immaterial 
whether or not they belong to a European political party organization that acts  as  a  link between 
'top'  and 'base'.  Westerterp  goes  on to  ask  what the  relationship between the European parties 
and the present  national parties  should  be,  and comes  up  with two possibilities: 
'1)  no formal  commitment to existing  national parties,  which  implies,  however,  direct  action  by 
the European party; or 
2)  a link, whereby the European party acts through one of the national parties, the latter becoming 
collective  members  of  the European party' (1). 
Westerterp inclines towards the second solution and considers that the Conference (now the Political 
Committee)  of the christian-democratic parties and parliamentary groups in the six EEC  countries 
and in the European Parliament - the permanent body which we have already described - would 
provide an appropriate framework for promoting and amplifying the concept of the nascent European 
Democratic Party by linking it with the organizational structures already existing in the Community. 
But on condition- Westerterp adds - that 'the leadership of the European parties is  truly supra-
national in character, as  is  the case with the political groups in the European Parliament' (2). 
This last point brings  us  to the question of the political groups. in the European Parliament and 
their  role  in  the  process  of  European integration. 
Can they,  after  possible  readjustment  and consolidation,  produce  the  thrust  towards  integration 
that would help to fill  the political vacuum of which we have spoken ? Given that the impetus will 
not be  forthcoming  either from  the national political parties,  totally  absorbed  as  they  are  in the 
struggle for power at a merely national level, or from the Internationals or European party associations, 
these being cut off from the European power structure, it would be interesting to ascertain whether 
the  European Parliament political groups  would  be  capable  of  assuming  such  a  role  themselves. 
To begin with, it can be stated without fear of contradiction that the political groups of the Strasbourg 
Assembly are the true mainsprings of the European Parliament and that no aspect of parliamentary 
life lies beyond the scope of their concern and action. Not only have they taken over parliamentary 
methods  from  the national parliaments  of  the  Member States  and introduced  a  few  innovations 
(such as the financing of the groups by the Parliament itself)  but they have also succeeded by steady 
and patient work, in partly modifying in the European Parliament's favour the institutional balance 
within the Community as  laid down by  the Treaty of Rome.  The clearest example of this  is  the 
acquisition  of partial budgetary powers  and the constant improvement of the links  between Par-
liament and Commission on the one hand and Parliament and Council on the other.  An  annual 
report  from  the  Commission  to  Parliament,  explanations  by  the  Council  in  cases  where  the 
Parliament's opinion has been rejected or not taken into consideration, a special multi-stage procedure 
for the examination of the budget drafted by the Council, an annual  'colloquy'  with  the  Council 
on the main topics  of  Community policy, the Commission's obligation periodically to inform the 
Presidential  Committee  of  the  European  Parliament  on progress  in the  practical  implementation 
of programmes scrutinized and approved by the Assembly - these are some of the many improve-
ments  in  consultation and 'control' procedures which have been introduced in recent years, mainly 
through the efforts  of the political groups in the Parliament. That much  can certainly be said as 
,  far as the practical working methods and the  'legislative'  activities - so to speak - of the political 
·  groups  are concerned. 
The political verdict is  different,  both inside and outside the European Parliament:  the prevailing 
opinion is that the political groups fulfil  only imperfectly the function of  promoting and channelling 
interests.  Taking first  their internal political activity, the political groups are generally reproached 
(
1
)  C-D  Europa,  op. cit.,  p.  4. 
(')  C-D  Europa,  op. cit.,  p.  4. 
177 with not attempting to raise the level of discussion on Community matters, with not trying to extend 
the discussion to other areas, such as foreign policy, which go beyond the Treaties, with not being 
sufficiently  resolute  with the  Commission  with  whom  Parliament deals  directly.  The fact  is  that 
matters of Community interest are what they are,  restricted and sectoral, and it is  not possible to 
go  beyond this ambit when Parliament is  asked to exercise its obligatory or optional consultative 
function;  this  is  why  the  discussions  in  the  Strasbourg debating  chamber  are  for  the  most  part 
highly  technical  and of limited political  appeal. 
But this is not to say that even in such specialized matters there are no important political interests 
to channel  or protect. And it is  at this point that, according to many indignant observers, occurs 
the most serious infraction of the imperfectly defined Europeanism of the parliamentary groups -
the occasional defence by national elements within the groups of the interests of their own country 
rather than those of the political group as a whole. However, too much should not be made of this, 
because  national interests  are no more  strongly defended at the European level  than are regional 
or sectional interests on the national scale. If there is  anything to deplore, it is rather the contrary, 
the fact that all too often political groups as a whole attach too much importance to the achievement 
of almost complete unanimity on resolutions tabled by the group on Community decisions: political 
militancy  becomes  so  dissolved  in a  generalized  'European  attitude'  that  the political vitality  of 
an Assembly that should direct rather than submit to the process of European integration is sapped. 
Here lies the root of the problem of relations between the Parliament and the Community executive 
organs,  and  particularly  the  Commission.  According  to  the  Treaty  (Art.  144),  Parliament  can 
theoretically pass a motion of censure on the Commission. Why is it that it has never used this right ? 
On several occasions the groups found themselves in a position where they had at least to consider 
this  possibility,  but  each  time  they  stepped  back from  the  brink,  either  through  institutional 
deficiency  (indeterminacy  of  the  relationship  between  Parliament  and  Commission)  or  from 
political calculation - fear  of  undermining the European institutional structure,  consciousness  of 
their  own political  weakness  and limited powers,  the fragility  of  outside  links  with the national 
political forces,  have  always  acted  in this  restraining  sense. 
The external links  with national political forces  have  been the subject  of  much  thought,  both as 
to  assessment  of  the  existing  situation  and  speculation  on  future  developments.  Certainly,  an 
outside observer cannot but feel  sceptical about the present state of relations between the political 
groups  in  the  European  Parliament  and  the  national  political  parties.  Apart  from  the  direct 
personal links of individual members  of the European groups with their national parties - which 
could  be  discussed,  but would in  any  case  be  of little importance - the  only true  organic  link 
between the European groups and national parties is  provided by the existing European inter-party 
organizations.  But  these  have  so  far,  been,  as  we  saw,  'a  useful  meeting  point for  the  various 
national members'  and,  in practical terms  at least,  nothing more. 
As  we have said, the disadvantages of such a situation have lately begun to be realized and, though 
accompanied  by  a  great  deal  of  controversy,  minor  organizational  changes  and  adjustments  of 
balance  have  been  initiated;  the  European  christian-democrats  have  perhaps  gone  furthest  along 
this  way by  introducing,  first  in the permanent  Conference  and now in the Political  Committee, 
machinery for political co-ordination between and mobilization of the associated parties in the process 
of  European  integration.  Their  principal  innovation  was  to  recognize  the  crucial  role  of  the 
Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament and to assign to it a more important place 
in  the Political  Committee structure. 
In short, it has now become recognized that, whatever can be said of them, only the political groups 
in the European Parliament  are  capable  of  providing the driving  and  co-ordinating force  in the 
process  of Europe's integration.  The participation of the political groups  of the European Parlia-
ment in the European inter-party organizations has  been increased. The Christian-Democrats have 
set up  a  joint ECDU-European Parliament C-D  group working-party  (concerned with Community 
institutions,  the  European  programme,  etc.)  'and,  further,  the  chairman  of  the  ECDU  and  the 
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Committee of the C-D  parties of the Member States of the European Community'.  The Socialists 
have  appointed  a  single  secretary-general  for  the  inter-party  Bureau  and  the  Socialist  Group  in 
the European Parliament. 
In  other words,  in the  absence  of practical initiatives  from  the  national political  parties,  moves 
continue to be initiated  'at  the  top',  thus  paralleling the process  of European unification  which 
itself was launched from above, with no grass-root movement to back it. This gradualistic approach 
is at present seen by many as the only possible way of attaining at least partial coordination between 
political forces  and national parties in a  Community framework:  and it is  obvious that in such a 
set-up  the  political  groups  in  the  European  Parliament  are  destined  to  play  a  role  of  primary 
importance.  But  how far  will they  be  able  to shoulder  this  task and how can they  become  the 
spoke&men  for the national parties in the creation of European political parties? Undoubtedly, on 
the gradualistic hypothesis, the political groups in the European Parliament have  an essential role 
to play  in exerting  pressure  and providing encouragement:  they  are  the  forerunners  of  the  first 
assembly of future European political parties which will be attained through confederation, followed 
by  the emergence of a political movement, and, finally,  by the mobilization of public opinion and 
of national political parties to form European political parties. According to some, these are unlikely 
to come into being, not only because the European Parliament lacks real wide-ranging powers, not 
only because there are no direct elections to the Strasbourg Assembly, but especially because of the 
fragmented  nature of  the  process  of  European integration which nullifies  the universality  that is 
an essential  basis  of  all  party organizations. 
Those  who  believe  that the mobilization of public opinion and of national political parties is  the 
precondition for  the formation of a  European political party,  evidently  attach less  importance to 
the role  of political groupings in the European Parliament: for them, the mobilization of national 
political forces  and  of  public  opinion, together  with direct  elections  to the European Parliament 
are  the  first  steps  that should eventually lead to the emergence  of European political parties. 
It is  clear at any rate that in a situation of political vacuum at Community level,  such as  we are 
experiencing,  the political forces  (and not only they but trade union forces,  too)  will have  some-
how or other come to recognize that they must participate more directly in controlling and guiding 
the process  of  European integration. 
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This paper will be concerned with what is  feasible for the European Community rather than with 
ideal solutions; and it will concentrate not on some vision of a united Europe or even on the year 
2000 AD,  but on what is  within our grasp for the last two decades  of the century.  On the other 
hand,  and unlike  many  recent  writings,  it will  use  a  framework  of political diagnosis  to suggest 
what is  possible.  After the postwar enthusiasm of federalists - and the reaction in the de  Gaulle 
era of the  1960s  - it has rather seemed fashionable,  as  K.  Neunreither has  observed (1)  to think 
only in pragmatic and immediate terms,  'avoiding definition  of longterm goals and expectations'; 
and treating the EEC  as  sui  generis,  relatively  cut  off  from  the  experience  of  history. 
The respective functions of a European Parliament and of national Parliaments in the decades ahead 
are, in fact, likely to depend on four interacting sets of factors: western ideas about and experience 
of the liberal state and any effort to build in or strengthen some of its  parliamentary features  in 
developing a Parliament for Europe; the nature, the present stage and the varying success of national 
models among the Nine; western experience of federal-type systems, including the EEC so far; and 
the  'Union in 1980' - with its institutional and party structure - that will result from the Summit 
decision,  under the pressure  of  world events  and national reservations. 
Parliament in the liberal  state 
The functions  of Parliament can  be  listed  as  follows: 
- the power to decide  over the  duration  of government, 
- providing  members  of the government and determining  government  membership, 
- the  power  to  make  rules  binding  on  the  government  - legislative  power;  power  over  the 
budget;  power to receive  and approve the general  and detailed  policy  of the government, 
- confrontation between government and opposition, focusing  political choice for  the electorate, 
through the party system, 
- the focal point also for  interest groups and expression of grievances,  acting as  a point of com-
munication  between  citizen  and government. 
Before we look at how these functions are carried out in individual national models, a general word 
must be said about the extent to which they have been modified in present-day practice in Western 
Europe. The tendency, all too often, is  to ignore this when prescribing for a European Parliament. 
Talk of  'parliamentary decline'  is  accompanied by  an uncritical and optimistic belief that we  can 
revert to a  pure form  of the  first  three direct  controls in building for the future.  But is  this  so ? 
(
1
)  Some reflections on the European Community and the Function of Parliament.  Paper for the Congress  of the International Political 
Science  Association,  1973. 
180 In  one  way  and  another,  governments  have  escaped  the  rigours  of direct  parliamentary control 
and have themselves come to have a great deal of control over assemblies. In the 19th century, when 
the  electorate  often  came  from  a  narrow  social  base,  and  before  mass  parties  existed,  some 
assemblies were able to have a unique power to choose and control the executive. But the coming 
of the mass  parties has  effectively  changed the system:  with party discipline  marshalled behind a 
government in power and often sitting in the assembly,  the relative independence of the assembly 
has tended to decline. The party systems,  operating through the electorate, usually control the real 
choice  of  government,  making  the  assembly  into  a  mandated  electoral  college.  Members  of the 
majority party know that undue assertion  of independence  over  the life  of the government,  over 
rule-making or sectional claims, will result in collapse, advantage for the opposition and, probably, 
in dissolution and defeat. The power of patronage - the hope of  being invited to join the govern-
ment - gives to government a further power of discipline over party members. In coalition situations, 
even the choice of individual ministers may be pre-empted by the parties staking claims to various 
portfolios.  When it comes  to  rule-making,  less  than five  per  cent  of  laws  and rules  originate in 
parliaments; the rest are executive-proposed, are pushed through by party discipline under standing 
orders favouring  government business - and only committee-based parliaments make some show 
of  retaining  power over  details. 
Indeed, as many writers point out, the more one examines the real functions of present-day assemblies, 
the less  they  appear  to be  decision-making  organs.  'European assemblies  can  be  seen  as  "nodal 
point&"  of  communication;  the  meeting  place  of  a  number  of  routes  issuing  from  and  to  the 
electorate,  but others  as  well  which link parties,  organised  interests  and  the  government.'  'The 
trappings  of legislative  power  help  to sustain the illusions.' { 1) 
If it were possible to recreate the United States' system in the original form intended by its founders 
- a  separate  Congress  making the rules  of  an executive. merely  administering them, - then the 
early independence could be regained.  For reasons that will  be given  below, that is  very  unlikely 
in  Europe.  Instead,  and  because,  government  today  involves  more  than  administering  laws,  is 
immensely  complex  and needs  day to day  decisions  by  a  small  group,  assemblies  give  power of 
,direction and initiative to government; and in return for legitimising its main proposals and giving 
it support on behalf of the electors, they build a system of influence and general guidance, reciprocal 
understanding  and  give-and-take.  The immediate  lessons  for  a  European  Parliament  need  to  be 
faced. Parties in governments of the Nine are aware of these trends in power: they cannot be expected 
to listen to what they believe to be naive calls for return to that too-simple list of controls over whatever 
form of European executive is created. Indeed, if a European system involving identity and consequent 
sympathy  between  an assembly  majority  and the  executive  cannot be  created,  then governments 
may  not favour  even  tentative steps  along the road to real assembly powers, unless  the proposals 
positively  face  up  to and provide  barriers  against  a  'deputy-centred'  system.  Once we  get  some 
idea of the form of Union, we shall need to return to this point in outlining the role for parliament. 
National models 
The varying stages of the development of national models in the Nine will further affect and limit 
what is  possible inside Union. There is differing experience of unification and separation of powers, 
. of  civic  culture,  of party patterns  and of emphases  in parliamentary  activity~ They will influence 
the  form  of Union demanded and the make-up  and instincts  of  the parliament. 
The British system is  possibly the easiest to summarise, though with all the dangers that arise from 
brief descriptions of this kind. The main outline is  well-enough recognised.  Government originates 
from  and  sits  in  Parliament;  the  Commons  are  elected  on  the  simple-majority,  single-member 
(I)  Politics  in  Western  Europe  by  Gordon  Smith,  pp.  213  and  187. 
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civic  culture shows respect  for  and  pride in government:  progress from  absolutism to democracy 
occurred through  an intervening period of government by 'enlightened  gentlemen  of  means',  the 
problems  of popular democracy  were faced  one  by  one,  and little distrust of executive  authority 
has  survived.  The party system  is  simple  because  only  one  politically relevant cleavage  operates, 
based on economic issues, left versus right. •Class  is important- indeed central-in British politics 
because  nothing  else  is.'  (1)  Religion  is  no  longer  a  force  in  politics;  and  industrialisation  has 
produced  a  homogeneous  society  with only 3 %  still  on the land. 
The government  dominates  parliament and can dissolve  it virtually  at will.  Parliament functions 
mainly as  an arena for government/opposition confrontation ready for the next election,  and this 
applies even to the detailed study of draft laws.  As  a result, Parliament's independent control over 
legislation  and the  budget is  sacrificed  in favour  of conflict  about the policies  behind them.  But 
government accepts guidance and influence in return for support and legitimation of its laws, while 
firmly conserving the right of initiative and the right to govern. Subject-committees found elsewhere 
are  replaced  by a  small  number  of  specialist  or expenditure-head  committees,  investigating  in  a 
relatively non-party atmosphere the government's choice of policies and its effectiveness and economy 
in pursuing them. Patronage, government control of standing orders, and the absence of deep-running 
group grievances in society, add strength to party discipline in the continuous plenary confrontations. 
It is important to estimate the effect of familiarity with this system on the attitude of the two major 
parties  to European Union.  Although  the  Conservative government  has  championed  membership 
of the EEC,  it must be remembered that the party initially preferred an industrial free  trade area, 
and then exceptional terms for EEC  membership, before finally accepting the Community as  it is. 
Conservative leaders obviously expect that the remnants of opposition and doubt in the party will 
decline (as occurred in the Six)  as  the next few years and elections go by. But any attempt to force 
the  pace  unduly  and  to legislate  for  Treaty  amendments  creating,  say,  a  European  government 
responsible to an elected European Parliament seems out of the question for as far ahead as one can 
see. The loss of sovereignty over, for example, foreign affairs or sensitive areas of economic policy, 
would  probably  be  unacceptable  at this  relatively  early  stage  after  entry. 
Be  that as  it may, there is  a limit to what can be done in UK conditions in the teeth of opposition 
by the alternative government. Decisive steps towards any form of federal Europe almost certainly 
need consensus. For the time being that is  impossible. The Labour Party's opposition to the terms 
of entry, and the demand for  'renegotiation' cannot be  entirely explained in terms of internal British 
politics  and  irresponsibility  when  out  of  power.  In December  1973,  the  Opposition  spokesman 
on foreign affairs, scornful of the failure to reach agreement in Brussels on a Regional Fund, openly 
revived the idea of going back to a free  trade area; and the absence of EEC unity in the oil crisis 
added reinforcement. More important, perhaps, was the reply of Mr. Michael Foot, MP, the Opposition 
spokesman on Europe, to Chancellor Brandt's plea for more speed towards Union:  •I  do not wish 
to be a member of a super-state. If you do that, you are destroying the British parliamentary system. 
As  a  Socialist I  believe  that the fulfilment  of  Chancellor Brandt's aim  and ideal would mean the 
permanent entry of this  country,  and in  particular my party, into  what I  describe  as  continental 
coalition  politics.' 
This last point is  not rhetoric. Many British socialists, and they carry a majority of the party with 
them,  regard  the  British  system,  with its  simple left/right cleavage  and  continuous  parliamentary 
confrontation - the concentrating on differences rather than agreement - as the one which offers 
the best chance for  radical challenge to the economic status quo;  whereas  the  'coalition  politics' 
(which complex European party patterns entail)  muffle  that challenge and force  parties of the left 
to cooperate in working the free  enterprise economy broadly as  it exists.  The British approach to 
parliament  is  seen  as  more  important than  independant  parliamentary  power  to  make  rules  or 
(1)  Comparative  Government  by  S. E.  Finer. 
182 exercise direct controls over the executive, and this power is freely sacrificed if  need be. Furthermore, 
the British system is thought best able to involve the voter by its drama and to harness his enthusiasm 
in the choice between distinct alternatives, helping the final  breakthrough to a  socialist society. It 
is this argument which is likely to endure even if Labour, in or out of government, becomes reconciled 
to the Rome Treaty, and as  attention shifts  to questions  of European Union. 
The subsidiary effects  of British parliamentary experience on attitudes to the work of a European 
Parliament are being seen already as UK members make proposals for changes in procedure. Because 
there is no sense of alienation from the executive, there is less interest in wide-ranging and consensus 
parliamentary reports, examining every aspect of EEC policy as  the  'separate  and sovereign repre-
sentatives of the people.' Selective criticism and exposure of differences, combined with sharing power 
through influence  - these  are the emphases  being recommended. 
The Italian  and French - and to a  smaller  extent,  the  Dutch - experience  and traditions  are 
different. In Italy, as Professor Manzella's paper has shown, the parliamentary system is in a testing 
period. It is,  again, a unified system; but the variety of parties, the civic culture and the approach 
of parliamentarians  all  make  it difficult  to  operate.  The sharp  polarisation  between  the  Roman 
Church and advocates  of  a  secular  society divides  the parties  and the interest-groups throughout 
society. It is  more important than the economic cleavage which is  itself deep.  To these are added 
urban/rural contrasts, with varying influence of landholding patterns on political allegiances. Because 
of  past  authoritarian  history,  there  is  substantial  alienation  and  positive  distrust  of government 
and its  bureaucracy:  the  anti-system  parties  on left  and right  complicate  parliamentary  life  and 
government formation. Although economic development, the steady decline of religion as the dominant 
political force,  and the exit from  agriculture  (still  taking 25 %  of the work-force),  will gradually 
modify  Italian  politics,  the  cross-cutting  divisions  will  complicate  parliamentary development  for 
some time yet.  The Christian Democrats do not usually get an overall majority and are dependent 
on other parties to form a government; proportional representation helps to maintain a multi-party 
situation; and governments restricted by agreement on a  short-term coalition programme have  to 
face  two equally powerful chambers, where the protests of the alienated elements  hinder reasoned 
confrontation.  Legislation  is  hampered  by  strong  pressures  in  committee  on behalf  of  powerful 
interest-groups  outside. 
Because Italy is  in this period of social and parliamentary transition, its influence on the form of a 
European  parliamentary system  may  not be  pronounced  or demanding.  But  the Italian  share  of 
an elected parliament is likely to display the sharp divisions mentioned above; and its parliamentarians 
will be more familiar with an assembly concentrating on legislation than on clear party confrontation 
based simply  on economic  conflict  in urban society. 
There  is  less  uncertainty  about  French  influence  so  long  as  the  Gaullist  Party  controls  both 
presidency  and parliament.  The Fifth Republic's  constitution is  a  reaction  to the alleged  failings 
of  the  parliament  of  the  Fourth  and  dominates  the  Party's  approach  to Europe.  For  historical 
reasons,  the  Prime  Minister,  though  emerging  from  and  responsible  to parliament,  had evolved 
as  not necessarily  the  leader  of  the largest  party.  Although  cleavages  in French  society  are  less 
pronounced than in Italy,  they are similar- creating a multi-party position which was fortified  by 
proportional  representation  and provided no  stable  majority.  'A general  distrust  of  government 
power, from the days when the Republic had to oppose first the monarchy then the Empire, outlived 
these regimes in the minds of the deputies and in the procedure of the Assembly.'  (1)  Government 
power was automatically suspected of being arbitrary. Committees appeared to dictate to government 
in day to  day matters,  and replaced  government  draft laws  with texts  of  their  own.  Fracturing 
demands  of outside interest-groups  were  strongly  pressed  regardless  of  the fate  of  governments, 
and the Assembly ended with undue concentration on minor laws,  'immobilisme' on fundamental 
problems and, at the height of the Algerian trouble, with hostile armed forces gathering ominously. 
(')  Politics  in  France  by  Pierre  Avril,  p.  47. 
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presidential hybrid. The directly elected President, making up for the absence of a stable majority, 
appoints  the  government,  presides  over  the  Cabinet  and  is  the  source  of  major  policy.  The 
Assembly's  power  to  dismiss  the  government  is  limited  and  regulated  and  the  provincial-based 
Senate has lost power. It is  a legislative assembly, dealing to a timetable with government-proposed 
bills which, by a package vote or confidence procedure, can escape amendment. Since interest groups 
have been provided with many consultative councils for direct contact with government, they take 
little  interest  in  parliament.  But  in  recent  years,  and  despite  the  handicaps,  an  atmosphere  of 
confrontation has developed between a government now supported by a majority and an Opposition 
steadily finding  unity  on an election platform.  The presidential system,  as  in  the  USA,  is  helping 
to polarise  the parties. 
This history, added to the Gaullist desire to revive the independent power of France in the world, 
accounts for  the reservations about the parliamentary future of Europe. The present French govern-
ment is  determined to resist all dangers of  a  'regime  d'Assemblee';  they will want firm  assurances 
about the  limits  of parliamentary  control  and  they  are  bound to be  in favour  of  some form  of 
separation of powers in a confederacy of nation-states. In the Parliament itself, the Gaullists refuse 
to sit with Christian Democrats, claiming that they are not simply a  party of the Right. 
There will no doubt be some change if the Left wins power in presidential or parliamentary elections. 
They are committed to reduce the power of the president and to return to a government more actively 
responsible to the National Assembly. But even in Opposition, the Gaullists will have an authoritative 
and restraining influence on surrender of power in Europe, just as  Labour will have in Britain.  In 
both countries it would  be virtually  'unconstitutional'  to  go  very far  without consensus.  And is 
it not at least possible that a socialist/communist alliance, once in power and able for the first time 
to make  substantial  changes  in France,  will  be  reluctant in its  early  years  (and  with  alternating 
governments  in prospect)  to go  at top  speed  for  European federation ? 
In contrast again, practically all parties in the Netherlands favour early moves towards an advanced 
form of parliamentary democracy at the European level and the country has a constitution providing 
for  surrender  of  powers  to  international  authorities.  At  home  the  Catholic/Protestant/secular 
cleavage cuts across the left/right divisions and has produced a diffused party pattern that is fortified 
by  strict proportional representation for elections.  But it is  a weak form of sectionalism: the three 
main rightwing religious  parties  are accustomed to working together in government and, latterly, 
to a  common  election  programme.  In  recent  years  a  left  alignment  round the  Labour Party has 
paralleled the  'Christian'  bloc  and, after presenting a government team to the electorate, has come 
to power. A realignment of the party structure, based more on left versus right, may be in the making. 
The Cabinet comes  from,  but does  not remain  in parliament:  there is  a  good deal  of reciprocal 
influence and cooperation. Parliament's main chamber goes so far as to lay down in advance certain 
limits  on the coalition's policy,  but does  not attempt to govern  or to  dictate  day to day  policy. 
Once again we see  a form of separation of powers, an acceptance of permanent coalition, but with 
a  parliament less  bitterly divided  and hostile than in France or Italy and therefore perhaps more 
easily  restrained  in  the  use  made  of  parliamentary  power.  But  breaking  points  do  come  and 
coalitions  have fallen  regularly  when  divisions  have  again  become  uppermost. 
The West German constitution is federal, with powers distributed. The second chamber is composed 
of Land government representatives and possesses  a veto  over measures affecting the Lander. Also 
resulting from earlier German history, it is based theoretically on a separation of powers: the Chan-
cellor, once elected by parliament, selects his ministers, is responsible for policy and can be removed 
only by electing  someone in his  place.  Other features  are added to avoid the pre-1939  instability 
of governments:  parties which get less  than 5 %  in the voting  by proportional representation are 
denied seats in the Bundestag; and the relative  autonomy of parliament and Chancellor is  further 
stressed  by  preventing easy  dissolution. 
184 Almost  unexpectedly  a  stable  party structure has  emerged.  Earlier  cleavages  in society,  including 
religion, have largely declined. Trust in government has been restored. Even in  traditionally agricultural 
Bavaria the exit from the land has gathered speed and reduced urban/rural difference. And a virtual 
two-party system - conglomerates of left and right, plus a small  'liberal'  party - now operates. 
But parliamentary functions are not sacrificed, on the British pattern, to permanent party confrontation. 
There is a sense of legislative independence, though not of antipathy to the government, when draft 
laws are being considered in the all-important committees  (plenary sessions number about 60  days 
per year compared with 160 in Britain) ; and, within the limits of the need of the majority to support 
its Chancellor's drafts, there is  much give  and take, expert study and party negotiating in order to 
get a compromise version.  This has been helped by  the Social Democrat Party's move,  in its  1958 
programme, towards the centre. But there could be a change if electoral defeat, inflation or a sudden 
end to rapid economic  growth  reopened  deep  policy  conflicts  inside  the  party. 
German  experience  has  already  had  a  considerable  effect  on the  existing  European  Parliament, 
mainly  because  its  delegation was the most united  of the large groups of the Six.  The European 
Parliamentary committees work like the German- relaxed study of drafts with Commission officials, 
long  consensus  reports  for  the  plenary,  almost  the  sense  of  a  supervisory  board  calling  in  the 
management to go  over  its budget and its work, suggesting changes  and criticising its drafts. The 
federal situation and the partial separation of powers -together, of course, with truncated Germany's 
search for safety and strength in the West- may help to explain growth of interest in moves towards 
Union. In his November 1973 speech to the European Parliament, Chancellor Brandt spoke of steady 
progress  through  functional  integration  to  a  'sensibly  organised  European  government'  which 
would  be  'subject  to  parliamentary  control'  and  would  be  'in  charge  of  the  economic  and 
monetary  community,  the  social  community,  perhaps  also  the educational  community,  definitely 
the community  of foreign  affairs'  and,  one  day,  defence  security. 
This brief  look at some  of  the  national  models  has  not been  in  order to present  an  exhaustive 
analysis, but only to show differences and to indicate problems that will arise when the institutions 
of Union come to be clearly defined. For a start, the party systems are at varying stages of develop-
ment:  their  policies  and  programmes  reflect  greatly  different  political  history  and  present-day 
social  conditions,  with  frequent  cross-cutting  conflicts  in  society.  Europe-wide  elections  would 
mirror this for  a  considerable time, giving  a  diffused  set  of parties or,. at best,  a  smaller number 
of  weak coalitions.  These would be in danger of  each fracture,  particularly if voting carried real 
power of decision  over  laws  or the executive.  Social  democrats,  for example,  influenced  by  their 
national conditions, are not one homogeneous bloc, frequently have to leave delicate issues to free 
votes in the plenary sessions of the present European Parliament, and have divergent  ideas  on such 
matters as industrial affairs, agriculture and European integration. Inside  each bloc, and complicating 
the party groupings, would be the extra cleavage of nationality, putting party unity under additional 
stress when party and state interests fail to coincide - and where, as in Denmark, there is a national 
veto on such an important issue  as  progress towards supra-nationality. All this is  already  evident 
in the existing Parliament, and the prospect might be of shifting allegiances and temporary alliances 
on various  matters  if voting  carried  real  power.  The executive,  however composed,  might be in 
repeated  difficulty,  unable  to  find  a  stable  majority  for  its  policies. 
The party systems of the models also show the variety of historical and of present-day constitutions, 
the differing  relationships  of assemblies  to the executive,  and conflicting ideas  about the role and 
main  functions  of  parliament.  For  some  the  confrontation  is  important,  perhaps  all-important; 
for others it is the surveillance of the executive, or non-partisan work on budget or legislative details. 
The final blend, the final emphasis, will take a decade or more to create, and greatly affects relations 
with the executive. 
Reverting to what was said earlier about government fears  of  a deputy-centred system,  seeking to 
dictate rather than to influence, we can see that the uncertainties and the complexities in the make-up 
and instincts  of an elected European Parliament will give  governments pause and perhaps arouse 
misgivings  when planning the  institutions for  Union.  Given real powers, would the parliament be 
185 unstable, a permanent anti-government, attempting to assert its power over nation-states' interests 
as  well  as  the executive?  Can we  find  a form of Union which  both reconciles the differing  party 
and national approaches and, at the same time, guards against these dangers in its pattern of powers 
and institutions?  It is  therefore to a consideration of federal  experience and of the likely form  of 
Union  that we  must turn. 
Western experience  of  federal-type  government 
It is  important to begin by stating the sense  in which  the words •federal'  and 'confederal'  will be 
used.  The Swiss  Confederation, for  example,  is  really  a  federation  and the words  are frequently 
used  synonymously.  •Federal'  will  be  used  to mean  a  system  in which  there  is  an independent 
central government responsible for certain matters, and independent regional or state governments 
for the rest-and in which the central government •is  not subordinate to the others'. (1)  By contrast, 
'confederation'  will  be  taken ·to imply that the central political authority remains  subordinate to 
and is  effectively the agent of the Member States of the 'confederacy':  it  can,  at the extreme, be 
a  unity  based  merely  on a  set of treaty relationships. 
The historical experience of federations is, of course, a vast subject. The aspects that are particularly 
relevant  for  us  here  are  the  methods  used  to keep  a  balance  between  states'  rights  and  central 
government,  and the position in decision-making of the parliamentary  asse.mbly. 
In the case  of  the  United  States  of  America,  what is  often forgotten  is  that the 1777 Articles  of 
Confederation preceded the federal constitution of 1787.  States' delegates, voting as  a bloc, formed 
the  first  single-chamber  Congress,  which  possessed  only limited  powers  to act  for  the  states  -
over  peace  and war,  coinage  and foreign  relations.  Success  of that early  system  depended  upon 
cooperation of the states, and when they encroached on each other's commerce, issued their own 
paper money and failed to honour treaties, the Confederation began to falter.  The 1787 gathering 
at Philadelphia  was  a  result  of  dissatisfaction,  but it was  divided  as  to  how powers  should  be 
distributed between the national and the state governments. In the end the sharing was· agreed -
a  Congress  with apparently limited powers  over defence,  taxes, foreign  and inter-state commerce 
and coinage, and including a states-nominated Senate sharing power with the executive in foreign 
affairs and major appointments to the Supreme Court and the administration. Despite this balance, 
argument continued for a century over the extent to which central government was  still the agent 
of the states. 
As  to  executive/parliament  relations,  two  points  are  significant:  some  of  the  delegates  in  1787 
wanted a plural or collegial executive so  as  to keep power out of the hands of one man; and the 
final  agreement  was  not on  a  government  originating from  or responsible  to the directly-elected 
chamber- for that would have run the risk of making it too powerful both vis-a-vis the statett and 
the  states-appointed Senate - but a  separately  elected  executive  President. 
For some decades after 1787 the President did remain a mere administrator of laws, leaving policy-
making to Congress. By today, the balance has changed. The Senate has been directly elected since 
1913, but still guards a good deal of power on behalf of the states. And constitutional amendment, 
judicial interpretation and the needs of the modern economy have combined to make the presidency 
more powerful. Congress has surrendered much of its initiating role and has become more a critic 
and an investigator  of the executive  like  other assemblies.  The legacy  of the history is  that the 
extreme  separation  of  powers  has  resulted  in a  slow-moving system,  the executive  unable  to  be 
certain of getting its legislation  through,  and presidents finding  themselves  unable to put through 
the  policies  on which  they  are  elected. 
(1)  Federal  Government  by K.  C.  Wheare,  p. 35. 
186 The Swiss  federation  is  also  interesting for  European  unity.  Before  the  Napoleonic  invasion,  the 
thirteen  separate  cantons,  with differing  forms  of  democratic  and  autocratic  government,  were  a 
'sort of miniature league of nations. Their individual rights were so preponderant· and their federal 
organisation so loose that historians have generally been led to declare that there was no such thing 
as  a  Swiss  state' (1).  Napoleon's  centralised  constitution was repealed  after  his  fall,  reaction  and 
conflict  followed  and,  after  a  brief  civil  war  against  a  secessionist  group  of  cantons,  a  new 
constitution was agreed in 1848.  The American form of government had long been admired and it 
influenced  what was  chosen:  a  parliament with  two  co-equal  chambers,  one  being  a  Council  of 
States;  and,  this time,  a  collegial  executive  chosen  by the Federal Assembly,  for  a  fixed  term of 
years and without the power to dissolve parliament. This pattern survived a major revision in 1874, 
increasing  the  power  of the  central  government.  The constitution enumerates  the powers  of the 
government,  and residual  powers  belong to the cantons.  The referendum  by  which  federal  laws 
can  be  challenged 'if 30,000  voters  or  8  cantons'  demand,  is  a  popular check  on federal  laws, 
balancing a constitutional provision that federal laws override those of the cantons. It is also a check 
on and a  vehicle for  constitutional  amendments,  and has  been  frequently  used for  this  purpose. 
The outcome is a careful blend of state and federal powers. Once again we see not only a chamber 
from the states, but also avoidance of a government responsible to a popular chamber (and therefore 
in  danger,  when in alliance,  to  override  states  desires). 
Divisions of language, religion, culture and economic interest are all important in Switzerland. The 
system is worked so as to bridge these divisions as well as to preserve state rights. The main parties 
are represented in the Federal executive according to their share of seats  in the popular chamber. 
Whereas a president helps to force the party structure towards two main parties, this preserves the 
several parties, and government by consensus  among them is  what results. But some events in the 
1960s show how conflict between institutions can arise even in such a stable form of government built 
on coalition and compromise (
2
). When the costs of buying some new fighter aircraft escalated before 
delivery,  the  Assembly  refused  to pass  a  supplementary  budget  and  cut  the  number  of  aircraft 
instead. This led to something of a constitutional crisis. The executive insisted that the parliament's 
role under the constitution is  to advise  and to recommend, but not to interfere this far in govern-
ment administration. Until then it had generally been assumed that the parallel coalition complexion 
of executive  and. parliament would avoid such  clashes.  The consequence of the quarrel is  that a 
parliament  that was  previously  amateur  in  its  methods  and  committee  enquiries  has  set  about 
equipping itself to gather expert advice  and to pursue methods of. interrogation that will, it hopes, 
make it better able to control the executive. This kind of crisis can, of course, occur regularly in the 
United States of America. But it does illustrate again that these forms of  separation of powers can 
lead  to indecision  or imperilling  of  government policy,  perhaps  based  on incomplete information 
or capricious voting. Parliamentary claims to  'have the last word' can create these problems when 
reciprocal  government/parliament  controls  are  absent  and  when  there  is  no  marshalled  majority 
supporting its  government. 
It is  a problem which will not have escaped Western European governments who do not face it in 
their  home  parliaments  and may  not,  therefore,  wish  to  leave  such  things  entirely  to chance  in 
creating European Union. 
Germany  is  another  example  of steady  change  from  a  confederation  towards  a  federation.  The 
Empire of 1871-1918 was a confederacy of twenty five states. Its Council, consisting of states' delegates 
voting as  separate blocs, was more important than the Reichstag. After 1918, when the clear sense 
of identity as  a nation could no longer be denied, the Weimar Republic remained a federation only 
in  name.  Power passed to the  Reichstag,  to the  detriment  of  the states.  Voting in the Reichsrat 
ceased to be by blocs, but the chamber could still force a referendum on constitutional amendments. 
( 1)  The Government  of  Switzerland  by  W. E.  Rappard,  p.  16. 
(')  Le  Contr61e du Parlement sur les  Depenses  Publiques  en  Suisse  paper by  Paolo  Urio, 1971. 
187 As  has  been  described  earlier,  today's  constitution  reverts  to  a  federation,  in which  bloc  voting 
and a  veto  over  states'  rights  are  restored to the Bundesrat.  As  in Canada and Australia  (where 
federal  constitutions  reflected  the  UK  pattern· of government  at the  date they  were  granted)  the 
federal government is now responsible to the directly-elected chamber-though causing less complaint 
from  the states  about the safety  of their rights  than in the former  UK  Dominions. 
The Netherlands  are yet  another country showing this historical progression.  The constitution of 
the  United  Netherlands,  dating  from  the  late.  16th  century,  had  a  States  General  composed  of 
delegations from the Estates and the consent of all seven provinces was needed for important matters. 
The modern nation dates from 1815,  but the fragile  union of north and south was  broken when 
the  south revolted  in  1830  and became  the  independent  state  of  Belgium.  A  federal  feature  has 
survived, in that one of the chambers in the Dutch parliament is  elected by the provincial councils. 
When  federal  experience  is  examined  in  this  way,  there  is  a  ring  of  familiarity  about what  is 
evolving under the Treaty of Rome, even though it was meant as functional integration when more 
grandiose schemes  for political union had collapsed.  The policy areas  chosen for central decision 
are  what would  be  expected:  it is  a  customs  union  and it shows  increasing  interest in moving 
- beyond the Treaty terms - into common foreign  policy.  (Because  of special  and modern-day 
conditions,  first  emphasis  included  a  common  agricultural  policy  inside  the  customs  union;  and 
there is now agreement on diversifying into items of social policy and protection of the environment 
as  well  as  moving forward to economic  union.)  The collegial  government. which  makes  rules  on 
behalf of the constituent states (comparable to examples quoted above)  is the Council. The novelty 
is  in the addition of an associated executive,  the Commission, given powers of initiative so  as  to 
be the driving force  towards the union mentioned in the Treaty's preamble. It should perhaps be 
thought of as  a group of departmental' economic ministers attached  to  the  collegial  'government'. 
And,  of  course,  there is  a  separate parliamentary assembly,  which has  a  subsidiary and advisory 
role  (again  like  others  in history)  but can  dismiss  the  Commission.  The pattern proves  to  be  a 
variation  on the  classic  confec,feral  systems  of  history:  it  is  somewhere  on  the  road  between  a 
gathering of nation-states and a  Community or possible eventual federation. 
We do not need to attempt an exhaustive analysis of how the EEC is  working in practice. Instead, 
and with an eye  on possible progress  along that road, and in the manner of other examples,  we 
can point to some  trehds  in  central decision-making  and in institutional development: 
1)  It is  first  of  all  obvious  that  the  EEC  Council  is  not  working  as  intended.  The  1965/66 
'Disagreement'  has  brought  regular  search  for  consensus  instead  of  the  voting  system  in  the 
Treaty. A new  Committee of Permanent Representatives  does  a  great deal  of the bargaining and 
testing  whether  agreement  is  possible.  In  this  sense,  the  Community  has  remained  obstinately 
stranded:  it is  working  very  much  as  a  collection  of nation-states,  using  diplomatic  bargaining, 
the beginnings of a confederacy in fact. This disadvantages the Assembly, for when a single objector 
in  Council  can  force  Commission-proposed  texts  to  be  put  aside,  there  is  little  point  in  the 
Parliament's insisting that Commission texts should not depart from what the European Parliament 
wishes to see - and hopes might be carried if a vote took place in Council. The Commission has 
to be left with freedom to manceuvre and to amend texts in the light of known national positions, 
so  as  not to see  more of its texts simply rejected.  As  the Vedel  Report has emphasised,  power in 
the system has, in consequence of all this, passed more to the Council than the Treaty provided, 
and the Commission's role is  reduced.  Its  duty  as  'driving force'  and 'European  conscience'  has 
also  been impaired  by  the growth  of  regular  Summit  conferences.  It is  these  which  now set the 
pace of  policy-making  and institutional progress  both inside  the Treaty and in areas  allied  to it. 
The Council is given straightforward instructions about subjects to be tackled and time-tables that 
are to be followed.  The Community is  moving away from  the  'High Authority'  solution towards 
a  confederacy. 
2)  Nevertheless,  the Parliament's activities  have  expanded in other ways  that go  well  beyond the 
letter  of the  Treaty.  It  is  consulted  on  all  Commission  draft  proposals  of importance  and  not 
188 simply  as  listed in the Treaty, and Council has now formally  agreed not to proceed to a decision 
before  receiving  the Parliament's  opinions.  Direct  relations  with  the  Council  have  been  created, 
despite absence of arrangements in the Treaty. Council has agreed to join in debates and discussions 
after its  answers to Questions and on the final  draft of trade agreements with third  countries;  'to 
be represented during Parliament's important debates and in certain cases to participate in them;' (
1
) 
and to report formally to Parliament when it cannot accept advice on important matters.  Council's 
representatives,  usually  the  president-in-office,  have  made  regular  progress  reports  as  statements 
in Parliament and now answer questions afterwards, and have taken part for some years in colloquies 
on agreed subjects.  It has recently proposed (2)  that the debates  on the Annual Report,  when the 
president-in-office  opens  discussion,  should  include  plans  for  the year  ahead  - that he  will,  in 
effect,  make  a  statement  of  'government  policy'.  The  budget  procedure  has  included  direct 
Council/Parliament meetings  about proposed amendments,  and the plenary session  on the budget 
and supplementary budgets involve increasing  Council participation. 
3)  Similarly,  relations  with the  Commission have  advanced.  For example,  the Commission,  when 
attending  committee  meetings  to  explain  texts  and policy  progress,  takes  committees  more  and 
more  into  its  confidence  about ideas  under  consideration,  and  the  Commission  President  makes 
regular  reports  on general  progress  to  the  expanded  Bureau  of  Parliament.  A  Commissioner  is 
charged with relations  with Parliament and reports  at each part-session  on what has  been  done 
about texts or amendments voted last time. It has proffered (3)  its willingness to take part in general 
debates  and suggests  that they  should  be  on subjects  with greater  political  impact.  In  the  same 
vein,  it recommends Parliament to extend committee work to  include  'hearings'  into  Community 
and Commission policy and, as  detailed below, into spending.  None of these points in paragraphs 
2  and 3  may  seem  important when  taken  individually:  together  they  represent  a  steady  growth 
towards  a  democratic parliament/executive relationship,  on the  basis  of well-tried  methods. 
4)  The 1973/4 negotiations  about budget control  are full  of significance for the future,  since  the 
changes proposed, if adopted by Council, will carry over into legislative control. In December 1973, 
after  long  negotiations  with  Parliament,  the  Commission  has  proposed (4)  quite  revolutionary 
progress in the European Parliament's powers. New auditors, appointed with Parliament's approval, 
are intended to work with a  new parliamentary Accounts  Committee,  to watch the management 
of public funds. The Commission is also adding that 'if Parliament should decide to make the most 
of the latent powers at its disposal' it can use the  power over  accounts  'to examine and appraise 
any  aspect  of the common policies'. 
Most  important  of  all,  the  Commission  is  proposing  that  Parliament  be  associated  with  all 
decision-making  that carries  important budgetary  consequences  through  a  'second  examination' 
procedure  plus  a  system  of  exhaustive  'compulsory  conciliation'  - 'which'  it  says  'would  be 
political in nature'  - between Council and Parliament. It is  also recommended that the European 
Parliament  should  have  control,  the  'last  word'  over  an increasing  number  of  budget-headings 
which do not arise from the Council's legislative decisions, that it should fix  the VAT rate needed 
to balance revenue and expenditure, and that Parliament's agreement should be necessary for any 
recourse  to  borrowing.  Finally,  the  Commission  recommends  that  Parliament  should  have  the 
right to reject  the whole  budget. 
The significance  of  all  this  is  that if all  or a  substantial part of these  proposals  are  adopted  by 
Council now or in the coming years, then in addition to the mechanisms of a democratic relationship 
(paras 2 and 3)  there will be substantial powers of codecision and investigation of the executive that 
are the proper content of it. In terms of the earlier phrase, the EEC will then be a good way along 
that road between  a  collection of states  and a  Community. 
(1)  Statement  by  the  President  of  the  Council  to the European  Parliament,  17th  October  1973. 
(')  Ditto. 
(3)  Doc.  COM(73)999:  Communication  to the European  Parliament. 
(')  Doc.  COM(73)1000  final:  Strengthening the  Budgetary  Powers  of the  European  Parliament. 
189 5)  The revived  interest, spurred by  the spectacle  of Europe's inability to play any  significant  role 
in stopping the 1973  Middle East war on its  doorstep is  in coordination of foreign  policy.  This is 
not provided for in the Treaty of Rome and attempts at creating a political union failed in 1962. 
But under the Davignon Procedure, it has been taking place to a limited extent since 1971 as purely 
inter-governmental cooperation - twice yearly  meetings  of foreign  ministers,  with more frequent 
meetings of officials. Reports are made to the Political Committee of the European Parliament, and 
the Commission is  asked  to give  its  opinion when the matters under discussion have implications 
for  the EEC.  The half-dozen  main  studies  that were  made  in the first  two years  (on  such  policy 
areas as the Middle East and the Mediterranean) have led to some progress in harmonising foreign 
policies. 
But  the  September  1973  'Second  Report'  from  the  foreign  ministers  stresses  that the  habit  of 
working together is developing steadily and the 'collegiate sense in Europe is  becoming a real force 
in international relations'.  It believes  that the colloquy  with  the Parliament's  committee  and the 
report of the President of the Council to Parliament's plenary session, have 'put into effect the desire of 
the foreign  ministers to make a contribution to the democratic character of the construction of  a 
political  union'.  Henceforth,  ministers  and  officials  will  double  the  frequency  of  meetings,  staff 
will be designated in each foreign ministry to develop and administer the system, and the Permanent 
Representatives in Brussels  and other diplomatic staff  are to become  more deeply involved  in the 
procedures.  Contact with the Parliament is  to  be  increased  and is  intended  to become  two-way. 
The Report is in fact a striking document: it shows that policy coordination is not only to be stepped 
up, but is  to be  brought more and more into contact with the Council and Parliament of the EEC, 
with a particular leading role for the president-in-office.  Regardless  of the argument about the seat 
of the new central secretariat, when it is finally created, it is not difficult to see that it will inevitably 
grow in a form attached to the EEC Council (as proposed in the recent Parliamentary Report drafted 
by  Mr Mommersteg) (1).  The Parliament's  role  is  bound to  remain  subsidiary  since  the  work is 
clearly  inter-governmental.  Sovereign  independence  in foreign  policy  is  rigidly  guarded  and main 
responsibility is  before national Parliaments. In this matter the Nine will remain a confederacy for 
the foreseeable  future. 
6)  With the customs  union  and  common  market achieved  or well  under  way,  we  are  left  with 
economic and monetary union as  the one remaining heading among the subjects chosen for central 
decisions. The Summit Conferences have repeatedly reaffirmed, most notably in the Paris Communique 
of  October  1972,  their  determination  'irreversibly  to  achieve  economic  and  monetary  union' 
proceeding  through  clear  stages  'with a view to its completion not later than 31  December 1980'. 
This may seem to give time enough for the technical and political problems to  be  solved,  but the 
outlook is  not encouraging.  The progress  is  already  behind schedule. 
The  target  is  ambitious  and,  if realised,  will  determine  the  future  of  European  Union  to  a 
considerable degree.  Conversely,  one might say that, without it, any Union  is  bound to remain  a 
loose  and limited  confederation.  As  originally  defined  by  the  Council,  the  Community  must  in 
the end: 
- constitute a zone combining free  movement  not only of  persons,  goods  and services,  but also 
of capital; 
- form  a  distinct  monetary unit  with  currencies  totally  convertible  fixed  parities  and a system 
for  the  Central Banks; 
- have powers in the economic and monetary fields  to organise the union, including key economic 
policy  decisions  and  programmes  (though  with  balanced  sharing  of detailed  powers  with  the 
Member States); 
::  include a Regional Fund large enough, as the Summit put it, to correct 'the structural and regional 
imbalance which  might  affect  the achievement  of  EMU'. 
(1)  Doc.  12/73.  Report  on European  political  cooperation  and  unification. 
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to a final stage. But the earlier ones are proving difficult to reach for several reasons. Member States 
are apparently not very willing - or indeed able, given the speed with which economic and monetary 
convulsions blow up and given the chaos of the world monetary system - to coordinate short-term 
policies.  Moreover,  because  the  Member  States  are  at varying  stages  of  economic  development, 
and because the correction of regional imbalances is  more intractable and much more costly than 
first  expected,  there  seems  to  be  little  chance  of  allowing  capital  to  move  freely  and  perhaps 
concentrate in the developed centre of the Community. On the monetary side, fixed  exchange rates 
are already being abandoned in favour of a new plan for restricted flexibility- though this, according 
to a recent expert report (1)  to the Commission, need  not in itself prevent the start of a European 
monetary  unit. 
The new oil crisis, making all countries of the Nine liable to run large balance of payments deficits, 
is  going to mean a recasting of the plan to pool reserves, intended to help countries in temporary 
deficit.  It is  now a  new  world in that respect  and plans for  Europe may have  to wait for  wider 
agreement  among oil-importing countries. 
Finally,  even  if all  these  technical  problems  can be  solved  or greatly  reduced,  there is  as  yet  no 
agreement in prospect on the crucial distribution of powers over economic union between the states 
and the  centre.  For  an  economic  union  to  work  successfully  it is  probable that exchange rates, 
monetary  supply  and  interest  rates  need  to  be  centrally  decided,  with  budgetary  and  incomes 
policies,  at most, left to the Member States. But few states or political parties are certain to agree 
to this amount of Community direction, particularly in view of divergent ideas about how to tackle 
inflation or unemployment and of disagreement on such  matters  between left  and right.  It is  also 
doubtful, as bitterness over the size of the ltegional Fund has shown, whether there will be agreement 
on providing the immense funds that will be needed for the allied social, industrial and environmental 
plans in the Commission documents, drawn up to Summit instructions. As  one of the main authors 
of the expert report to the Commission has put it:  •Only if this problem is overcome can EMU as 
at present conceived go  ahead. As  it does, more and more economic issues familiar in the national 
setting - growth; inflation and employment policies; competition for public expenditure; regional 
and  social  programmes;  issues  of  public  operations  - would  be  fought  out  on  a  Community 
scale.'  (
2
)  The enthusiasts  will  say  that unless  the Nine will  face  up  to this  amount of decision-
making in common, their prosperity and stability are doomed: the sceptics  will deny this, though 
without at this stage knowing the alternative.  And it is  difficult to foresee  how the matter can be 
resolved. What can be said is  that if confederal agreement on these issues is  so far off, then federal 
direction by  a  central authority, overriding states governments, seems  indefinitely delayed. 
European Union  and the role for  Parliament 
It is  time to draw together the threads of argument in this paper and to review the form of West 
European  Union  they  suggest,  the  appropriate  institutions  and  the  particular  problem  of a 
Parliament's  powers  and the shaping of its  work. 
History does have some lessons for the form of Union.  Our western experience in recent centuries 
is  mainly of states and provinces being combined to form today's nation-states, under the pressure 
of the desire to defend themselves and be free of foreign domination, a desire helped by geographical 
contiguity, racial or national similarity, and the hope of creating for emerging capitalism units  of 
an economic size.  When these factors have been less  binding or imperative, when they have existed 
at the  same  time  as  the  wish  to retain  independence  for  some  important purposes,  federal-type 
(
1
)  European  Economic  Integration  and  Monetary  Unification.  (Rapporteurs  Profs.  Dosser,  Magnifico  and  Peeters.)  Commission 
document  No.  11/520/1/73E. 
(')  Article  in  the Times  newspaper  by  Douglas  Dosser,  22  October  1973. 
191 systems were often chosen. But we have little or no experience of unions achieved between nation-
states, at the later and more difficult stage, when they have had for a long time (in some cases for 
centuries)  a strong sense of separate national identity and when the economic systems have become 
the complex and separately-functioning units of advanced capitalism. We can, however, expect that 
since at the less  developed stage states often went through a period of confederacy before federation, 
this path of evolution is  even  more probable in the case  of the nationalistic states of today. 
To this can be added other factors.  K.C.  Wheare, in his  standard  work  on  'Federal  Government' 
insists  that, for  federal  government to be  adopted  'the  communities  or states  must desire  to be 
under  a  single  independent government  for  some  purposes  at any  rate.  That is  essential.  Unless 
they  are  prepared to go  as  far  as  this, the question of federal  government does  not arise ...  they 
have not achieved the first prerequisite of federal government'. In the case of Western Europe today, 
it is hard to say that this condition can be fulfilled. The crucial areas, as we have seen, have regularly 
been foreign affairs, defence and economic affairs. There is as  yet no sign of a widespread wish to be 
under  a  single  independent government for foreign  affairs.  Even  Chancellor Brandt's  speech  was 
about 'sensibly organised government'  which could mean federal or confederal. Unity over defence 
is some way off because Denmark would not be willing to join a defence community, and the French 
are now outside NATO and its Eurogroup (and have repeatedly refused to return). It may be that 
joint arms procurement programmes and other functional forms of integration may have to precede 
moves  towards  a  new  defence  community.  Whatever  the  speed  of  progress  the  essential  point is 
that a central and independent government in foreign  affairs and defence would need to have real 
powers, or it would be a sham; and is Western Europe anywhere near the stage when we can expect 
to see  such an independent authority - guided by an elected parliament, able to by-pass national 
Parliaments - deciding the basic issues  of foreign  policy,  making treaties  and enforcing them on 
Member States,  and  able  to go so  far as  to commit forces,  declare  war  and have  the power  of 
defence  mobilisation and taxing that this  entails? 
There is perhaps less certainty, in the federal/confederal argument when we reach economic matters. 
In these  the  Nine have  agreed to integration - a  common market with all that this has come to 
imply  - rather  than harmonisation.  Here  again,  however,  our analysis  suggests  that the  move 
forward to EMU will create fierce  conflict about what economic decisions, in really binding form, 
need to be taken at the centre. This is quite apart from, and well ahead of, the even more contentious 
idea of putting them under independent government. Even the proposition that, without such central 
direction,  Europe will soon have the sort of economic cataclysm that will force  nationalism to be 
abandoned, does not rule out a confederal solution. There is, moreover, some further dispute: many 
believe that these problems already need decisions on the scale of the free world, or at least among 
its  advanced nations, rather than simply at European level.  The expected domination of the trade 
and  industrial production of  the free  world in the 1980s by a handful of. multinational companies 
reinforces  this standpoint,  as  does  the estimate  that the main  oil  producing nations  will by  then 
hold  two thirds  of the  reserves  of  currency  and  gold. 
Finally there is, in any case, some doubt among analysts whether the weakening of national loyalties 
(by  education, by contact between bureaucracies  and by  'enlightened  public  opinion')  will neces-
sarily lead to a new  'European loyalty',  and the demand for a direct form of government at that 
centre. Positive  and sharp  commitment, similar to that enjoyed by  the nation states,  may simply 
not grow in mass terms; functional integration is  by no means certain to bring this; and the sense 
of the world scale of economic problems may dilute what does grow. Paradoxically, the withdrawal 
to regional loyalties illustrates  the same point. 
The present stage of government  and party opinion in the Member States  of the  Nine reinforces 
the belief  that a  period, possibly extended,  of confederacy is  inevitable.  Since  this was set out at 
some length in the early pages  of this paper, referring particularly to reservations  and entrenched 
positions in France and Britain, there is perhaps no point in going over the ground again. The party 
systems  of  the  Nine  depend  on  and  interact  with  the  differing  experience  of  constitutional 
development, reinforcing the delaying effect of nationalism. Politically relevant cleavages differ from 
192 society to society,  again limiting the prospect for easy  unity.  Europe-wide parties do not exist and 
reasonable identity of  view among similar parties cannot always  be reached because policies relate 
directly to their own country's stage of development. The first  steps are being taken on the left to 
form  some  sort  of  European  Fabian  Society,  which  will  start  by  examining  these  differences  of 
approach among social-democrat  parties.  Perhaps  President  Pompidou was correct when  he com-
mented recently (3rd January 1974): 'Europe will  probably be for a very long time a confederation 
of  states  very  different  from  the  Europe  envisaged  by  the  founding  fathers.' 
When we come to institutions, it seems that we must expect separation of powers and not any form 
of  unified  system.  As  we  have  seen,  some  federations,  and those  which have  wished  strongly to 
preserve states' rights, have deliberately avoided a  unified system - fearing the power of a central 
government in  alliance  with an elected assembly.  It might come to claim superior legitimacy over 
a nominated Senate and override small states. In a confederacy, separation, or some hybrid system 
as in France, seems inevitable, since for areas where the central 'government' is  merely harmonising 
the policies of Member States, it must be the instrument of the states; and it can hardly originate 
from .a  parliament,  with  whatever  political  complexion  that gives  it at any time. 
This brings us to the views of those who believe that the EEC should advance by making the Com-
mission  - regarded  as  a  'government  in  embryo' - into  a  central  government,  emerging from 
an elected  parliament  at some  stage,  while  the Council becomes  a  states-nominated Senate.  This 
view seems to neglect the considerations outlined here.  Moreover, it is  not, in fact,  in accord with 
the present evolution of the Community. The gradual building of democratic power over the executive 
is proceeding most strikingly in the case of the Council, which shows  no signs  of 'withering away'. 
It is little use pleading that this is contrary to what the Treaty intended. The Council, in fact, is adopting 
the  role  of  a  confederal  and  collegial  executive,  with  Commission  technicians  (originally  given 
initiatory powers so as to keep up the momentum towards union) holding the departmental portfolios 
in economic· affairs. The Council and Commission are both becoming responsible to the Parliament. 
When we  add the forward-looking  commitments  of the Summit conferences,  the EEC  appears in 
essence to be changing from a separate piece of functional integration into a more general confederacy. 
Foreign  affairs,  a  political  union,  perhaps  one  day  as  history  unfolds,  defence  and  security  -
these  are the stuff requiring straightforward confederal arrangements  between governments.  Inevi-
tably,  ministers  of the  nation-states  become the central pivot of a  grouping with these objectives, 
going  beyond the initial technical  matters  suitable for  a  High Autority to lead.  For this  reason, 
those who wish to see  a  union covering foreign  affairs  and defence really need to abandon over-
emphasis  on preserving  the  central role  of the  Commission. It is  worth adding that since  Union 
could also cover, quite soon, central decision-making on other policies  (postal arrangements, inter-
state and international transport, even aspects of education) there is extra reason for moving away 
from  the limiting effects  of the  High Authority solution. 
·  If this  alternative  line  of  progress  is  followed  through,  then  the institutions  for  Union,  and the 
stages they may pass through, become less difficult to discern. President Pompidou may have shown 
the way forward when, in 1971, he suggested that executive power might come to rest with states-
appointed ministers who,  only in a  final  phase,  would 'have  nothing  but strictly European duties 
and no longer be part of a national government'. In  parenthesis,  it is interesting to note that this 
has some similarities with what M. Michel Debre proposed (1)  in 1950, at the period when federalism 
was at its postwar intensity.  His project included an executive  president  ('Arbitre')  assisted  by  a 
collegial  body of national  ministers,  meeting  alone  for  foreign  affairs  and otherwise  assisted  by 
departmental  commissioners. 
Union, which need not wait for the magic date of 1980,  could thus be foreseen  on the following 
lines. A Treaty would establish a Political and Economic Union of the Nine, open to any democratic 
state in Western Europe. It would be a clearly recognised confederacy and the basic document would 
(1)  Projet de Pacte  pour une  Union  d'Etats  Europeens  by  M.  Debre. 
193 not be difficult to draft following the large measure of agreement reached among the Five,  and the 
efforts  of  Sr.  Cattani to achieve  a  reconciliation with the French,  at the end of the Fouchet plan 
discussions  in  1962. (1) 
The governing organ would be  collegial,  a  group of deputy foreign  ministers,  based  more or less 
permanently in Brussels.  They would have a central secretariat for foreign  affairs  and would meet 
alone to coordinate foreign policy  (thus bringing the developed Davignon procedure, and its  plans 
to involve  COREPER, within the full framework of a confederacy built on the EEC).  They would 
have the assistance of Commission members,  departmental ministers in effect,  for economic affairs 
and would be free  to add others - for any new matters to be added to the process of confederal 
decision.  This solution would amount to a fusion of the present divided EEC  executive but would 
still be in accord with paragraph 16 of the October 1972 Summit communique, which spoke of Union 
'with the fullest  respect  for  the Treaties  already  signed'. 
The Treaty of Union would indicate that this is a starting-point. In the preamble or in a Declaration 
attached to the Treaty there  would be  a  statement of intention to push  on through new stages, 
perhaps  giving  a  rough  time-table  in  the  manner  of  current Summit  communiques.  These  stages 
would include extra civil functions, steps towards joint defence policy and the next big leap  forward 
when  ministers  in  the  executive  would  cease  being  active  members  of  national governments  and 
when a senate, nominated by the states and with powers to protect their interests, would be created. 
Rather in the manner, once again, of Summit communiques, the institutions and the Member States 
would  be  invited  to  submit  proposals  on these  last  two  points,  for  consideration  by  Heads  of 
State  and Prime  Ministers  and  the necessary  new  treaty  amendments. 
It  may  perhaps  be  objected  that this  scheme  may  be  the  same,  in  final  form,  as  the  proposals 
criticised  earlier for  upgrading the  Commission  into  a  'government'  and  states'  withdrawal to  a 
senate. The crucial difference is  that the intervening stage of full political management by ministers 
who are senior members of national governments does two essential things: it establishes a recognised 
confederacy which can then include subjects like foreign affairs and, later, defence, which governments 
(and parliaments) wish to keep under their own final control while harmonising at confederallevel; 
and it gives  time,  in  this  confederal period, for  mutual trust and experience  to grow - and for 
reflection  on whether  and  how to proceed  towards  an  independent central government. 
The powers  of  an elected  parliament should  equally  be  treated  in non-static terms.  A  confederal 
system of separation of powers,  as  outlined above, involves the problem of a  ministerial executive 
not based in or ultimately responsible to the assembly,  and unable to rely  on its  majority,  or use 
controls over the assembly,  to see  its proposals get through.  Once it is  agreed,  however, that par-
liamentary power should,  in  the  main,  be  used  as  a  basis  for  influence  rather than for  trying to 
govern and to dictate policy to the executive, the way ahead opens up.  With these points in mind, 
let us take the direct control functions listed on page 1 - over the government's life, its membership 
and over rule-making as  broadly defined (including legislation, budget, and policy). The aim should 
be  to complete  and  to build  on progress  made in the  EEC. 
In the case of rule-making, the executive's decisions will be of two kinds. There will first be those 
whjch  amount to coordinating policies  of the  Member  States,  to result  in central  directives,  etc. 
At the  date  of  Union,  the  Commission's  1973  proposals,  mentioned  above,  will  hopefully  be  in 
operation for those with budgetary consequences. Let us  therefore take them first.  The Commission 
has  recommended  a  'second  examination'  procedure  in  any  case  for  all  'important rule-making 
decisions  of general  application'  as  a  means  of forcing  the  Council  to make deliberate efforts  to 
meet  the  Parliament's  ideas.  Then,  for  new  acts  with  important  financial  features,  it  proposes 
'compulsory  conciliation'  - i.e.  a  committee  of  Council  members  and  parliamentarians,  with 
the  assistance  of  the  Commission,  intended  to  reach  agreement  by  give-and-take.  In  effect  this 
(
1
)  See  'Towards Political  Union'  a  Selection  of  Documents  published  by  the  European  Parliament,  January  1964. 
194 institutionalises the less  obvious methods of parliament/government influence seen in some national 
models. The essence is that neither should have the 'last word. It will be interesting to see whether 
the scheme can be made to work successfully if finally adopted. As M. Cheysson, the Commissioner 
handling  these  matters  said  to Parliament (1):  'this  meeting ...  will  constitute  a  most  interesting 
development - the comparing  of  national points  of view  on the  Communities'  major  problems 
with the political views  held  by  the  various  groups  in this  Parliament". 
In the case  of spending under existing acts  (for  example the current Common Agricultural Policy) 
the influence would be made felt at budget time when, as  already occurs, a delegation of Parliament 
presses  changes  on the  ministers  who,  however,  retain  the  last  word  with  a  voting  procedure. 
For this influence  to be  effective,  Parliament will  have  to  rely  on  its  general  sanctions  over  the 
executive,  and they  are  discussed  below. 
The second category of rule-making with financial  consequences  concerns  what we  can define  as 
spending that is  really 'communautaire'. That is  to  say  it involves  spending on centrally devised 
and run programmes or projects that are outside the check of national assemblies and may involve 
executive  discretion  on how  the  money  is  used.  The  Commission's  proposals  define  this  rather 
differently  - 'all  expenditure  which  does  not  result  automatically  from  previous  longterm 
decisions' - but the items will probably be the same when they come to be settled. The grouping 
will extend the 'non-obligatoire' category from the 3 % of the budget (minor administrative expend-
iture)  defined  by  the  EEC  Council  in  1971  when  interpreting  the  Luxembourg  Treaty  on these 
points, to make the category cover, it is  assumed,  spending heads  such as  overseas  aid, the Social 
Fund, perhaps the Regional Fund, and funds  proposed for protection of the environment. At  least 
one member of the European Parliament, Mr. Dewulf (
2
)  has seen the importance of the items which 
should fall into the new definition:  he made a rough estimate that they could immediately amount 
to one quarter of the budget. For all these the Commission has proposed that, under the Luxembourg 
Treaty, Parliament should have the 'last word' and the right,  as  provided in the Treaty, to increase 
spending within defined limits.  This will  amount to considerable power,  and the definition  could 
apply to this  type  of  spending  under a  confederation. 
The importance of this last proposal concerning  what M. Cheysson  calls 'last word  expenditure' 
should not be thought to lie in the extent to which parliament would henceforth  be  able  to decide 
minor spending increases or definite decreases. Such new power will best be used with considerable 
restraint if trust is  to grow.  The significance  is  rather in the general sanction that is  provided to 
back  up  general  and detailed  parliamentary proposals for  budget changes  and in the  policy  that 
lies  behind budget items.  For,  most clearly,  the Commissioner in  charge,  has  at last confirmed (3) 
that  'your "last  word"  gives  you  the  right  to  reduce  appropriations  to  nil,  which  constitutes, 
indeed, a right of partial rejection'. If narrowly confined to the 3 %, the power can already be  great 
enough almost to bring Community administration to a stop; but i£  widened as  now proposed, it 
carries  a  substantial sanction over important policies  as  well  as  the  working machine.  Once the 
right to reject the whole  budget is  finally  conceded, the armoury of sanctions will be  formidable. 
Finally,  referring  back to that list of  three  direct  controls  in the list  of  parliamentary functions, 
there remains  the power over  the executive's life  which,  under Union,  would still exist for  those 
areas covered by the Rome Treaty and would give the right to dismiss the executive commissioners 
for economic affair.s.  The general parliamentary power to determine government membership would 
not apply,  though some form  of  approval of states'. nominations might be  built in at some  stage. 
These remarks have been covering, in the main, power over decisions involving spending. But many 
common  policies  and  the  means  to implement  them  (directives,  statements,  recommendations  to 
Member States)  involve no spending,  or at least none from the central budget.  But the principles 
which  should  come  to  be  established  in  the  budgetary  field  can  be  applied  more  widely.  Once 
(
1
)  Speech  to  Parliament, 18th October 1973,  Official  Journal, p.  120. 
(')  Speech  to  Parliament, 4th  October  1973,  Official  Journal, p. 35. 
(
3
)  Speech  to Parliament, 18th  October  1973,  Official  Journal,  p.  121. 
195 again,  a clear confederal stage of development enables  us  to establish what is  appropriate. Where 
the central decisions amount most obviously to harmonising national positions over which national 
parliaments  jealously  claim  sovereignty  (e.g.  foreign  affairs),  the  European  Parliament's  views  as 
expressed  in  resolutions  must  remain  advisory.  When  rule-making is  involved,  Parliament can  at 
best  expect  to  have  powers  to  make  the  executive  reconsider  amendments  or counter-proposals 
('second  examination')  and,  perhaps,  some  form  of  navette  or  'compulsory  conciliation'  if  it 
works successfully in budgetary procedure. The objective would be  to let this relationship develop 
during the early years  of confederal Union,  with a  view to moving to a  real power of codecision 
at the  stage  when  ministers  of the  executive  cease  to  be  members  of  national governments  and 
when  a  senate  is  created  as  the  special  protector  of  states'  rights.  It is  worth  adding  that the 
interim stage before codecision is reached is not one where Parliament lacks real power: it will have 
the budgetary sanctions, particularly the power to 'reduce to  nil' expenditure  on central  adminis-
tration, and they should under-pin parliamentary pressure and help  a system of influence to grow 
and  operate regularly. 
The second kind of central decision is when the Union acts as a distinct personality, a unit not merely 
coordinating the will  of Member States.  Budgetary  examples  were  mentioned  above:  creation  of 
special funds  with central  administrative discretion  (the  Regional Fund or overseas  aid funds,  for 
example), central borrowing, and the fixing  of the rate of VAT (or any other tax which comes to 
be  chosen by agreement)  needed for revenue.  These matters fall outside the check of national par-
liaments. The Vedel  Group (1)  singled out an analagous group of decisions - its List A - which 
include revision of the Treaty itself,  addition of functions  to meet Treaty objectives,  admission of 
new  members,  and ratification  of international agreements.  For these  it is  appropriate that some 
form of codecision, at least Parliament's right to say 'No' should apply  from  the  outset of Union. 
A good deal of conflict arises over powers. It is based mainly on a dispute, only half expressed, between 
those who expect strict adherence to the High Authority blueprint of the Treaty of Rome, so as  to 
create quickly a virtual federal system, and those who, in effect, see the EEC as broadening in practice 
into a confederacy going well outside the Treaty. It is here suggested that the conflict can be at least 
partly resolved if the evolution is  planned to include a clear confederal stage of Union, which can 
comprehend all that has  been achieved in the Common Market and can be  seen  as  preliminary to 
further progress along the road. The degree of  power for an elected parliament then follows from 
a practical diagnosis of the extent to which groups of decisions involve or do not involve executive 
responsibility  to  national  parliaments.  If, moreover,  the power  is  used  as  described  here  it  can, 
despite the dangers of a constitution with separated powers, combine effective parliamentary control 
with firm  executive  leadership. 
There remain the other parliamentary functions  on the Page 1 list: confrontation between parties, 
focusing of choice for the electors, the expressing of group and individual grievances. They are the 
assembly's 'communications function' between citizen  and government. The importance in national 
models has been described.  Until its Working Party was set up in 1973, the present European Par-
liament has given too little thought to its practices in this respect. It has tended to complain bitterly 
about lack  of  attention from  the  media,  without diagnosing  the trouble. 
In its early years the Parliament has sought unanimity as  much as  possible - in order to make its 
views effective when all it was allowed to give was advice; so as to show responsibility in the formative 
years;  and because  steady  unity gave  strength to demands to be taken seriously  and to be  given 
real powers. Moreover, the lack of identity with the executive and frank distrust of executive power; 
have led to over-emphasis on one aspect of committee work, the study of texts and progress reports. 
Parliament has seen itself as a sovereign independent body, delivering rounded and considered views 
on everything,  in  parallel  with  Commission  and  Council.  And  by  the  time  these  overlong  and 
consensus  Resolutions  have  been  elaborated  behind the  closed  doors  of  committees,  the  plenary 
session  becomes  robbed  of natural party conflict,  of  its  sparkle  and of  its  drama. 
( 1)  Report  of the Working  Party  under  Professor  Vedel,  p.  53. 
196 If a Europe-wide party system is  to be developed so as  to present real choice on European issues, 
so as to involve the voter, interest the media and attract interest-groups to the corridors, the recent 
steps  towards  increased  confrontation  should  be  developed.  Political  Groups  have  begun  more 
frequently to use  Oral Questions with Debate to stage party-inspired discussions. The Commission 
has been bold enough to suggest that general debates ought to be on topics of greater political interest. 
Many other suggestions  have been  made to get away from the consensus or coalition atmosphere 
and brighten the plenary - more debates on party motions without preliminary report from com-
mittee,  for  example;  and critical  amendments  during debates  on the  Annual  Report  and  on the 
plans for  the  Community's year ahead. 
The Commission  has  also  suggested  that committee  work  be  modified  to  include  'hearings'  on 
vital aspects of policy. They could be effective if held, in varying towns and countries, on inflation, 
or, on, say, the common agricultural policy.  Parliament has also been openly encouraged to make 
investigations into how policies  are carried out and the use of public money.  Such  enquiries into 
wasteof money in the C.A.P.  or into whether the anticartel policy is  working  ,would soon attract 
the voter's attention. There could  be  contact with committees  of national parliaments, helping to 
build mutual trust, sustaining loyalty to Union and deepening investigations into particular problems. 
To put it  plainly, Parliament presently aims to operate only one half of Parliament's standard functions; 
and the other half happens to be the one which is really important for citizen involvement in Union 
and in pressing  on further  one day. 
This paper has tried to show that experience, in other centuries and in other countries than our own, does 
have  a  lot to offer  when constructing Union  and mapping out the role of Parliament.  It has also  tried to 
suggest that differing national and party approaches can be  reconciled if we take a guarded view about the 
pace  towards  federation  and  a  realistic  view  of Parliament's  functions. 
197 PARLIAMENT  AND THE  POLITICAL  SYSTEM: 
THE  CASE  OF  THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
Summary Note by  Dr.  Johan de  VREE, 
Professor  of International Relations,  University  of Utrecht 
The article seeks to assess the position of the European Parliament on the basis both of an historical 
survey  of,  and a  general  political theory about, parliamentary institutions. 
Such  institutions  provide  legally  defined  channels  of  access  through  which  politically  important 
citizens  and interests  participate in  a  regular fashion  in  decision-making for  a  body politic.  They 
are to be expected when political systems come to exhibit a certain measure of complexity, depending 
upon the tasks they face and the level of mobilization of the population. Not being necessarily demo-
cratic, they are made up  of those whose collaboration is  necessary in making the system function 
and survive, or who command enough resources to be able to put the system in jeopardy. Accordingly, 
the growth and development of parliamentary government is  ultimately determined by  such social 
and economic forces  as  the development of trade and industry, of technology, literacy,  education, 
and  organisation. 
This  is  fully  borne out by  the  history  of  European  governmental  and parliamentary  institutions 
from the earliest times onwards. It is  manifested in the r6le of the military nobility, of the clergy, 
and,  somewhat  later,  of  the  towns,  in  Mediaeval  governmental  and  (quasi-)  parliamentary 
institutions; in the interlude of absolutist government in early modern times; as well as in the gradual 
growth of modern parliamentary government,  and the composition of  such institutions  by  means 
of elections on the basis  of  an  ever  widening  suffrage  in  more recent times  - in some  cases  via 
quite  violent revolutions. 
On the basis  of  a general theory of politics and political behaviour,  of  which the article describes 
the barest essentials, it is deduced that for a political system to survive and show a measure of stability, 
its institutional structure must be geared to satisfy this condition: to mobilise enough political weight 
to make and enforce decisions  with regard to the issues fed  into it, to induce participants to feed 
their demand behaviour into it rather than into some alternative system, and to make them comply 
with the outcomes reached through and by its processes, procedures and laws. This need not happen 
in a peaceful way, and it need not always rest upon the consent of the participants, but it does mean 
that the institutional structure provides for an opportunity to predictably and dependably construct 
such coalitions as command sufficient,  i.e., dominant, strength with regard to the issues with which 
the system  is  confronted. 
It is  further  argued that political systems  of some scope and extension  generally  require a 'multi-
layered' structure:  issues  to be decided by the system as  a whole are to be processed through a set 
of  more  or less  hierarchically  arranged  institutions  dealing  with aspects  of the  matter  only,  and 
articulating,  aggregating,  and  organizing  relevant  demand  behaviour  on  the  part  of  citizens  or 
groups  and organizations  of these.  Parliamentary institutions  provide one,  important, link in this 
chain. 
All  this  applies  fully  to the Western European political system  and the European Parliament. We 
are witnessing here the slow gradual development of a political system.  As  a result of the growing 
interdependencies among the Western European states and societies, leading to a continuous increase 
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the problems and tasks with which the system is  confronted, this  system is  gradually building and 
strengthening  a  more elaborate institutional  structure  in  order to more  adequately  cope  with  its 
increased political load. 
It is  argued  that in  the  circumstances  prevailing  in contemporary Western  Europe  some  kind  of 
parliamentary institution is  to be  expected  in this  evolving  political  system,  and  that its  growth 
derives from more fundamental forces and considerations than the mere wish to lend some democratic 
legitimacy to the enterprise and as  a  concession to current democratic ideology.  But at the same 
time it appears that the role and position of such an institution can hardly be anything but limited 
and  that this  is  not to  be  remedied  by  mere  constitution-mongering  - at least  in  present-day 
circumstances.  However  since  both the  process  of  European integration  and the  development  of 
parliamentary institutions  therein  derive  from  very  fundamental  forces  that may  be  expected  to 
grow in the long run, there does not seem to be any reason for despair here - although it should 
be recalled that historically such processes tend to take much time and are normally to be counted 
in generations  rather than years. 
199 THE ROLE  OF  THE ITALIAN  PARLIAMENT 
IN THE POLITICAL  SYSTEM 
Paper  by Professor  Alberto PREDIERI,  University  of Florence 
1)  The observation that the role of Parliament has  changed is  as  common as  it is  self-evident.  It 
would, indeed, be a highly improbable claim that the Parliament of a liberal-oligarchic state, based 
on small and medium-sized private enterprise, restricted suffrage,  and parties founded on electoral 
patronage, can perform the same function in an industrialized society, with private and public economic 
power concentrated in business  and financial  conglomerates, popular parties, organized and wide-
spread interest groups, mass  media and economic planning in both public and private sectors  and 
a  political  system  whose  climate,  requirements  and solutions have  considerably changed. 
It is  hardly necessary  to argue that opinions  about the crisis  of the parliamentary system,  hand-
wringing apart, need to be carefully examined - not with the aim of refuting self-evident diagnoses, 
but because we need to identify the parameter which will enable us  to see and measure the extent 
of the change; of course it is  not easy to find  a reliable gauge either in the dimension of space or 
of time, dimensions which are in fact inter-dependent. At any rate, it is essential, in a study of this 
kind to define  a reference model, bearing in mind that we also need to dispel the myth concerning 
the r6le of parliament (as indeed, of all the constitutional bodies with respect to other, more relevant 
and powerful,  even if less  emblematic,  social  mechanisms),  both in its  diachronic and synchronic 
aspect;  both  in  the  context  of  constitutional  bodies  (particularly  in  their  interaction  with  the 
government),  and in the context of institutions  (and I  mean here those institutions which are not 
constitutional bodies - political parties,  trade unions,  public enterprises,  public corporations,  as, 
for  instance,  the  Central  Bank  or  the  television,  in  those  countries  where  a  public  monopoly 
operates, etc.), as well as in the framework of the society within which economic forces are at work, 
and the technostructures (which control and plan production and distribution, in turn, independently 
of, alternatively to, in substitution for or in conflict with, public authorities, and the government's 
consequent predominance in initiating legislative  output). 
If I may be allowed to repeat some platitudes, even in regard to a typical and perhaps, as  we shall 
see later, a  main parliamentary function today, that of law-making, an analysis of the activities  of 
parliaments in Liberal-oligarchic states  shows that even in that golden age,  the role of parliament 
in terms  of  legislative  output was considerably  smaller  than certain commonly  accepted  opinions 
and traditional accounts  might,  at first  sight,  lead us  to believe.  If we  take the British  example, 
common law had long been the core and basis of laws both as regards their number and the consensus 
of general opinion; indeed, it remains so in the view of  many jurists.  Common law still represents 
the basis of normative output or what might be  called general legal principles. 
In the British experience,  a  balance was  achieved  between the judiciary  and  parliament, the two 
great  sources  of  law-making.  On the continent,  too, -despite  the absence  of  common law  and  of 
the principle of stare decisis, a balance has been struck between parliamentary and non-parliamentary 
legislative  output,  with  codification  and  delegated  legislation  being  in  practice  subtracted  from 
the power of parliament which is  restricted to the function of approval. If we look through the pro-
ceedings of the Italian Parliament of 1865  or 1883  or 1877, we shall find there the same procedural 
devices  that  we  find  used  today  in  the  French  or  Italian  parliament  for  the  approval  of  the 
economic plan, as  for instance, the adoption of an act in three articles only; the appendix to which 
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parliament debated a  bill for which the appendices were the texts of acts  on the Council of State, 
on the  administration  of communes  and provinces,  on public safety,  on administrative litigation, 
on public works and public health:  in fact,  the entire basic  legislative  corpus of the newly-United 
Kingdom. 
Thus, in the two versions  of parliamentarism, that in which the civil  body rests  on common law, 
and that in which iti  s based on a code of law, there is  achieved,  by different  technical  means,  a 
political and constitutional balance between the non-elected magistrates and the elected parliament 
(at least in the case of one chamber}, as in the British example, and between the draftsmen (officials 
and magistrates)  of the codes  and delegated legislation and the elected parliament (at least in the 
case of one chamber). In both systems, a large area, which is, indeed, becoming the greater part, of 
the  ordinary dealings  between  citizens  as  economic  units  is  regulated  by  laws  originating not in 
parliament but essentially with the bureaucracy or the administration, since it remains in the hands 
of  a  body of legislators,  notably magistrates,  who are  not elected. 
Of course, there are chronological disparities  between the English  version,  which was  the earlier, 
and the continental versions,  including the Italian,  which  appeared later. 
Even in the 19th century liberal states, parliament enacted laws which were not part of the organic 
and permanent  body of judicial  legislation  (common  law  or codes)  but were  of  a  circumstantial 
and mobile type, in which a law is  a policy, a tool of the government, or, in itself, an act of govern-
ment. The difference lies largely in the type of activity with which the law is concerned, in the kind 
of interest which it is  intended to regulate or protect, in the transition, in other words, which we 
are today witnessing in some parliamentary systems  (I  am thinking of the Italian case,  but also  of 
that of the Federal  German  Republic)  towards  sectoral  and sub-sectoral  legislation. 
It hardly needs saying that, even in the 19th century systems, there were large areas  of activity over 
which the powers of parliament were extremely weak. We only need to reflect on the policy-making 
process  (and  to remember the role of secret diplomacy, of secret treaties  on which volumes could 
be written, of military undertakings,  of the Franco-British Suez  intervention in 1956,  of Vietnam, 
and so  on). 
2)  In  fact,  to  demand  the  'demythification'  of  the  conveniently  idealized  models  (which  are 
frequently shaped by conservative and backward-looking political values)  is  not to deny the reality 
of the loss  of parliamentary powers,  which  has  been  taking  place  particularly in  two directions, 
one to do with the relationship between parliament and the electoral body and the other with the 
relationship  between parliament and the constitutional institutions. 
The  principal  intermediaries  in  the  relationship  between  parliament  and  the  electorate  are  the 
popular political parties and organized interest groups; so much so that the representative system: 
electoral  body-parliament,  electoral  body  organized  in  political  parties  - parliament,  is  now 
flanked  by a new sub-system: electoral body-interest groups, linked as  strongly to the government-
bureaucracy nexus as  to the parliament, with details of the inter-relationships differing from country 
to country, but, nevertheless, institutionalized as a whole to the point of having become a convention, 
or fundamental principle in the primary stages of law-making (the principle having been first formulated 
in fact in British delegated legislation)  and then in the process  of the drafting of laws  at the pre-
parliamentary-government  stage.  The  institutionalization  is  seen  as  much  in  the  organizations 
concerned (commissions, committees, etc.) on which interest groups, the bureaucracy and the ruling 
party experts  are represented,  as  in the procedures  (more or less  formalized)  of consultation and 
participation in decision-making which, at a later stage, in the European case  (the North American 
experience being different)  extend from  the governmental to the parliamentary sphere,  by  the use 
on methods inspired and more or less  modelled on congressional hearings. This interest sub-system 
influences both the output of the parliament which, in many cases, as in Italy, (which I shall consider 
in paras. 8 and 9), was increasingly forced to legislate in response to the sectional requirements of 
201 interest groups, and its working methods. Parliament adopts increasingly an  nquiry approach, and 
less that of the general debate, it becomes an assembly where one does not speak but listens to others 
speaking and re-establishes contacts with social forces  which otherwise would seek a dialogue with 
other institutional bodies: this is  the experience of the American hearings which has been repeated 
almost  simultaneously in the  British  and  the Italian  parliaments  and which the  Federal  German 
Republic's  parliament seems  about to follow. 
3)  There is  a close connection between the shift of  the basis  of representation, its  fragmentation 
into sub-systems, the pressures of social groups demanding that their conflicting interests be defended 
by public intervention in the economic and social sphere, and the loss of parliament's powers vis-a-
vis  the government or administration. The latter acquires more power not only because it is  better 
technically equipped (for instance, in monetary problems, credit control, shortterm economic policy, 
etc.)  but also because of its closer links with the interest sub-system which offers it information and 
approval and enables it to carry out its  administrative policy for favours,  rewards, privileges  and 
bribes  on a  scale  which  grows  as  the  administration's  responsibilities  increase  in the  economic, 
research  and  development  sectors.  The  administration  evolves  into  a  structure  of  more  or  less 
autonomous  sub-systems;  in Italy for  example, the  administration has  become  sub-divided  into  a 
system of the traditional departmental bureaucratic machinery, linked at the top by ministers who 
are politicians,  plus a system of local governments (communes, provinces and regions) with political 
top administrators  and  a bureaucracy  recruited  largely  on a  competitive  basis,  plus  a  system  of 
public  enterprises  whose  chiefs  are party nominees  according to the spoils system, itself dependent 
on the pattern of party factions,  and  the  administrations  of  the private-sector type  (for  example, 
insurance  institutions,  hospitals, etc.),  plus a  system of  public corporations where the top appoint-
ments are filled on the spoils system and the civil service administration is recruited on a competitive 
basis. Through all these sub-systems there are struggles and tensions all the more acute because they are 
not allowed to express  themselves in relations between the bureaucratic machinery and private indi-
viduals,  all  bureaucratic machinery being usually regarded automatically as an enemy by the others. 
In  the case  of Italy the politicization of administrative sectors  of  the newer  type  (state-controlled 
enterprises, corporations, etc.)  was principally promoted by the majority party, as part of a coloni-
zation design dating back to 1950, which has contributed to the proliferation of sub-systems (which 
I have just described and which has thrown out of gear the mechanisms provided by the constitution). 
We need only look at the contradiction between the functional decentralization of public corporations 
and enterprises  and regional territorial decentralization.  Whereas  the first  was  introduced,  another 
25 years were to elapse before the regions, the centres of policy-making legislation and administration, 
were to be set up, though these constituted the essence of the reform of state administration under 
the 1948  constitution which should have  made Parliament the coordinator, through the enactment 
of  skeleton  laws,  of  all  activity in  the regions. 
The politicization  of the  sub-system  comprising  public  corporations  and enterprises  has  resulted 
for  the parties  in increased influence  by factions  close to the centres of power  (and  hence  in the 
diminution of the political strength of the parties themselves, relative to the size of the majority and 
the  amount  of  government  and parliamentary activity)  and,  on Parliament's  side,  in a  shrinking 
of its scope of intervention and the effectiveness of its control function (because, although fragmented 
on certain points, the majority is basically united): and this acquires particular importance in a political 
system such as  the Italian, where a strong political party which is  not ideological but widely-based 
remains constantly in power, while a strong Communist party has, in the last analysis,  a position 
somewhere  between that of the legitimate  opposition and forming  part of  a  leftist  majority; this 
in the minds of some people implies the danger of a headlong slide of the Chilean type, and persuades 
them  that in  Italy  a  two-party  system  would  not only  be  imperfect  but institutionally  deficient. 
This is  why the parties extend their power by  systematically taking possession of more key  posts 
in  the  administrative  apparatus,  in the  case  of  the  majority  party,  and in the  case  of  the  other 
parties, including those which do not participate in the central government but have strong influence 
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area, ranging from public enterprises to hospitals. The nexus of linked interests and financing circuits 
between  the  administration  and  interest  ~roups, between  enterprises  and  political  factions,  has 
been growing to the point of exploding in the present crisis in which the generally known, even  if 
not proven, cases of bribery are used as evidence and argument for obtaining official financing of the 
political parties. 
4)  Overall,  the position  of  Parliament  has  become  that of  an instrument of  mediation  between 
the  party - electoral  sub-system,  and  the  interest  group  sub-system,  the  bureaucracy  and  the 
administrative  sub-system  (e.g.  the  central  authority - regions  sub-system). 
This analysis still does not exhaust all the possibilities: even in a constitutional system such as  the 
Italian,  which  unlike  the  French,  does  not reserve  certain  decisions  to the  executive,  Parliament 
does not exercise its power in a number of exceptionally important areas; for instance, in respect 
of the control of television services the first legislation in our country came in 1974; similarly, price 
control for certain articles came in the form of legislation only in 1973  (it is not so for the prices of 
newspapers,  which  being  controlled,  but not by Parliament, find  their very  existence  threatened). 
Nevertheless,  Parliament  does  make,  or takes  part in  making,  the fundamental  decisions  on the 
distribution of power, deciding how the machinery of the State is  to be organized, and thus estab-
lishing  the  structure  of  the State  apparatus  (and  therefore  also  the  potential  spheres  of activity, 
including  law-making  activity,  of the  other bodies,  e.g.  Gesetz  zur  Fiirderung der  Stabilitat  und 
des Wechstums der Wirtschaft) and always takes, directly or indirectly, decisions regarding expenditure 
(though it may do so  by authorizing other bodies to make particular expenditures). This power of 
expenditure  acquires  a  particular importance in  a  state which  provides  the  financing  for  private 
economic activities and intervenes in the economic process not so  much as overall planner but by 
means  of  (outline)  sectoral planning, depending principally on the financing  of private and public 
enterprises.  The  actual  areas  of  Parliamentary  intervention  outside  the  prerogatives  reserved  to 
Parliament by the constitution vary today substantially from country to country. And not only as 
regards  the individual  types  of  institutions  controlled  (e.g.  whether it is  public  enterprises  or the 
central bank). Thus, the Italian Parliament could perfectly well debate the functioning and long-term 
objectives of public enterprises whenever it is  called to adopt bills for the financing of such bodies, 
but such discussions never take place and the bills are approved at an amazing speed (see for example 
paragraph 7(b)  below),  whereas in  Great Britain these things  are discussed  by  Committees  which 
lay down the long-term aims. But the difference of approach is manifest also in general parliamentary 
activity  (for instance, the extent of Parliament's contribution to the process of law-making); there 
is a British way (few laws on society's major problems and the general structure of the administrative 
apparatus, with very extensive use  of government-sponsored or delegated legislation), there is  also 
the somewhat specific  Belgian  way,  and the  approach  embodied  in the  constitution  of  the Fifth 
Republic,  and there  is  the  Italian  way  (a  multiplicity  of  'little laws',  the  micro-sectional  laws, 
originating with Parliament,  and a  few  major laws  plus  a  multiplicity  of  'little  laws'  sponsored 
by the Government). The amount of legislative output is the first  differentiating factor  between the 
British - Belgian  - French  approach and the Italian  (and in fact  also the German).  A numerically 
high  output of  necessity  means  that many  of  the  laws  produced  are  of the  sectional  or micro-
sectional type, and are concerned with limited aspects of the administrative process (and in the last 
resort are in fact simply administrative measures),  and not major decisions.  This fact,  in its  turn, 
determines the character of the legislation: in the first  approach we have skeleton laws which refer 
to detailed regulations, in the second a  large number of very  detailed minor laws. 
The second  aspect we  have  mentioned,  the balance of parliamentary and governmental initiative, 
is  another  useful  discriminant,  provided  we  remember  that  the  crude  statistics  need  informed 
interpretation  (parliamentary initiatives  can  be  broken down  according  to the  proponents'  party 
allegiance; in a multi-party system one must bear in mind that a number of rival proposals differing 
to  a  greater  or lesser  extent from  each  other  may  be  put forward  on the  same  subject  by  the 
different  parties,  etc.). 
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we  can  obtain  a  first  estimate  from  the following  six statistics: 
a)  There were 2,317 bills adopted in the First Parliament, 1,897 in the Second,  1,785 in the Third, 
1,769  in the Fourth and 841  in the Fifth; or, approximately 220  acts  per year. 
b)  In the Fifth Parliament 42.1%  of the bills were adopted without amendment, the rest adopted 
with amendments. 
c)  The majority of  the bills were  adopted by  committees  acting with legislative power (74.4%  in 
the  First  Parliament,  76.3 %  in the  Second,  76.3 %  in  the  Third,  77.1 %  in the  Fourth  and 
77.6%  in the Fifth Parliament). 
d)  Of these acts, those originating in the Parliament accounted for  11.3% in the First Parliament, 
25.5%  in the Second,  27.2%  in the Third, 33.1%  in the Fourth and 26%  in the Fifth. 
It is  interesting to note that in the Fifth Parliament the proportion of proposals sponsored by 
deputies  of  the  majority party rose  to 7  4 % of Parliament-initiated acts. 
e)  Of these acts, over the life  of the first four Parliaments, the micro-sectional laws accounted for 
39 %, the  sectional  ones  for  25 %  and  private  legislation  for  7.5 % ;  in the  Fifth  Parliament 
micro-sectional  and  private  legislation  rose  to  76.1 %  while  public  legislation  accounted  for 
6.4 %. Laws benefiting sectional, micro-sectional or private interest are suggestively, but loosely, 
called  •little  laws'  (leggine)  because  of  their  limited  application  and short texts; in  the Fifth 
Parliament 55 %  of the acts  had less  than 4 articles, 32 %  had from 4 to 9, 12.3 %  more than 
9  articles;  in  the First Parliament the  respective  proportions  were  68.2,  22.5  and  8.9 %. 
f)  There were 78  instruments of delegated legislation in the Fifth, and 46 in the Sixth Parliament 
(for  the period from  25  May 1972  to 31  March 1974). 
g)  The majorities by which the acts  are passed differ  in general from the size of the government 
majority; in the First Parliament opposition to the government rose to peaks of 45.3 %, whereas 
the average  size  of the vote  against bills  was  21.6 % ; in the Second Parliament the respective 
figures  were 49.5% and 16 %, in the Third 49.7 and 1.1%; in the Fourth 58  and 23.4% and 
in the Fifth 52.4  and 24.8 %. 
To the above  analysis  we  should add the fact  that: 
h)  Outside the legislative  process  government crises  (which  all  originate  and are  resolved  outside 
Parliament, that is  without a vote of confidence being taken)  are frequent  and often prolonged 
in Italy  (the  average  life  of  the  government  has  been 319  days). 
If we compare these data historically with the situation in the Italian Parliament and instantaneously 
with those in the Parliaments of other countries, we can begin to see  the major characteristics of 
the Italian Parliament's legislative  output. 
The following  statistics  can  be  compared: 
a)  Number of acts: in Great Britain 76  acts were passed in 1971-72,  89  in 1970-71,  63  in 1968-69; 
in Denmark from 1960  to  1966  the annual average was  129  acts  passed; in France,  under the 
Fifth Republic, there were 147 acts passed in 1966, but in 1959 only 51, in 1960, 89, in 1961, 103; 
in contrast, under the Fourth Republic the figures  were 244  in 1947; 331  in 1948; 276  in 1949; 
257  in 1950; 272  in 1951;  184 in 1952;  239  in 1953;  237  in  1954;  197  in  1955;  140  in  1956; 
198 in 1957; with an annual average of 234 acts passed; in Sweden in 1966, 285 acts were passed; 
in Federal Germany during the Third Parliament  (1957-1961)  424  acts  were passed and during 
the Fourth Parliament (1961-1965),  426,  or about as  many as  are passed in a year by the Italian 
Parliament. In Belgium in the period 1948-1951, there were about a hundred acts, and subsequently, 
in the decade  1958~19.68 879 acts,  or an annual  average  of  87.9  (to  be  compared  with  11094 
decrees of general application, that is an average  of 1109  per annum), with peaks of 117 in 1962-
1963  and 1963-1964  and a  trough  of  29  in  1967-1968. 
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in Parliament was passed, as in 1966-67, or where only one such act was passed as  in 1961-62; 
the maximum number, 15, occured in 1964-69, for which period the government-sponsored acts 
accounted for 60.6 % of the legislation; in the German Federal Republic, out of 1904 acts passed 
between  1949  and 1965  those  originating in Parliament numbered 463  and the proportion of 
bills  approved, as  opposed to those introduced, was 88 %  for  government-sponsored legislation 
and 39 %  for  that originating in Parliament. 
In the Netherlands,  from  1945  to 1967  only one  bill  initiated  by Parliament was  adopted; in 
Belgium  (for the period 1948-1958)  about one-sixth of Parliament-initiated bills  were  approved; 
in France the figure  was  less  than 2%  (under the Fourth Republic 29.45%  of legislation was 
Parliament-initiated); in  the United  States 73%  of  acts  passed  in 1967-68  (the  90th  Congress) 
were  of Parliamentary origin. 
6)  Faced  with the  increased  demand  for  legislation,  typical  of  present-day  societies,  the  Italian 
parliament  chose  the  'parliamentary'  solution,  as  opposed  to  the  delegated-legislation  solution 
(the British or Belgian method) in which government initiatives predominate in the legislative output. 
The Italian solution is  'parliamentary' not only  in  the  formal sense  (preference for parliamentary 
acts over delegated legislation)  but also in the substantial, in that a large proportion of the acts are 
initiated  by  parliament and are  the subject of parliamentary bargaining. 
These points require further clarification.  Parliamentary initiative can  mean a  number of different 
things,  depending on whether the individual member  concerned belongs  to the ruling party or to 
the opposition. 
In  the Italian system,  the rate of success  of parliamentary initiatives for the Christian-Democrats, 
the party which has  been  continuously in power since  1944,  was 25.7 %  overall for the first  four 
parliaments, and 19.4% in the fifth; for the Italian Communist Party the respective figures are 17% 
for  the first  four parliaments  and 2.5%  for  the fifth;  and for  the Italian Socialist  Party,  21.6% 
in the first parliament, 19.7% in the second, 8.3% in the third, 13.3% in the fourth, and 12.9% 
in the fifth.  (It will be noted that the percentage declined when the Italian Socialist Party (PSI)  was 
in  government.) 
Parliamentary bargaining means that over certain bills there are considerable struggles on amendments; 
the texts  of government-sponsored bills  of particular importance  (e.g.  the economic recovery plan 
for Sardinia, or the housing reform, or the freezing of urban rents of November 1969 which preceded 
the housing reform) are frequently substantially changed. Decree laws are converted into parliamentary 
laws  with considerable  modification. 
Another bargaining device  is  the  'package deal'  embracing  one  or  more  bills  from  the  majority 
and the opposition side, the opposition agreeing in return for its passage not to send back government-
or majority-sponsored bills  submitted to the Assembly. 
7)  All  of this is not to say that government initiative has been reduced. Two further indicators will 
be  useful  here: 
a)  The rate of success is  greater for government-sponsored than for parliament-initiated legislation 
(the  respective  percentages  were:  for  the  first  parliament  88.7  against  11.3;  for  the  second 
parliament 74.5  against 33.1  and this trend has been  more pronounced in recent times  (e.g.,  in 
the  fifth  parliament,  under  the  Andreotti  centre-right  government,  74.5%  of  the  acts  were 
government-sponsored, and 26 % parliament-initiated); it should also be remembered that during 
the centre-left period in the fifth  parliament there was  a  monthly average  output of  10  acts  as 
against  18  under  single-party  Christian-Democrat  governments; 
b)  The  average  time  of  passage  through  the Assembly  (which  influences  the  chances  of  a  bill's 
success) is  118 days for a government bill and 164 days for a parliament-initiated bill; to appreciate 
the effect of the time of passage it should be noted that appropriations for the financing of public 
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increasing  the  endowment  fund  for  ENI  (the  National  Hydrocarbon  Resources  Board)  by 
256  billion lire,  took 58  days  to adopt, but the actual parliamentary passage required only 18 
days. 
8)  We  have seen that on the whole the Italian Parliament's legislative activity is  characterized by 
a large output of frequently unrelated and incoherent sectional-interest acts, largely to the exclusion 
of  major  laws,  whether for  structural  reform  or tidying-up  and modernizing  existing  legislation. 
(To this  day,  the laws  on public safety,  the penal code  and laws  governing  criminal proceedings 
are those of the fascist era from which articles  contravening the present constitution were deleted, 
not by acts of parliament, but only through the intervention of the constitutional court; the admin-
istration of communes and provinces  is  governed by a hotchpotch of laws dating from 1934, with 
some going back to 1915; company law is that of 1942, family law is of the same date and so on, 
and so on.) The list could be extended indefinitely. All these are laws with a smaller political content 
than those described above, sometimes they are examples of private bills having a certain political 
colouring in the context of the existing  system.  But such  laws  parliament does  not debate,  does 
not enact; it goes  on producing microsectional legislation,  the 'little laws'. 
Of  course, such  minor legislation,  filling  in the details of the prevailing policy and regulating the 
country's activity with respect to the prevailing law, is  necessary and has an important role in the 
law-making process.  But that is  not the fundamental  point.  Parliament is  criticized  not so  much 
because it produces  many minor detailed laws  but because it fails  to bring out major laws. 
9)  The technique  of  microsectional  legislation,  of  the  making  of  the  •leggine',  has  a  different 
character  and importance,  depending  on whether it is  viewed in the context of the parliamentary 
or legislative  system  or of  the  political  system.  From  the point  of  view  of the  effectiveness  of 
parliament as  a lawmaker,  the  production  of  the •little laws' is  proof  of inefficiency.  Parliament 
is failing in its task, wastes time on administrative measures which should be left to the administration 
or, at most, delegated to the government. This results in reduced efficiency of both administration 
and government which  are  interlinked and interdependent.  Particularly so,  since  parliament most 
frequently intervenes to lay down provisions on the civil service. And it often intervenes in this and 
other matters at the request, or order, of certain sections of the administration which itself, is active 
also  in  areas  other than that of  parliamentary initiative. 
Seen in the context of the overall political system in which it is  the instrument for the drafting and 
promulgation  of  the  minor  laws  in  particular,  parliament  assumes  a  different  role.  Legislative 
inefficiency becomes a kind of political efficiency when we remember that it is desirable for the system 
to  tend  towards  equilibrium,  towards  integration.  In  such  an  assessment,  of course,  we  neglect 
any  criticism  that  might  be  made  of  the  function  of  equilibrium  in  society  or  on the  relative 
importance of balance and conflict  between social groups.  Even  more  obviously, we suspend any 
value  judgment on the type of  equilibrium that is  achieved  or on the stability of  the integration 
that is  pursued. It would be  as  relevant to debate whether Euclidean  or non-Euclidean  geometry 
is  'better' or 'more conductive'  to the happiness  of  societies. 
If we  accept the axioms  (whether they be Euclidean  or non-Euclidean!),  and hence the desire  to 
maintain the  equilibrium  of the system  (and  of  the system  as  it was  without application  of  the 
constitution),  certain  consequences  and  corollaries  inevitably  follow.  Disregarding  stories  which 
properly belong to the folklore of legislation, stories of not the law, but the 'leggina' having  become 
king,  stories  worn in repetition  and of  facile  effect  (of  how  parliament  concerns  itself  with  the 
stripes on the carabinieris' uniform, with the red ant, with the classification of the tunny fish)  the 
fact  remains  that this  method  of producing  minor  legislation,  of  administration  by  law-making, 
does represent a certain equilibrium, does introduce a certain restricted and marginal, but nevertheless 
real  'joint  rule',  an  amount  of  participation  by  the  opposition  in  the  exercise  of  power,  in 
governing the state apparatus; the whole amounting to a certain distribution of power at the local 
level, a complicated balance of 'sharing out' in  which  an area of decision-making is  allotted to the 
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can be  subject to the corrective influence  of the opposing groups,  because the system is  such that 
majority-opposition interplay cannot take place over time,  by  relying on the  traditional 'swing of 
the pendulum', but  must  take place instantaneously, and therefore in spatial terms,  either in one 
joint body or over a number of geographical regions having different political majorities, by means 
of a  sharing-out of  power - this  time  among the electorate. 
As  far as  the Italian case is  concerned, it need hardly be said that this kind of balance, or modus 
vivendi  (whatever  one's value-judgment about it may  be)  is  based on a  distortion of parliament's 
legislative function  as  it  is  envisaged  in the constitution.  The legislative  function  is  not exercised 
on major issues,  that is  precisely those which according to the principles  of the system  should be 
specifically reserved to parliament and should determine the lower levels of the legislative provisions. 
Parliament,  in  abstaining  from  its  policy-making  function,  is  reduced  to  a  secondary  role.  It  is 
obliged to concern itself with minor legislation, with administrative matters in their most restricted 
and traditional meaning,  thus encroaching  upon an area  which  could perfectly  well  be  regulated 
by  the government  and the administration.  What is  more,  the  administration itself  is  still  of the 
traditional type  and  not of the new entrepreneurial kind. 
Since parliament hardly ever concerns itself with the major issues,  living instead from day to day, 
from one 'little law' to another, it is  inevitable that a frightening volume of arrears must build up. 
There is  a whole series  of  bills left over from the first  parliament which is  regularly re-introduced 
in each subsequent legislature.  Admittedly,  the great  bulk of this  unfinished  business  is  fictitious, 
because it consists of proposals which everybody knows will never be discussed (and which are not 
discussed often precisely because they would introduce major and far-reaching  laws). If we  analyse 
the numbers of bills introduced, weeding out the multiplets, that is  identical proposals formulated 
differently  by  various  political  parties,  and  the  old  proposals  which  drag  on through  successive 
parliaments,  we  shall  see  that, for  example,  in  the  first  year  of the  third parliament,  836  out of 
1222  bills  were  concerned  with new and novel  subjects. 
10)  These  observations  apply  to all  the parliaments.  Certainly, there has  been  a transition from 
parliamentary situations in which the tensions  between the majority and opposition were stronger 
to those where greater emphasis is laid on integration of the opposition. Examples of the first  case 
were  provided  by the cold-war period; then,  too, there  were  head-on  clashes  and veritable  riots 
in the Assembly,  but the majorities  which the bills  commanded in committees were  such that the 
average total of the members (in the Assembly and in committees) voting in favour of the bills was 
78.4 %  in the first  parliament and 83.9 %  in the second parliament, one reason for this being that 
the Communists  (PCI)  and Socialists  (PSI)  tended at that time not to stay on the sidelines. 
As  regards the second case, the tendency to integration of the opposition, of towards  "joint rule", 
has  been gradually growing since  the T ambroni crisis  of  1962  when the centre-right formula  was 
dramatically switched to a  centre-left configuration: we have,  in fact,  seen how in the fourth par-
liament the rate of success  for  Christian Democrat members' initiatives was 25.7%  while that for 
Communists  (PCI)  was  17 %. 
Subsequently,  after  the  economic  crisis  of  1964  and  the failure  of  the  centre-left  to  reform  the 
state apparatus around a  plan which would have changed the model of economic development, the 
growing  political  fragmentation  was  reflected  also  in  legislative  procedures,  with  majorities  of 
varying size being evoked by different acts of major importance (e.g. the workers' charter, the housing 
act, the regional elections act). The situation was, in fact, not so much one of a democratic partnership, 
with interplay  between  parliament and government  according  to the traditional rules,  or, if  you 
prefer,  according to the new rules  of a  majority-opposition debate,  as  one  of  latent ambivalence 
between this  type  of change  (which  in fact  represents  the historical  compromise,  or the conciliar 
republic, substantially in line with PCI ideology)  and the maintenance of the power position of the 
majority party with a  considerable shift to the right  (in  the fifth  parliament the Communist  (PCI) 
joined with the  majority in  83.1%  of  the cases,  the MSI  Socialists in 79% of the cases,  and the 
207 extra-governmental Left in 53.8 %  of the cases),  in expectation of strengthening its position to the 
point where relations between government and parliament would also be reshaped. But throughout, 
from  the  first  parliament to  the sixth, the disparity  between  the input and output of the  system 
has been  very great; important decisions  are avoided so  consistently that the opposition does  not 
even  present its  demands. 
The demand which generates legislation tends  to be reduced to the kind of demand that will not 
evoke  fundamental  political opposition,  on which  discussion  or dialogue  are a  priori  believed  to 
be  impossible - not only as  regards the parliamentary opposition but even within the parties and 
particularly the party factions  (always  ready to align themselves  with other parties or other party 
factions),  which  support, or ought to support, the government. 
The  greater  the  number  and  variety  of  sectional  and  micro-sectional  demands,  the  weaker  the 
transmission of general  demands.  The 'typical'  bill,  representing  a  little  over  a  quarter of those 
tabled in parliament, is  concerned with some  measure  modifying slightly  the state administration, 
affecting the position of a small group of individuals, very often the actual staff of the administration. 
While for matters of general interest the role of the parties in initiation and formulation is fundamental, 
where  sectional  demands  are  concerned,  this function  has  been taken over  by party sub-systems, 
by sectional interest groups, by sectoral groups in the State administration, in public enterprises, etc. 
As  regards the role of parliament in the process, we see  again and again that parliament fulfils  its 
general  task  (that is  one not restricted  to the  legislative  process)  of  mediation,  formation  of the 
consensus, and of negotiation on multi-partite compacts and does so perhaps more when the political 
parties fail to fulfil their task of channelling demands  and of supplying  parliament's 'imput'.  (But 
we should always remember that parliament and parties constitute a continuous and interpenetrating 
whole). 
In both the mediating and the negotiating function, legislative activity, as determined by parliament's 
real attitude, as  I have described it, is of determining importance. The Italian parliament's function 
is  above all legislative: measured against Bagehot's classical classification of parliamentary functions 
(the elective function, the expressive function, the teaching  and  informing  function,  the legislative 
function), it is  apparent the Italian parliament has kept them all, if we consider it together with the 
party system  and the attenuation  and changes  brought about by  universal  suffrage,  the existence 
of mass  parties, state capitalism, and mass  communication media, but that it exercises  principally 
the legislative function. I should add here that when I say 'the parliament' in this context I do mean 
'the parliament'  that is  its  two branches  seen together as  collegiate bodies in which there exists a 
majority and opposition groups,  but in  which  only the  majority counts  and the minority groups 
only have the right to a negative vote. Parliament as a whole exercises the legislative function, with 
the obvious and important distinction between the positions of the majority and opposition groups, 
but  without  having  descended  to  the  role  of  an  assembly  endorsing  all  government  policy  by 
acclamation,  much  less  to  that of  a  parliament which 'sometimes  amends,  rarely  rejects,  usually 
approves' said  by  some observers to be typical of the legislative assemblies of our era. The Italian 
parliament does,  pre-eminently and characteristically within the  terms  of the  system,  exercise  the 
legislative function as  a  body which, on the one hand, is  concerned with regulating and protecting 
interests, and, on the other, with integrating opposition groups by means  of  shifts  and adjustments 
around the dominant party. In a  multi-party system,  when there is  only one dominant party and 
where a two-party alternative does not exist, government changes can take place by rotation of the 
dominant party's ally  within the  range  centre-right-centre-left. 
Such rotation takes place also within the area of the legislative consensus which,  as  we have seen 
(paragraph 5),  is  not identical  with the government  majority.  In the third parliament  before  the 
coming into power of the centre-left,  the  rate of success  of socialist parliamentary initiatives was 
8.3 %, and in the fifth  parliament the rate of success  of Communist-sponsored initiatives was 2.5; 
we  see  that it was in the law-making sphere that there first  appeared the shift of alliances  which 
was  to be  subsequently endorsed  by  the electorate:  in  the fourth  parliament through support for 
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undertake the  experiment of a  centre-right  configuration. 
But, as  I have  been  saying, the legislative function is exercised by  the means, within the limits and 
with  the  aims  that I  have  described,  and dominates  and determines  both internal  parliamentary 
dealings  between the  majority  and opposition and  the  final  results,  parliament's  visible  'output'. 
In  the  Italian  case  its  character  is  determined  above  all  by  its  area  of  activity,  that  is  by  the 
exclusion  of  decisions  concerning  administrative  institutions  and  by  the  exclusion  of the  major 
political  issues,  and also  by  the  discontinuous  and fragmented  nature  of  economic  development, 
by  the fact  that resources  are  distributed  generously  but without  real  coordination  and  without 
clearly  defined  aims  and  responsibilities,  by  the  refusal  to countenance  structural  reform,  by  its 
inability to respond to more  general demands,  by its  capacity,  on the other hand, to respond to 
micro-sectional demands, that is in effect, to protect and promote weaker, more  vulnerable, interests 
because  the  stronger interests  resolve  their problems  elsewhere. 
The result is  growing loss  of confidence in the administration and in Parliament (precisely because 
of its special position); and, notably, the vacuum left by Parliament's abdication of certain activities 
is  filled,  in a process of shifting of powers, by other institutions  which  however, cannot supplant 
parliament.  Just  as  lacunae  in  major legislation  cannot  be  made  good  by  the  'fighting  judges' 
('pretori  d'assalto')  pronouncing  on  matters  of  labour  legislation  or  environmental  protection, 
nor by the Constitutional Court itself, nor even by the central monetary authority when it is  made 
to  bear the brunt, if  not the entire weight,  of responsibility for  the economic policy;  just as  the 
channelling  function  properly  belonging  to the political  parties  cannot  be  replaced  by  the  trade 
unions whose vicarious role in the 1969-71 crisis period is becoming predominant in the formulation 
of demands for legislation and in the legislative process, but which in the long term will neither be 
able to take the place of the parties (inefficient though these are)  in their channelling function, nor 
to free themselves of their intrinsic party ties - despite the introduction of rules against combining 
union  and party  office  and union  office  and the  parliamentary  mandate. 
Parliament, then, performs the function of integration by its law-making; but it acts  at the lowest 
level,  abstaining from legislation at the higher level,  when there is  also no strong executive to act. 
The Italian  parliament in  its  function  is  rather similar,  therefore,  to a  North American  congress, 
in a system where there is no President and the government is  of the 'congressional' administration 
type. 
11)  It will  be  obvious that in this long-standing crisis  situation which,  however, is  now close to 
breaking  point,  and  which  arises  from  the  fundamental  pattern  of  political  forces,  parliament's 
working methods and the technicalities of parliamentary procedure become of secondary importance, 
even though many aspects  of the legislative technique are significant; for instance the existence of 
committees which discuss laws, the distinction between the consequences of a vote of no confidence 
and  a  vote  against the government on a  particular bill,  and so  on. 
A few  main points should,  however,  be  emphasized.  The working methods  are changing,  because 
there  is  a  growing  tendency  to  adopt  the  inquiry  approach  (more  in  the  fact-finding  than  the 
investigative sense):  but even here the general trend, common to many parliaments  (I  have already 
said that modifications of working methods in committees, the introduction of hearings and methods 
of  control  over  enterprises  have  been  contemporaneous  in  Great  Britain  and  in  Italy)  exhibits 
different  time patterns and different  results. 
The Italian  parliament's  limited  efficacy  is  illustrated  by  the  transition  from  the  'parliamentary 
hearing' model  to that  of  the  'fact-finding  enquiry'. This is  not a purely verbal distinction: while 
in  a  North American  parliament  hearings  are  conducted  'live',  as  part  of  the  decision-making 
process and with the aim of arriving at a legislative decision, in a fact-finding inquiry the consultation 
and the evidence are not directly linked to the legislative  decision,  but have only the character of 
background research. 
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bring immediate effects,  will produce results at a slower pace.  Not least because the use of general 
fact-finding inquiries can, by the confrontation of opposing evidence and views lead to the widening 
of  horizons,  to  a  reaction  against  degeneration  into  a  sectorialism  concerned  solely  with  the 
production  of  micro-sectional  laws  (in  effect,  of 'private  bills'),  and  by  publicising  the  inquiries 
can  restore parliament's informative function  and even,  perhaps, its  teaching function. 
In this  evolution of  procedural and  worning methods we should  note particularly the importance 
of the concerted and global nature of parliament's activities,  the extension of its  fact-finding  and 
supervisory  function,  with  the  correlated  considerable  transformation  also  of  what  used  to  be 
traditionally called the function  of control  (it  would be irrelevant here to enquire whether we  can 
really  speak  of  control  or verification,  in  the  legal  sense),  the  significance  of  the  'recovery'  of 
parliament's  position  vis-a-vis  the  bureaucracy  as  regards  relations  with  the  interest  groups  as 
well as increased involvement of the deputies, and the changed role of back-benchers, whose influence 
rises  as  parliament  becomes  less  of  a  debating  house. 
I have dwelt on the effect that this  method of working can have on the content of legislation and 
on the  danger of the prevalence  of  sectoral concerns,  a  concomitant of which  is  the difficulty  of 
undertaking  major  decisions  (requiring  a  more  complex  methodical  approach  and faster  action, 
which  parliamentary  procedures  cannot  ensure),  particularly  as  regards  short-term  economic 
planning and conjunctural policy. 
The ultimate result of the situation I have described may be that parliament will acquire a certain 
efficiency  in  the  area  of  sectional  interests  thanks  to  its  method  examining  and  conciliating 
contradictory interests and views,  but that the cost of this will ultimately be  a loss of its power of 
decision  in  the  area  of  major  policies,  which,  while  it may  be  compensated  as  regards  certain 
rapidly-changing political strategies, may not be so as regards important long-term decisions pertaining 
to the  legislative  body in its  traditional, if  you like, function  of introducing reform  and updating 
the law. 
We  may  expect  in this  context certain  trends  common in greater or smaller  measure to all  par-
liaments; for  instance a  greater interest  and involvement in legislation  on major social problems, 
with a greater contribution from individual parliamentarians or from opposition groupings, and the 
disappearance  of  certain  traditional  views  on the  role  of  parliamentary  initiative  (recent  British 
experience  seems  to  me  significant  in  this  case,  with  its  considerable  increase  of  parliamentary 
initiative  seen  in  the  enactment  of  very  important  laws,  and  a  notable  change  in  traditionally 
accepted attitudes; it would indeed  be interesting to discover if there is  a  correlation between this 
recovery  of  parliamentary  functions  linked  in  the  British  model  with  a  changed  government-
parliament relationship,  and changes  in the majority-electorate patterns which emerged in the last 
elections,  suggesting  a  common tendency to a  joint function,  anticipating my  forecast with regard 
to the Italian situation, prefiguring shifting parliamentary patterns around the dominant party, and 
an approach to the role exercised  by the opposition in  the Italian case,  particularly in  1958-1963 
in the third parliament and in  1963-1968  in  the fourth). 
But  all these  discernible  trends  while they imply  a  wider distribution of power within the Parlia-
ment also  confirm the tendency to loss  of authority to other centres of power, compared with the 
established  models  (in  the  historical  sense,  at least)  in  the  area  of  major  decisions. 
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PRINCIPLE  OF RESPONSIBLE  CABINET  GOVERNMENT 
Paper by Professor Erik RASMUSSEN,  University  of Aarhus 
I - The Status  of the  Principle  of Responsible  Cabinet Government 
in EC and the Member States 
The political systems of the nine EC countries are - France being to some degree an exception -
based on the principle of responsible cabinet government. They are modelled on the British paradigm, 
making  up,  constitutionally,  an easily  identifiable  family,  to which  belong  (outside  the European 
Communities)  Austria,  the  other  Nordic  countries  and  some  of  the  Member  States  of  the 
Commonwealth of Nations. Even if each of the nine countries have developed their own peculiar 
ways  of  practising  the  principle  - the  result  being  a  rich  flora  of  different  parliamentary  and 
constitutional usages - a fundamental likeness remains a most conspicuous and in this connection 
certainly most relevant  feature. 
Obviously, such a  likeness  may  be considered  as  in itself  contributing to promote cooperation in 
the EC and the mutual understanding of the handling of problems within and between its Member 
States. But one may also put the question whether the principle of responsible cabinet government 
is  less  suitable per se  than other basic principles of government to the promotion of a process of 
integration  between  sovereign  states.  One  might  e.g.  hypothesize  that the  higher  the  degree  of 
supremacy possessed  by  a  parliament,  the less  may  be  its  willingness  to surrender  parts  of  such 
supremacy  and,  consequently,  the  ability  of  governments  to  give  way  to  demands  for  further 
integration. These are question:.  which will be touched on in the following pages. 
In contradistinction to the Member States, the EC itself is not based on any principle of responsible 
cabinet government. The possibilities of the European Parliament to carry a vote of censure on the 
Administration are highly hypothetical and its powers  of contrr' truly modest.  As  to the Council 
of Ministers,  the influence  of  the EP  verges  on nil. 
If considered unsatisfactory, this state of affairs might be remedied or even altered by a strengthening 
of the position of the Parliament or, ultimately, by the introduction of responsible cabinet govern-
ment in the EC  constitution.  As  is  well known,  a  rather heated discussion  is  going  on as  to the 
advisability  of  such  measures. 
It is  obvious that any important strengthening of the influence  of the EP  will mean a  cut in the 
influence  of  the national Parliaments. It might not mean  a  corresponding cut in the influence  of 
the electorates of the nine countries looked upon as  a whole. But it might entail a loss of influence 
considered from the point of view of the electorate of any single country, especially the electorates 
of the smaller Member States,  which  constitute,  even if favoured,  only a  negligible  percentage  of 
the sum of EC electorates. Nevertheless, the Dutch, one of the smaller nations, are known to be the 
most eager spokesmen of far-reaching  integration  and,  more specifically, of a strong and reformed 
European Parliament. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to an analysis and an evaluation of the role of the principle 
of responsible cabinet government iv  ~he present situation and future developments of the EC. The 
211 paper  is  based  on  Danish  material,  especially  from  the  time  after  Denmark's\.accession  to  the 
Community. Its conclusions may, hopefully, be of some value to fellow EC citizens, to whom Danish 
points of view  are  per se  of  minor interest. 
II  - Some  Facts  about Denmark's Accession  to EC 
Together with Great Britain  and Ireland,  Denmark joined the EC  as  from  1 January 1973. 
The accession was the result of two decisions,  one made by the Folketing  (the  Danish Parliament) 
on 8 September, the other by the electorate in a referendum on 2 October 1972.  The final  vote in 
the Folketing was carried by a majority of 141  to 34, the two Faroe members abstaining (the Faroe 
Islands  were  not covered  by  the Accession  Treaty),  and two other members  being  absent.  In the 
referendum the Folketing decision was approved by 63.3  as  against 36.7 per cent of the valid votes, 
the  turnout  being  90.1  per  cent,  which  is  the  highest  in  any Danish  election  or referendum(''). 
Even if looked upon solely from an EC-supporter's point of view,  these figures  may be interpreted 
in  more  than  one  way.  Both  majorities  seem  solid,  and so  they  are,  especially  when  compared 
with the  corresponding  Norwegian results,  the  referendum  in  Norway ending  up  in  defeat.  The 
referendum left no doubt as to the will of the Danish people. Still, one must certainly add that, after 
all,  the  minorities  were  considerable,  much  too  considerable  to  be  ignored  in  Danish  after-
referendum EC-policies. 
Table 1 
Support of and Opposition  to  Danish  EC  Membership,  by Political  Party,  September 1972 
Final vote in the Folketing  Gallup  poll (1) 
8 September  1972  September 1972 
For  Against  For  Against  Don't Know 
Socialist  People's  Party ...........................  0  17  10  87  3 
Social  Democrats  ••  0  ••••••••••••••••••  0  ••••••••••  58  12  41  38  21 
Radical  Liberals  ••••••• ••••• 0  ••  0  •••••••••••••  0  • ••  22  4  59  27  14 
Conservatives  0  •••••••••••••  0  ••••••••••••••••••••  31  0  76  12  12 
Agrarian  Liberals ................................  30  0  84  10  6 
141  33 (2) 
(')  Published  in  Berlingske  Tidende,  21  September  1972. 
(')  In  addition,  one of  the two  members  for  Greenland  voted  against. 
More detailed  information  on the  distribution  of  support and opposttton  among  and within the 
parties in the Folketing  and in the electorate  will stress  the point.  Some  interesting  observations 
force themselves upon the reader of Table 1. First, that only three of the five Folketing parties acted 
(*)  For a  brief,  and brilliant, account of the prehistory of and the  campaign for  and  against Danish  accession to the EC as well as  a 
preliminary analysis of the referendum results, see  Nikolai Petersen and ]0rgen Elklit, 'Denmark Enters  the  European  Communities', 
Scandinavian  Political  Studies,  vol.  8,  Oslo,  1973,  pp.  198-213. 
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and his predecessor, split their votes.  Secondly, that even if the stand of each party was supported 
by  most  of  its  sympathizers  their  support was  in  no case  unanimous  and the  opposition to EC 
membership much stronger among the Radical and, especially, the Social Democratic rank and file 
than  among  their  MP's,  whereas  the  Don't Know's  were  rather  numerous  in  both  parties  and 
among the Social Democrats easily enough to be able to cause a  swing of the pendulum (
1
). 
Further elucidation is offered by Figure 1 (2). It shows that from the latter part of 1970 till September 
1972 the fight  for or against EC membership  appeared to be  a rather close race,  the solid victory 
of the pro's being the result of a  last minute swing  to their side  by the Don't Know's. 
Figure  1 
Attitudes to  Membership  1970-1972 
(The  end  points  of the  curves  represent the result  of  the  referendum  of  2  October,  1972) 
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The preceding campaign was both extensive and intensive.  During most of the period 1970-72 the 
opponents were on the offensive, one of their chief points being the inadvisability of handing over 
any part of Danish sovereignty to a big and 'bureaucratic'  Community,  which  the  Danish  Parlia-
ment and,  ultimately, the Danish electorate would not be  able to control or influence  effectively. 
The main arguments  of the counter-attack were to underline the economic  advantages,  especially 
to Danish agriculture and the rather precarious balance of payments, and to tune down the risks 
to Danish independence,  a  choice  of  tactics  which  was  probably effective,  but at the  same  time 
implied  some  sort of  obligation  to  counteract  future  proposals  of  further  narrowing  of  Danish 
sovereignty;  open  appraisal  of European integration  was  nearly never  heard (3). 
(1)  In the 1971 election five parties had not been able to obtain the minimum of 2 per cent of the votes required for representation in the 
Folketing_  Of these the Communists, the Left Socialists, and the Justice Party (single taxers) were opposed to, the Christian Democrats 
and the Schleswig Party (the party of the German minority)  in favour of Danish accession to the EC-
(')  Petersen  and Elklit,  p.  204-
(1)  Peter Hansen, 'Adaptive  Behaviour  of  Small  States: The Case of Denmark and The European Community', to be published in The 
Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, vol. 2, will afford an apt account and characterization of Danish pre-accession 
debate. 
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Voting  in the Referendum by Party  1971''  and District,  Percentages 
Hammerum  Dalum  Eng have 
Yes  25  15  10 
Socialist  People's  Party ....................•...  No  75  85  90 
Total  100  100  100 
N=  71  201  512 
Yes  64  67  46 
Social  Democrats .............................  No  36  33  54 
Total  100  100  100 
N=  629  1107  1367 
Yes  87  77  58 
Radical  Liberals ..............•...............  No  13  23  42 
Total  100  100  100 
N=  379  561  171 
Conservatives  Yes  92  87  74  ................................  No  8  13  26 
Total  100  100  100 
N=  467  900  196 
Agrarian  Liberals .............................  Yes  95  86  76 
No  5  14  24 
Total  100  100  100 
N=  643  222  38 
* Only  the  five  parties  now in  the  Folketing. 
A good impression of the final  distribution of votes in the referendum among the sympathizers of 
the diverse parties can be had from Table 2 (1). It bears witness to the last minute swing as  well as 
to the still remarkable split of especially  the Social Democratic rank and file;  at the same time it 
shows  that Copenhagen  was,  in  all  parties,  the  stronghold  of  opposition to  membership. 
The seemingly convincing result of the referendum thus turns out to be no firm  ground on which 
to build an integrationist EC policy and, more specifically, a policy which implies a far-going weakening 
or narrowing of the importance of the Cabinet's responsibility to the Folketing. These circumstances 
were  reinforced  by  some  peculiarities  of  the country's  parliamentary  and party system. 
On the whole, the five parties of the Folketing interacted in accordance with a rather well-established 
pattern, especially with respect to government formation. This pattern is  depicted in Figure 2.  Since 
the  adoption  (in  1901)  of  the principle of responsible  cabinet government  most  Danish  Govern-
{1)  Petersen and Elklit, p. 212. - In collaboration with the Danish Television some members of the staff of the Institute of Political Science 
at the University of Aarhus carried out a voting study in three polling districts by  asking the voters, immediately after they had cast 
their votes, to fill  in a questionnaire in a room nearby.  76.1-86.8  per cent complied with the request. The results of the study are very 
close to official results from the three districts. These were Hammerum, a rural district in Jutland, Dalum, a suburban white-collar 
district  on Funen,  and  Enghave,  a  working-class  district  in  Copenhagen. 
214 ments  have  been either majority coalitions, as  were the Social Democratic-Radical Liberal Govern-
ment  1960-64  and  the  Radical  Liberal-Agrarian  Liberal-Conservative  Government  1968-71,  or 
minority one-party Governments which, in politically crucial questions,  are regmarly supported by 
one  or more  other parties,  with the result  that such  Governments  £unction  more  in  the  way of 
minority  Governments;  recent  instances  are  the  Social  Democratic  Governments  of  1966-68  and 
1971-73,  both leaning  rather heavily  on the Socialist  People's  Party (1). 
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Figure  2 
Bases  of Governments  in  the  Folketing  1960-1973 
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It is  important to notice that in EC questions,  as  well  as  in NATO affairs,  the Social Democratic 
Government  of  1971-73  would  be  backed  by  the  non-socialist  parties.  That means  that in these 
respects  the life  of  Government was not dependant on support from the heavily  anti-EC Socialist 
People's  Party.  Even  so,  the  Socialists  were  not likely  to allow the  Government  any  steps  in  EC 
policies  which  were  not immediate  consequences  of  the  referendum  decision.  The Government's 
own party being  split on the question it is  easy to understand that its  range of  action was  rather 
narrow. 
Nor were the non-socialist parties in favour of any rash strengthening of the EC ties. Danish policies 
with respect to the League of Nations present many precedents of what is  now again demonstrated, 
that  even  if Danes  and  Danish  parties  are  eagerly  in  favour  of  international  cooperation  they 
ordinarily  agree  on giving  up  the  least  possible  of  Danish  sovereignty.  So,  the  difference  to the 
country's  EC  policies  by  having  a  Social-Democratic  or  a  non-Socialist  Government  might  be 
expected  to  be  more  one  of  nuances  than of  fundamental  change. 
These  are  facts  that  must  always  be  kept  in  mind  when  trying  to  predict  Danish  attitudes  to 
integrationist EC policies and, more particularly, to changes in the status of the European Parliament. 
On 4 December 1973  new elections were held. The dissolution of the old Folketing took place for 
reasons unconnected with EC policies. The results, as  shown in Table 3, were quite unprecedented 
(even if, thanks to opinion polls, not unexpected) in several respects. The number of parties represented 
was  bigger  than ever  before,  in  sharp contrast to the elections  of  1971  which  resulted  in  fewer 
parties in the Folketing than since  1932.  All  parties represented before the election suffered heavy 
defeats.  The four so-called old parties  (Social-Democrats,  Agrarian Liberals, Radical Liberals,  and 
Conservatives}, all dating back to the pre-World War I period and always between them commanding 
80-90 per cent or even more of the seats, this time got slightly more than 60 per cent. The pronounced 
tendency  of  the  years  1966-73  towards  a  two-bloc  party  system  of  Socialist  versus  non-Socialist 
parties came to a halt, as none of the latter were prepared to count on the support of the Progressives. 
Of the newcomers, the Communists and the Justice Party dated back to the twenties, but had been 
(')  For further comments on the Danish party system and Danish Government formation, see  Erik Damgaard's paper in  this conference. 
215 unrepresented  since  1960.  The  Christian  Democrats  had,  unsuccessfully,  taken  part in  the  1971 
election.  But the most prominent victors  were newly  formed  parties,  the  Centre-Democrats  being 
formed  just before the election by a Social-Democratic right-wing secessionist and the triumphant 
Progressives launched at the beginning of the year as  an anti-tax protest party. An epoch of stable 
democracy, which had lasted for more than two thirds of a century, seemingly  had come to an end. 
Table 3 
The  Danish  Folketing  1973,  as  compared to  that of 1971 
Social  Democrats 
Radical Liberals .........................................  . 
Conservatives  ...........................................  . 
Justice Party  (single  taxers) ...............................  . 
Socialist  People's  Party ...................................  . 
Communists  ............................................  . 
Centre  Democrats  .......................................  . 
Christian Democrats .....................................  . 
Agrarian  Liberals ........................................  . 
Left  Socialists ...........................................  . 
Progressives .............................................  . 
Greenlanders ............................................  . 
Faroe Islands* ..........................................  . 
1971 
70 
27 
31 
0 
17 
0 
0 
30 
0 
1973 
46 
20 
16 
5 
11 
6 
14 
7 
22 
0 
28 
175  175 
2  2 
2  2 
gain/loss 
-24 
- 7 
-15 
+  5 
6 
+  6 
+14 
+  7 
8 
0 
+  28 
----------------
179  179 
''  One of the Faroe representatives is  a  Social  Democrat. 
What will be the impact of these rather topsy-turvy changes on Danish EC policies? It will probably 
be slight, or perhaps there will be none at all. EC questions were not to the forefront of the election 
campaign, despite the efforts of the Communists and the Justice Party, which are both pronouncedly 
anti-EC;  the  modest  success  of  the  latter  party  may  be  ascribed  to this  fact.  But  all  the  other 
newcomers, with the possible exception of some of the Progressives, are all supporters of EC member-
ship,  the  Centre Democrats  even  eagerly  so.  The number  of  anti-EC  Folketing  members  slightly 
increased, but no real change took place. On: the other hand, the new minority Government, formed 
a  fortnight  after the elections  by  the Agrarian Liberals,  who among  the  old parties are certainly 
the most outspoken EC supporters, will be in no position to take a new lead, even if it might wish to. 
It  is a noticeable fact that opinion polls just before the elections showed that supporters and opponents 
of Danish EC membership now seem to balance each other, a heavy decline of support compared 
to the results of the referendum, but not to the polls of the preceding year.  It is  just as  noticeable 
that  this  change  of  opinion  did  not  markedly  influence  the  election  results.  It  may,  possibly, 
influence  Danish EC policies  in  a  negative  way,  but probably not to a  considerable  degree. 
216 No EC debate has taken place in the new Folketing so far (15  January, 1974). What was said above 
makes it probable that the results of the analysis of debates prior to the 1973 elections will, on the 
whole, still hold true. The preconditions of Danish EC policies  have not been  changed, certainly 
not fundamentally,  perhaps  not even  slightly. 
III  - Introduction of Responsible  Cabinet Government in EC 
Some  Theoretical Considerations 
Theoretically, the principle of  responsible cabinet government may be  applied to the problems of 
the EC/Member State relationship in two different ways, leading to mutually opposite conclusions. 
In the Member States the said principle is  the governing principle.  In between the EC institutions 
it is  not. 
The consequence  is  that any  adherent of the  principle - and in Denmark as  in  most  other EC 
Member States  it is  considered fundamental and a  necessary prerequisite  to  effective 'government 
by  the  people' (1)  - is  confronted  with  the  choice  between  two  alternatives. 
Either he  must opt for  an introduction of responsible cabinet government in the EC, meaning that 
the loss  to the principle by accession  is  compensated for  within the EC framework,  by  means  of 
establishing supremacy of the European Parliament in relation to the Council and the Commission, 
or he  must wish to keep down transference of  sovereignty at the lowest possible level  and,  at the 
same time, to maximize the influence of that EC institution, namely the Council, in which decisions 
by  his  native  institutions  carry the  biggest  possible weight. 
Of course, the alternative is not all that simple. Several factors contribute to a blurring of the outlines, 
especially  of those  presented  by  the first  alternative.  Two, at least,  are  of  major importance. 
The first,  which was touched upon above, is  the fact that even if the principle were fully introduced 
and practised in the EC political system its implementation would not fully recompense the voters of 
any single Member State, and especially not a small one, for their loss of direct influence,  as  their 
representatives  might  easily  be  outnumbered in  the  divisions  in a  reformed European Parliament. 
So  the  combination of European parliamentary supremacy with an integrationist course  of policy 
presupposes an unconditional acceptance of the application of the principle of  one man, one vote, 
one value to both levels, the European as well as the national, in a way similar to that in which the 
inhabitants of a county do not dispute the supremacy of the decisions of the country's parliament 
to those of their own county  council.  Consequently,  only if this  condition is  fulfilled,  i.e.  if the 
adherent of the principle of cabinet responsible government is at the same time a fully-fledged European, 
he  will  consider  the reduction in  importance  of  the national  cabinet government  system  as  fully 
compensated  by the corresponding introduction of the  principle in  the EC  system. 
It goes without saying that a  mere strengthening of EP  will fail  to recompense to the same degree 
in  which  it will  come  short of  full  parliamentary  supremacy. 
This leads  up to the second factor which blurs the picture. That is  the question of timing. If loss 
of importance of the principle of responsible  cabinet government is  to be  evaded its introduction 
in the EC  is,  logically,  a  precondition to any  strengthening of integration, however  much  it may 
seem  probable that further  integration  might  pave  the  way for  the introduction of the principle. 
Otherwise,  the sphere  of  'government by  the people'  will  be  correspondingly  narrowed,  at  least 
temporarily  and with no guarantee  against the principle's final  failure.  As  nobody will  judge the 
introduction of that principle to be a matter of, say, a few years, its staunch adherents, even among 
integrationists,  are faced  with some  sort of precarious  cost/benefit analysis. 
(1)  It is quire obvious, of course, that responsible cabinet government as practised in these countries is no more comparable to 19th century 
paradigms, but rather a cloak for party government. However, as far as party government still depends on a majority in the Parliament, 
no substantial objection could be raised  against the use  of the term as  a  convenient shorthand expression of the state of things. 
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the  supremacy  of  EP  as  the final  step  to be  reached  by  laboriously climbing  a  number of lower 
steps on a ladder. Those lower steps  might consist in the adoption of some of the proposals made 
in the Vedel Report or, in July 1973,  by Mr. Cornelis Berkhouwer, all  aiming at strengthening the 
Parliament, some of them amenable to the Treaty of Rome,  others requiring a revision of some of 
its  stipulations.  Even  so,  gradualist  adherents  must,  step  by  step,  evaluate  costs  in  the  shape  of 
giving up national control to the benefit of expanded possibilities of EP control, and do so impressed 
by  uncertainty as  to the probability of their ever reaching  the  final,  or even the next,  step of the 
ladder. 
Such proposals might be as  modest as  those put forward by Mr. Berkhouwer: the obligation of the 
Council to take into real consideration the opinion of Parliament on the proposals of the Commission 
as  well  as  on the Member  Governments'  proposals for  appointments  to the  Commission.  Other 
proposals might endow Parliament with the power to veto Commission proposals and even Council 
decisions,  a course which might eventually lead to the introduction of  responsible  cabinet govern-
ment in EC  affairs,  Needless to say,  a host of in-between proposals have  been put forward. 
Any  analysis  of  debates  concerning  the  present  and  future  status  presupposes  some  sort  of 
classification  scheme.  The following  may  be  considered  useful  as  a  rough  sketch: 
1)  Proposals  within the Treaty of  Rome; 
2)  Proposals  beyond  the Treaty of  Rome  not necessarily  aiming  at parliamentary supremacy; 
3)  Proposals  beyond the Treaty of  Rome involving  parliamentary supremacy. 
A fourth  category, 
4)  Proposals  concerning  direct  election  of  Parliament,  needs  some  comment. 
Theoretically, direct elections  might,  even if  implying  an amendment of the Treaty,  be  combined 
with  moderate  as  well  as  radical  changes  in  the  constitutional  rights  of  Parliament.  Conversely, 
any  such  changes  might  be  conceived  of  without the introduction  of  direct  elections.  However, 
European ideas of democracy being what they are, direct elections can be, and in Denmark certainly 
very  often are, looked upon as  a precondition of  any far-reaching strengthening of the powers of 
the European Parliament and,  specifically,  of  the introduction of  responsible  cabinet government. 
Participants in a debate may react positively or negatively or not at all to any of the four categories 
of proposals;  a  positive reaction may be vague  or definite. 
Finally,  reactions  may  be  classified  as  to  whether  they  are  concerned  with  the  near  or  some 
distant future. 
These considerations end up in a  scheme  of analysis,  which is  certainly rough,  but will, after all, 
permit some  general  conclusions  as  to opinions  put forward  during  a  debate.  The scheme  looks 
like this: 
Near future  Distant· future 
defit:i:ely  vag~~ly  no  negative  definitely  vaguely  no  negative  pos1t1ve  posltlVe  comment  positive  positive  comment 
Category 1 ......... 
Category 2 ......... 
Category 3 ......... 
Category 4 ......... 
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Reasons  which were mentioned above make it, if not probable, at any rate possible that it was not 
thought wise to propagate integrationist viewpoints in the debates preceding the decisive referendum 
of 2  October 1972.  That is  why these  prolonged debates  are not taken into consideration in the 
.analysis  below,  the object  being to take the integrationist temperature of Danish EC policy  with 
specific  reference  to the principle of responsible  cabinet government. 
Since  the referendum  only  two  Folketing  debates  have  concentrated  on this  subject.  One, which 
took place on 8 November 1972 (1)  was occasioned by an interpellation by the anti-EEC Socialist 
People's  Party  after the Paris  meeting  of the chiefs  of government on 19-21  October.  The other 
followed on 1 February 1973 (
2
)  originating in the dissatisfaction of the opposition parties with the 
results  of  and,  more  specifically,  the  procedure  chosen  by  the  Social-Democratic  Government  in 
connection with the negotiations of the Minister of Agriculture at the Brussels meeting in January. 
Attitudes to the questions  dealt with in this paper came to the fore  more in the first  than in the 
second of the debates.  Even so, the first  presented only a  fragmentary picture, which can usefully 
be supplemented by considerations put forward during the latter debate. That is why it is preferable 
to analyse the contents of the two debates as if they were one. No change of views  is  liable to have 
taken place in the couple  of  months  separating them. 
The results of the analysis  are given in Figure 3, the frame  of  which is  identical with the scheme 
which was  sketched above.  Needless to say, the scheme is  too rough to do justice to every detail 
or nuance in the attitudes  of the several  parties.  Some  of these  defects  will  be  mentioned in  the 
comments. 
Figure 3 
Analysis of Post-Referendum  Folketing  EC  Debates  concerning strengthening of EP 
Category  1 ......... 
Category 2 ......... 
Category 3 ......... 
Category 4 ......... 
AL:  Agrarian Liberals. 
C  :  Conservatives. 
defi~i!elY 
posmve 
Near future 
vaguely  no  negative  positive  comment 
C,AL,  s 
RL, (SP) 
C,AL,RL  S,SP 
all 
parties 
C,RL  S,  AL,  SP 
RL:  Radical  Liberals. 
S  :  Social  Democrats. 
Distant future 
definitely  vag!'~ly  no  negative  positive  positive  comment 
C,AL,RL  S,  (SP) 
C,AL,RL  s  SP 
S,C,AL,  SP 
RL 
C,AL  s  RL  SP 
SP  :  Socialist  People's  Party. 
The most salient feature is the fact that none of the parties commit themselves to any definite and 
concrete steps in the near future concerning a strengthening of Parliament. The three non-socialist 
parties  are  vaguely  positive  and  definitely  positive  only  with  respect  to  some  undefined  future, 
whereas the Social Democrats mention a  series  of proposals without any future commitment. The 
{ 1)  Folketingstidende  (the  Danish  Hansard)  1972/73, sp.  923-35,  958-1039. 
(')  Folketingstidende  1972/73, sp.  3269-3366. 
219 Socialist  People's  Party is  expressly  inimical  to  any  strengthening  of  the  European Parliament  at 
the expense of the national ones, its appearance - in parentheses - in the columns of vague positivity 
indicates  only  a  willingness  to  strengthen  the  powers  of  control  by  Parliament  as  against  the 
Commission. 
As  to the questions discussed in this paper it is  especially important to notice that all parties agree 
in  opposing parliamentary supremacy in the  near future,  meaning  that they want to preserve the 
control of the national Parliaments  through the  national representatives  in the  Council,  and that 
the four pro-EC parties do not even comment on the distant future,  whereas the Socialist People's 
Party  is  of course  explicitly negative. 
This picture seems to some degree to be blurred by the attitudes to the introduction of direct elections, 
some of the parties declaring themselves in favour of such a step some time in the future. Possibly, 
this is only a reflection of the fact that during the debates preceding the referendum those opposing 
accession  made a point of teasing supporters  by ridiculing the lack of direct popular mandate on 
behalf  of the European Parliament. 
It comes into the picture that in the debate on 8 November 1972 the Prime Minister, while commenting 
rather  deprecatingly  on  the  efforts  of  his  Dutch  colleague  in  favour  of  Parliament,  pointed 
specifically to his  own argument at the Paris  meeting that what is  needed is  to strengthen and to 
make  more  effective  the work of the  Council. 
Even  if  some  of the  speeches,  especially  that of the Conservative spokesman,  who was himself  a 
member  of  EP,  did  not lack  an  undertone  of  sympathy for  integrationist tendencies,  the  overall 
impression is  one of reluctance and, certainly, of strong commitment to the rather guarded mandate 
obtained through the  referendum  and the preceding  public debates. 
V - Predominance  of the  Principle  of Responsible  Cabinet Government 
in Danish EC  Politics 
Whereas the debate on 8 November 1972, the immediate subject of which was EC affairs, was certainly 
not one of the most brilliant performances of the Danish Parliament, the debate on 1 February 1973, 
the chief concern of which was the Folketing's own control with Government, was on normal level, 
the  representatives  knowing  exactly  what to say  and how to manreuvre. 
The debate  was  occasioned  by  the  opposition's  dissatisfaction  with  the  results  obtained  by  the 
Minister  of Agriculture  in the negotiations  of the  Council in  Brussels  on 22-23  January.  But  the 
core of the debate concerned a long discussed,  but until then not solved question of how to ensure 
parliamentary control  of governmental handling of  negotiations  in EC  meetings.  By  a  stipulation 
of the Act of Accession the Government is  obliged to notify a Folketing committee of any Council 
motion  which  will  apply  to Denmark directly.  The obligation  to  notify  is  understood  to  imply 
Government's  taking into consideration opinions  put forward in the  committee to such  a  degree 
that its management of negotiations will be considered consonant with the views of, at least, a majority 
in the Folketing. But what if in the course of Council negotiations Government will judge it necessary 
to accept a compromise far less  satisfactory than foreseen during the Committee discussions? Apart 
from  tactical  manreuvres  motivated  by  a  precarious  parliamentary  situation,  the  non-socialist 
opposition and the Socialist People's Party were agreed on securing Folketing control in such cases, 
and  the  Social  Democrats  willingly  accepted  a  narrowing  of  Governments'  freedom  of  action. 
The final  motion was carried by the SocialDemocrats, the Socialist People's Party, and the Radical 
Liberals.  The Conservatives  and the  Agrarian Liberals  abstained  because  the motion,  contrary to 
one put forward by all three non-socialist parties, did not entail a censure on the Prime Minister's 
handling of the concrete  situation.  But that did not imply dissatisfaction with the  procedure laid 
down  by  the  majority. 
220 The decision  of  the Folketing of 1 February 1973  obliges  Government to inform  all  members  of 
Parliament  on  current  EC-affairs  in  order to  make  it possible  to raise  questions  in the  Market 
Committee and other standing committees,  and to inform, in connection with future negotiations 
and  decisions  of  major importance  in the  EC  Council  of Ministers,  the  Market  Committee  on 
Government's mandate to the negotiator in order to secure parliamentary support of the mandate 
and,  in  case  negotiations  render  necessary  another  mandate,  to  submit  this  to  the  Market 
Committee. 
So  it is  quite  obvious  that presented  with  the choice  between  the  alternatives  mentioned  above 
Danish parties have all opted for the second one, eagerly maximizing their influence on EC affairs 
through the medium  of  the  Council and at the  same time  showing  but  a  slight  interest  in  any 
immediate strengthening of the Parliament. The spokesman of the Agrarian Liberals, the one party 
which has since the fifties  consistently advocated Danish accession to the EC,  stated (1)  his  reason 
for this  course of policy by referring to the ineffectiveness  of democratic control at the European 
level,  which  made control by  the national Parliaments  through the national representatives in the 
Council the only way of securing necessary  democratic  backing.  This makes it clear that even  to 
Danish  parties  least  afraid  of  steps  towards  further  European  integration  'democratic  control', 
i.e.  responsible  cabinet government,  is  a  major premise which must not be  hazarded, even  at the 
explicitly  admitted  risk  of  lags  in  the  process  of  Council  decision-making.  Consequently,  the 
question raised above as  to whether allegiance to the principle of responsible cabinet government 
may  per  se  be  a  hindrance to integration,  probably must  be  answered in the affirmative. 
Of course,  adherence  to  a  principle  is  not  the  single  reason.  Danish  politics  are  generally  not 
doctrinaire. Unanimous adherence is  a symptom of compromising  between  outright opposition and 
more or less  hesitant  advocacy  in constant fright  of the opponents  and therefore  clinging  to the 
mandate of the referendum. But the principle is  more than a symptom. It is  also a symbol with an 
independent value,  representing concepts like democracy and sovereignty,  which Danes  are  apt to 
confound in a rather self-righteous manner. So  the symbol, convenient to rally around and difficult 
to transgress,  is  after all  a  reason  in itself. 
Having ascertained that much,  a  reconsideration of Table 3  may bring some  consolation even  to 
integrationists. It is,  after all,  remarkable that, with the  exception of the Socialist People's  Party, 
the  Folketing  parties  did  not object to a  future  strengthening  of the European Parliament,  some 
of them even  advocating measures in that direction in the not too distant future.  Table 3  may be 
read  as  a  tender  testimony  to  the  applicability  of  a  gradualist  course  of  integrationist  policies. 
VI  - Value  premises  and strategic considerations 
It is  a  commonplace in  modern Social Science  that any  research is  influenced  by the researcher's 
explicit or implicit value premises.  I do agree.  At the same time I  maintain the desirability of  as 
accurate an ascertainment of 'reality' as  possible,  in  the  interest of  science as  well  as  of politics. 
Hopefully, the above exposition will testify to this desire of mine. Still some remarks about my own 
sympathies  will  help  to  facilitate  the  acceptance  of  my  results  as  intersubjectively  transmissible 
knowledge. 
Personally,  I  am an integrationist.  This conviction  of  mine  dates  back to  the  early thirties.  Born 
during the First World War I just managed to develop some personal views  before Hitler's Macht-
iibernahme, which preluded the Second. Dread of war - a war which was, as some of my contem-
poraries  will  remember,  widely  expected  to  become  the  end  of  civilization  - easily  convinced 
young minds of the necessity of hailing internationalism as  the only lasting remedy and European 
(1)  Folketingstidende  1972173,  sp.  3269. 
221 integration as  the self-evident first  step.  A lot of water has flown under the bridges since then. The 
experiences  of  Nazi  occupation  of one's  country  made youngish  dreams  of internationalism  and 
European brotherhood seem premature or even immature. It is a fact that the damage done by Hitler 
is even today not wiped out. Still, he somehow paved the way for the European Communities, which 
got under way in the fifties, and within a few years raised hopes of becoming some nucleus of European 
unity  and peace. 
Certainly, the EC is  no perfect institution. Its  defects  and shortcomings were mentioned again and 
again during the debates preceding the Danish referendum, sometimes in an annoyingly self-confident 
way.  But,  to my  opinion, to decline  to join a  community because in certain respects  it does  not 
correspond to one's ideas  of  how it ought to be  is  equivalent to refusing to join any community 
whatsoever. So I was rather an ardent supporter of Danish accession, accepting also as a consequence 
the necessity and desirability of further and, ultimately, full integration. It conveys to me a pleasant 
feeling  of being fully  in consonance with the ideals of my  youth, a rare experience for a person in 
his  fifties. 
Still, wishing for ultimate integration is not equivalent to being in favour of integration immediately. 
Backlash is  a possibility to be reckoned with. Evaluation of circumstances  may very well dispose 
even  the  most  wishful  integrationist  to prefer  a  Fabian strategy.  What was  said  above  makes  it 
pretty clear that any rash measures  towards the implementation of integrationist objectives  might 
easily  endanger  the  acceptance  of the goals  of the EC,  and even  of membership,  in my  country, 
especially if decreasing to any substantial degree Government's dependability upon and responsibility 
to the national Parliament. Is it preposterous to assume that Denmark is, even if  perhaps integrationally 
the most backward Member State, not the only one in which considerations of this kind will carry 
a  considerable weight?  And  that reluctance  is  still  of  much  importance even  in  some  of the  six 
original  Member  States?  If so,  Denmark is  perhaps  a  marginal  case  which  exhibits  clearly  traits 
that are  after all  discernible  elsewhere  too. 
Traditions differ in our nine countries. So does the style of politics. Maybe we are sometimes inclined 
to overestimate the differences. Still, Danes believe that ideas and-high principles-play a prominent 
part in Continental politics,  in a  way which makes them suspicious.  I guess  that any Continental 
with sufficient  knowledge  of Danish political life would find  it dull and materialistic,  and lacking 
in  style.  If such  differences  exist,  if  the  Danes  are  really  less  inclined  than some  of  their  fellow 
Europeans  to be inspired  by  visions  and,  perhaps,  too impressed  by  obvious deficiencies,  say the 
lack of EC solidarity concerning the Oil Crisis, the reason may be partly ascribed to a matter of style. 
But  only to a  certain degree.  Style,  after  all,  is  an  expression  of  historical  experience,  a  way  of 
living.  The role of vision  was  conspicuous in the initiating phases  of the European Communities. 
Most Danes  are  unaware  of  that,  as  are  probably  many  other  Europeans,  not only  among  the 
newcomers. But even if they knew about it theywould be much more apt to form their judgments 
on the basis of recent experience, as they are wont to, rather haphazardly perhaps, in native politics. 
So  what seems  rri.ost  recommendable now, from the point of view  of a Danish integrationist, is  a 
strategy  of steady growth in European cooperation,  a  gradualist course of policy  which will  knit 
together,  step  by  step,  the  economies  of  the  nine  countries  in  a  way  that  by  convincing  and 
constraining their peoples will,  hopefully,  pave  the way for  future  strides.  What is  not advisable 
are  eye-catching  measures  not in consonance with day  by  day experiences. 
VII  - Some  Conclusions 
The chief  subject  of this  paper  is  the  reciprocal  relationship  of  the European  and  the  national 
Parliaments  with respect  to the principle  of  responsible  cabinet government. 
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securing control with Government's  handling of  affairs  in EC negotiations  and,  more specifically, 
in the Council of Ministers, whereas even  the  pro-EC parties showed no immediate and as  to the 
future no really  obliging interest in developing possibilities  of control through the medium of the 
European Parliament. 
Probably, modest proposals of strengthening the position of EP  towards the Commission will meet 
with no opposition in the Folketing majority  and  may,  as  indicated,  possibly  be  backed even  by 
some opponents of EC membership. But the major conclusion to be drawn is  undoubtedly that any 
measure which might possibly weaken the control of the Folketing will, in a foreseeable future, be 
met with fierce  opposition and, at best,  half-hearted support, and undoubtedly be turned down, if 
not for  other reasons, for fear of defeat in another referendum.  Any  Danish Government is  likely 
to anticipate such  a  result and can  be  expected to  act  accordingly  beforehand. 
Some uncertainty may be said to prevail with respect to reactions to a proposal of introducing direct 
elections  for  EP.  The seemingly  "democratic"  character  of  such  a  measure  might  appeal  to the 
public to such a  degree that it would meet with no substantial opposition from  a  majority.  From 
a theoretical point of view this is rather paradoxical because, in my opinion at least, the introduction 
of direct elections would, even if not immediately, in the long run mean substantial increases in the 
formal powers of EP  in order not to be simply obnoxious, and might be expected to entail in the 
meantime  a  dangerous  confrontation,  which  luckily  does  not now  exist,  between  the  European 
Parliament and its  national counterparts. 
Several of those who spoke on behalf of their parties in Folketing debates were themselves members 
of EP.  They may have experienced an unpleasant discrepancy between the atmosphere of Strasbourg 
and the cooler air of politics at home. None of them were able to convey to their parties any enthusiasm 
they may have shared during their stay in Strasbourg.  By  the way,  several  among them lost their 
seats  in  the next elections. 
Eight  years  ago  an American  political  scientist,  Leon  N.  Lindberg (1),  commenting  on problems 
more or less identical with those treated in this paper, made the following remark: 'It is ... particularly 
unfortunate that the European Parliament has not tried to develop further its  communication and 
cooperation with the national Parliaments with a view to perhaps developing together new techniques 
of legislative  control or supervision.' 
In  view  of the overriding importance attached to  Cabinet's responsibility to Parliament in  all  EC 
Member States  and of, consequently,  a  potential  clash  of  interests  between  a  reformed  European 
Parliament and the national ones it seems wise to begin to consider any intended reform not exclusively 
in a European or in a  national context, but in both contexts at the same time.  What is  certainly 
needed  is  an  analysis  and  an  evaluation  of  conceivable  step-by-step  procedures  which  might 
minimise, or at least concretise, risks of loss of power run by the national Parliaments and, eventually, 
make  these  less  suspicious  of  integrationist endeavours  by  augmenting  the  influence  of EP. 
Post scriptum 
Post scriptum.  - On January 30,  1974,  another EC  debate took place in the Danish Folketing (2). 
As  foreseen,  it did not entail much change in the basis  of Danish EC policies.  Of the newcomers, 
the Centre Democrats and the Christian Democrats declared themselves in favour of EC membership, 
whereas the Communists and the Justice Party were pronouncedly against it. Everybody knew that 
beforehand. The fifth of the new parties, the Progressives, was known to be divided on the question; 
(1)  'The  Role  of  the European Parliament in an Emerging European Community', Elke Frank (ed.), Lawmakers in a Changing  World, 
Prentice  Hall,  Inc.,  Englewood  Cliffs,  M.]., 1966,  p.  119. 
(')  Folketingstidende  1973/74,  ps.  1332-1408,  1454-1541. 
223 their spokesman  declared  them  to  be  'sceptical',  but  not actively  wanting Danish secession.  The 
Foreign  Minister,  speaking  on  behalf  of  the  Agrarian  Liberal  minority  government,  said  that 
Denmark is  best served by an 'organic' development  of  the  EC, meaning  that the working of the 
institutions ought not to accelerate more than needed or earlier than acceptable to the peoples of 
the member countries. His cautious remarks were appreciated by the Social Democratic spokesman, 
the former market minister. In these circumstances the Conservatives came out as the most positively 
integrationist party, speaking favourably  on behalf of some future  development  of the EC into a 
political union and of,  rather soon, a  strengthening of EP  vis-a-vis  the Council.  Rather typical  of 
the debate as  a whole was  a pronouncement of the  Centre  Democrat: •The slowest growing trees 
produce the strongest  wood.' 
224 ELECTING  A  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
Paper by Professor Richard ROSE,  Strathclyde  University 
The constitution of the  European Parliament raises  fundamental  questions  of political values  and 
practical  questions  of  political  institutions.  Any  proposal  to  augment  greatly  the  powers  of  the 
European Parliament must face the question of how its membership is chosen. An indirectly elected 
Parliament  is  likely  to have  less  authority than a  directly  elected  Parliament. 
The advocate of election procedures in the abstract must have his arguments checked against concrete 
experience.  Many, before making up their minds about the desirability of a European Parliament, 
will also want to know something about its mechanics. How could or would such a system operate? 
Equally, people will want to know which parties would do well, and which badly in a Europe-wide 
election. 
The purpose of this paper is firstly to consider the necessary steps in the direct election of a European 
Parliament in the light  of  similarities  and differences  of national practice and, equally important, 
the broad political objectives of such an election. Secondly, the paper presents evidence of the most 
likely  party-political  outcome  of  such  an election,  and  points  out implications  for  the  European 
Parliament. 
I - THE METHOD  OF ELECTION 
1)  The size  of a  directly  elected  Parliament 
The present Strasbourg Parliament has 198  representatives.  The number of representatives may be 
considered deficient  on two grounds. The first  is  that the burden of work placed upon individual 
members, particularly considering the travel involved, is  too great. The second is  that the ratio of 
representatives to be represented is  too low. Within the European Parliament, there is  one member 
for every 849,000 persons registered to vote within the nine member countries. In national parliaments, 
however, the ratio in the four most populous countries of the Community is  one deputy for every 
65,000 electors; in the five  smaller member nations, the ratio is  one deputy for every 26,000 electors. 
The  size  of  the present  Parliament  can  be  justified  because  it represents  national  units  and not 
electors  directly.  Moreover,  its  workload is  limited,  albeit growing. 
A directly elected European Parliament must inevitably be larger than the present assembly, because 
of the greater volume of work it would be expected to undertake, and because of the need to provide 
closer ties  between representatives  and those who elect them.  The electorates  of the nine nations 
now total  168,000,000  persons.  A  body  with proportionally  as  many  deputies  to electors  as  the 
smaller  European nations  have  would require  more  than 6,000  members;  a  body with the  same 
ratio  of  deputies  to electors  as  the four  larger nations would require  more than 2,500  members. 
Assemblies of such a size would be impossibly unwieldy, because of the difficulties they would present 
in  terms  of communication,  in  both a  conversational and political sense. 
225 As  a  basic  norm, one might expect  a  European Parliament to have one deputy for every 500,000 
inhabitants. (Setting a standard in terms of population avoids problems arising from national variations 
in qualifications to vote).  On current population figures,  this  would result in an assembly  of 505 
representatives.  A body of about 500  members would be familiar to the majority of its  members, 
for it would be  of the same scale as the national Parliaments of the four large nations in the  Com~ 
munity, which average 556 members. The ratio of seats to electors would be about the same as  in 
a United States Congressional district, and twice as  favourable as  the average for the United States 
Senate. 
2)  The  method of counting  votes 
Broadly  speaking,  there  are  two  contrasting  methods  of  electing  representatives:  a  proportional 
representation system, in which seats are assigned approximately in proportion to the popu,lar vote 
of parties,  and  the  simple  plurality  system,  in  which  an individual  who  comes  first  in  a ·single~ 
member  electoral  district  is  elected,  and no weight  is  given  to  votes  cast  for  the  'also  rans'.  A 
form  of the proportional representation system  is  used in seven of the nine  Community countries 
today, and has been in use in France intermittently. In addition, one part of  the United Kingdom 
(Northern Ireland)  currently conducts important regional  elections  by  this  method. 
The arguments  for  the  use  of  proportional representation in electing  a  European  Parliament  are 
several. The first  is  that it would be consistent with existing practices of the bulk of the electorate. 
The second is  that proportional representation ensures  a  more nearly exact ratio of seats to votes 
in a Parliament than does the simple plurality system. Thus, the former method is  not only more 
familiar, but also more equitable. The argument for the simple~plurality system in a national context 
is  probably  a  disqualification  in  a  European  context  - that it  is  a  system  of  disproportional 
representation,  giving  a  greater  share  of  seats  to  the  strongest  party  than  its  share  of  votes. 
Within  a  nation,  this  can  be  justified  as  a  means  of  producing  government  by  a  single  party 
majority, even though it falls a few per cent short of an absolute majority of the votes. The acceptance 
of  single~party rule requires  a  society with relatively few  social  differences,  where the views of the 
majority may be represented by either of two parties. These conditions do not obtain within some 
European nations.  Continental societies  can be far  more differentiated than the English,  and have 
far more parties or political tendencies.  Social and political variety are increased at the level  of the 
Community.  To adopt the British  system  in  a  European election would risk giving  a  majority of 
seats  to  a  political  group  with  between  one~half to  one~third of  the  vote.  This  would  not  be 
acceptable to Britons  or to Continentals. 
A  proportional  representation  election  requires  multi~member  constituencies.  The  larger  the 
constituency,  the  more  nearly  seats  can  be  apportioned  exactly  in  proportion to votes.  With ten 
seats  in a  constituency,  a  party need only take  one~tenth of the vote to be  sure of one seat.  But 
the greater the number of deputies returned by a  single  multi~member constituency, the larger the 
constituency,  and  the  less  chance  of  personal  contact.  With  large  multi-member  constituencies, 
Ireland,  Denmark and Luxembourg might each  be  a  single  constituency,  and a  constituency in  a 
larger  nation  might  have  up  to five  million  people  in  it.  The larger  the  constituency,  the  more 
heterogeneous its composition, and the more difficult it is  for any one politician to be familiar with 
its  problems  or communicate its  concerns. 
In practical terms,  multi~member constituencies might have anything from three to seven  members 
returned.  The fewer  the  number of representatives  returned  by  a  constituency,  the  more  difficult 
it is for smaller parties to win any representation. The smaller constituencies would be more appropriate 
in  countries where two parties predominate (e.g.,  Germany or Britain)  and the larger in countries 
with considerable numbers of parties (e.g., Italy and the Netherlands). There is  no need to require 
an  equality  in  the  numbers  of  members  per constituency,  within  or between  nations. 
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representation,  by adopting a  variant of the German electoral system,  in which some members of 
the Bundestag are  elected from  single-member  seats,  and the remainder  are  allocated among the 
parties  to ensure  a  more  exact ratio  of  seats  to votes  than by  the return of  members  solely  by 
multi-member constituencies.  Unless  a  threshhold of about five  per cent were set for qualification 
such an arrangement would increase the voice of minor parties, e.g.,  neo-Fascists and nationalists. 
(See  Federal Trust, 1972,  p.  17.)  Moreover, the idea of a Europe-wide supplementary entitlement, 
to  be  allocated  by  blocs  of  parties  organized  cross-nationally  as  in Strasbourg,  would  be much 
more difficult  to operate than in a  national context.  Moreover,  the fact  that the resulting single-
member constituencies would be  more than ten times  larger than in the Bundestag further argues 
against  any  attempt to constitute single-member  constituencies  within  a  European Parliament. 
3)  The  nomination  of candidates 
Political parties  must be  intimately involved  in the selection. of candidates for European elections, 
if  the  men  elected  are  to be  representatives  of  major  political forces  within  a  country.  To note 
this is  not to reject the idea of independents seeking and winning election, but rather, to emphasize 
that a  Strasbourg of politically independent deputies  would owe its  sense  of common cause  to a 
common  isolation  from  national  political  forces.  This  would  inevitably  weaken  the  influence  of 
the  men elected,  and the  institution they  wished  to serve. 
The preparation of a party list of candidates for contesting a multi-member constituency inevitably 
involves  parties.  A  party is  not  only  responsible  for  nominating  candidates  for  a  multi-member 
constituency,  but also  for  agreeing  the order in which the candidates  are ranked, thus  effectively 
determining who is  most and least likely to be victorious. The size of the constituencies would force 
responsibility for the listing of candidates to the regional level or to a party's central headquarters. 
This would permit national party leaders to select as  candidates for the European Parliament men 
whom they thought best able to make a contribution in the exceptional conditions prevailing there. 
If  the voters  were permitted to re-order  candidates listed,  should they  disagree  with their party's 
ranking, this would provide a restraint upon ill-advised attempts to match candidates to constituencies. 
The Irish system of single transferable vote provides an alternative way of choosing among nominees. 
Each voter lists his candidate preferences in order, from first to last. He can thus endorse his party's 
nominees  in  any  order  he  wishes,  and  intersperse  candidates  from  other  parties,  insofar  as  he 
wishes to do so.  The system works satisfactorily in the small, face-to-face  communities of Ireland, 
(see  Chubb, 1970, Ch. 6)  but would not be so appropriate for large constituencies, where individual 
candidates would be less well known. Moreover, it is an invitation to factional competition between 
candidates  of  a  single  party,  and also  to fissiparous  competition between  candidates  of the same 
party living in  different  parts of a  constituency. 
4)  Timing an  Election 
To constitute a directly elected Parliament, initially at least, all members would have to be elected 
at the  same  time;  if  elections  were  held  within  a  nation  only  when  the  country  itself  had  its 
general election, directly and indirectly elected deputies would be mixed together for  several years. 
The latter alternative has the advantage of staggering the transition from indirectly  (and therefore 
experienced)  and directly  elected  (and  often inexperienced)  deputies.  But it would  hardly appeal 
to supra-nationalists,  or to those nations at the extremes  of the queue for national elections. 
An election held at fixed  intervals  of four or five  years, would avoid the problems of intermittent 
election 'scares', arising if an assembly  can be dissolved at any time. Moreover, a four or five-year 
term  would give  members  time  to learn  their  arduous  tasks,  and enable  politicians  to leave  the 
227 mainstream of  national politics  with some  assurance  of time  to establish themselves  in European 
affairs. A provision for dissolution outside the normal timetable would be desirable to permit Euro-
pean  opinion  to  be  tested  in  emergency  situations.  An  emergency  dissolution  might  require  an 
affirmative  vote  of a  three-fifths  or two-thirds  majority. 
5)  The  Campaign 
An election held at the same time in each Community country could accurately be called a European 
election  campaign.  But  habit,  as  well  as  political  differences,  would  only  slightly  impinge  upon 
national features  of the campaign in each  country.  Even  though the issues  in question  might  be 
common to the whole Community, the candidates would be elected within a national constituency. 
Moreover,  only  as  and when  and where  supra-nationalism  is  considered  an electoral  advantage, 
will any party wish to use  endorsement by  foreign  parties or politicans  as  a prominant feature in 
their  campaign.  Moreover,  many  minor  features  of  electoral  law  (e.g.,  provision  for  absentee 
ballots)  might  be  determined  by  national  legislation  to avoid  major  irritation  on  minor  matters. 
(Cf.  Sternberger  and Vogel,  1969.) 
The significance  of the campaign is  twofold. From the candidate's point of view,  popular election 
gives  him authority  vis-a~vis the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the national Parliament 
that he does not enjoy at present. In the course of the campaign, issues can be brought before voters 
that would  otherwise  be  buried  in  Community  documents  or multi-lingual  sources.  Competition 
for electoral victory will encourage critics as well as proponents of Community policy to speak out. 
The  total  effect  of  such  discussion  would  inevitably  be  beneficial  to  the  Community.  Deputies 
would become more sensitive to the acceptability within their constituency of ideas taken for granted 
in  Brussels  or Strasbourg.  Citizens  would  benefit,  because  the  campaign  would  inform  them  of 
Community activities  and of differences  of views  about Community policy. They would also enjoy 
the ultimate  sanction  of  voting  for  or against  representatives. 
The advantage of a campaign conducted separately from national elections is  that it could provide 
greater  publicity for  Community affairs,  and simultaneously detach  Community politics  from  the 
intricacies  of  national politics.  But such  an election might fail  to stimulate much  popular interest 
or participation. Few things would be worse for a directly elected Parliament than that its members 
be  returned  in an election  in which  less  than half of the  electorate  bother to ballot.  To ensure 
popular interest and the mobilization of the electorate, the involvement of political parties in campaign-
ing,  as  well  as  choosing  candidates,  is  particularly  advisable.  The  creation  of  pan-European 
parties  is  not  a  necessary  condition  of  a  Europe-wide  election  campaign,  and  the  problems  of 
co-ordinating as well as creating such parties might make them less than effective vehicles for organizing 
campaigns  simultaneously  in  Calabria,  Bavaria,  Scotland  and  Copenhagen.  The specific  interests 
of national parties could be  stimulated to organize campaigns  on European issues  within national 
contexts. Parties in government and in opposition would see  an election to a European Parliament 
as  one in  which  their standing is  at stake,  and  strive  to mobilize  support. 
II- THE POSSIBLE  OUTCOMES 
While elections involve an element of uncertainty, there is little point in creating electoral institutions 
unless one has some idea of what can result. Socialists can hardly be expected to endorse a proposal 
that would effectively  give  Catholics  a  majority,  and vice  versa.  Moreover, few  democrats  would 
welcome an electoral system that would fasten a permap.ent single-party majority upon a European 
Parliament.  Hence,  questions  of  principle  must  be  related  to  the  existing  pattern  of  political 
preferences  within  Community nations  to anticipate possible  outcomes  of a  European election. 
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provision for the role of parties in the working of the assembly. The Parliament provides procedural 
and financial benefits for representatives who combine to gain recognition as  a political group. To 
do this,  at least  14 members  must join together.  The provision thus  militates  against  small one-
nation or one-member  European  (sic)  parties. 
Four political tendencies have found it relatively easy to form groups within a European Parliament, 
because  they  had  pre-existing  trans-national  ties:  Socialists,  Christian  Democrats,  Liberals  and 
Communists. The Socialists are the only party with electoral strength in every country of the Com-
munity; only the abstention of the British Labour Party prevents the Strasbourg group from having 
proper representation in every country. The Liberals have members from eight of the nine countries, 
and the  Christian  Democrats  from  seven  countries.  Communists  can  expect  representatives  from 
two  countries,  with the potential for  additions from  four  more. 
The parties that have found it most difficult  to identify themselves  with a European tendency are 
those  that  are  neither  Socialist  nor  Christian  in  origin,  or,  like  the  Liberals,  inheritors  of  an 
economic and/or a secular ideology. The problem afflicts large as well as  small parties. The French 
Gaullists  remained  a  uni-national group  until falling  support at the  1973  French  general  election 
forced  their  12  representatives  to link  with  five  Irish  Fianna Fail  deputies  to form  a  bi-national 
European Democratic Union.  The European Conservative group with 18  British members  and two 
Danish members  forms  another bi-national group.  The relatively  small  size  of the European Par-
liament and the filtering of selection by national Parliaments results in a small number of non-aligned 
representatives  in  the present Strasbourg Parliament.  Enlarging the  membership  of  Parliament  by 
introducing popular elections  could conceivably encourage the proliferation of  parties  beyond the 
six  major tendencies  listed  above. 
Politically, the most important point about the existing pattern of representation in the European 
Parliament  is  that  no  party  group  dominates  the  assembly.  (Table  1.)  The  largest  bloc,  the 
Socialists,  have less  than one-third of the seats in the Strasbourg Parliament. If  the seats  credited 
to European Socialists but not taken up by the British Labour Party are subtracted, then their numbers 
go  down to one-quarter, the  same  as  that of the  Christian Democratic group. 
A  second  important  feature  is  that  there  is  no  simple  left/right  dichotomy  of  tendencies.  The 
'left' appears  more  cohesive,  because  it has only two groups, the Socialists  and Communists. But 
the two groups cannot be  joined  together,  analytically  or  institutionally,  because such a  front is 
anathema to most members  of  the Socialist  International. The potential claimants  for  the 'centre' 
ground are several  and by  no means  in  agreement  about the relationship  of their political views. 
The heterogeneity  of  views  is  further  emphasized  by the fact that the Liberals  also  differ  greatly 
from country to country  (see  Me Callum Scott, 1967)  and two tendencies - the Conservatives and 
the Progressive Democrats - are marriages of convenience, created by determining the minimum size 
of  recognized  groups;  they  are  not the  expression  of  established  historical  and  ideological  ties 
The principal  features  of  the  existing  pattern  of  political  representation  at Strasbourg  are  well 
known within  the  Community.  (See  Forsyth, 1969.)  The prospect of  a  directly elected  Parliament 
is  thus best considered in terms of the question: to what extent would direct elections be likely to 
change  the political  balance  of power in  the Strasbourg Parliament?  One reason  why  this  might 
occur is  that a  directly elected Parliament would not be  subject to any bias that might be found 
within national Parliaments. A second reason is that different formulae for allocating representatives 
to  nations  might,  incidentally,  alter  the  aggregate  strength  of  party groups  within the  European 
Parliament. 
The result of an election  depends  upon the range  of parties put before the electorate,  as  well  as 
upon  the  preference  of  individual  electors.  It is  doubtful  that elections  to European  Parliament 
would be contested  by  parties very  different from those found within Europe today.  The existing 
party alternatives  within  European nations  are  for  the  most  part well  institutionalized,  reflecting 
social  differences  rooted in history.  (See  Lipset  &  Rokkan,  1967.)  Any  political tides  that would 
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major (and possibly destructive)  effects  upon relations between member nations of the Community. 
Any expectation that the future development of the Community in a supra-national direction requires 
supra-national parties may be stating a condition that could be an obstacle to a stronger Community. 
Even if such parties were to form,  decades  would be required to make a transition to new trans-
European political  alignments.  Any  projection  of  the outcome  of  direct  elections  to  a  European 
Parliament must start with parties  as  currently established within the nations of the Community. 
Ironically, as long as candidates for the European Parliament are nationals of the country they seek 
to represent and contest an election in the name of a national party, then popular choice of members 
of a directly elected European Parliament could not be determined solely on nationality lines. Given 
two, four  or six  candidates of the same  nationality as  himself,  a  voter would have to find  some 
criterion other than nationality to use in making his choice. Insofar as there is a consensus favouring 
membership  of  the  Community  within  the  nation,  then  voting  would  not  be  on  pro  or  anti-
Community lines.  Britain is  today unusual in that a European election could, to some  extent, be 
between pro and anti-Market  parties.  But even in Britain,  the Labour Party today is  not against 
the  Community  in  principle,  but  rather  in  favour  of  changing  its  policies  .  as  a  condition  of 
maintaining membership.  ' 
If several  countries  had anti-Community parties contesting elections  to the Strasbourg Parliament 
the final  outcome would not be a national front against the Community, but rather the formation 
of a new  cross-national front,  constituting an alliance  of 'anti-integrationist' parties in a European 
Parliament. Their integrationist opponents would similarly constitute a group or groups there. 
The most likely outcome of a European election is that similar issues would be raised in each country, 
and  similar  divisions  would appear.  There would be  no  need  for  the elaborate mechanism  of a 
poly-lingual political party to ensure that wages and prices would be discussed. Within each country 
proponents  of  growth would line  up  on one side,  and  defenders  of  stable  currencies  would line 
up  on another.  Distinctions  between  inflationists  and deflationists  transcend  national boundaries. 
Similarly,  questions  concerning  agricultural  supports  or regional  policies  are  capable  of  dividing 
people within a nation, as well as linking partners to disagreement with counterparts in other nations. 
The national proportions on each side of an issue would probably vary more than the issues themselves. 
In such circumstances, the most likely outcome of a European election is  that electors would vote 
for  candidates endorsed by the  party  which they  normally  support.  (Rose,  Richard,  1974.)  This 
general  tendency  would not  necessarily  exclude  independents  or  prohibit  any  'over'  or  'under' 
representation  of  Strasbourg  parties  by  comparison  with  their  strength  in  national  Parliaments. 
But any projection of party strength in the European Parliament must start from the existing electoral 
strength of  different  types  of  parties  in Europe today. 
The projection of election results  on a  European basis  requires  several  steps.  First,  the total vote 
for  each  party must be  ascertained  at the most recent national election in each  member country. 
This task is  relatively easy to accomplish.  (All  electoral data cited herein are derived from Mackie 
&  Rose,  1974,  or supplied by  official  reports from countries holding elections  in 1973.)  Secondly, 
the votes  won by  each party must be  converted into seats  in the European Parliament, according 
to formulae specified for assigning seats to nations, as  well as votes to seats. Thirdly, the seats wor 
by each party within a nation must be assigned to a specific party group to determine the aggregate 
pattern of  party strength in  a  directly  elected European Parliament. 
The formulae  for  apportioning seats  among national groups  are potentially infinite.  Three broac 
alternatives can be identified. The first  is  a European election with the present national allocatior 
of seats at Strasbourg. The second is an electoral system in which national representation at Strasbour~ 
is strictly proportional to national population. A third alternative would be to modify representatior 
strictly in accord with population, to allow smaller nations a disproportionate share of  Strasbour~ 
representatives;  because of the enlargement of the total numbers  in a  directly  elected Parliament 
the element  of  disproportionality would be less  than at present. 
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The  Strength  of Party  Groups  in  the  European  Parliament, 
according  to  different  methods  of selection 
Present  Choice  Direct Election:  Direct  Election  Present  by  National  Nat'! weight  by  Population 
Parliament  (A)  (B) 
No.  per  cent  No.  per  cent  No.  per  cent 
1.  Socialists ...................  64"  32  64  32  162  32 
2.  Communists ................  13  7  24  12  64  13 
3.  Christian  Democrats  •  ••••••  0  52  26  46  23  121  24 
4.  Liberals ....................  24  12  21  11  53  11 
5.  European  Conservatives 
(British,  Danish)  ............  20  10  18  9  51  10 
6.  European  Progressive  Demo-
crats  (Gaullists,  Fianna  Fail)  17  9  15  8  32  6 
7.  Non-attached  members  ......  8  4  10  5  22  4 
198  100  198  100  505  100 
per  per  per 
cent  cent  cent 
Direct  Election: 
Modified 
Nat'! weight 
(C) 
No.  Per  cent 
183  32 
68  12 
141  25 
63  11 
52  9 
35  6 
30  5 
572  100 
per 
cent 
''  Seats  allotted to the British Labour Party but not taken up by its  members have  been  assigned to the European Socialist group. 
A)  Direct  Election  with  present national weighting 
The figures  in Column A show how small is  the aggregate change in political colouring that would 
result from the direct election of a  European Parliament, with seats  allotted among the nations as 
at present,  and  the  total  number  of  seats  remaining  the  same.  Only  the  Communist  tendency 
would gain significantly, with representation up from 7 to 12 per cent of the Parliament. This would 
result firstly from the fact that Europe's strongest Communist party, the French, tends to be under-
represented  in  its  national  assembly.  The  increased  Communist  bloc  (assuming  that  the  French 
Communists  could succeed,  in  European  terms,  in avoiding  the electoral  obstacles  placed  before 
them within France)  would not be large enough to act as  a  pivotal group within the Parliament. 
In  political  terms,  any  Socialist-Communist  alliance  would  be  well  short  of  a  parliamentary 
majority - and almost certainly in reaction create better coordinated actions  by the non-Socialist 
majority. 
B)  Direct  Election  with representation  proportional to  population 
A  system  of  direct  election  proportional to population  as  well  as  party would produce virtually 
the same political balance in an enlarged European Parliament as  would exi'st  in the present Par-
liament, weighted to over-represent smaller nations as  at present. The only noteworthy difference, 
the larger  proportion of  Communists,  would  be  a  product of direct  election  (that is,  of popular 
preferences  reflected  in proportional representation)  and not of the relative reduction of the voice 
of smaller nations.  The distinctive features  of party" systems  are not correlated with differences  in 
national size.  Within the  Community both large  and small nations have multi-party systems  with 
Christian and Socialist parties prominent; predominantly two-party systems  can also  be found in 
large  and  small  countries. 
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A European Parliament formed  strictly proportional to population would hardly disturb  the rela-
tionship of larger nations. Except for a slightly more populous Germany, the big four nations would 
be  almost  equal  in  numbers  of  representatives  (Table  2).  The  chief  changes  in relative  strength 
would arise  among the five  smaller  members  of the  Community. 
Table 2 
Representation  in  the  European  Parliament  by  Nation 
Nation  Today  Proportional 
No.  to Population 
Germany  ·········· ........  36  123 
Italy  ......................  36  108 
United  Kingdom ............  36  108 
France .....................  36  103 
144  442 
Netherlands ................  14  27 
Belgium  ...................  14  19 
Denmark  ..................  10  10 
Ireland  •••• 0  •••••••••••••••  10  6 
Luxembourg  •  0  •••••••••••••  6  1 
54  63 
Totals •••• 0  ••••••••••••  0  •••  198  505 
All would decline in weight in relation to the four larger nations, and change significantly in relation 
to  each  other.  Dutch  representation  would  increase  by  comparison  to  Belgium,  as  well  as  by 
contrast with the  smallest  Member States.  Two countries  - Ireland  and Luxembourg - would 
actually lose representation, even  after allowance was  made for  a Parliament increased two and a 
half times  in size.  If one  assumes  that a  reduction  in numbers  is  politically impossible,  especially 
when  most  nations  are  increasing  seats,  and  that there  is  a  minimum  number  of  representatives 
that a  country  must  have  to maintain  an effective  presence  in supra-national  Parliament  and to 
report back to national government, then there is  a strong case for modifying a strictly proportional 
system  of  allocating  seats. 
There are  several  ways  to ensure that these two difficulties  are  met without creating an unwieldy 
Parliament,  that is,  without increasing  the  numbers  much  above  600.  One formula  might  be to 
double the representation of the smaller five  nations to provide 126  seats  rather than the 63  tnat 
their population would strictly merit.  This would leave  the total number of seats for the smaller 
five  nations less proportionate than the present apportionment formula, and increase the Parliament 
to 568  members.  A second alternative might be to assign each nation an initially equal number of 
deputies, say, 6 or 10 each, and add others in proportion to population at the same rate of one per 
500,000.  (The core group might conceivably be coopted by  national parliaments to provide some 
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members. If one takes the more disproportional of these amendments - the doubling of the seats 
of the  smaller five  nations  (and  exceptionally  allowing  Luxembourg to retain  six  representatives 
in  view  of  its  small  population),  a  directly  elected  Parliament  would  rise  to  572  members,  a 
manageable  size.  Equally  important,  the  balance  of  party  groups  within  the  Parliament  would 
hardly  be  affected,  and  their rank order would remain the  same  (Table  1). 
In  the  abstract,  one  might  postulate  that changes  in  popular  support for  parties  within  nations 
could  lead  to  changes  in  the  balance  of  political  forces  within  the  European  Parliament.  For 
example,  one  might  hypothesize  a  long-term  secular  decline  in  Christian  Democratic  parties, 
counterbalanced by a rise in Socialist strength.  Or an upsurge of votes for  Communistparties, or 
for right wing neo-nationalist parties currently little represented in the Strasbourg Parliament.  But 
such an argument appears relatively unlikely of realization - at least within the foreseeable future. 
One reason for this is that the electoral support for parties within European nations changes relatively 
slowly through time. More than half the parties in the nine Community nations saw their vote change 
by  less  than one-quarter of one per cent per annum in almost a  quarter century since  1945.  (See 
Rose  &  Urwin,  1970,  pp. 314-319.)  The second is  that changes  in support for single  parties  may 
often cancel out in a nine-nation context. For example, the decline in votes for the French Socialists 
has  been  counterbalanced  by  the  rise of the  German  SPD.  The relative  volatility  in  support for 
Belgium parties is offset by the relative stability of parties in Britain. For any change in party strength 
to affect a universe as large as  the present Community, it would have to be felt with equal intensity 
- notwithstanding  the  major  differences  in  existing pational party systems. 
The  most  striking  feature  of  these  projections  is  that, .  whatever  alterations  one  makes  in  the 
allocation  of  representatives  to  nations,  the  aggregate  results  are  virtually  the  same:  no  party 
group  approaches  majority status.  Each  method  of election allots  almost the same proportion of 
representatives to each group - and each is very nearly identical to the allocation of representatives 
within  the  present nominated  Parliament.  (Mutatis  mutandis,  forcing  a  first-past-the-post  simple 
plurality  electoral  system  upon  every  Community  nation  might  well  result  in  the  same  broad 
outcome.) 
'  '  '  :  ·.  '  . 
It is equally noteworthy that small (and often extremist) parties would have little voice in a directly 
elected  European Parliament. Electoral strength sufficient to garner a  few  seats  in  a  national Par-
liament would often be insufficient to cross  the threshold required for representation in the larger 
electorate  of  the  European  Parliament.  Small  national  parties  securing  seats  in  a  directly  elected 
European Parliament would be  under strong pressure to identify with  an established party group, 
rather  than  maintain  an  independent  alignment,  to  enjoy  the  advantages  of  augmented  numbers 
in claiming procedural  and other privileges. 
The likely distribution of seats  would allow three different  coalition possibilities: 
i)  The  simplest  coalition,  in  terms  of  the  number  of  groups  to  be  considered,  would  be  a 
combination of Socialists and Christian Democrats. This would include representatives of every 
member nation, and both major German parties. It is  a familiar  alliance,  in which each party 
tends  to act  as  a  moderating influence  upon the  ofter. 
ii)  A  Christian  Democratic-Moderate  Right  coalition  is  the  other  major  alternative.  This  would 
require  the  coalesce  of  four  different  tendencies  within  the  existing  Parliament:  Christian 
Democrats, Liberals, British Conservatives and Gaullists. A coalition embracing up to 18 parties, 
including  those  as  various  as  the  Bavarian  CSU,  the  British  Liberals,  the  Gaullists,  and  the 
Irish Fine Gael party would be  an extremely heterogeneous collection of politicans, difficult to 
be  disciplined for  long periods of time. 
iii)  Excluding  a  politically improbable coalition  such  as  Socialists,  Communists  and Liberals,  the 
third alternative is  that no coalition of parties could dominate the Parliament on an annual or 
longer-term  basis,  by  commanding a  reliable  majority of  votes. 
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to those Europeans wishing to create an assembly  that could predictably and consistently endorse 
a clear and strong policy. This outcome would be found reassuring by those Europeans who prefer 
assembly rule, or are distrustful of placing substantial authority in an executive body endorsed by 
a  majority  of  their  compatriots,  and  would  be  even  more  distrustful  of  a  body  dominated  by 
fellow  Europeans perceived  as  foreigners. 
If European elections are to be successful, then they must reflect, rather than grossly distort, existing 
realities. If there is  a  multiplicity of  parties within European nations, the same must be  found in 
Strasbourg. If there is no dominant party - or dominant ideology around which a pan-European 
party may  be formed - then no tendency should approach a majority in a European Parliament. 
The two possible majority coalitions identified above- a Socialist-Christian or a Christian-Moderate 
Right bloc - would be weak rather than strong majority groups, divided by ideology on important 
issues, as  well as  by contrasting national perceptions. To seek to use electoral institutions to manu-
facture  a  majority  in  a  supra-national Parliament would  mobilize  opposition to the  development 
of European institutions, and invite those frustrated by  a sense of impotence or the denial of fair 
treatment to return to their national political  arena  to raise  there  an anti-European  cry. 
In turn,  the parties in the European Parliament will reflect  the circumstances  of the other major 
institutions  of  the  European  Community,  the  Commission  and  the  Council  of  Ministers.  The 
weaker the Parliament is  in relation to other parts of the Community, then the less incentive there 
is  for  prominent  national  politicians  to  seek  election  to  the  European  Parliament  or  for  any 
European  nationals to attempt to create cross-national  party ties,  whether  in  election  campaigns 
or in voting  blocs  in Parliament.  The influence  is,  however,  reciprocal.  The  stronger  the  repre-
sentative  institutions  of the Parliament,  and the  better  able  Strasbourg  MPs  to demonstrate  that 
they  speak  with  the  authority  of  elected  representatives,  the  greater  the  potential  accretion  of 
authority to the collectivity of the Community. 
Whatever its powers and whatever the ability of parties  and politicians to aggregate interests, the 
institution of direct elections to the European Parliament is  unlikely to be greatly inconsistent with 
developments  elsewhere  in the  Community  and  within  Member  States,  for  the  same  influences 
albeit  in different  weights,  play  upon the  whole  panoply of European institutions. 
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235 THE  ROLE  OF  THE  PARLIAMENTARY  INSTITUTION 
IN EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
Paper  by  Professor  Georges  VEDEL,  University  of Paris 
1)  It must be conceded that the authors of the Treaties of Rome and Paris have not, at least in the 
short-term,  granted  the  parliamentary  institution  an  important  position  among  the  Community 
instruments  and the factors  involved  in European  integration. 
The Assembly- which the Treaties  carefully  refrain  from  calling 'the Parliament' -has no real 
decision-making powers; even its consultative function is  fairly unobtrusive. The motion of censure 
it  can  pass  against  the High  Authority  or the  Commission  relates  to  an  eventuality  which  was 
considered unlikely when the Treaties were drawn up.  The deferment to a later date of  elections 
to the European Parliament by universal suffrage, and the method by which its members are appointed 
from the national Parliaments, are further proof of the apparently secondary role reserved for the 
parliamentary institution.  · 
2)  If we  determine  the  reasons  for. this  attitude,  its.  predse implications  will  become  clear. 
None of  the governments  in question was  motivated  by  anti-parliamentary feeling  nor was there 
excessive opposition to parliamentary government in the countries concerned. European integration 
did not present serious  problems for  the various  governments in regard to  their respective  Parlia-
ments. In France, the example of the collapse of the EDC had led the government to adopt the wise 
course  of  keeping  Parliament  informed  of  the  progress  of  the  Common  Market  and  Euratom 
negotiations in  Brussels  and seeking Parliament's consent at each major stage in the negotiations. 
There are three real reasons for the secondary position granted to the Assembly in the 1957 Treaties: 
The first is the suspicion evinced by the authors of the Treaties, not of European integration in itself, 
but of over-obvious external manifestations of integration - the use of terms indicative of supra-
nationality,  intrusive  institutions  which,  particularly  in  France,  would  have  provoked  violent 
counter-attacks  in  support  of  national  independence.  If the  Assembly  had  been  given  too  much 
power the resulting  degree  of  integration would no doubt have  been  greater than was  politically 
acceptable at the time. Furthermore, to the extent that the election of the European Parliament by 
universal  suffrage  was envisaged,  members  of national Parliaments would have  been faced  with a 
number of  social and professional problems  (a  reduction in the prestige of national parliamentary 
office,  difficulties  of  choosing  between national and Community  politics)  which would have  been 
more of  a hindrance than a help to European integration. In short - and this is  the first reason -
a  European Parliament elected  by  universal  suffrage  and endowed  with real  powers  would have 
been  inappropriate to the political situation in 1956-1957. 
The second reason is  that the gradual establishment of the two Communities and in particular the 
Common Market was to require considerable economic and technical efforts; at this stage immediate 
and  sustained  action  was  necessary  on the part of  the  Commissions  and their  departments,  the 
governments,  national civil  services  and experts  of  all kinds.  The intervention of  a parliamentary 
institution in which there might be protracted debates and delays in reaching decisions could represent 
an undesirable  hindrance.  While,  in the  opinion of  the authors  of  the Treaty, the parliamentary 
institution was to benefit from European integration, European integration was  not in  a position 
to benefit  immediately from  the parliamentary institution. 
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of the Communities, the progress of the integration to be  achieved not only in the economic but 
also in the political field  would depend on Parliament's position in the Community structure being 
strengthened.  Election by universal suffrage,  as  provided for  in the Treaties, would be  introduced 
within  a  short time  and it was  clear that this  type  of  election  would require  an increase  in  the 
Assembly's  power and influence  (although the Treaties  make  no  provision for  this). 
3)  By comparison with these initial expectations, some of the resu Its, as always, have been unforeseen. 
In a sense,  although the European Atomic Energy  Community has not played the role assigned to 
it to the full,  the Economic  Community  has  been  ahead  of  schedule  in  its  development.  In the 
economic field  it has undoubtedly been successful; it has contributed to prosperity and progress in 
the  Member  States  and even  outside  the  Community.  The founder  States  have  never  renounced 
the hope of achieving political union- although the terms in which they envisage this vary greatly. 
However, in these fifteen successful years the European Parliament has seen no fundamental changes 
either in the way its members are appointed or in its powers. No doubt, in the budgetary field,  the 
fact that the Community will cease  to depend on finance  from national budgets  has finally  led  to 
Parliament  being  given  real  but  restricted  decision-making  powers.  But,  apart  from  this,  the 
members of the European Parliament are still recruited from the national Parliaments; parliamentary 
procedures have been evolved (notably questions)  but have had little impact on Community opinion 
and decisions; the Council and the Commission regard Parliament as  a respected partner but they 
do not always listen to its views.  All these factors have already been pointed out by other experts; 
to discuss  them in detail would  be  outside the scope of this  report. 
The most  obvious  indications  of  the  European  Parliament's  subordinate  role  must,  however,  be 
mentioned. If it is  acknowledged that politics  are  a  by-product of personal ambition - as  seems 
obvious - it is  disturbing that the European Parliament has little attraction for the ambitious. In 
the Six,  and now the Nine, political careers are forged in the national Parliaments  and not in the 
European Parliament. 
4)  After these preliminary remarks, it is  time to pass on to the real subject of this report. Under-
standing of the subject  calls  for  a  high  degree  of  subjectivity  or perhaps  flexibility. 
It seems that, in view of the extensive work done in the Community organizations and the Parliament 
itself  on problems such  as  election  by  universal suffrage,  increase of powers etc.,  the most useful 
approach in this  report would be to take as  a fairly simple basis  a few  fundamental points which 
are rarely specifically questioned but are not unconnected with the sort of inertia which often hampers 
progress  in  the European Parliament. 
Somewhat arbitrarily,  it must  be  admitted,  we  have  chosen the three following  questions: 
- Would  the  development  of  the  parliamentary  institution  in  the  Community  in  fact  promote 
European integration? 
- To what extent or in what way would the Community system have to be changed for the par-
liamentary institution to play a  major  role? 
- How could the European parliamentary institution be integrated with the national parliamentary 
institutions? 
I- THE PARLIAMENTARY  INSTITUTION AND  INTEGRATION 
5)  The view is often expressed - and to some extent accepted automatically - that the development 
of  the  Community's  parliamentary  institution,  in  terms  of  election  by  universal  suffrage  and 
increased  powers,  would  necessarily  promote European  integration. 
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- By definition, a Community Parliament in which the votes are not determined by the nationality 
of  the  delegates  is  an  integrated  institution:  - more  integrated  than  the  Council,  which  is 
composed of ministers who act as  much in the· interests of their governments  as  on the Com-
munity's  behalf:  __:_  more integrated than the  Commission,  which  may  be  essentially  a  supra-
national power, but does not derive its power through directly democratic channels. Figuratively 
speaking, a Community Parliament invested with powers of decision would  express  the 'general 
Community will',  a  transposition of  the  national 'general will'. 
- Any  political  body  tends  to  exercise  powers  as  wide-ranging  and  intensive  as  possible;  the 
European Parliament is  no exception. If invested with real powers of decision, it would exercise 
them  to  the  full  and  extend  them.  Any  gain  in  parliamentary  power  would  be  a  gain  for 
European integration. 
- European  integration  suffers  from  one  serious  socio-psychological  handicap,  namely  that  all 
political terminology  has  a national bias.  Ideologies· in particular have  retained many national 
connotations. Political careers, as  mentioned earlier,  are made in national politics.  Community 
political terminology is  confined to limited circles centred around the Commission  (for example 
industrial executives  or civil  servants in contact with the Community apparatus).  The national 
political  parties have  already been reorganized into political groups  within the European Par-
liament,  although  this  process  is  still  incomplete.  An  increase  in  the  European  Parliament's 
powers would give it much greater significance.  Election by  universal suffrage  might even  lead 
to the formation  of  European parties  presented  as  such  to the electorate. 
- Finally, there are sectors of opinion to which the democratic legitimacy of the Community and 
of its structures and machinery seems  inadequate. The transfer of national powers to the Com-
munity, generally regarded  as  a limitation of State sovereignty,  also  constitutes the transfer of 
powers  belonging  to  the  national  Parliaments  or  under  their  control  to  organizations  (the 
Council,  the  Commission)  whose  democratic  legitimacy  is  very  indirect.  The development  of 
the European parliamentary institution would facilitate  the transfer of national powers to the 
Community and remove  the above  objection. 
6)  On the  basis  of  this  argument,  it  may. be  concluded  that in  general  any  progress  towards 
European integration is  dependent  on the European Parliament's  status  being  improved.  It is  at 
this point that difficulties arise since, as  often happens with institutions, it is  difficult to distinguish 
cause  and effect in the correlation thus established. This is  the root of the problems referred to in 
so  many  studies, projects  and reports,  and the proposed solutions  differ: 
- Must  further  progress  be  awaited  in  European integration  and  in  particular  in  the  political 
sector before the European Parliament's status can be improved?  Or, on the contrary,  should 
this  be  regarded  as  a  priority measure  which  will  lead to further  integration? 
- In regard to the relationship between election by  universal suffrage and the increase of Parlia-
ment's powers there are three possible attitudes  (which are in fact upheld in various quarters): 
- election by  universal suffrage must precede increased powers since its impact will be so great 
that the increase  will  follow  automatically; 
- increased powers must precede election by universal suffrage, since it is  impossible to disrupt 
or involve  150  million voters  in  the election  of a  body which  is  only  a  Parliament in  the 
academic  sense; 
- it is  not necessary to draw up a timetable setting out the operations in chronological order; 
each  one is  urgent and necessary;  whichever  is  most  appropriate in  the  political situation 
must  be  implemented  first,  and the  other  will  automatically follow; 
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- as  mentioned below, it is being asked in some quarters whether election by universal suffrage 
is desirable,  at least for  the time  being,  since  it is  likely to create rivalry  between the  Par.-
liament of the Community and the  national parliamentary institutions. - Moving  on  to  another  subject,  is  it  possible  for  the  European  Parliament's  powers  to  be 
increased in accordance with the system traditionally adopted for national Parliaments: greater 
legislative  power,  political  control  of  government  and  administrative  bodies?  if  the  particular 
characteristics  of  Community constitutional law are  to be  taken into account,  should not the 
European parliamentary function  be  defined  as  a  special  case  rather than in accordance  with 
the traditional  rules  for  national States  and in  particular  without any  reference  to legislative 
or executive  power? 
7)  However,  before  discussing  these  points,  it  might  be  asked  whether  the  generally  accepted 
correlation between the development of the parliamentary institution and the progress of European 
integration is  not open to doubt or at least to certain nuances  of interpretation. 
The following is clearly not an attempt to deny that the development of the parliamentary institution 
in a political system with no elected bodies and few  procedures for public discussion and majority 
decision is  equivalent to democratic progress.  The question is  whether it is  equivalent to progress 
towards  integration. 
The lessons of past experience are ambiguous. Democracy in itself is  a 'form' or system of procedures. 
It is  not determined by results,  although the basis of democratic opinion is the assumption (usually 
correct) that, over a sufficiently long period and with a sufficient amount of experimentation, a demo-
cratic system of procedures will produce more satisfactory results  for the individual and the com-
munity  than  any  other  system  (to  paraphrase Sir  Winston  Churchill's  famous  formula).  · 
Thus,  depending  on the  circumstances,  greater  democratic  legitimacy  in  a  political  system  leads 
either to integration or disintegration. To take a very simple example, the almost immediate effect 
of  the  democratization  of  relations  between  metropolitan  France  and  the  overseas  departments 
brought about by  the 1958  Constitution was not further integration but the disintegration  of the 
unit thus democratized. In other cases, democratization has been a unifying factor and this explains 
the importance of universal suffrage in integration, even when it is  strictly limited. Many developing 
countries, even those with a one-party system, have regarded this as one of the ways in which national 
unity  can  be  moulded,  cutting across  ethnic,  religious  and even  tribal barriers. 
The question which must be discussed more fully - and which cannot be answered by slogans -
is  whether the  development  of  the parliamentary institution,  which  undeniably  constitutes  a  step 
forward for  democracy,  would also  be  a  step  forward towards integration. 
8)  Without embarking  on a  historical  study  of  the integration  process,  one  is  inevitably  struck 
by the fact that executive  bodies  (and to a  lesser  extent the judiciary, as  American experience has 
shown) have played a major part in this process. It is true that experience of parliamentary institutions 
spans a shorter period than experience of monarchs and chiefs, which goes back thousands of years. 
Speaking frankly,  and without lengthy explanations, we  are  of the opinion that the creation of  a 
democratic European presidency would have  a far  more decisive  effect  on the integration process 
than any  major progress  for  the Parliament. 
Let  us  try to imagine what the first  'European' election  campaign  would  be  like,  at  least  in the 
initial  phase.  It seems  clear that foundations for European political parties  (except perhaps for  a 
Communist party, which would not be in favour of integration) do not yet exist. No doubt parallel 
political  organizations  (socialists,  liberals,  christian-democrats,  etc.)  in  various  countries  would 
exchange fine-sounding  phrases  but the motivation for the campaigning and voting would not be 
very  different from the national elections - partly ideology,  partly class  and group interests  and 
partly local  interests. 
The  importance  of  executives  in  national  political  systems  has  also  accustomed  the  voters  to 
overestimating the initiative and veto function of the Parliament in the face of the integrated govern-
mental decision-making system.  This way of thinking would still  be  encountered if  the European 
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many European delegates would be given a mandate by the electorate to defend national interests 
in the face  of  Community integration.  To take just one  example,  agricultural policy would be  a 
major consideration in such  mandates. 
It is  difficult to weigh up these opposing factors. Members of Parliament elected in various countries 
to defend free  enterprise or planning in Europe contribute towards integration because they bring 
their political struggles  to the  Community arena.  Would members  elected  to defend the interests 
of French wine-growers, British housewives  or the Italian Mezzogiorno be  a factor in integration? 
With a powerful Community government our reply might be affirmative; they would act as a Com-
munity tribune. But it should not be forgotten that, in the present instance, the lack of integration 
in the Community's government machinery would have to be mitigated by the parliamentary institution. 
What is  needed is  not a tribune function but a  decision-making function  and, as  we  shall see  the 
majority  vote,  on important  questions,  is  a  legal  solution,  but  may  lead  to  a  political  impasse. 
9)  We referred briefly above to the socio-psychological integration factors that would be involved 
in  the functioning  of  a  European Parliament invested  with real  powers  and elected  by  universal 
suffrage:  the pursuit of  maximum power, possibilities for the reorganization of political forces  on 
the basis of trans- or supra-national criteria; the formation of a European political 'corporation', etc. 
In a sense, however,  such an organization is likely to be less  stable in the event of a crisis than an 
intergovernmental  body like  the  Council  or a  non-elected  body  such  as  the  Commission. 
Firstly  the  development  towards  greater  democratic  legitimation,  increased  powers  and  prestige 
for Parliament is  likely to throw the balance of national representation in the European Parliament 
into question  once  again.  This  balance elicits  no  criticism when Parliament has  very  little say  in 
Community decisions. Would it be accepted without argument when it was a question of appointing 
a real Parliament? The opponents of integration would have a useful piece of election propaganda 
in the most densely-populated countries if they pointed out to their fellow-citizens  that their votes 
were worth less than those of the electorate in the less populated states. And if we consider the example 
of the second federal  Chambers  whose purpose is  to represent the Member States  we  are  bound 
to regard  the  Parliament  as  constituted  at present as  only half  a  Parliament. 
In any case,  let us  suppose that this  problem has  been solved,  and consider the possibility of the 
Parliament having to deal  with  a  serious  crisis  such  as  the  Community has  already  experienced: 
the agricultural question, the problem of the underdeveloped regions, a monetary crisis. The Council 
may or may not reach a solution. Certainly this can be regarded as a crucial situation. But diplomacy 
between friendly governments where there is  no risk of military conflict makes a rift unlikely or at 
least so far removed from actual conflict that nothing irreparable occurs. On the contrary, there is  a 
risk that the development of a major conflict within the Parliament will be  much more difficult to 
curb. It may happen that in a particular issue all the delegates of one of the Member States will be 
isolated from the others, and this is  likely to give  rise to personal and national resentment.  If  the 
matter is  of great importance, a  majority vote  against one isolated country may lead to rejection, 
which is much harder to check in an Assembly sensitive to the forma1ities of public speaking, mobilizing 
public  opinion in public  debates,  etc. 
In short, the usefulness of the European parliamentary institution in promoting integration depends 
to a large extent on its ability to compromise. If it can do this successfully, the bargaining will lead 
to integration despite its irrationality. If, on the other hand, the majority decision becomes the only 
means of settling major problems, integration will still be promoted, but is liable not to be accepted. 
10)  All  things  considered,  in  a  situation  more  favourable  to  European  integration,  one  might 
perhaps  question the value  of  the parliament's  playing  a  major role in promoting integration.  It 
would be wiser to develop the supra-national aspects of the other organs progressively side by side, 
and to increase Parliament's powers gradually. In other words, a priori, the development of the par-
liamentary institution appears to us to be a factor in integration, but not the most important factor. 
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blocked. For reasons which there is no need to discuss in detail, the Council is not prepared to allow 
the  Commission to take more wide-ranging  action than in  the past few  years.  Furthermore,  the 
Council is  more than ever  determined to behave like  an intergovernmental  body.  The differences 
in national policies within the Community in regard to monetary questions and international rela-
tions are also well known.  There is  even a danger of secession from the Community. 
When all the paths so far explored are blocked, one is  compelled to try new, hitherto unexplored 
ways.  As  a last resort, the Parliament of the Community could be strengthened. Of course this pre-
supposes agreement between governments, and it is debatable whether this agreement can be reached. 
The threats to European integration and their economic repercussions  can however be  considered 
grave  enough  for  the  national  governments  to  realize  the  incalculable  effects  that  the  sudden 
disappearance or decline  of the Community would have,  and for them to show a sense of respon-
sibility  and, for  example,  agree to election  by universal  suffrage  as  promised in the Treaties. 
In any case, if it is  possible for the status of the parliamentary institution to be improved, we must 
now consider how. 
II- PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTION AND  COMMUNITY SYSTEM 
11)  It is  often remarked that the power structure in the Community differs  greatly from that in 
the  Member States.  Even  allowing for  the fact  that  the  traditional  definition  of  'powers',  more 
or less valid in the practical sense, is  belied in many modern democracies from the structural point 
of  view,  the Community system  still  shows  marked differences. 
The Community makes  no distinction between legislative  and executive,  either in a  practical or a 
structural  sense.  In practical terms  the  distinction  between  regulations,  decisions,  directives,  etc., 
bears  no  relation  to  the  distinction  between  legislation  and  administration.  The  division  of 
responsibilities  between  Council  and  Commission  is  not  an  organic  distinction  between  basic 
legislative  power and implementing  or regulatory  power.  The  Commission's  powers  of  initiative, 
the  sanctions  attached to the  Council's  compliance  or non-compliance  with its  proposals  do  not 
resemble the organization of any contemporary state. There is no need to reiterate that Parliament's 
position in this structure, as  a consultative body recently granted budgetary powers, is  reminiscent 
of certain obsolete political structures. Only the legal institution, namely the Court of Justice, could 
justly  be  compared with the national legal  institutions  (at  least of the continental type). 
12)  Thus, there are a number of ways to ensure that Parliament plays  a more important part in 
this  unique  decision-making  system;  their  general  outlines  and the  philosophy  behind  them  are 
described  below.  It should,  however,  be  noted that they can  be  amalgamated to a limited extent. 
13)  The first  possibility is  an empirical approach, or more accurately, the maximum economy of 
means. This calls for compliance with the fundamental balance of power laid down in the Treaties. 
No doubt it is  scarcely to be  expected that Parliament's role could  be  drastically altered without 
revision  of  the  Treaties.  But  this  revision  could  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  and  translated  into 
practical terms in advance. 
An example of this first possibility is  to be found in the report by the ad hoc working party set up 
by  the  Commission  to study  the  strengthening  of the  European  Parliament's  powers  (report  of 
25  March 1973). 
In essence this would involve  (apart from the extension of unsystematized procedures, such as  the 
arrangements  for  discussion  between  the  Commission  and Parliament,  contacts  between  Council 
and Parliament, etc.)  giving Parliament, in the first  stage, powers of co-decision  (that is  powers of 
veto)  on a number of 'constitutional' questions relating to the Community (revision of the Treaties, 
admission  of  new  members,  Community  treaties,  etc.)  and  more  extensive  consultative  powers 
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interval  of several  years,  the  powers  of  co-decision  would  be  extended to all  fields.  In addition 
(and this would be very important in psychological terms)  Parliament would be required to appoint 
the President of the Commission proposed by the governments and this President would be consulted 
on the constitution of the  Commission  under his  authority. 
Without commenting any further on this document, it is clear that it does not affect the basic tenets 
of the Community decision-making system. The power of decision, which cannot be divided between 
legislative  and executive,  still rests  with the  Commission  and the  Council.  Finally,  assuming  that 
the changes advocated in this report were implemented, the result should be that Parliament could 
veto the decisions  of the Council and the Commission and not impose its own decisions  on them. 
Obviously the 'induced' effects  of this  system  would have  to be taken into  account. 
The possibility of Parliament's blocking the decision-making process may seem somewhat negative 
from the point of view of European integration, but every political theorist knows  that 'preventive 
powers' can  be  used to positive ends.  The way in which means  of  exerting pressure or influence 
are  used is  not determined by their nature.  In particular, Parliament's power of co-decision could 
be instrumental in ensuring that the Council's decisions were more Community-orientated, in that 
any  solutions  that were  not sufficiently  Community-orientated  would  be  rejected. 
In addition, Parliament's budgetary powers,  due to take effect  with the introduction  of  the 'own 
resources'  system,  provide  another  channel for  parliamentary influence. 
Obviously there are  many possible  wa;ys  in which new powers could be  integrated into the  basic 
framework  of  the  Treaties  gradually  a:nd  without  disruption.  This  is .  merely  a  general  outline. 
14)  A  second  possibility is  the rationalization  of the  Community institutions, taking the present 
position as  the skeleton or embryo of a genuinely integrated organization. In this case, the present 
unique organization of these institutions would be phased out. A more traditional structure would 
be  evolved - an organization of federal  States. 
The structure, a familiar one, would be  approximately as  follows:  in the present embryo stage  of 
the Community, power belongs more or less indivisibly, to an embryo government (the Commission) 
and an embryo  Confederal Diet  (the  Council).  According  to the laws  of political evolution these 
primary organs would become increasingly differentiated and the organization would become more 
complex. Government power would be concentrated on the Commission, which would be appointed 
on a more democratic basis and would become a Directing Board rather than a Cabinet. The Council 
would evolve into a Senate representing the Member States, in which the influence of the national 
governments  would be diminished  or even  eliminated  and which would be  one of the organs  of 
Community  legislative  power.  The Parliament - or rather the  Assembly  - appointed  by  direct 
universal suffrage, would be a Chamber made up of representatives of the citizens of the Federation. 
With this system too, there are many possible variations; in particular, the Council could continue 
to be the government organization for certain decisions, and citizens and States could be guaranteed 
parliamentary representation  by  dividing  the Parliament into two sections,  each with appropriate 
methods ·of recruitment. 
But the general  principle  is  as  explained  above;  drastic  changes  in the  decision-making  processes 
provided for  in  the  Treaties  would  be  necessary  for  this  'embryo'  to  become  fully  developed. 
15)  A third possibility would depend on experience of the way in which the Community institutions 
function.  There are two problems  in  regard  to relations  between  the  institutions. 
First of all,  whatever the exact legal  situation  after  the  equivocal 'Luxembourg compromise', the 
rule of unanimity is  applied. in the Council, and this reduces the Community's powers of decision 
to a very large extent. No doubt, whatever the situation, the majority vote would not be insisted 
on when a question was really vital to one of the Member States.  But the fact that this has more 
or less  been stated has meant that a unanimous vote is  considered necessary even when the matter 
is  not crucial. 
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the second problem  .. For instance, if the majority vote system was  used,  a  minister in the Council 
could bow to an opposing decision,  since he  could prove to his  national Parliament that he  had 
defended his  national point of view to the utmost. If, on the other hand, unanimity was required, 
and if  the  decision  was  taken,  he  would  be  considered  to have  betrayed  his  country's  interests, 
since he could have prevented it but failed to do so; and it is for this reason that the decision is 
not taken.  Moreover, the insistence  on unanimity has  the effect  that any question which is  likely 
to lead  to  a  controversial  debate  is  shelved;  this  is  why  many  Commission  proposals,  although 
not formally  rejected,  remain  unanswered. 
The role of the Parliament could therefore be regarded  as  that of  an 'arbitrator' intervening when 
the normal Community machinery is  blocked; it would act like a monarch pronouncing judgment 
directly on the problems that the normal apparatus is  not equipped to deal with,  as  was the case 
in France with certain legal  matters or the role of the 'summit' in Community policy. 
This special decision-making power would be exercised, for example, subject to certain time-limits 
and procedures,  when  the  Commission  and the  Council  were  in  opposition  or when  an  urgent 
problem was  left unsolved  because one or other failed  to take action. 
Clearly this role would exceed the limits of the powers conferred on the Parliament. In fact Parliament 
would exert considerable pressure on the Commission (apart from its power of censure which would 
be revived)  and the Council. With its power to intervene on unsolved questions it would persuade 
the  Commission  and  the  Council  to  reach  a  compromise.  Through  the  Commission,  which  it 
could  if  necessary  censure,  it would in fact  have  the power to guide  Community  policy. 
On the surface it does  not seem  that the revision  of the Treaties which would be necessitated  by 
the introduction of  this  system  ne~d to  be  very  extensive.  However,  it must be  appreciated  that 
this system, more than any other, has a drastic effect on the decision-making procedure laid down 
in  the Treaty.  Although  externally  this  power  of  arbitration  bears  very  little  resemblance  to the 
normal parliamentary institutions and the model supra-national institutions, it is  this power which 
is most parliamentary and most supra-national in character, parliamentary, because the other organ-
izations would appear to be subject to its sovereignty, supra-national, because the real policy- and 
decision-making  power would belong  to a  non-national assembly. 
15)  The  above  list  is  certainly  not  exhaustive.  The possibilities  of  amalgamating  these systems 
would  also  have  to  be  considered,  as  would  the  feasibility  of these  changes in the Community 
decision-making  processes.  This is  only intended to  be  a  general  outline. 
III- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS  AND  NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
16)  There  are  two  aspects  to  relations  between  the European  parliamentary institution  and the 
national parliaments. 
The first  involves questions which are to some extent traditional in European affairs,  and must be 
mentioned here:  . 
- Firstly, in the event of election by  universal suffrage,  should simultaneous elections  be held on 
the basis of a single electoral law? If I may be allowed to express a personal opinion with a brief 
explanation, it might be  said that simultaneous elections  would be  highly desirable to prevent 
the campaign in one or other of the Member States being based on the results in another Member 
State. On the other hand, whether or not it is desirable, a single electoral law would simply not 
be feasible, since it is inconceivable that European countries in which there are so many different 
types  of ballot could arrive  at an agreement,  within a  reasonable time,  on a  uniform system. 
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be combined? Should there be a system of substitutes which would enable leading political figures 
to be represented in the European Parliament without their being forced to neglect their national 
political activities?  These are important questions  requiring careful consideration,  but it seems 
that it would be possible for the two mandates to be combined - if the necessary arrangements 
can  be  made  for  substitutes  - by  a  certain  proportion of  European  members  of Parliament, 
and for  a  certain time. 
17)  The second  aspect  of the  problem  to  be  mentioned  here  is  in fact  the  most  important.  It 
concerns  the conditions under which the major changes  essentia I to the achievement  of European 
integration could be implemented. The words of Jean-Baptiste •II £aut qu'il croisse et que je  diminue' 
('His stature must grow as  mine declines')  could be applied to any national Parliament in  relation 
to the  European Parliament. 
These  changes  can only come  about if  they  are  accepted  more  or less  consciously;  it is  possible 
-although this possibility was not seriously considered before Great Britain's entry into the Com-
munity - that resistance  to integration in the national Parliaments  might  be  even  greater  (if  the 
matter  is  handled too  clumsily)  than resistance  from  the governments. 
Furthermore,  European  integration  and  the  increased  democratic  legitimacy  of  the  Community 
must not be accompanied by a reduction in participation at the lower levels. By definition, European 
members  of  Parliament  will  represent  a  greater  number  of  electors  than  national  members  of 
Parliament and their constituencies will be larger and less homogeneous. The member of Parliament 
may seem too remote from the electorate, and the only links between them would be purely ideological 
or 'sectoral'.  This would not be  in the interests  of democracy. 
18)  To counteract these  difficulties  as  far  as  possible,  it would no  doubt be  desirable, if it were 
decided that national and European parliamentary office  should be kept apart, for this to be done 
in stages with a transitional period to allow the two parliamentary functions to be gradually segregated. 
It would  be  equally  desirable for fairly  official  links  to  be  established  between the two  types  of 
Parliament and members  of Parliament. It has already  been proposed in various quarters that the 
national Parliaments should be consulted on certain points, that joint committees should be set up 
to  deal  with  specific  subjects,  that national  Parliaments  should report  annually  to the European 
Parliament,  and vice  versa;  these  proposals  must be  borne in mind. 
Other suggestions  could be  made,  but the aim of  all proposals should be  to lessen  the resistance 
of the national Parliaments to the development  of a parliamentary institution that they regard  as 
a rival and to ensure that European members of Parliament maintain sufficiently close contact with 
their constituents. 
19)  Basically, the European political situation has simplified the problem dealt with in this report. 
At times it was  questionable whether the development of the European Parliament's status would 
be  the result of integration or the instrument for its  achievement.  In the present circumstances, it 
is  clear that, in so far as  integration can still progress, or at least will not regress, elections to the 
European  Parliament  by  universal  suffrage  and the reinforcement  of  its  role  are essential  stages. 
The strategy  of integration is  a  one  way  process.  But,  like  Napoleon,  we  know that tactics  are 
'the  art  of  getting  things  done'.  This  report can therefore  be  no  more  than an introduction  to 
the discussion. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 
Pierre  AVRIL,  born  18  November  1930  in  Pau  (Pyrenees-Atlantiques),  Doctor  of  Laws  at  the 
University  of  Paris,  graduate  of  the  Institut  d'etudes  politiques  de  Paris.  Editor-in-chief  of  the 
Cahiers  de  la  Republique  until  1962  and of the  Documents  et Informations  parlementaires  until 
1969.  'Agrege' in  public  law  and  political science  (1972),  professor  at the Universities  of Poitiers 
and Paris  X  (Nanterre). 
PUBLICATIONS 
- Le  regime  politique  de  Ia  ve  Republique,  2nd  edit.  1966,  Librairie  Generale  de  droit  et  de 
jurisprudence, 20,  rue  Soufflot,  75005  Paris 
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Dr Gianni BONVICINI 
BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 
- Secretary-General  of  the  Institute  of  International Affairs,  Rome. 
- Publicist. 
PUBLISHED  WORKS 
- 'Towards  a  European  currency',  International  Spectator  collection,  1970  (study  of  the 
proceedings  of the  Turin  Convention,  June  1970); 
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- 'Italy's  Presence  in  the  EEC  during  1971',  International Spectator,  No 1/1973; 
- 'The  role  of the  political  groups  in  the  process  of European  integration';  Italy  and  Europe, 
European Law quarterly,  July-December,  1973; 
- 'European Integration Policy', Italy in International Politics  (1972-1973),  Community publication, 
1973. 
In  preparation 
- 'The Political  Groups  of the  European  Parliament',  ad hoc  research; 
- 'A Programme  for  Europe',  study of the proceedings  of the IAI  of November  1973; 
- 'Report on European  Integration  Policy  in 1973' for  Italy in International Politics  1973-74. 
Professor David COOMBES 
Name: David COOMBES; Age: 33; Nationality: British; Present Post: Professor of European Studies, 
Loughborough  University,  Leics.,  Great  Britain.  Education:  Saltash  County  Grammar  School, 
Cornwall and Brasenose  College,  Oxford; Previous  Posts:  Lecturer in Political  Studies,  University 
of Hull, Lecturer in Politics,  University  of Reading,  Research  associate  of Political and Economic 
Planning.  Extra-Mural  offices  and  activities:  Visiting  lecturer  and  member  of  the  International 
Advisory Board, International Course on European Integration, University of Amsterdam; Visiting 
professor at the College of Europe, Bruges; Part-time Director ·of Research at the European Com-
munity  Institute for  University  Studies,  Brussels;  Member  of  the Study  of  Parliament Group. 
Note: In July 1974 Professor COOMBES is  taking up a  new post as  Director of a  Programme of 
research  undertaken  by  the  Hansard  Society  for  Parliamentary  Government  in  London  on  the 
subject:  'The  future  of  Parliamentary  Institutions  in  Europe'.  The  programme,  which  lasts  for 
three  years,  is  financed  by  the Ford Foundation. 
PUBLICATIONS 
1)  Books 
- The  Member  of Parliament  and  the  Administration:  The  Case  of the  Select  Committee  on 
Nationalised  Industries 
1966,  George  Allen  &  Unwin  Ltd.,  London, 218  pp. 
- Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the EEC 
1970,  George  Allen  &  Unwin Ltd., London, for  Political  and Economic Planning,  336  pp. 
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The Scrutiny of Ministers' Powers by the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, Public Law, 
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(With  Richard  Norton-Taylor)  Renewal  in Belgian  Politics:  The Elections  of  March  1968;  Par-
liamentary  Affairs,  Vol.  XXII,  No 1,  Winter  1968/69,  pp.  62-72. 
The Relations  between  ministers  and the  boards  of  the  nationalised  industries. 
(Memorandum submitted to the House of Commons Select Committee on Nationalised Industries.) 
First Report from  the Select  Committee on Nationalised Industries,  Session  1967-68,  Vol.  III,  pp. 
238-248. 
(With  Prof.  A. H. Hanson and Mr.  S. A.  Walkland.)  Parliamentary Scrutiny  of  Taxation. 
(Memorandum  submitted ·to  the  House  of  Commons  Select  Committee  on  Procedure.)  Second 
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Vol.  VI,  No 3, July/August 1971,  pp.  271-289. 
The  Implications  of  British  Entry  to  the  European  Community  for  the  Party  Groups  in  the 
European  Parliament.  Lo  Spettatore  Internazionale,  Vol.  VII,  No  3-4,  July/December  1972,  pp. 
135-146. 
The Conservative Party and Public Ownership: Some recent developments in British Public Enterprise. 
Rivista  Trimestrale  di  Diritto  Pubblico,  Anno  XXII,  No 2,  1972,  pp.  819-832. 
(With Avi  Shlaim.)  The European Communities: Political Unity  and British Interests, in M. Leifer 
(ed.).  Constraints  and  Adjustments  in  British  Foreign  Policy,  Allen  &  Unwin,  1973. 
Introduction, and (with Prof.  M. Beloff and N. Johnson)  Study of Parliament Group Paper on the 
Consequences for Parliament of British Membership of the European Communities,  in  Westminster 
to Brussels: the significance for Parliament of Accession to the European Community. PEP Broadsheet 
540  January 1973,  28  pp. 
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BIOGRAPHY 
Erik DAMGAARD, born in 1943, obtained his university degree in political science (statskundskab) 
1968.  Since  1969  he  has  been  associate  professor  (lektor)  at  the  Institute  of  Political  Science, 
University of Aarhus, Denmark. In 1971-72 he was visiting fellow  at Yale University.  Currently he 
is  chairman  of  the  Institut  for  Statskundskab  at Aarhus  University.  His  main  fields  of  interest 
include Danish legislative politics and public policy analysis. In the next two years he will be doing 
a  study  on  policy-making  in  Denmark  concentrating  on  the  role  of  the  Folketing  within  the 
framework  of  theories  of  democratic  government and coalition  behavior. 
PUBLICATIONS 
1)  'The  Parliamentary  Basis  of  Danish  Governments:  The  Pattern  of  Coalition  Formation', 
Scandinavian  Political  Studies,  vol.  4,  1969,  pp. 30-57. 
2)  'Party  Distances  in  the  Danish  Folketing  1945-1968",  Scandinavian  Political  Studies,  vol.  6, 
1971,  pp.  87-106. 
3)  'Noter til diskussion  af  politisk output analyse', Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 1972: 1, pp. 107-122. 
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vol.  1,  No 1  (April,  1973,  pp. 35-66). 
5)  'Top  Civil  Servants and Politics in Denmark: The Political Role of  Non-Political  Bureaucrats', 
in Mattei Dogan (ed.),  The Political Role of Top Civil Servants, Sage Publications, Los Angeles, 
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6)  'Stability  and  Change  of  the  Danish Party System  in  half  a  Century',  Scandinavian  Political 
Studies,  vo!.  9,  1974  (forthcoming). 
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attached  to  the  'Europa  Instituut'  of  same  University;  since  1973  Professor  of  International 
Relations  at the University  of Utrecht. 
Research  and teaching  have  been  centred  around  the  philosophy of  science,  the formation  of  a 
general political theory,  and the  theory of political integration. 
PUBLICATIONS 
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- Political integration: the formation of theory and its problems  (diss)  Mouton, Den Haag 1972; 
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The  politics  of  the  East  European  Communist  States,  1966  (French  and  German  translations). 
Opposition,  with I. de  Madariaga,  1968  (German  translations). 
The new politics of  European integration  (Ed.),  1970. 
Between  Sovereignty  and Integration  (Ed.),  1974. 
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The Political  Thought of Saint-Simon. 
The political crisis  in Britain and in the EEC. 
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BIOGRAPHY 
Age  42.  Professor  of Public  Administration  at the Graduate School  of Management,  Delft,  1974. 
Has been Secretary to the Labour Party in the Lower House of Dutch Parliament, and also lecturer 
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PUBLICATIONS 
Publications on decision-making, relations between officials and politicians, and the role of bureau-
cracy  in the  Dutch political system. 
Is  working on a  book on the role and function of Parliament in the Dutch political system. 
Mr Jules  GERARD-LIBOIS 
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Avenue  du Houx 28,  1170-Bruxelles  - Belgian  nationality. 
Doctor of Laws at the University of Liege - Studies in Germanic philology at the University of Liege. 
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of the Directorate for Information Media at the Directorate-General for Press  and Information of 
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President  of  the  Centre d'Etude et de  Documentation africaine  (CEDAF),  Brussels. 
Director and member of the Bureau of the Institut beige de Science Politique (IBSP). 
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University Press); 
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3)  MA in  History,  Princeton  University  1953. 
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Minutes  of Evidence  7  Feb.  1967,  pp. 3-33. 
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1)  'The Role  of the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  Before  1914',  (English  Historical  Review, 
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2)  'Electoral trends and the tendency to a one-party system in Nigeria', (Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies,  vol.  I,  No 3, November  1962). 
3)  'Federalism  in  Nigeria',  (Political  Studies,  vol.  X,  October  1962). 
4)  'The Nigerian Federal Parliament',  (Public  Law, Autumn 1963). 
5)  'Politics  in  Nigeria:  The  Action  Group  Crisis  of  1962',  (Political  Studies,  vol.  II,  No  3, 
November  1964). 
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Law, Spring  1964). 
7)  'Nigeria's  External  Relations',  (journal  of  Commonwealth  Political  Studies,  vol.  II,  No  6, 
November  1964). 
8)  'Regional Administration: Has it Worked in Scotland?'  (Public  Administration, Autumn  1964). 
9)  'Scottish  Nationalism',  (The  Political  Quarterly,  vol.  38,  No 4,  1967). 
10)  'The Prime Minister and the Cabinet',  (Parliamentary  Affairs,  vol.  21,  No  1,  Winter 1967/68). 
11)  'What is  Wrong  with  British  Parliamentary  Democracy?'  (Westminster  Bank  Review,  May 
1968). 
12)  'Britain in Europe:  Historical  Perspective  and  Contemporary  Reality',  (International  Affairs, 
vol.  45,  No 2,  April 1969). 
13)  'The Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland 1966 to 1969', (Public Administration, 
Spring  1970). 
14)  '40 Years  On?',  (The  Political Quarterly,  vol.  41,  No I,  March  1970). 
15)  'The Problems  of Agricultural  Politics',  (journal  of  Agricultural  Economics,  vol.  21,  No  1, 
January 1970). 
16)  'The Influence  of  the Backbencher,  Now and  a  Hundred  Years  Ago',  (Manchester  Statistical 
Society,  March 1970). 
17)  'Specialist Committees  in  the House  of  Commons: Have They Failed?', (Edinburgh  University 
Occasional Papers,  No 1,  April  1970). 
18)  'Political  Pressures  on  Agriculture',  (Proceedings  of  the  25th  Oxford  Farming  Conference, 
January 1971). 
19)  'The House of Commons and Taxation', (Political  Quarterly, March 1971). This was  reprinted 
as  a chapter in a Pelican  Original,  Taxation Policy,  edited by Robson and Crick in  1973. 
20)  'The  Report  of  the  Review  Body  on Northern Ireland,  1970:  The Macrory Report',  (Public 
Administration,  April  1971). 
21)  'The Problems  of the  Labour Party',  (Political  Quarterly,  vol.  43,  No 1, March 1972). 
22)  Gemeinsame  Europaische  Aussenpolitik,  (Europa  Archiv,  June  1972). 
23)  'Socialism or Social Democracy? The  Choice  for  th.e  Labour  Party',  (The Political Quarterly, 
vol.  43,  No 4,  October-December  1972). 
24)  'A British View of the  Institutions  of  the  Common  Market', (The Round Table, Spring 1973). 
25)  'The Kilbrandon  Report',  (Political  Quarterly,  vol.  45,  No 1,  January 1974). 
26)  'Agricultural Politics  and European Integration', (to appear in The Economic Journal in 1974). 
Press  articles 
1)  1968  to  1970:  political  columnist  with  The  Times.  Since  1973:  monthly  columnist  with  The 
Scotsman  and British  journal of Hospital  Medicine. 
2)  Also  regular  contributor  to  The  Guardian,  New  Society,  The Spectator, The New Statesman 
Encounter  and  Times  Educational  Supplement  and  occasional  contributor  to  The  Observer. 
3)  Since  1969:  Member,  Editorial Board  of The Political  Quarterly. 
4)  Since  1971:  Member,  Editorial  Board  of  The  Round Table. 
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- Lecturer  in  constitutional law; 
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- Parliamentary adviser  at the  Chamber  of Deputies,  in  charge  of the  office  responsible  for  the 
coordination  of legislation  and relations  with the  government. 
Principal  publications 
1)  Note  sull'organizzazione  dei  lavori  parlamentari  (in  'Tempi  Moderni',  No 32,  Rome  1967). 
2)  Prerogative e immunita parlamentari (in 'II  Regolamento  della  Camera dei  Deputati', Colombo, 
Rome,  1968). 
3)  Il  rapporto  maggioranza-opposizione  in  Parlamento  (in  'lndagine sulla  funzionalita  del  Parla-
mento', II,  Giuffre,  Milan,  1969). 
4)  Note sulla questione di fiducia  (in 'Annali Facolta  Giurisprudenza  Universita  di  Genova',  1970). 
5)  I  controlli  parlamentari  (Giuffre,  Milan,  1970). 
6)  Sul  lavoro  della  Commissione  parlamentare  per  le  questioni  regionali  (in  'La via  italiana  aile 
regioni',  Comunita, Milan,  1971). 
7)  Interrogazione  e  interpellanza  parlamentare  (in  'Enciclopedia  del  Diritto',  XXII,  Guiffre, 
Milan,  1972). 
Professor Alberto  PREDIERI 
BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 
Alberto  PREDIERI,  born in Turin on 7 March 1921,  graduated in Law,  and is  now Professor of 
Italian  and  Comparative  Constitutional  Law  in the  Department  of  Political  Sciences,  University 
of Florence. 
He has a legal practice and  acts  as  adviser to public and private organizations. 
His  research  has  been  concentrated  in  the  following  principal  fields:  the  Italian  Parliament,  the 
institutional and legal aspects of economic and urban planning, intervention by the public authorities 
in the land sector, the problems of data processing in government administration. He has published 
over fifty  essays  and articles in various periodicals, the most important of which are listed below, 
arranged  according to subject: 
PuBLICATIONS 
A)  Lineamenti  della  posizione  costituzionale  del  Presidente  del  Consiglio  dei  ministri,  Florence, 
Barbera  1951,  161  pp. 
La  produzione  legislativa,  in  SOMOGYI,  S.,  LOTTI,  L.,  PREDIERI,  A.,  SARTORI,  G.,  Il 
Parlamento  italiano,  1946-1963,  ERI,  Naples  1963,  pp.  205-263. 
Contraddittorio  e testimonianza del  cittadino  nei procedimenti legislativi,  Milan, Giuffre  1964, 
325  pp. 
255 Tesi e ipotesi sul processo legislativo in Italia, Milan, Giuffre, 1974, 450 pp., vol. I. This volume 
is the first of a series of six, some already published and some in the press, presenting the results 
of a programme of research on the legislative process in the Italian Parliament, financed  by the 
National Research  Council. 
B)  Pianificazione  e  costituzione,  Milan,  Comunita  1963,  630  pp. 
Il  programma  economico  1966-1970.  Aspetti  giuridici,  Milan,  Giuffre  1967,  211  pp. 
Le  societa  finanziarie  regionali,  Problemi  giuridici,  Milan,  Giuffre  1972,  176  pp. 
C)  Urbanistica,  tutela  del  paesaggio,  Espropriazione,  Giuffre,  1969,  469  pp. 
La  riforma  della  casa,  Legge  1°  giugno  1971  n.  291  e  Iegge  22  ottobre 1971  n.  865,  Milan, 
Giuffre  1971,  pp.  1-48; 74-178;  477-488. 
D)  Gli elaboratori elettronici nell'amministrazione della Stato, Quaderni dell'IRSTA, no. 1 Bologna, 
II  Mulino  1971,  151  pp. 
Nuove tecnologie  dell'informazione  e  nuove istituzioni:  un rapporto  problematico. 
Razionalita soziale e tecnologie dell'informazione, edited by ROSITI, F., Milan, Comunita 1973, 
III,  pp.  216-299. 
Professor Erik RASMUSSEN 
Erik RASMUSSEN, professor, Dr. phil. Born 1917.  Cand. mag.  (MA)  1942, dr. phil. 1955 (University 
of  Copenhagen),  professor  of  Political  Science,  University  of  Aarhus,  1959.  Member  of  IPSA 
Executive  Committee  1967-70.  Editor of Scandinavian  Political Studies,  vols.  6 and 7  (1971-72). 
PUBLICATIONS 
- Indien.  Samfundsforhold  og  Mod  erne  Historie  (India:  Social  Relations  and  Modern  History), 
Gyldendal,  Copenhagen,  1942; 
- Kurantbankens  Forhold  til Staten 1737-53  (Relations  between the Courant Bank and the State 
1737-53),  with  an English  Summary,  (diss.),  Det Danske Forlag,  Copenhagen,  1955; 
- Det  Radikale  Venstre  1905-55  (The  Radical  Liberal  Party  1905-1955),  together  with  Roar 
Skovmand,  Det Danske  Forlag,  Copenhagen,  1955; 
- Statslanskrisen  1919.  En  Redeg0relse  for  dens  Forl0b,  med  Saerligt  Henblik  pa  Folketings-
parlamentarismen  (The  Public  Loan  Crisis  of  1919:  An  Account  of  a  Danish  Political  and 
Constitutional  Conflict,  with  Special  Reference  to  the Principle  of  Parliamentary  Government 
Based  upon the Lower House),  with an English Summary,  Universitetsforlaget i Aarhus,  1957, 
second  edition,  1970; 
- Velfaerdsstaten  pd  Ve;  (The Welfare State on Its  Way),  Danmarks Historie, vol.  13, 1913-1939, 
Politikens Forlag, Copenhagen, 1965, second edition, 1971: abridged  German  edition, 'Auf dem 
Wege  zum  Wohlfahrtsstaat',  in  Geschichte  Danemarks  1830-1939,  Karl  Wachholtz  Verlag, 
· Neumiinster,  1973,  pp.  323-443; 
- Komparativ Politik (Comparative Politics) I-II, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 1968-69, second edition, 
1971-72;  Swedish  edition,  Komparativ  politik  1-2,  Bokforlaget  Aldus,  Bonniers,  Stockholm, 
1969; rev.  edition,  1971; 
- Ideologi og Politik (Ideology and Politics),  Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 1969.  'Some  Comments  on 
the Concept of the Political  System', Scandinavian, Political Studies  vol.  5, Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo/Columbia  University  Press,  1970,  pp.  11-19. 
Articles  on Political  Science  subjects  in  Danish  periodicals. 
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BIOGRAPHY 
Lecturer in European Law,  Trinity College,  since  1972;  born 1944;  married  1970, 2  children; BA 
Dublin 1967 (1st Cl. Mod. in Legal Science),  LL.B. Dublin 1967 (1stcl.),LL;M. Harvard 1968 (1st cl.), 
M.A. Dublin 1970; Barrister, King's Inns Dublin 1967  (1st cl.)  and Middle Temple (1973), Member 
representing Dublin University in Irish Senate 1969; Irish  Legal Expert, Vedel  Committee on Insti-
tutions  of the EEC, 1971; Member of Joint Committee  on EEC Secondary Legislation, Irish Parlia" 
ment; Member of Select  Committee  on Statutory Instruments,  Irish Senate;  Vice-Chairman, Irish 
Council  of  the European Movement; Executive  Council,  Trinity Trust. 
Address: 27  Merrion Square,  Dublin 2. 
Details  of Studies  and  Academic Posts  held 
Having  been  awarded  an entrance scholarship  to Trinity College,  I read for the degree  in  Lega 
Science  which is  a four years honours course in law. I was awarded a scholarship in Legal Science 
in 1965, and got first class honours in the degree in 1967. I also got first class honours in the LL.B. 
degree and I read concurrently for  the degree  of Barrister-at-Law at King's  Inns, Dublin, which I 
was  awarded with first  class  honours in June 1967.  I have since  been called to the Bar of Middle 
Temple in  London.  On graduation from Trinity College I  was  awarded a fellowship  to Harvard 
University Law School, where I read for the LL.M. degree. It was here that I developed an interest 
in European studies, and did my thesis for the LL.M. degree on the role of the Court of Justice and 
the national courts in enforcing the competition policy of the European Community. While at Harvard 
I followed a seminar course in legal aspects of the European Community given by Professor Henry 
Steiner.  I was awarded the LL.M.  degree with first  class honours in June 1968. 
On return to Ireland I practised at the Irish Bar and was appointed the Reid Professor of Constitutional 
Law, Criminal Law and Penal Legislation in July 1969 at Trinity College, Dublin. This is a five  year 
appointment for a member of the Irish Bar, and it will expire at the end of the current year. Meanwhile, 
since  1972, I have  been lecturing in European Law to the final  year students in Legal Science.  My 
main academic interest now is in European Law, and I am specializing as a barrister in legal problems 
relating  to the  European  Community.  As  the Irish  legal  expert on the  Vedel  Committee  on  the 
European Parliament I  had a  unique  opportunity to view  the working of  the Institutions  of  the 
Communities,  and this  has  been  of  benefit  in  my  role  as  a  member  of the Irish  Senate  and in 
particular as a member of the Joint Committee of the Irish Parliament on EEC Secondary Legislation 
of which I am the only Independent Member. I was elected to the Irish Senate for the first time in 
August  1969,  and re-elected  in  May 1973. 
PUBLICATIONS 
Contributions to the Harvard Journal of International Law, the Irish Jurist, the Common Market 
Law Review,  Government  and Opposition, the University  of Western Australia  Law Review  and 
others. 
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BIOGRAPHY 
Born  1933,  St.  Louis,  Mo., USA. 
Married; three  children. 
Educated 
Johns  Hopkins University,  BA  1953. 
1953-54  London School  of Economics. 
1957-60  Oxford University,  D.  Phil. 
Career 
1954-55  Political  public relations,  Missisippi  Valley. 
1955-57  Reporter,  St.  Louis  Post-Despatch. 
1961-66  Lecturer  in  Government,  Manchester  University. 
1966- Professor  of  Politics,  Stratheclyde University. 
Election  Correspondent,  The Times,  1964,  1966,  1970. 
Secretary,  Committee on Political Sociology,  International Sociological  Association,  1970. 
Executive  Committee,  European  Consortium for  Political  Research,  1970. 
Member,  UK/UK  Fulbright  Committee,  1971. 
PuBLICATIONS 
- The British  General Election  of  1959  (with  D. E.  Butler)  1960. 
- Must Labour Lose?  (with  Mark Abrams)  1960. 
- Politics  in England  1964. 
- Studies  in British  Politics  (editor)  1966. 
- Influencing  Voters  1967. 
- Policy  Making in Britain  (editor)  1969. 
- People  in  Politics  1970. 
- European Politics  (ed.  with M.  Dogan)  1971. 
- Governing without Consensus:  an Irish perspective 1971. 
- International Almanack  of Electoral History  (with  T.  Mackie)  1973. 
- Electoral Behaviour:  a  Comparative  Handbook (editor)  1974. 
- Contributions  to academic  journals  in Europe and America. 
Dr Uwe  THAYSEN 
BIOGRAPHY 
Uwe  THAYSEN,  Dipl.-Pol.,  Dr.  phil., lecturer  at the social sciences  seminar of the University  of 
Hamburg  (Hamburg  13,  Von  Melle  Park  15).  Studied  political  science  in  Tiibingen,  Berlin  and 
Hamburg.  From  1972,  editor-in-chief of the Zeitschrift fur  parlamentsfragen. 
258 PUBLICATIONS 
- Parlamentsreform in Theorie und Praxis. 
Zur  institutionellen  Lernfahigkeit  des  parlamentarischen  Regierungssystems.  Opladen  1972, 
325  pp. 
- Zur institutionellen Lernfahigkeit des parlamentarischen Regierungssystems, in: Politische Viertel-
jahresschrift,  Sonderheft 4/1972,  pp.  343-369. 
- Contributions to various  periodicals  notably the Zeitschrift  fur  parlamentsfragen. 
Jacob Jan VIS 
BIOGRAPHY 
Born 30  October  1933,  at Wormerveer,  Holland. 
Studies 
Press  Institute, University  of Amsterdam  (1955-1957). 
Law  Faculty,  University  of  Rotterdam  (1967-1971),  Doctor of  Law. 
Present Position 
Temporary lecturer  in constitutional  law,  State  University  of  Groningen. 
Career 
Held  various  positiOns  in  journalism.  Haagsche  Courant  (1953-1956),  Algemeen  Dagblad  (1956-
1960),  press  adviser  United  States  Information  Service,  The  Hague  (1960-1963),  parliamentary 
correspondent  of  GPD  (largest  chain  of  provincial  dailies  in The Netherlands,  1963-1967),  chief 
political  desk  and commentator  on domestic  political  affairs  of  NRC Handelsblad  (independent 
liberal daily and leading national newspaper on political affairs). Produced various TV-programmes 
on the relationship of the citizen to the Government. Writes a two-weekly column in NRC Handels-
blad on current political and constitutional affairs. Is preparing a study on the position of the Dutch 
parliament during the various  cabinet formations. 
In  his  academic  work,  he  emphasises  the  strong  influence  of  the  political  situation  on juridical 
structures. 
PUBLICATIONS 
Articles 
Cabinet formation  and publicity - Socialisme  en Democratie, January 1972. 
Polarisation  or not?  Dutch political  parties  in transition  - Ons  Erfdeel,  March 1972. 
The longest  cabinet formation  - Intermediair, 5  October  1973. 
For or against Den  Uyl;  the political guerilla  goes  on - Ons Erfdeel,  March 1974. 
Books 
H. Gruijters  and J. J.  Vis: 
29-11-1972:  Elections  - Utrecht,  1972. 
J. J.  Vis: 
Cabinet formation  1973  - Utrecht,  1973. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 
1934  Born  in Saarau,  Silesia. 
1954  Completed  schooling  in  Celie,  Lower  Saxony. 
1954-1956  Training in publishing with the George Westermann-Verlag,  Braunschweig. 
1956-1962  Studied  politics,  sociology  and  history  at the  universities  of  Heidelberg,  Munich  and 
Paris. 
1959-1960  DAAD  exchange  student at the  Lomonosov  University  in  Moscow. 
1962-1963  Research  Fellow  at the Harvard University  Russian  Research  Center. 
1963-1967  Assistant  lecturer  at  the  Institut  fiir  Politische  Wissenschaft,  Heidelberg  (Prof.  Carl-
Joachim Friedrich). 
1967  Qualified  as  lecturer in  Heidelberg. 
From 1967  Professor of Political  Science  in Tiibingen. 
1969  Deputy  head  of  the  Department  of  Social  and  Behavioural  Sciences. 
1971  Briefly,  Rector  of the University  of  'Tiibingen. 
From  1974  Professor  in Heidelberg. 
PUBLICATIONS 
1)  Original  works 
Der  Foderalismus  in  der  Sowjetunion.  Heidelberg  (Quelle  &  Meyer)  1964,  160  pp. 
Die  politische  Soziologie  im  zaristischen  Russland.  Wiesbaden  (Hamsewitz)  1965,  166  pp. 
Das  pdisidentielle  Regierungssystem  der  Vereinigten  Staaten in  der  Lehre  der  Herrschaftsformen. 
Karlsruhe  (C. F.  Miiller)  1967,  78  pp. 
Die  verfassunggebende  Gewalt  des  Volkes.  Tiibingen  (Mohr)  1968,  68  pp. 
Politische Ideengeschichte - Probleme eines interdisziplinaren Forschungsbereiches. Tiibingen (Mohr) 
1969,  59  pp. 
Interessengruppen in der Demokratie. Munich (Piper)  1969, 234 pp. 3rd Edit. 1971  (in Engl. London 
1971),  4th Edit.  1974. 
Die Parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa. Munich (Piper)  1970, 1025 pp. 2nd Edit. 1972. 
Das  Politische System Italiens.  Stuttgart  (Kohlhammer)  1970,  187  pp. 
Die politische Elite in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Munich (Piper) 1971, 241 pp. 2nd Edit. 1974. 
Vom Faschismus zur Entwicklungsdiktatur. Machtelite und Opposition in Spanien.  Munich  (Piper) 
1971,  260  pp. 
Die  politischen Theorien der  Gegenwart.  Munich  (Piper)  1972,  2nd Edit.  1974. 
2)  Contributions  to  other publications 
Robert  von  Mohl.  Politische  Schriften.  Koln  Opladen  (Westdeutscher  Verlag)  1966. 
(With Lehmbruch and Fetscher)  Demokratisches  System und politische Praxis det Bundesrepublik. 
Munich  (Piper)  1971. 
Theory and Politics.  Jubilee  publication for  C. J.  Friedrich.  The Hague  (Nijhoff)  1971. 
Empirische Revolutionsforschung.  Opladen  (Westd.  Verlag)  1973. 
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This bibliography is  based on an exhibition of literature displayed in the Library of the European 
Parliament during the Symposium on European Integration and the future of Parliaments in Europe, 
2nd - 3rd May 1974. 
It does not claim to be  a comprehensive listing of literature on this topic. 
GENERAL 
UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE.  Geneve:  Parlements.  Une  etude  comparative  sur Ia  structure 
et le  fonctionnement des  institutions representatives dans cinquante-cinq pays.  2e  ed.  Paris, P.U.F., 
1966. 
ROBERTSON,  A. H.:  European  Institutions.  Co-operation-Integration-Unification.  3rd  ed.  Publ. 
The London Institute of World Affairs London, Stevens  &  Son., New York, Matthew Bender, 1973. 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:  Selected  readings.  Edited  by Michael Hodges.  Middlesex,  Penguin 
Books,  1972. 
WALLACE  Helen:  National  Governments  and  the  European  Communities.  London,  Chatham 
House-PEP,  1973. 
KUBY,  Heinz:  Politische  Souveranitat  fur  Westeuropa.  Miinchen,  Bavaria,  1964. 
MEERSSCHE,  Paul van  de:  Europa Morgen: Integratie of Desintegratie? Rotterdam,  Universitaire 
Pers.  1972. 
PEDINI,  Mario:  Une  Chance  pour !'Europe:  Problemes  d'une  integration.  Bruxelles  editions  de 
l'Universite,  1974. 
PENTLAND, Charles: International Theory and European Integration. London, Faber &  Faber, 1973. 
WHEARE,  K. C.:  Modern  Constitutions.  London,  Oxford University  Press,  1951. 
IONESCU,  Ghita:  The New Politics  of European Integration.  London,  Macmillan,  1972. 
ROTH,  Andrew:  Can  Parliament  Decide ...  About  Europe ...  Or  About  Anything?  London, 
Macdonald,  1971. 
STICHTING  GROTIUS  SEMINARIUM:  Limits  and  Problems  of  European  Integration.  The 
Conference  of May 30  - June 2,  1961.  The Hague,  Nijhoff,  1963. 
HOGAN,  Willard  N.:  Political  Representation  and  European  Integration.  International  Political 
Science  Association,  Munich Round Table Meeting, August 31  - September 5,  1970. 
FURLER,  Hans:  Im  Neuen  Europa,  Erlebnisse  und  Erfahrungen  im  Europaischen  Parlament. 
Frankfurt am Main, Societats-Verlag,  1963. 
SPINELLI,  Altiero:  L'Europa non cade  dal cielo.  Bologna,  Societa  editrice il Mulino,  1960. 
HOGAN, Willard  N.: Representative  Government  and  European  Integration.  Lincoln,  University 
of  Nebraska Press,  1967. 
261 ASSOCIATION  DES  INSTITUTS  D'ETUDES  EUROPEENNES:  Les  Partis  Politiques  et  L'Inte· 
gration Europeenne.  Colloque  de  Bruges,  Annuaire  1969/70.  Geneve,  1970. 
HAAS,  Ernst B.:  The Uniting of  Europe.  Political,  Social  and Economic  Forces  1950-1957.  Publ. 
The London Inst.  of World Affairs.  London,  Stevens  &  Son,  1958. 
HAAS,  Ernst  B.:  Beyond  the  Nation  State.  Functionalism  and  International  Organization. 
California, Stanford University  Press,  1964. 
DEHOUSSE, Fernand: L'Europe et le Monde. Recueil d'etudes de rapports et de discours, 1945-1960. 
Paris,  Librairie  Generate  de  Droit et  de  Jurisprudence,  1960. 
COOMBES,  David:  Towards  a  European  Civil  Service.  London,  Chatham House  PEP,  1968. 
VREE, Johan K.  De: Political Integration: The formation of theory and its problems. The Hague-
Paris,  Mouton  &  Co,  1972. 
WILDHABER, Luzius: Treaty-Making Power and Constitution. An International and Comparative 
Study.  - Basel  und Stuttgart, Helbing  &  Lichtenhahn,  1971. 
THE EUROPE  WE  BUILD:  A  GLYC  Pamphlet  on Europe's  Future  by  Allan  Gregory  (e.a.).  -
London,  Greater London Young  Conservatives,  1973. 
L'EUROPE AU  CARREFOUR: Societe d'etudes politiques et sociales, cahier No 8, by J. Vandamme 
(e.a.).  - Bruxelles,  L.P.O.  Editions  Renardeau,  1972. 
BASTIANETTO, Mario: Gli Stati Uniti D'Europa. Soluzione federate e vecchi stati sovrani. - Firenze, 
Bulgarini,  1973. 
POLITICAL  OPPOSITIONS  IN WESTERN  DEMOCRACIES:  edited by Robert A.  Dahl.  - New 
Haven  &  London,  Yale  University Press,  1966. 
NIBLOCK,  Michael:  The EEC:  National Parliaments in Community Decision-Making.  - London, 
Chatham House PEP,  1971. 
SYMPOSIUM EUROPA  1950-1970:  Edited for  the 20th  anniversary  of  the  College  of Europe  by 
the Alumni  Association  of the  College.  - Bruges,  College  of  Europe,  1971. 
KAISER,  Karl:  L'Europe  et  les  Etats-Unis.  L'avenir  de  leurs  relations.  - Paris,  Laffont.  Aspen 
Institute for  Humanistic Studies,  1973. 
COOMBES,  David,  WIEBECKE,  Ilka:  The Power of the Purse in the  European  Communities.  -
London,  Chatham House PEP,  1972. 
COLLOQUE  PARLEMENTAIRE  EUROPEEN.  (Strasbourg,  15  et  16  mars  1972.)  L'etat  de 
!'unification  europeenne  et  le  role  des  Parlements.  Compte  rendu  in  extenso  des  seances.  -
Luxembourg,  O.P.O.C.E.,  1972. 
INSTITUT  DE  LA  COMMUNAUTE  EUROPEENNE  POUR  LES  ETUDES  UNIVERSIT  AIRES: 
Etudes  Universitaires  sur L'Integration Europeenne, No 6 1970, recherche.  - Bruxelles,  O.P.O.C.E., 
1970. 
INSTITUT  DE  LA  COMMUNAUTE  EUROPEENNE  POUR  LES  ETUDES  UNIVERSIT  AIRES: 
Etudes  Unive1sitaires  sur L'Integration Europeenne, No 7 1972,  recherche.  - Bruxelles, O.P.O.C.E., 
1972. 
EUROPAISCHE  POLITISCHE  EINIGUNG  1949-1968:  Dokumentation  von  Vorschlagen  und 
Stellungnahmen.  - Bonn-Wien-Ziirich, Siegler  &  Co.,  1968. 
OCCHIMINUTI,  G. R.: Les  Relations  entre l'Executif et  le  Legislatif  dans  L'Europe Elargie.  Le 
cas  des  budgets  nationaux et du budget communautaire.  - 1970. 
MEYNAUD, Jean, SIDJANSKI, Dusan: Les groupes de  pression dans la Communaute Europeenne. 
Tome 1-11.  (Serie  roneotee,  No 4,  Hors  Commerce.),  1969. 
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L'Europe unie.  22  textes sur !'integration europeenne. Edite par S.  Patijn. - Leyden, Sijthoff,  1970. 
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NEUNREITHER, Karlheinz: Les rapports entre le Parlement Europeen et les Parlements Nationaux. 
- (Annuaire  Europeen,  vol.  XV,  p. 52-81.) 
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PARLEMENT EUROPEEN.  Luxembourg:  Reglement.  (A.D.F.I.N.E.).  -Luxembourg, 1974. 
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273 THURSDAY, 2 MAY 1974 
PLENARY SITTING Plenary  session - 10.00  am. 
Mr  BERKHOUWER,  President  of  the  Euro-
pean Parliament,  opened the symposium  with 
the following address: 
'Your Excellencies,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  as 
host I should really welcome you all personally. 
However,  the number  of distinguished  people 
here today is  so large that if I were to list all 
of  them  we  should  never  get  down  to  the 
actual  purpose  of  this  meeting,  which  is  to 
discuss  European  integration  and  the  future 
of Parliaments  in  Europe. 
I  should however,  like  to make  a  few  excep-
tions  for  the  representatives  of  the  Luxem-
bourg Government, of the Community institu-
tions  and  of  the  other  parliamentary  bodies, 
of the  Council  of  Europe,  the Western  Euro-
pean  Union  and NATO. 
Then  I  should  like  to  convey  my  thanks  to 
all  those from  the  academic  world who  have 
made  this  symposium  possible  in  preparatory 
meetings  and  by  writing  discussion  papers.  I 
should  particularly  like  to  mention  Professor 
Carl  Friedrich  of  Harvard  University  in  the 
United States and Heidelberg University, Chair-
man of the European  Research  Committee of 
the  International  Association  of  Political 
Science.  At the request of the enlarged Bureau 
of  the  European  Parliament,  then  under  the 
presidency  of  my  predecessor,  Dr.  Walter 
Behrendt,  he  has  from  the  beginning  played 
an  active  part in  bringing  about  this  sympo-
sium. 
In  giving  its  formal  approval  for  this  sympo-
sium,  the  Bureau's  intention  was  to  establish 
a connection between science and daily parlia-
mentary work.  This  idea  arose  specifically  in 
the European Parliament precisely  because  we 
all  necessarily  belong  to  two  parliaments  and 
are therefore faced more than anyone with the 
struggle  every  parliament in  the world wages 
anew  each  day  to  defend  the  rights  and  the 
political ideas  of the citizen. 
I  should like  to  make two  observations  here. 
Firstly,  at this  particular stage in its  existence 
the Community seems to be faced with a dark 
forest  of obstacles. 
A  sense  of  reality  should  induce  us  to admit 
that  the  Community  has  been  shaken  to  its 
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foundations. Despite all the setbacks we always 
thought  that  certain  achievements  were  in-
vulnerable.  We  have  now  seen  even  the  free 
movement  of  goods-the  keystone  of  the 
customs  union-affected.  But  pacta  sunt 
servanda, and it is  the foremost duty of every 
parliament to point this  out to the authorities 
when  they  are  at fault.  This  applies  both  at 
Community level  and to  us  as  representatives 
of the peoples living and working in the Com-
munity. 
My second observation is  that we should stop 
tiring ourselves  out with crocodile tears about 
crises. That only leads deeper into a crisis. 
If there  are holdups,  whether or not they  are 
due  to  default  or  inactivity  by  other  Com-
munity  Institutions,  then  it  is  our  duty  as 
representatives  of the European peoples to be 
the  driving  force  pushing  the  Community 
forward.· And  if  we say  nothing about failure 
to implement the Treaties, who will? 
It  is  clear  that  parliamentarians  who  must 
keep  up  with  political  life  from  day  to  day, 
cannot  always  find  sufficient leisure  and time 
to  make  a  fully  scientific  study of these  driv-
ing  forces.  It is  for  that very  reason  that we 
have  called  you  together  to  provide  us  with 
new ammunition for our continuing struggle. 
In  my  opinion,  this  symposium  must  not  be 
regarded  as  part of the pause  for  thought  in 
the  process  of  European  unification  which 
some  people  have  been  proposing.  This  is 
hardly the place or the time to start a discus-
sion  on the pause.  I  am still  of the view that 
in  the  present  economic  situation  events  are 
succeeding each other with increasing rapidity 
and  that every  day  we  are  again  being  faced 
with a number of essential decisions. One can-
not  bring  the  machinery  of  integration  to  a 
stop  or contemplate pauses. 
This applies above all to our budgetary powers, 
which derive from  the Luxembourg Treaty of 
April  1970,  creating  the  Community's  own 
resources.  The  transfer  of  revenue  from  the 
Member States  to the Community should, ac-
cording  to  that Treaty,  run parallel  with the 
transfer of budgetary powers from the national 
parliaments  to  the  European Parliament.  This 
agreement  was  confirmed  by  the  Paris  and 
Copenhagen Summit Conferences and ought to be  observed  in  due  time,  before  1  January 
1975. 
Nor can the political development of the Com-
munity,  especially  as  regards  the  part played 
by its  major institution, the parliamentary as-
sembly, be allowed to stand still. All the agree-
ments made to extend the powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament must be implemented in full. 
Now is  the  time  to break out of the  vicious 
circle  which  is  too  often  used  as  an  excuse. 
The circle supposedly arises because no powers 
can  be  given  to  a  parliament  which  is  not 
elected, while no one is  going to elect a parlia-
ment with no powers. 
In  this  space  age  we  must  regard  further 
development  as  a  three-stage  rocket:  powers, 
elections  and  the  Community-wide  political 
parties  these  will  necessitate.  But  at any  rate 
the first  stage, the powers, is  the most impor-
tant for  us  at the moment.  Nor do they seem 
to me at all to contradict the present concerns 
of the  Community. 
Any  government  which  wishes  to  revise  the 
Treaties in any way must accept the constitu-
tional  and  institutional  consequences  of  this 
demand. The Treaty of Rome itself lays  down 
the ways  in which modification of the Treaty 
is  possible,  and  an  essential  part  in  the 
modification procedure is  assigned to our Par-
liament. Accordingly, every country which is  a 
member  of the Community,  and in  particular 
a country which is  in favour of modifying the 
Treaties,  should  be  fully  represented  in  all 
Instit~tions  of  the  Community.  This  also 
implies that all the parliaments of the Member 
States,  as  long  as  the  Treaty  obligation  of 
direct  election  has  not  yet  been  met,  should 
appoint from  their  midst  a  full  delegation  to 
the  European  Parliament  with  a  numerical 
strength in accordance  with Article  10  of the 
Act  of Accession. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the symposium which I 
have  the  privilege  to  open  is  devoted  to  the 
position  of  parliaments  in  the  new  Europe. 
This  is  a  very  broad  topic.  Parliamentary 
democracy  is  a  delicate  and  precious  thing. 
Let  me  say  in  passing  that  all  is  not  dark 
here. The recent developments in Portugal have 
thrown some hopeful light. 
You  are  going  to  discuss  parliaments.  The 
important thing  for  me  at the moment is  the 
relationship  between  the  parliaments  of  the 
Member  States  of  the  Community  and  the 
parliamentary democratic control institution of 
the  Community,  the  European  Parliament. 
There  is  too  little  awareness  that  important 
aspects  of national parliamentary control have 
been  dropped  in  the  process  of  European 
integration,  without  the  lost  powers  being 
replaced  by  our  Community-level  powers.  A 
vacuum  has  thus  arisen  in  parliamentary 
democratic  representation  in  the  Community. 
If  government  by  consent  is  important  for 
parliamentary democracy, there is a clear failing 
here. 
I hope that the theoretical and practical experts 
gathered together here will not only devote the 
necessary  attention  to  this  matter  of  vital 
importance for our European members of par-
liament, but also  be  able to arrive  at practical 
proposals and solutions. 
It is in that hope that I declare this symposium 
open. 
Mr  BERKHOUWER  passed  the  Chair  to 
Professor VEDEL. 
Professor  VEDEL,  honorary  Dean  of  the 
Faculty  of Law  and Economics,  University  of 
Paris,  thanked Mr Berkhouwer for  the  happy 
introduction given  to the work of the sympo-
sium, saying that it was for him a great honour 
to be Chairman of the meeting. Professor Vedel 
then called upon Professor von Beyme to make 
his introductory speech to the symposium. 
Professor VON BEYME of Heidelberg Univers-
ity  then  gave  the  introductory  academic  ad-
dress  to the symposium. 
Professor  von  Beyme  outlined  the role  which 
he and Professor Coombes would have to play, 
namely  to  draw together  the main  threads  in 
the studies  of the parliamentary institution  in 
the  different  Member  States.  He  would  con-
centrate  on  the  national  parliaments,  while 
Professor  Coombes  would  deal  mainly  with 
relations between the national parliaments and 
the  European Parliament. 
Professor von Beyme  regretted  that the paper 
he  had submitted to the symposium on 'basic 
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Parliament in Western Europe' was incomplete, 
because  important studies  on West  Germany, 
Luxembourg and Italy had not been  available 
when he wrote it; furthermore it had not been 
possible  to  draw  up  a  uniform  questionnaire 
for the individual authors. Nevertheless, all the 
papers  showed  agreement  on  the  six  most 
important  parliamentary  functions,  variously 
stressed according to each  author's method of 
presentation. 
Modern parliamentarianism had been subjected 
to strong criticism lately from political scientists 
(especially in West Germany, France and Italy), 
and it had been  alleged  to have  lost  some  of 
its  functions.  Perhaps,  however,  it would  be 
more  appropriate  to  speak  of  a  modification 
rather than of a loss of functions. 
Professor  von  Beyme  then  evaluated  the  six 
parliamentary  functions,  concluding  that  the 
communication  function  had  been  the  most 
seriously  eroded  (e.g.  through  public  discus-
sion,  opinion  polls  etc.),  while  the  legislative 
role no longer consisted in laying down general 
rules  affecting all  citizens  but rather in enact-
ing individual laws relating to group interests. 
The recruiting function on the other hand had 
grown more  important. 
A  general  assessment  of  the  position  of  the 
parliaments  could  not  be  based  solely  on  a 
study of the  parliaments themselves  but must 
also  take  into  account  the  underlying  social 
system  into  which  the  parliaments  were  inte-
grated.  In  the  Community  there  were  three 
different  party systems:  what might  be  called 
the  'two  and  a  quarter'  party  system  with 
alternating governments; the multi-party system 
in which all parties were eligible to participate 
in  a  coalition,  and  the  multi-party  system  in 
which  only  certain  parties  were  eligible  to 
participate,  so  that  one  party  enjoyed  a 
hegemony. Obviously the parliamentary institu-
tion  was  strongest  in  the  second  type;  sur-
prisingly,  however,  there  was  a  general 
tendency towards greater cabinet stability. 
Political  science  had  come  to  recognize  that 
there  was  no  ideal  type  of  parliamentary 
system and that all were open to criticism. 
The position of parliaments also depended on 
the kind of interest groups outside parliament; 
the  more  traditional  the  structure  of  under-
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takings  and  the  more  capital-dominated  the 
economy,  the weaker the  parliament's role  as 
mediator. This could be clearly seen in certain 
cases  such  as  Italy  where  reference  was  now 
being made to 'legislation by the trade unions'. 
Parliament's usefulness  today could be gauged 
by  the  degree  to  which  it  represented  the 
underprivileged;  modern  parliamentarianism 
could only survive in coexistence with pluralism 
and the principle of effective democracy. 
Professor  COOMBES,  University  of  Lough-
borough, said  he  would not refer  individually 
to the papers that had been  submitted on the 
national  parliaments  and  say  complimentary 
things  about  their  authors.  This  he  would 
certainly be justified in doing, as  all the papers 
were  of such a  high  quality,  but it was  now 
unnecessary in  view  of Professor von Beyme's 
excellent  analysis.  There  were  two  points, 
however,  that  he  would  like  to  stress  parti-
cularly. 
First of all, he would like to refer to the choice 
of  subjects  for  the  working  groups,  and 
secondly, he would like to comment on the way 
that academics  could organize  their studies  so 
as  to make them of the greatest possible value 
both  to  the  national  parliaments  and  to  the 
Parliament of the European Community. 
He went on  to  say  that he  was  honoured  to 
speak  under  the  chairmanship  of  Professor 
Vedel  who  not only  enjoyed  an  international 
reputation as  a scholar in the field  of political 
science  but was  also  head  of the  well-known 
Vedel Group. He might have the distinction of 
being the first Frenchman ever to be appointed 
head  of  what  had  been  seen  originally  as  a 
sort of British  Royal  Commission,  and while 
the  reports  of  such  Commissions  were  often 
filed  away in obscurity, he felt that this group 
had had an influence on thinking about Com-
munity institutions. What it had not considered 
was the working of parliament and the political 
institutions  at  national  level  in  the  Member 
States.  This  work could  be  of great value  in 
leading  to  an  understanding  o£  how  Com-
munity  government  can  be  made  to  function 
more effectively. We had a great deal of ground 
to make up in applying at a Community level 
what was  already  known  about  the  working 
of political institutions at national level. There  was  often  an  unfortunate  dichotomy, 
Professor  Coombes  said,  between  the  way  in 
which  parliament  was  considered  on  the 
national and the Community levels. People who 
were always  ready to spring to the defence  of 
the  rights  of  national  parliaments  seem  less 
ready  to  defend  the  Parliament  of  the  Euro-
pean  Community,  but  parliamentary  institu-
tions on the two levels  had much in common 
and this should be realised. Study of the Com-
munity in its present transitional phase tended 
to be  left to experts in  international relations, 
but this was  undesirable. 
Referring  to  the  choice  of  subjects  for  the 
working  groups,  he  said  that these  were  not 
chosen  at random but that they were  a result 
of modern studies on how national parliaments 
could  function  most  effectively,  and  it  was 
hoped that by studying these topics, one might 
pass  from  an  understanding  of parliament  at 
national  level  to  a  realisation  of  how  much 
could be contributed to the effective function-
ing  of  parliament  at European  level. 
The  subject  for  the  first  working  group  was 
the topic of parliament as  a  focus  of opposi-
tion.  He said  that  he  might  mention  in  this 
context the current discussions on the question 
of  'renegotiation'. Some people were speaking 
as  if  this  request for  renegotiation was  some-
thing  that undermined  the  entire  working  of 
the  Community,  but it should  be  seen  as  no 
more  than  the  expression  of  opposition.  It 
should  be  possible  to  effect  change  without 
threatening  the  whole  structure;  parliaments 
had an important role to play in providing for 
continuity and peaceful change. He referred to 
Professor von Beyme's exposition of the elective 
function of parliament, by which the executive 
was  appointed by parliament, and said that in 
a  parliamentary system  the executive  and the 
forces of opposition should be able to sit down 
in  the  same  place  and  discuss  any  matter 
freely. 
The topic for  the second working group  was 
parliament and administration and the question 
of how  far  parliaments  could  be  effective  in 
control of administration. One instance of this 
was  parliamentary budgetary powers;  if these 
were  better  understood  in  the  context  of 
national  parliaments,  they  could  be  better 
understood at Community level. 
The topic for  the  third group was  parliament 
and public opinion.  This would be considered 
in  two  ways:  firstly,  how  the  public  could 
have  access  to  parliament  and  how  far  the 
parliament  was  responsive  to  the  voice  of 
public  opinion;  secondly,  how the  parliament 
itself  communicated with the  public  and kept 
the citizens informed of its proceedings and of 
its views. 
Professor Coombes went on to say that he was 
the last  academic  to  speak that morning  and 
that he  was  glad to be  followed  by  practising 
parliamentarians.  He  said  that  the  study  of 
parliaments  by  academics  was  something that 
was now coming back into fashion in political 
science, but that it was important that it should 
always  be carried out in conjunction with the 
practitioners of the art of politics. 
He  cited  the  example  of the  British  Study  of 
Parliament  Group  of  which  he  himself  was  a 
member,  saying  that  it  had  published  some 
valuable  studies  on  national  parliaments  and 
that it worked in  harmony with the Hansard 
Society for parliamentary government. He refer-
red  to  a  research  programme  about  to  be 
undertaken  by  the  Hansard  Society  on  the 
subject  of the future  of parliamentary institu-
tions  in  Europe,  to  be  financed  by  the  Ford 
Foundation;  he  was  in  fact  relinquishing  his 
professorship  to  direct this  research  program-
me.  He also  referred  to  similar  studies  being 
carried  out  in  other  countries,  notably  in 
France by the  Centre des  Etudes  Parlementai-
res  and  in  Germany  by  the  Vereinigung  fiir 
Parlamentsfragen. 
He concluded by saying how significant it was 
that  these  studies  were  being  carried  out, 
especially  in  view  of the  close  collaboration 
between  academics  and  practical  politicians 
that went into them,  and expressed  the  hope 
that the  meeting  of minds  between  academics 
and parliamentarians at the symposium would 
be  very valuable and fruitful. 
The  CHAIRMAN  introduced  the  general 
debate by pointing out that the parliamentary 
institution  itself  was  undoubtedly  undergoing 
change. He suggested therefore that the debate 
might  well  be  centred  on  this  concept,  and, 
with this  in  mind,  proposed five  subjects  for 
discussion: 
279 (i)  what is  the use  of a Parliament today? 
(ii)  what is  the use of a Parliamentarian? 
(iii)  what techniques  exist  already  or may  be 
devised which may give  the parliamentary 
institution more public impact? 
(iv)  is  the  parliamentary  institution  an  influ-
ence for integration? 
(v)  any other topic which might be proposed 
by the meeting. 
The  session  was  briefly  suspended  before 
general discussion was resumed. 
Mr  DOOGE,  Chairman  of  the  Irish  Senate, 
said  'My first  words  today must be words  of 
thanks  and  congratulations  to you,  Mr Presi-
dent, and to your Bureau for the initiative you 
have shown in convening this symposium. The 
subject  of  the  symposium  is  one  which  has 
been  a matter of concern to parliamentarians, 
whether members  of a  national parliament or 
of the European Parliament.  The form  of the 
meeting is  also  a matter for  congratulation. If 
solutions  do  exist  to the  problems  we  are  to 
discuss, then these solutions will be more easily 
found  by  calling  on  the  knowledge  and  the 
talents of all who concern themselves with the 
work of Parliament.  Gathered  here  today  we 
have Presidents of the national parliaments and 
their  deputies,  members  of  the  European 
Parliament,  Secretaries  General  of  the  parlia-
ments, and academic experts from many coun-
tries. All  of these have a contribution to make 
to  the  formulation  of  the  lines  along  which 
the  democratic  institutions  of the Community 
should evolve. 
Procedure,  practice  and  conventions  differ 
from parliament to parliament. Under the con-
vention  of  our  parliamentary  institutions  in 
Ireland,  the  Presidents  of  the  Houses  are 
precluded  from  discussing  matters  of  policy 
that are the subject of debate between political 
parties.  It is  fortunate,  therefore,  that  many 
matters in regard  to  the Community  and  the 
European  Parliament  are  widely  agreed  upon 
in Ireland,· so  that I can speak on such topics 
without breach of this convention. 
As  all present are aware, the people of Ireland 
voted by  referendum in favour  of membership 
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of  the  Community,  the  vote  in  favour  being 
over  800/o.  It  is  generally  agreed  that  they 
were  moved  to  do  so  not merely  because  of 
the  real  economic  benefits  to be  gained  from 
membership,  but also  because  of  a  real  belief 
in the ideal of a united Europe. We in Ireland 
have  always  maintained  a  sense  of  identity 
with  Europe.  It  has  been  a  very  long  time 
indeed  since  the  island  of  Ireland  was 
physically  separated  from  the  land  mass  of 
continental Europe. It is  quite some time since 
the  ancestors  of  the  Irish  people  abandoned 
the  heartland  of Europe  and  retreated to the 
western  edges  of  the  continent.  Despite  this, 
the  Irish  people  have  down  through  the 
centuries  maintained  a  sense  of  kinship  with 
Europe.  The fact  that there  is  another  island 
between  Ireland  and  the  mainland  of  Europe 
did  not  diminish  this  sense  of  kinship  and 
indeed at times helped indirectly to nourish it. 
We  hear  much  nowadays  of  the  need  for  a 
sense  of participation  by  the  public  in  every 
political and social organisation. All  too often 
the  voters  feel  less  and  less  identified  with 
those  who  are  referred to as  their representa-
tives and members of national parliaments have 
difficulty  in  maintaining  a  sense  of  identity 
with their electorate. This problem is  naturally 
intensified within the Community where it was 
necessary  not  only  to  found  institutions  but 
also  to  develop  traditions.  It may  be  readily 
agreed  that  the  indirect  mandate  of  the 
members  of the European Parliament and the 
indirect  mandate  of  the  Council  of Ministers 
are  too  tenuous ·to  give  the  members  of  the 
public  a  feeling  of participation  in  the  Com-
munity  institutions.  Failure  to  remedy  this 
situation, failure  to solve  this  problem, failure 
to  create  a  real  sense  of  belonging  will 
inevitably  result  in  a  stagnation  under  which 
the Community will become incapable of fulfil-
ling the hopes  of all our peoples. 
What can  be  done  during  the  next two  days 
is  to  make  a start in  regard  to this  problem. 
Any  attempt  to  do  more  would  be  to  risk 
disaster  through  an  over-simplification  of the 
problem.  It is  not our task in  this  symposium 
to  reach  a  solution  but rather  to  ensure  that 
the search for  a solution is  well  begun.  If we 
do  this  by frank discussion  and careful listen-
ing,  we will  have  made a real  contribution to 
the solution of the problem. Such  a  solution  would  be  of value  not  only 
to  the  European  Parliament  but  also  to  the 
very  life  of  the  Community,  since  failure  to 
find  a  solution would rob the Community of 
any lasting vitality. To find a solution for this 
problem of participation on a  European scale 
would also  be of value to the national parlia-
ments.  Many  members  of  these  parliaments 
are  concerned  with their increasing  alienation 
from  their electorate, but are inhibited by the 
rigidity of their institutions and the inflexibility 
of their traditions  from  adapting to meet this 
new  situation. Solutions  of these  problems  on 
a  European  scale  could  be  of value  in  point-
ing  the  way towards  solutions  on  a  national 
scale as  well. 
It is  for  these  reasons,  Mr Chairman,  that  I 
conclude  these  few  remarks  as  I  opened,  by 
words  of thanks  and  congratulations  for  the 
initiative  shown  by  the  European  Parliament 
in  relation  to  this  important  and  pressing 
question.' 
Mr FAURE,  President of the French National 
Assembly,  said,  'I  should  like  to  speak  this 
morning, Mr President, because I  attach great 
importance  to  this  symposium  which  Mr 
Berkhouwer has had the happy idea of conven-
ing and I propose, as  I have already indicated 
to you, to present a paper tomorrow, to which 
I attach a certain importance. As  far  as  today 
is  concerned, I gladly take up your invitation, 
but  I  do  not  know  whether  I  shall  be  fol-
lowing a very rigorous method in dealing with 
the five  points you set out a  little while  ago. 
I recall your asking what purpose a parliament 
served  and  also,  I  believe,  what purpose par-
liamentarians  served.  These  questions  are 
closely linked. I would answer in this way: the 
parliamentarian  is  essentially  a  mediator,  a 
mediator between  the  citizens  and constituted 
authority.  This  mediator  exercises  his  role  in 
the  two  different  situations  that  may  exist: 
either he is  the creator of this power, in which 
case  the power emanates from  parliament,  or 
he  is  not  the  creator  of  this  power,  if such 
power  has  another  basis;  in  both  cases,  the 
normal  role  of the  parliamentarian  is  one  of 
mediation.  Now,  the problem  is  posed  today 
in  different  terms  from  those  of the  classical 
hypothesis,  the  well-known  hypothesis  of the 
philosopher  Alain,  namely  the  citizen  against 
the constituted authority. 
What has changed are the techniques of power: 
power  has  exceptional  technical  resources  at 
its  disposal.  The parliamentarian  must,  there-
fore,  be  the  mediator  between  the  technical 
element  of  a  problem  and  the  non-technical 
element  of  that  problem,  i.e.,  its  emotional 
content. Problems cannot be solved without the 
aid of the decision-making techniques provided 
by  computers  and  other  means.  But  account 
must also be taken of the non-technical aspects 
of a decision.  I£  it is  proposed to demonstrate 
to  a  man,  by  means  of  a  computer,  that he 
is  happy although he knows he is  not, he must 
be  able  to  say  so.  One  aspect  of the  parlia-
mentarian's  role  which  corresponds  to  this 
notion is  often held  up to ridicule  and this  is 
very wrong-I refer  to the aspect which con-
sists  in informing the public or in transmitting 
its  demands  concerning  the  trivial  matters  of 
daily  life.  Fun  is  often  made  of  parlia-
mentarians  who  are  all  day  long  forwarding 
letters about social insurance matters. The first 
letter I received was from  a man who wished 
to change an artificial limb which he was given 
as  a result of a war injury.  People said:  'How 
ridiculous.'  I  said:  'It is  not at all  ridiculous,' 
because if this  man has to apply to a  Deputy 
to settle such a simple matter, that proves that 
the administration is  not functioning properly. 
In  reality,  those  of  us  who  study  their  role 
in a scientific sort of way are well aware that 
each petition has no great importance in itself, 
but we have  adopted the habit of calculating 
the number and drift of such petitions. If, out 
of 100 letters I receive, 50 are about hospitals, 
I  can be sure that the hospital  administration 
is  not functioning  properly.  At  the  moment, 
most of the letters we receive have to do  with 
education,  which  proves  how  important  this 
question is  to  the population and  also  that it 
is  not being dealt with satisfactorily, especially 
in rural districts. I shall leave this question and 
return-trying not to exceed the time allotted 
to me-to the concept of the parliamentarian's 
role  in parliament. 
There is,  first  of  all,  a  political role which is 
perhaps  to  create  or  dissolve  authority.  At 
present, in France, we no longer have the role 
of creating authority,  but we still  have  a  dis-
solving role. We can thus dismiss a government 
-which is  basically a control function-when 
we feel  that the governmental authority, which 
does  not emanate from us,  ceases  to discharge 
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aside  this  political  role,  I  shall  dwell  briefly 
on  the  legislative  role:  at  one  time,  the  only 
role was a voting one. A deputy voted for  the 
law or against it.  The procedure is  now more 
complicated  and  the  important  role  of  the 
parliamentarian  just  as  important  as  voting 
legislation,  is,  at the higher level,  the elabora-
tion  of  legislation  and,  at  the  lower  level, 
control  of  its  implementation.  The  parlia-
mentarian  must  be  better  associated  in  the 
process of elaborating legislation, failing whi_ch 
the  technician imposes  his  project and parlia-
ment  cannot  adequately  amend  it.  We  have 
examples  of this,  at least in my  own country. 
And,  after a law has been enacted, parliament 
and the parliamentarian must be able  to  con-
trol its  implementation.  It sometimes happens, 
at least  in  our country, that a law is  not put 
into  effect  for  one  or  two  years,  failing  an 
implementing decree,  or that it is  distorted by 
implementing  decrees.  This  is  where  the  par-
liamentarian  fully  comes  into  his  role  of 
mediator, because what interests  the citizen is 
not whether  a  law has  been  passed  but how 
that law  applies  in his  own  case.  I  shall  say 
no  more on this subject, except,  as  it were, to 
prepare the address I shall be giving tomorrow 
by  pointing  out  that  this  role  of  mediation 
between  the  technical  and  non-technical 
elements  in problems,  a role which  character-
ises  the  parliamentarian  in  the  national  con-
text  must  be  assumed  within  the  European 
fra~ework,  for  Europe  must  not  be  built 
simply  on  a  technical  level.  If there  is  some-
times  alienation  from  our  probelms,  it  is 
because the public is not particularly interested, 
for example, in calculations  about agricultural 
refunds. Europe must be technical, but it must 
be  more  than  just  a  technicality  and  this  is 
the  parliamentarian's  role,  to  establish  yet 
again  a  link  between  the  technical  and  the 
subjective;  it  is  on  this  subject  that  I  shall 
make  a  concrete  proposal  tomorrow.  Thank 
you,  Mr President.' 
Mrs  CARETTONI ROMAGNOLI, Vice-Presi-
dent of the Italian Senate and Member of the 
European  Parliament,  thanked  the  European 
Parliament for having arranged the symposium. 
She  said  that the  grave  crisis  through  which 
Europe  was  passing  could  only  be  resolved 
at the  political  level,  even  though  something 
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could  also  be  learned  from  a  study  of  its 
technical  aspects.  One  of  the  main  concerns 
of public  opinion  in  Europe  was  the  transfer 
of powers from the national parliaments to the 
Council  of the  EEC,  that  is  to  say,  from  a 
parliamentary  to  a  non-parliamentary  institu-
tion.  Although  pronounced  legitimate  by  the 
Italian  Constitutional  Court,  the  process  had 
perplexed  many  students  of  political  affairs 
and  politicians. 
She  went  on  to  point  out  that  the  problem 
of parliamentary control over Community acts 
had engaged the attention of the Italian Senate 
and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  In  1968  the 
Senate  had  set  up  a  standing  committee  on 
European affairs, initially with advisory powers 
only. In 1971  new rules were drawn up giving 
the Committee extensive new powers, including 
the  authority  to  report  back  to  the  Senate. 
In point of fact,  the Committee  discussed  the 
Foreign  Minister's  report  at its  meetings  and 
drew  up  its  own  report  for  the  Assembly, 
outlining the objectives which the Government 
ought to be  pursuing  and commenting  critic-
ally on past action. The members of the Italian 
delegation  to  the  European  Parliament  took 
part in those meetings.  In its  advisory capacity 
the Committee was  called upon to deliver opi-
nions  on bills  concerning Community matters, 
on resolutions of the European Parliament and 
of  other  European  assemblies  as  well  as  on 
regulations  and  directives  published  in  the 
Official  Journal.  In  addition  to  this,  it  could 
initiate a  debate on Commission  proposals or 
on Community matters at the request of eight 
senators  or  a  fifth  of  the  members  of  the 
delegation  to  the  European  Parliament,  this 
debate being held in the presence of the Min-
ister  responsible.  The  Committee  could  also 
organise fact-finding surveys but it did not pass 
resolutions.  For corresponding measures  taken 
by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  the  speaker 
referred her listeners  to  the study carried  out 
by Professor Manzella. 
Mrs.  Carettoni  Romagnoli  concluded  by 
observing  that  the  national  parliaments  were 
also  going  through a  crisis,  caused  chiefly  by 
the expansion of society.  But  answers  to both 
national and Community problems could only 
be  found  if  they  acted  with  firm  political 
resolve, conscious of the need to make Europe-
a reality. Mr  PETERSEN, Danish Member of the Euro-
pean  Parliament,  thought  that it would  obvi-
ously not be possible to engage in a discussion 
in the limited time available.  He regarded the 
symposium  more  as  the first  of a  long  series 
of  joint  attempts  to  clarify  and  then  to  act 
on the very  general subject on the agenda. 
He said that parliaments' working methods had 
not kept up with developments. It was difficult 
to  change  them  since  traditions  were  deep-
rooted.  Parliaments'  decisions  affected  the 
daily  life  of  citizens,  but it was  difficult  for 
them  to  change  their  own  working  methods. 
Parliaments  usually  devoted  too  much  atten-
tion to detail  and lacked a  broad vision.  The 
power  of  organisations  and  the  dependence 
on other countries also escaped their attention. 
Members of Parliament did not have an overall 
picture, since committees were formed accord-
ing to the spheres of responsibility of the Min-
istries.  In his  opinion a great deal of valuable 
and factually  sound  work was  done  in  com-
mittee,  but at the same time  a  comprehensive 
approach was lacking. It was not realized that 
the whole was more than its component parts 
and  that  changes  in  one  part  often  affected 
another.  This  meant  that  parliaments  had 
constantly  to  adapt  and  revise  decisions 
adopted,  which  in  turn  could  mean  that  the 
electorate  was  not  sure  what  actually  was 
intended. 
In his opinion, parliaments devoted most atten-
tion to current business  and thus  often failed 
to  consider  long-term  issues  which  in  turn 
made it difficult to solve short-term problems. 
He felt  that the Community had considerable 
responsibility in this sector and should initiate 
a  progressive  debate.  Democracy  was  not  a 
once-only gift; it had to be fought for continu-
ally, he concluded. 
Mr MASTROIANNI,  a  lawyer  employed  on 
the staff of the Italian Delegation to the Euro-
pean Parliament, said that in his  introductory 
remarks the Chairman had clearly spelt out the 
chief  purpose  of the  symposium,  which  was 
to  find  new  ways  and  means  of  developing 
the  European  Parliament.  The  speaker  noted 
that  highly  effective  procedural  instruments 
were  already  to  hand,  such  as  resolutions, 
agendas,  and the budget debates, by means  of 
which ·Members  of  Parliament  could  initiate 
useful  dialogues  with  their  respective  govern-
ments  and  compel  them  to  take  a  more 
practical approach to the problems of Europe. 
But  this  was  not enough.  In  order to achieve 
practical  results  'political  will'  was  necessary, 
but even  this  was  of  no  avail  unless  it  was 
backed by effective 'political power'. This had 
its  source  in  public  opinion,  the  one  force 
which  gave  effective  power  to  representative 
bodies  and  gathered  to  it  the  full  forces  of 
capital and labour as  the key  protagonists  on 
the political scene. But the European Parliament 
was  screened  off  from  public  opinion,  which 
meant that people were not directly  aware  of 
what  it  did.  The  Press,  for  instance,  was  a 
channel for conveying information, but so  nar-
row that very little reached the public. 
It would help  a  lot,  he  said,  if  the European 
Parliament's debates were televised. One of the 
many  advantages  of  this  would  be  that  it 
would  give  viewers  a  keener  awareness  of 
what was happening in  Parliament and would 
improve the quality of the debates. 
In  this  connection  Mr  Mastroianni  reminded 
his  listeners  of  the  enormous  power  enjoyed 
by the United States Congressional Committees 
as  a result of live  screening of their meetings. 
He realised that this  would hardly be  feasible 
over  the  usual  television  channels,  but  one 
possible  way  of  doing  it  would  be  by  cable 
television. 
The  speaker  maintained  that  there  were  no 
insurmountable technical or financial obstacles 
to a project of that kind. It would give  a large 
number  of  Europeans  the  opportunity  to 
familiarise  themselves  at  first  hand  with  the 
problems  of Europe. 
He  concluded  by  stressing  the  vast  power 
which the  European institutions  would  derive 
from  such  a  close  and  intimate  relationship 
with public opinion and the effective contribu-
tion  which it could  make  to the  achievement 
of  that  European  unity  to  which  they  all 
aspired. 
Professor IONESCU, University of Manchester, 
began by saying that he would deal with ques-
tion four which he  considered to be  the most 
relevant  of  the  questions  raised.  Question  4 
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ary  systems  in  Europe;  the  most  important 
task was to examine the functions of the Euro-
pean Parliament as  they existed, but these had 
to be related  to  the functions  of the national 
European parliament today. 
Professor  Ionescu  then  went  on  to  say  that 
various bodies were interested in the function-
ing of national parliaments today. 
He hoped  that  on  the  first  day  of the  sym-
posium, they would deal with national parlia-
ments  as  they  now operated and that on the 
second day they would investigate these  func-
tions.  They  might  discuss,  for  instance,  what 
Parliament ought to be. 
Parliaments  were  historical  expressions  or 
mirrors  of  the  history  of  their  nation.  They 
had  influenced  the  building  of  nation  states. 
The speaker  illustrated  his  point  by  referring 
to  French  history,  in  particular  the  French 
revolution.  He  described  how  the  Jacobin 
party,  France's  first  national  political  party, 
was formed out of the Breton regional group. 
Subsequently,  the  French  National  Assembly 
abolished  through  the  Le  Chapelier  law  the 
professional associations, guilds, syndicates etc. 
They were viewed as  useless  relics of the past. 
The speaker then referred to the English Parlia-
ment  which  had  the  longest  historical  con-
tinuity.  In  general European governments  had 
successfully  administered  their  nations'  affairs 
and had enabled their countries to make great 
progress. 
Decisions were imposed in  a sovereign way on 
everyone, everywhere. 
But, society had changed and was still chang-
ing.  Decisions  made  by  governments  were 
being  challenged,  sometimes  even  defied  in 
modern industrial societies. Such decisions were 
less  effective  and  less  real. 
Two  kinds  of  forces  operating  in  national 
societies  were  to  be  considered: 
1)  International  forces  where  events  in  one 
country could 'blow off course' the policies 
of another  country. 
2)  Corporate forces. The modern technological 
society  had enabled  these  forces  not  only 
to influence but to impose decisions. 
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There were three kinds of corporate forces: 
1)  Firms  or corporations, 
2)  Local  Government,  especially  regional 
authorities, 
3)  Trade unions  or syndicates. 
All  these  forces  sought  autonomy  which 
implied de-centralisation ; they were sometimes 
indifferent,  if not  actively  hostile  to  national 
parliaments. 
In  modern  society  multinational  corporations 
could  impose  decisions  on  nation  states  by 
transferring  capital  and  investments  from 
country to country. 
Regions  could  refuse  to  implement  national 
legislation, or would prefer to have their own 
parliaments.  Trade  unions  imposed  decisions 
by  interrupting  the  functions  of  society  until 
they  gained  their ends.  These  bodies  doubted 
the present importance of parliament. 
Members  of  parliament  were  sometimes  res-
ponsible  to  particular  interest  groups,  trade 
unions or regions. In some cases  the represen-
tative  might  become  a  delegate. 
Parliament should continue to be a forum and 
not become an arena of confrontation. Modern 
parliaments were undergoing a kind of disinte-
gration. A new type of parliament was needed 
with  new  institutional  devices.  The European 
Parliament might look for new approaches. 
In  his  address  Dr  GUIZZI,  of  the  Italian 
Chamber of Deputies  attempted an answer to 
the  question  whether  Parliament  could  be 
regarded  as  a  force  for  integration.  Judging 
from  experience in France and to some extent 
also  in  Italy,  he  would  have  to  deny  it.  The 
speaker's  view  was  that  the  causes  of  the 
crisis  of  Parliament  and  of  the  Community 
were  not  technical  but  purely  political.  In 
practice,  what  this  meant  was  that we  were 
reluctant to admit that the realities  of politics 
had  changed  profoundly  and  that  we  were 
faced  today  not  with  classical  parliamentary 
rule but rather with a government of political 
partie8. 
Dr Guizzi went on to say that the Community 
seemed at this point to be marking time. There 
was  a lack of political resolve  to make  Com-munity  instruments  function  effectively,  and 
the political parties seemed not to be conscious 
of a  European  dimension.  He felt  that if the 
process  of  integration  were  to  be  got  under 
way again, a more important role would have 
to  be given  to the European Parliament.  This 
would also be to the advantage of the national 
parliaments,  whose  powers  had,  to  some 
extent, been transferred to the Community. 
Dr Guizzi  concluded by saying that what was 
at  stake  today  was  the  very  survival  of  the 
democratic system, both at national and Com-
munity level.  It was  essential that all  political 
forces  should move speedily to fill  the present 
vacuum,  thus  forestalling  other  forces,  which 
in  many  cases  stood for  purely  sectoral inter-
ests. 
Professor  MACKINTOSH,  University  of 
London and Member of the British Parliament 
said  that he  wanted to take up  a point made 
by  Professor  von ·Beyme  when  he  had  said 
that his view of the powers of the U.K.  Parlia-
ment was too pessimistic; in fact he felt that it 
had  been  over-optimistic. 
He  wished to make the following  points  con-
cerning the threats to the British Parliament. In 
the first place the main function  of the House 
of Commons was as  an arena of political con-
flict;  it  was  not  a  decision-making  body. 
Governments now met pressure groups outside 
parliament  and took decisions  outside.  Under 
the  previous  Conservative  administration  this 
had been known as tripartism-a system where 
the  Prime  Minister  met,  for  example,  trade 
unions and employers at No 10 and a bargain-
ing  process  took  place-this  was  in  fact  a 
legislative process  at the end of which parlia-
ment was asked to endorse the decisions taken. 
The new  Labour  Government  behaved  in  the 
same way when they incorporated their agree-
ment  with  the  unions  into  their  election 
manifesto  and then  expected  the  new  parlia-
ment to  endorse this.  Such  behaviour reduced 
the  importance  of  parliament;  he  could 
remember the chairman of the group of miners' 
MPs  being  excluded  from  talks  between  the 
miners' trade union and No 10. 
And  now  the  party  in  power  believed  in  a 
new principle, that of the referendum. Hitherto, 
matters  had been settled by  a majority in  the 
House  of  Commons  but now  they  might  be 
settled by  a  majority  outside Parliament;  this 
was  an attack on the principles of parliament-
ary democracy. 
In  all  western  countries  Parliaments  had  lost 
power to the executive and to pressure groups, 
but it might be possible to arrest this process. 
For example, in the case of Britain, entry into 
Europe might have  helped  for  a  while.  Legal 
powers might have been lost, at the same time 
new  areas  for  parliamentary  discussion  might 
have been opened up.  An  example of this was 
that since  1947  the  British  Minister  of  Agri-
culture  for  three  months  in  the  year  did  not 
see  any  MPs  with  agricultural  interests  while 
he  was  negotiating  prices  with  the  N.F.U. 
Now,  however,  the  discussion  of  agricultural 
prices was a European matter and British MPs 
knew the arguments in Brussels and could make 
their  views  known.  But  this  could  only  be 
successful if the British Parliament would adapt 
its procedure to handle Community legislation; 
unfortunately, this had not happened as Parlia-
ment  had  not  allowed  for  proper  detailed 
scrutiny.  All  they  would  have  was  between 
six  and twelve debates  a year on issues  which 
excited political controversy.  The trouble was 
that while that followed the pattern of parlia-
ment's conduct on domestic issues, in the latter 
case, the executive had a majority in the Com-
mons to defend its position but the EEC  Com· 
mission  had  no  one  to  put  its  case  in  the 
House  and  so  the  whole  process  could  be 
negative  and  not  only  be  inadequate  as  a 
scrutinising process but also negative as regards 
European policy-making. 
Professor  CHAPMAN,  University  of  Sussex, 
said  that as  an  academic  and  an  ex-MP,  he 
wanted  to  speak  frankly  to  the  parliament-
arians present. They had been asked what was 
the  use  of Parliament.  They  had  to  consider 
the six functions  of Parliament and to get the 
balance  right.  The first  three  functions  were 
direct controls  over the  executive,  namely  the 
life of a government, its composition, and rules 
to  control it.  However,  both in  the European 
and national  parliaments,  they had  tended  to 
forget  the  other  three  functions  because  all 
MPs  were  Ministers  manque.  Committees 
laboured over texts which nobody would read 
and  in  the  case  of the  European  Parliament 
they  worked in  parallel with the  Council  and 
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govern if. they really did. 
There  should  be  greater  communication  be-
tween citizens and government and there should 
be  confrontation  between  government  and 
opposition in Parliament allowing the electorate 
a  real  choice.  Parliament's investigatory  work 
in  committee  could  also  be  improved,  they 
spent too much time in the necessary work on 
legal  texts  but not  enough  on  investigation: 
he  cited  the  common  agricultural policy  as  a 
case  in  point. The same  was  true of inflation 
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where committees would have better occupied 
their  time  investigating  and  reporting  after 
hearings in various countries of the Commun-
ity  rather  than  with  broad  economic  reports 
which  said  nothing  effectively.  They  would 
have  to see  what needed  to be done  to keep 
the balance right between the search for poli-
tical  power  and  a  proper  investigatory  role. 
The  Chairman  thanked  Mr  Chapman  and 
declared  the  plenary  session  adjourned  until 
5.00  p.m. THURSDAY, 2 MAY 1974 
Working Group No 1 
'PARLIAMENT AS  A FOCUS  OF OPPOSITION' The meeting commenced at 3.00 p.m. 
Chairman :  Professor  Andrea  MANZELLA, 
attached  to  the  Italian  Chamber  of Deputies. 
The  CHAIRMAN  reminded  the  meeting  that 
the topic for discussion in Group 1 was Parlia-
ment and Opposition. 
In  his  introductory  remarks  he  observed  that 
in  a  changing Parliament the  Opposition was 
also  changing,  adding  that  there  were  two 
main  factors  making  for  change  in  the tradi-
tional relations between opposition and major-
ity. The first was political and had to do with 
the  emergence  of  what was  known  as  extra-
parliamentary  opposition  in  all  its  various 
forms;  the  second  had to  do  with  the  exist-
ence of corporate bodies of various types  and 
with the fragmentation of public power, which 
today  was  wielded  through  a  greater  variety 
of channels  (public  undertakings  and regional 
authorities were cases in point). 
These two factors gave rise to major problems 
for  majority  parties  and  opposition  parties 
alike. 
Such  experiments  as  the  'Grand Coalition'  in 
Germany  or  the  recent  attempt  at 'historical 
compromise'  in  Italy showed an  awareness  of 
this  on  the  part of the  political  parties,  even 
though  opposite  reactions  had  occurred  in 
various  countries  in  an  attempt  to  break the 
pattern (regional  referendum in France during 
the  crisis  of  the  first  Gaullist  period;  forth-
coming  divorce  referendum  in  Italy;  mooted 
referendum  in  Great Britain on the renegotia-
tion of terms  of entry to the European Com-
munity). 
A  further  point was  that the  opposition  had 
begun  to  take  a  different  approach  to  tradi-
tional  parliamentary  machinery  (watchdog 
function,  legislative  process,  etc.,),  seeking  to 
use  it as  a means  of sharing in  decision-mak-
ing processes. 
The  Chairman  invited  the  members  of  the 
working  group  to  comment  on  and  explain 
similar changes within their own national par-
liaments. 
Mr KOOPS, Clerk to the Second House of the 
Dutch  States  General,  drew  attention  to  the 
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fact  that  in  several  countries  there  was  a 
minority  government  with  the  majority  in 
opposition.  The  term  'minority'  is  therefore 
not always identical with the term 'opposition'. 
He  would  therefore  like  to  define  the  term 
'opposition' as  follows:  parties not represented 
in  or without  allies  in  a  government. 
Mr BURGBACHER,  German  Member  of  the 
European  Parliament,  asked  the  following 
questions: 
1)  Was democracy the control of the minority 
by  the  majority?  If so,  who  took account 
of  whom? 
2)  What did  the working group  think of the 
'imperative  mandate',  under  which  parlia-
ment or the  individual  delegates  were  not 
responsible  to  their  own  consciences  as 
under  the  'free  mandate'  but  bound  by 
specific  instructions? 
3)  Was  democracy  compatible  with  the  fact 
that there were  now  forces  which claimed 
a  political  mandate without being  politic-
ally  accountable  to  anybody? 
Mr  VON  HASSEL,  Vice-President  of  the 
German  Chamber  of  Deputies,  answered  Mr 
Burgbacher's  second  question  as  follows:  He 
had seen  in  the Federal Republic of Germany 
the  vital  need  for  every  parliamentary  demo-
cracy  to  reject  an  imperative mandate.  Parlia-
ment  could  only  function  on  the  basis  of 
free  decisions  dictated  by  the  conscience  of 
the individual. 
The  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  minority 
was  the  first  essential  in  a  parliamentary 
democracy.  When  his  party  had  been  in  the 
majority  in  the  Bundestag  it  had been  parti-
cularly  concerned  to  defend  the  minority. 
Today,  however,  he  had  observed  that  the 
present majority, which had formerly  been  in 
opposition,  often  neglected  the  rights  of  the 
minority.  The  delegates  of  today's  majority 
coalition  came  with  preconceived,  one  might 
even say pre-agreed views,  to committee meet-
ings and automatically rejected the opposition's 
arguments.  The present majority's  practice  of 
deciding in advance what stand to adopt could 
be  explained  by  the  fact  that  they  had  not 
always  been  sure  of their  majority.  But even when  they were sure of it they constantly felt 
compelled to demonstrate it by a united stand. 
The  next  speaker  was  Professor  PREDIERI 
from  the University of Florence, who took up 
the  chairman's  suggestion  for  a  discussion 
from  various  angles  of  the  situation  in  the 
various  national parliaments,  especially  in the 
Italian  parliament with its  apparently  curious 
relationship  between  majority and opposition. 
In  Italy,  there  is  a  large  and  powerful  party 
of  the  Left  which  is  seen  by  some  as  being 
frankly hostile to the system. At the same time 
the  majority  party  has  enjoyed  unbroken 
power. What we are witnessing in Italy today 
is  a process, operating through the production 
of legislation,  in which  the party of the  Left 
is  being  integrated  into  the  government 
majority. 
The  Italian  parliament  produced  about  220 
laws every year, a remarkably high figure. 
This  he  saw  as  a  response  to  the  demands 
of the system;  other countries,  su~h as  Britain 
or the Federal  German Republic,  have tended 
to  produce  fewer  laws  and  a  greater  volume 
of delegated  legislation. 
The majority of Italian laws,  about 77°/o,  are 
adopted  in  the  various  parliamentary  com-
mittees. 
Legislation  was  to  a  great extent narrow and 
sectoral;  400fo  of  the  laws  passed  being  no 
more  than  largely  administrative  provisions, 
adopted  under  the  influence  of  pressure 
groups;  the  result  is  that  major  debates  on 
important  issues  are  frequently  not  held  at 
all or postponed. It should be added that 330fo 
of  all  laws  are  initiated  by  Parliament  and 
that  420fo  of  them  are  passed  with  amend-
ments. 
The  conclusion  from  this,  he  said,  was  that 
the  pressure  groups,  as  the  real  initiators  of 
sectoral  legislation,  brought  pressure  to  bear 
on majority and opposition alike. 
Discernible through this  body of legislation is 
a  genuinely  effective  association  between  op-
position and majority in what could be termed 
administrative activity. While opposition to the 
government at present takes in  about 450/o  of 
the  Parliament,  legislative  opposition  is  con· 
fined  to  200fo,  in  other  words  800fo  of  bills 
go  through  with  the  support  of  all  political 
groups in parliament. The line of demarcation 
between  government  and opposition  is  there-
fore  much  different  from  the traditional  con-
cept. 
This,  he  argued,  bore out the contention that 
in  discharging  its  legislative  function  the 
Italian  parliament  kept  hold  of  its  crucial 
function as  a mediator, despite all the changes 
that had occurred. 
In  certain  respects  the  Italian  parliament  did 
not conform to the traditional British pattern, 
nor even  to that apparent in the French Fifth 
Republic  or  in  Germany.  It  could  be  more 
readily compared with the United States  Con-
gress,  with the  sole  difference  that the  latter 
had  a  very  different  relationship  with  the 
executive  and enjoyed great stability, whereas 
in  Italy  there  was  a  government  crisis  on 
average every 319  days. 
Whether it deviated or not from  the standard 
model,  the  Italian  parliament  did  have  one 
destructive  feature-the  degree  to  which  it 
could be penetrated by pressure groups;  these 
formed a sub-system entirely outside the party 
system and acted on Parliament in such a way 
as  to produce a  measure  of  cross-fertilisation 
between  government  and  opposition.  In  this 
way  they  enhanced  the  government's  role  in 
integrating and mediating between the various 
political forces. 
The  Chairman  then  called  Professor  VEDEL 
who sought to give  a  definition of the notion 
of opposition. He pointed out that there were, 
in  fact,  different types  of opposition:  internal 
opposition in the party, as  in the single party 
system;  opposition to the  government  and  to 
the majority, which was what we most natural-
ly  understood by  the term;  opposition  to  the 
regime  and,  finally,  opposition  to  society, 
which  could  also  be  designated  as  'protest' 
and emanates essentially from young people. 
Opposition always existed; nowhere was there 
unanimity.  The speaker  stressed  the  fact  that 
the  traditional  opposition  to  the  majority 
within  our  parliamentary  system  was  only  a 
special  instance  of  the  general  opposition 
situation.  It did not call  in  question the rules 
of the game. Professor Vedel  then looked into 
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tion within the strict framework of the British 
type of parliamentary system. These conditions 
were,  as  he  saw it: 
1)  the credibility of a  change of government; 
2)  the possibility of alternation; 
3)  the existence  of an ideology  shared by all 
the citizens of the same country. 
The  speaker  then  considered  the  hypothesis 
according to which  conflicts  with the opposi-
tion were no longer based on party ideologies, 
i.e.  on  antagonism  between  the  majority  and 
the opposition, but on antagonism between the 
executive  and parliament. In other words, the 
executive  as  such would constitut!'!  the major-
ity and the entire parliament the opposition. 
Consequently,  within  the  framework  of  an 
integrated  Europe,  parliamentarism  could  fol-
low  two  divergent  paths.  The  first  was  the 
classic  situation  in  which  a  parliamentary 
majority  supported  the  government  while  the 
opposition  looked  towards  the  future,  cons-
tituting  a  virtual  majority  of  the  future.  The 
second  situation  was  less  classic:  parliament 
became  a  forum  for  claims,  grievances  and 
compromises  where  an  ideal  was  pursued  in 
opposition  to  an  executive  which  governed 
in  terms  of the possibilities This made it pos-
sible to avoid the danger constituted in a clas-
sic parliamentary framework by the formation 
of purely  national  oppositions.  The European 
Parliament  might  then  not  be  a  force  in 
decision-making  but  a  force  for  putting 
through demands,  a place for  channelling op-
position, in a pursuit of the ideal, to decisions 
dictated by circumstances. 
The Chairman then  called  Mr VON BEYME 
who  answered  questions  raised  by  Mr  von 
Hassel  concerning  the  right  of  expression  of 
the minority and the danger of the imperative 
mandate. 
He pointed  out that in  the  Federal  Republic 
of Germany the minority was  fairly  well  pro-
tected. There was, in fact,  a Charter of minor-
ity  rights.  The  minority  was  able  to  table 
amendments which were taken into considera-
tion. 
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The  two-chamber  system  offered  certain 
guarantees  to  the  opposition,  inasmuch  as  it 
curbed  or modified  the majority will.  In  both 
the UK and West Germany, an effort was made 
to  consult the  opposition,  although  the latter 
was not always inclined to associate itself with 
government  policy.  Mr von Beyme  felt,  how-
ever,  that in times  of crisis-and was  not the 
present period a time of  crisis  par excellence? 
-the solution  of  a  conflict  might  be  more 
important than  the  granting  of guarantees  to 
the minority. 
Turning  to  the  problem  of  the  imperative 
mandate,  the  speaker  indicated  that  he  was 
personally opposed to it, not because it would 
mean the end of parliamentarism-which had 
nothing  to  fear  as  long  as  pluralism  was 
guaranteed-but because,  on the one hand, it 
would involve great expense and, on the other, 
it would make things too easy for the pressure 
groups:  the best organised and most powerful 
interests  would  be  able  to  grant  or withhold 
the  mandate,  as  they  pleased.  The imperative 
mandate could  also  be  used  by  party author-
ities  to  rid  themselves  of  'undesirable'  parlia-
mentarians. 
In  large organisations or bodies the imperative 
mandate  could  never  really  endanger  parlia-
mentary democracy. 
Professor  IONESCU  asked  whether  or  not 
oppositions really oppose, if Governments can 
no longer be said really to govern in  the clas-
sical  sense.  Nowadays,  in  the  classical  sense 
of  the  expression,  it  was  important  to 
distinguish between opposition as  it existed in 
parliament  and  opposition  as  it  existed  in 
modern  industrial  countries.  It had  been  sug-
gested  that corporate opposition might  in  the 
future  replace  the  systems  based  on  party 
opposition. But how responsible to parliament 
is  this  opposition and how responsible  will  it 
be in the future? It was important to ask what 
was  meant by responsible  opposition:  opposi-
tion which of its  very  nature was  opposed to 
the system in  its entirety should be considered 
outside it.  In the United Kingdom, two recent 
governments  (1964-1970  and  1970-1974)  had 
attempted to involve  opposition  of  a  sectoral 
kind in the business of government. One of the 
reasons  they  failed  was  that the  trade unions 
regarded themselves  as  being by definition not capable  of  forming  a  substitute  government. 
What  kind  of  opposition  could  be  seen 
developing  in  Europe?  Quite  possibly,  the 
European  Parliament  was  better  able  to  act 
as  a  forum  for  interest  groups  (regional, 
generational  or  sectoral)  than  the  national 
parliaments,  and  this  was  something  which 
might  be  developed.  However,  it  would  still 
be  important to reconcile these different kinds 
of  opposition.  Professor  Ionescu  also  distin-
guished between extra-parliamentary and anti-
parliamentary  opposition.  When  parliaments 
showed too much bipartisanship on some con-
troversial issues, extra-parliamentary opposition 
developed.  But extra-parliamentary  opposition 
was  not opposed  to  the  institution  of parlia-
ment as  such.  It only  helped  from  outside to 
make  parliament  aware  of  questions  which 
agitated public opinion. 
Professor  STEFF ANI,  University  of Hamburg, 
commented  particularly  on  Mr  Burgbacher's 
and Mr von Hassel's  remarks  on the signific-
ance  of the imperative mandate.  He said they 
had obviously both been speaking from  recent 
experience  in  the  Bundestag.  In  the  past,  as 
now,  the opposition in  plenary sittings  of the 
Bundestag  could  generally  only  consider  faits 
accomplis.  In the committees, however, it had 
previously had considerable power to influence 
decisions,  although recently this had obviously 
been restricted, since the parties of the govern-
ment coalition obeyed  a  strict party mandate. 
Mr von  Hassel  had  asked  what  the  political 
scientists meant by an imperative mandate and 
what they  thought about it.  A  parliamentary 
mandate  authorised  delegates  to  take  binding 
decisions  on behalf of others.  This  authorisa-
tion could legally take two forms.  It could be 
'free',  that  is,  not  legally  binding  on  the 
mandatee. Under the 'imperative mandate', on 
the  other  hand,  the  mandatee  would  im-
mediately  lose  his  mandate  if  he  failed  to 
comply  with instructions. 
Mr HUMBLET,  Clerk  to the Belgian  Senate; 
brought  the  discussion  back  to  the  central 
theme, namely, the role of the opposition, and 
made the following observations: 
1)  To  his  way  of  thinking,  the  imperative 
mandate was, at least in Belgium, a fiction, 
for the elected parliamentarian represented 
the  whole  country.  However,  the political 
groups  were  acquiring  more  and  more 
influence  and  there  was  no  longer  any 
question of independence, within either the 
majority or the opposition. The imperative 
mandate  did  not,  therefore,  exist  in  law, 
but only in fact. 
2)  As  regards  the  attitude  of  parliament 
towards the opposition the situation of the 
opposition was roughly that of the govern-
ment,  since  it possessed  a  whole  range  of 
parliamentary  methods  or  techniques  for 
making  itself  heard,  e.g.  question-time;  it 
could  also  find  expression  in  all  the  par-
liamentary organs. 
In  conclusion,  Mr  Humblet  felt  that  Private 
Members  no  longer  existed,  decisions  being 
taken by groups;  or, if they did exist, they no 
longer had any  powers. 
The next speaker was  Professor SIOTIS  from 
the  University  of  Geneva.  He  first  remarked 
that  in  referring  to  national  parliaments  at 
this  meeting,  speakers  always  had  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament  in  mind,  hoping  to  discover 
what could be  done specifically to develop  its 
structure. 
The  speaker  distinguished  between  two  types 
of opposition:  opposition  to  the  government 
and opposition to the  regime,  though the lat-
ter did not necessarily mean opposition to the 
system  as  a  whole. 
This  was  to  look  at  the  whole  matter  in 
political terms, but it could also be approached 
from  a more sociological standpoint, by intro-
ducing  the  class  concept,  for  instance,  and, 
with it,  a Marxist vision  of the world. 
However, everyone would agree on one thing, 
i.e.  that in  European  democratic  systems  the 
opposition was seen as  the alternative govern-
ment. 
Looking  to  the  future  at  European  level, 
Professor Siotis  expressed  concern  at the lack 
of an  opposition in  the European parliament-
ary  system  and,  what  was  worse,  of  any 
foundations on which it might be built. 
He believed that two serious mistakes had been 
made.  The  first  was  to  envisage  European 
Union  as  a  process  of  agreement,  whereas 
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for disagreement. The speaker said that Europe 
could not be founded on consensus; if it were 
it would not be a  democratic reality. 
In  the  second  place  it  had  been  a  serious 
mistake  to  see  European  opposition  in  terms 
of  antagonism  between  opposing  bodies.  Es-
sentially,  this  approach had deprived  us  of  a 
genuine  democratic  system,  since  it  reflected 
an exclusively institutional line of thought. He 
seriously  doubted  whether  a  genuine  opposi-
tion  was  feasible  in  the  absence  of  a  valid 
alternative. 
The  Swiss  government,  he  added,  might  be 
quoted  as  an  example.  Since  the  end  of  the 
Second  World  War,  the  government  coalition 
had included about 950fo  of all  political forces 
in  the country. During the last elections how-
ever,  members  of parliament had,  in  a  sense, 
rebelled  against  their parties,  arguing that the 
opposition  had  virtually  ceased  to  play  an 
effective role.  As  a result, they had looked for 
other ways of expressing valid opposition. The 
speaker concluded by suggesting that the work-
ing group might consider whether an effective 
comparison could be drawn between the Swiss 
situation  and that of the  Community. 
Mr PREMOLI,  Italian  member  of  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament,  began  by  describing  the 
acutely  embarrassing  situation  of the  opposi-
tion  in  Italy  and the  resulting  debasement  of 
its  parliamentry function.  In  plain  words,  the 
dignity  of Parliament  was  offended  and  even 
trampled  underfoot,  and  the  speaker  quoted 
in this regard some personal experiences which 
he  had had as  chairman· of the Committee on 
Health,  all  of  which  pointed  to  a  complete 
lack  of  any  information  service  for  members 
of Parliament. 
Even  questions  in  Parliament  were  not 
answered  promptly,  and  the  replies,  when 
given,  always  took the  form  of  a  defence  of 
official  positions  and  were  never  found 
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satisfactory by the questioner.  Thus, even  this 
major instrument of parliamentary control was 
being  downgraded. 
One  method  of  strengthening  the  opposition 
would be to give careful consideration to draft 
legislation  submitted  by  it;  in  practice,  bills 
submitted by the opposition were dismissed in 
record  time  and  were  certainly  not  given 
serious attention. 
The speaker concluded by requesting  that the 
opposition should be  accorded greater respect 
and  dignity,  through  better  use  of  existing 
parliamentary machinery. 
Professor THA  YSEN,  University  of Hamburg, 
stressed  that  means  of  strengthening  the  op-
position  and  protecting  its  rights  did  exist. 
Views  differed  regarding  the  crisis  in  the 
institution of parliament. It did exist certainly 
and  reforms  were  needed.  Structural  tensions 
had  to  be  overcome  through  institutional 
means;  there  was  clearly  a  future  for  both 
the  imperative  mandate  and  the  opposition. 
The imperative mandate was,  moreover,  quite 
compatible with parliamentary democracy,  for 
democracy involved different kinds of mandate 
from  the  electorate.  The imperative  mandate 
could  be  assigned  by the  electors,  the  parties 
or the political  groups. 
The  opposition  must  be  given  the  chance  to 
influence  the  legislative  process,  although  it 
might  fail  to  avail  itself  of that chance.  Pro-
fessor  Thaysen  thought  it  very  important  to 
enlighten  the  general  public  about  the  value 
of  the  opposition's  work  and  the  scope  for 
opposition activities. 
The CHAIRMAN concluding the meeting, said 
that  three  main  issues  had  been  raised;  how 
opposition might best be  defined;  the increas-
ing  power  of  pressure  groups;  and  how  op-
position  at  a  European  level  might  best  be 
organised. THURSDAY, 2 MAY 1974 
Working Group No 2 
'PARLIAMENT AND ADMINISTRATION' The meeting commenced at 3.00 p.m. 
Chairman: Professor J.  KOOIMAN, University 
of Delft. 
The  CHAIRMAN  began  by  making  certain 
announcements  about the interpreting system, 
the  speaking  time  allotted  to  speakers,  the 
need  for  speakers  to  speak  slowly  and  to 
identify  themselves,  etc. 
Coming  to  the  topic  to  be  discussed  in  the 
working  group,  he  said  that  the  subject  of 
Parliament  and  Administration  was  not  a 
particularly exciting or glamorous  one;  at the 
same time, the basic hard core of parliament's 
work revolved around administration. 
As Professor von Beyme had said in his speech 
that morning, the legislative function of parlia-
ment  was  receding  somewhat  into  the  back-
ground  and other functions  such  as  the  con-
trol  function  were  coming  to  the  fore.  We 
might see this control function being exercised 
in  certain  important  areas,  such  as,  for 
instance, budgetary administration, the control 
of long-term  planning,  the  control  of  day-to-
day administration etc. 
The  Chairman  also  referred  to  a  threefold 
distinction made in the matter of parliament's 
control  function-the  classical  control  func-
tion,  an  ad  hoc  control  function  and  what 
is  sometimes called the 'ante-control' function, 
which  has  to  do  with the  checks  and super-
vision that parliament can exercise  over long-
term planning control for  the future. 
He  suggested  that  the  discussions  might  be 
structured  along  this  distinction  and  invited 
contributions  from  all  the  members  of  the 
group  present. 
Mr AIGNER,  German  Member  of the Euro-
pean  Parliament,  raised  the  question  of how 
far  Parliaments  could  still  be  regarded  as  an 
autonomous element in the classical  definition 
of  the  three  different  powers.  He  thought 
that in a great many states a distinction could 
be  drawn  between  the  government  and  the 
parliamentary majority which supported it on 
the one hand, and the opposition on the other. 
This  division  of power was  not embodied  in 
the  constitution  but  was  evident  in  political 
294 
practice and must consequently be taken into 
account in any analysis  of parliamentary con- · 
trol. 
There  were  also  developments  within  the 
individual parties which did not conform to a 
literal  interpretation  of  the  constitution.  The 
individual Member of Parliament who wished 
to have any practical influence over policy had 
to  follow  the  party  line.  It  was  mainly  the 
party  leaders  who  determined  parliamentary 
activity,  and their first  concern was  to gain a 
parliamentary majority for their party in future 
elections.  This  meant  in  practice  that  the 
activities  of  the  groups  were  very  largely 
determined by their likely impact on the mass 
media. 
Professor  SCHEUNER,  University  of  Bonn, 
agreed basically with Mr Aigner's analysis, but 
thought there were areas in which parliament-
ary  functions  could  be precisely  distinguished 
and  defined.  He  then  discussed  the  way  in 
which  plans  were  drawn  up  and  adopted  in 
Parliaments.  He referred  to  the findings  of  a 
German commission of enquiry, which in 1972 
had recommended  giving  the  'Lander'  parlia-
ments  a  share· in  state  planning.  A  recently 
published report by the commission of enquiry 
on the  need  for  a  total revision  of the  Swiss 
constitution contained a  similar proposal. 
It was  essential  for  parliaments  to be  able  to 
exercise  control  over  the  actual  details  of 
legislation. Particularly with long-term budget-
ary  planning-as  carried  out  today-Parlia-
ment  must  be  involved  right  from  the  start, 
otherwise  it  would  have  no  more  than  an 
auditing function. 
Professor CHAPMAN said that he would like 
to give  an  outline of the British experience  in 
the areas referred to by Mr Aigner and Profes-
sor Scheuner. 
He referred  to a  special  committee  set  up  by 
the  British  House  of  Commons  to  study  the 
entire  question  of parliamentary  participation 
in forward  planning.  The work of this  com-
mittee  highlighted  the  fact  that  preventive 
control  was  the  all-important  factor.  For 
instance, in the matter of budgets, only about 
30fo  of  proposed  expenditure  could  be 
changed  in  a  budget  at  the  time  when  the budget was  announced, as  credits  would have 
been  earmarked possibly for  years  in  advance 
for  specific  expenditures  such  as  education, 
defence,  etc.  For this  reason, Parliament must 
be  involved  in  forward  planning  of  these 
expenditures if it was to have any real control 
in  budgetary matters. 
He agreed with the point made by Mr Aigner 
that party political matters tended to be fought 
between  governments  and  opposition, even  in 
matters  affecting  the  public welfare generally. 
People  tended  to  want  to  score  political 
points, to catch the eye of people who mattered 
and generally to make  capital of the political 
opportunities  afforded  by  committee  debates. 
However,  if  the  committee  was  properly 
constituted  and  run,  this  weakness  could  be 
minimised.  He saw the proper venue for party 
political  battles  as  remaining  in  the  so-called 
classical control function situations. 
Mr AIGNER  pointed  out that  the  European 
Parliament's  power  to  influence  the  budget 
was  even  less  than  the  figure  of  30/o  might 
suggest,  since  the  governments  had  much 
wider freedom  of manoeuvre in  implementing 
the budget. 
Professor  AVRIL,  Universities  of Poitiers  and 
Paris,  stressed  the  importance  of  committee 
work,  where  it was  easier  to  bring  out  the 
real  aspects  of problems;  once  the  discussion 
became  public,  in  plenary  Slttmg,  each 
member  of  parliament  re-aligned  himself  on 
party lines. 
The  CHAIRMAN  felt  that  differentiation 
between the political and technical aspects was 
extremely  difficult  because  the very  means  of 
planning had become  political:  even  the most 
technical and new budgetary planning systems 
had  a  considerable  political  element  in  them. 
Mr PATIJN, Dutch Member of the European 
Parliament, believed that there were great dif-
ficulties  in  discussing  and  debating  general 
outlines  because  of the  pressures  which  grew 
up  to  force  governments  and  parliaments  to 
change  long-term  decisions.  He  cited  the 
example  of the  closing  of  the  dykes  in  Hol-
land when environmental pressure groups had 
recently called intci  question the decision taken 
many  years  ago.  He  also  talked  of  the  dis-
advantaged position of parliamentarians, small 
in  number  and  with  small  staffs,  trying  to 
provide  budgetary  alternatives  in  a  situation 
where  the  administrative  experise  of  the 
bureaucracy created a one-sided battle. He felt 
that administrations never offered two choices 
to  parliaments  and  that  parliaments  never 
asked  for such choices. 
Mr BARCLAY, Secretary of the UK Delegation 
to the  European  Parliament,  thought that the 
British Government tried to give such a choice 
to the British Parliament by explaining to what 
degree  their  estimates  were  firm  or  realistic 
and  what  major  changes  to  them  would  be 
involved  by  changing  the  policy.  The  choice 
he felt  was between a confrontation approach 
and  cooperation  both  between  parties  and 
between  parliament  and  the  government, 
Where  party  positions  were  taken  up  before 
examination  in  depth  of  problems  it  was 
extremely  difficult  to  get  information  and 
hence to make the policy flexible.  He believed 
that the pre-legislation process  of for example 
the  'green  paper'  where  the  government  set 
out  its  preliminary  thinking  was  extremely 
useful.  He mentioned the committee examina-
tion  of the proposed tax credit system  of the 
previous  government  in  the  United  Kingdom 
where  opinions  had  been  sought  before  firm 
positions had been taken up. 
Mr EHLERMANN, of the European Commis-
sion in Brussels, compared the powers of con-
trol of national parliaments with  those of the 
European Parliament.  He thought parliament-
ary  control  depended  on  three  basic  factors: 
the  work  of  the  committees,  the  role  of the 
parties  and the position of the government. 
Assuming that control by committees was most 
effective  when  they  met  in  secret,  then  the 
European Parliament's power of control could 
be  considered particularly effective.  The same 
was  true of the role  of the parties. If it was 
held that the national parliaments were unable 
to exercise real control because the position of 
the  government  was  secured  by  the  majority 
party,  it should follow  that the opposite  was 
true at European level  where the party system 
did  not  apply.  The  Commission  was  much 
more  prepared  to  cooperate  with  the  Euro-
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with its  parliament. The Parliament's commit-
tees  could  obtain  all  the  information  they 
required  provided  they  were  insistent  enough 
in asking for it. 
On this  assumption  the  European  Parliament 
was in a better position to influence the execu-
tive  than  a  national  parliament. 
Professor SCHEUNER shared Mr Patijn's view 
that it was  extremely  difficult  for  Parliament 
to  exercise  preventive  control  because  of  the 
uncertainty of future developments. 
Professor  Scheuner  spoke  of  the  advantages 
of the  federal  system  for  the exercise  of par-
liamentary  control.  The opposition  party had 
more power in the central parliament because 
it exercised  executive  functions  in  the regions 
and therefore  had at its  disposal  an  adminis-
tration which could provide it with the infor-
mation required for effective action. 
Lord O'HAGAN, United Kingdom Member of 
the European Parliament, agreed that commit-
tees  were  an  excellent  political  instrument  if 
they  would  use  the  powers  given  to them  to 
get  information. He felt  that the  Commission 
should work closely  with committee chairmen 
so  that  the  latter  could  ask  for  information 
about Community proposals still in a formative 
stage.  In  this  way,  the  committee  structure 
might  sometimes  be  more useful  to the Com-
mission  vis-a-vis  the  Council,  as  suggested  by 
Mr Ehlerman. 
The CHAIRMAN felt that there might be some 
danger to the independence of the Parliament 
if it proceeded in  that direction. 
Lord O'HAGAN was concerned that informa-
tion to  the people  about the Community was 
usually provided by national governments and 
that  oppositions  should  use  the  committee 
structure  in  the  European  Parliament  so  that 
better  information  for  home  consumption 
could be provided if the Commission was wil-
ling  to  be  used  in  this  way.  This  need  not 
affect  the  independence  of  the  European 
Parliament. 
Mr  KIRK,  United  Kingdom  Member  of  the 
European  Parliament,  thought  that  the  main 
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dispute in Parliament tended to be the political 
clash between individual parties of the various 
Member States and that this made comparison 
between  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
national parliaments invalid. He felt that in the 
national parliaments committees were hindered 
in  their  investigatory  role  by  the  administra-
tion  using  its  majority  on  the  committees  to 
block  the  investigatory  process  each  time  a 
committee seemed  to be getting  too  close  for 
comfort. He felt that unless the legislative and 
the  executive  branches  were  completely 
divorced, which he felt unlikely for some time, 
it  would  be difficult  for  parliaments  to  keep 
to a purely representational role. 
Mr AIGNER wished to examine the reality of 
the  present  situation  in  which  powers  were 
divided between national and European levels. 
He  believed  that  if  parliament  had  a  fully 
investigatory  power  it  could  do  without 
certain  legislative  powers.  He  mentioned  the 
history  of the Equalisation  of Burdens  law in 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  as  a  case 
in  which  governments  and  parliaments  had 
been  and were tied to a  decision  taken many 
years  ago.  He  felt  it  important  to  establish 
the  role of the national parliaments  and then 
to establish  a  link  between  the  national  and 
European legislatures. 
Mr AUDLAND,  Deputy  Secretary  General  of 
the  Commission  of  European  Communities, 
agreed with the importance of the investigatory 
power  of  national  Parliaments  which  he  felt 
should  be  more  fully  exploited.  He  believed 
that British  Ministers,  for  example,  were  less 
worried  by  set  piece  debates  of  one  or two 
days  than  by  in  depth  scrutiny  by  specialist 
committees.  He  felt  there  were  limits  to  the 
extent  to  which  government  supporters  in  a 
committee  could  foreclose  discussions  poten-
tially  embarrassing for  it.  Indeed  any  sign  by 
a  government majority that it wished  to stop 
further  investigation would be  likely  to incite 
a  minority  opposition  to  pursue  the  matter. 
He believed that a thorough investigation could 
often throw up new  facts  which would cause 
the  administration  to  accept  the  need  for 
changes  in its  policies. 
Mr PATIJN,  said  that most parliaments  only 
thought about planning in the period immedi-ately  preceding  an  election  and  then  forgot 
about  it.  Thus,  the  administrators  had  an 
advantage  over  them  because  they  continued 
planning  all  the  time.  When  a  parliament 
wanted an  alternative, it had to refer back to 
an  administration  which  had  drawn  up  the 
original.  There  was  normally  no  independent 
staff  available  to  advise  parliamentarians.  He 
asked  whether it was  possible  for  parliament 
to  provide  an  alternative  to  a  plan  it  had 
rejected.  He added  that planning was  out of 
the  question  in  the  context  of  the  European 
Parliament,  because  it was  only  a  spare-time 
activity for most.  The best they could do was 
to react. 
He pointed out that planning was  central.  All 
the  Parliament  could  do  was  query  and 
investigate  other  people's  work;  the  only 
possible action was rejection. 
However,  the  consequences  of  rejection  were 
serious,  as  there had to  be  an  alternative.  In 
fact,  one  was  obliged  to  refer  the  problem 
back to the original planners,  and the parlia-
mentarian  could  do  very  little  unless  he  had 
his own people preparing plans. 
Mr AIGNER observed that even if Parliament 
had  the  right  to  reject  a  plan  it  could  not 
exercise  that right since its objections  did not 
generally warrant such drastic action. 
Mr  WHEELER-BOOTH,  Secretary  to  the 
British Delegation to the European Parliament, 
pointed  out  that  since  the  decisions  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers  were  supposed  to  be 
legally  binding,  once  agreed,  it followed  that 
the legislative scrutiny of EEC proposals at the 
national  parliament  level  had  to  be  pre-
legislative in nature. There were some matters, 
e.g.,  of a  technical  nature which were  as  well 
considered  by  civil  servants  using  objective 
criteria  as  by parliamentarians. The one place 
where a parliament could play an effective part 
in policy formation was in Washington where 
Congress  could  have  plans  drawn  up  by  its 
large  staff  without  having  to  depend  on  the 
administration. 
The CHAIRMAN pointed out that comparison 
with the U.S.  was difficult as  the systems were 
quite  different.  They  also  had  two  bureau-
cracies to cope with. 
Miss  FLESCH,  Luxembourg  Member  of  the 
European Parliament, said that Europe had ten 
bureaucracies,  nine  national  and  one  Euro-
pean.  She  then  referred  to  Mr Patijn's  point 
about  governments  having  a  monopoly  on 
expertise. She felt the question was essentia11ly 
what was parliament's r6le--to take part in the 
actual planning or to consider the alternatives 
and  decide?  She  felt  the  latter  was  the  true 
'r6le of Parliament. 
Mr JOZEAU-MARIGNE,  French  Member  of 
the  European  Parliament,  speaking  in  his 
capacity as  former chairman of the Committee 
on Legislation of the French Senate,, reiterating 
the doubts expressed by Miss  Flesch who had 
questioned  whether planning was  within  par-
liament's province, mentioned the various ways 
in  which  relations  between  parliament  and 
government  were  regulated  in  the  different 
countries.  In  France,  for  example,  where 
Articles 34 and 37 of the Constitution organized 
the  separation  of powers  between  parliament 
and  government,  the  former  enacted  laws, 
while the latter issued decrees  and regulations. 
However,  whatever  the  arrangements,  parlia-
ment  always  retained  control  over  the use  of 
appropriations.  And  this  power  was  of  con-
siderable  importance,  although  requmng 
extreme tact in its use.  The committee chaired 
by Mr Jozeau Marigne, preferred prior, direct 
contact  on  all  contentious  matters,  not  with 
experts  but  with  the  responsible  minister 
himself.  The committee then used the budget-
ary  argument prior to any conflict.  Successive 
governments, impressed by this power of con-
trol,  had  often  preferred  to  submit  the  text 
of decrees  and regulations  to the  appropriate 
parliamentary  committee  for  prior  opinion. 
Considerable  differences  were  to  be  noted 
within  the  European  Parliament.  The  com-
munity system  did not rest on a strict separa-
tion  between  executive  and legislative  power; 
the  latter,  at  all  events,  was  not  vested  in 
the  European  Parliament.  There  nevertheless 
existed a power of control in the hands of the 
European  parliamentary  committees,  where  a 
consensus  frequently  emerged  among  parlia-
mentarians and members of the executive Com-
mission.  It was  not, strictly  speaking,  a  form 
of control but rather one of consultation and 
preliminary  agreement. 
297 Mr KIRK,  stated  that the British Government 
had plans to provide funds for the parliament-
ary parties to have  organizations to carry out 
research and study problems for them-some-
what  similar  to  the  European  Parliament's 
system of providing secretariats for the political 
groups. 
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Professor  CHAPMAN,  said  that  a  really 
determined  parliamentarian  could  get  any 
information he wanted.  It was  not correct  to 
say  that  only  governments  could  do  so: 
specialist  staff  were  by  no  means  difficult  to 
get. 
The meeting concluded. THURSDAY, 2 MAY 1974 
Working Group No 3 
'PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION' The  meeting  commenced at 2.45  p.m. 
Chairman:  Mr  Helveg  PETERSEN,  Danish 
Member  of  the  European  Parliament. 
In  his  opening remarks, the CHAIRMAN sug-
gested  that the  most  practical  use  that could 
be  made  of  the limited time  available was  to 
have  a  'brainstorming'  session  to  get  ideas 
which could be put to the plenary session. For 
this  purpose he  suggested  the  work could  be 
dealt  with  under  two  headings:  Parliament's 
access  to  the  public  and  people's  access  to 
their  Parliaments. 
On the  first  point, he  asked  how parliaments 
could change to make it easier for the general 
public  to  follow  what  they  were  doing.  He 
asked,  too,  how  parliaments  could  step  up 
their own information work through the mass 
media  and here he laid special stress  on tele-
vision,  special  publications  and  educational 
institutions. 
Turning  to  people's  access  to  Parliament,  he 
asked how the average citizen could gain easier 
access  to his  parliament through public  hear-
ings,  party organisations  and the organisation 
of general  debates  amongst  the  electorate  on 
important issues. 
Finally, he asked how the general public could 
be  more  involved  in  the  decision-making 
process,  apart  from  general  elections  and 
referenda.  Could  use  be  made  of  cable  tele-
vision? Would it be possible to ascertain what 
people thought on the very same  day as  deci-
sions  were  taken?  How,  finally,  could  cable 
television  be  used  for  internal  information so 
that  parliaments  could  see  the  consequences 
of decisions  they  were taking. 
Mr  VAN  DER  SANDEN,  Dutch  member  of 
the  European  Parliament,  wished  to  confine 
his  observations  to  the  interaction  between 
the work of the European and national parlia-
ments,  and the way  this  work was  perceived 
by  the  public.  He  was  not  advocating  full, 
direct  television  coverage  of meetings  of  the 
European and national parliaments. The essen-
tial  aim  was  to  get  the  highlights  of parlia-
mentary life across  to the public. Most parlia-
mentary  activities,  however,  consisted  of 
debates  on  technical  points,  which  if broad-
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cast,  would kill  public  interest  in  direct  tele-
vision  coverage.  The  middle  way  would  be 
to transmit summaries of debates.  The parlia-
mentarians should not, however, do this them-
selves,  but leave  it to  the professional parlia-
mentary press. 
Summarising, the speaker said that full  cover-
age  must  be  treated  with  great  caution;  he 
called  for  the  introduction  of  a  regular  pro-
gramme  on Parliament  with  clear  summaries, 
as  objective as  possible and with the principle 
of  fair  representation  of  all  opinions  being 
observed  by  the  professional  press. 
Mr  LENIHAN,  Irish  Member  of  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament,  agreed  that  the  previous 
speaker had been  right to emphasise the dan-
gers of television coverage of the work of par-
liament.  He also  felt  that the work of parlia-
ment  itself  might  be  in  danger  of  being 
frustrated by those seeking to make an appeal 
through  television  screen  rather  than  getting 
down to the proper business of parliament. 
He advanced  a  case  for  the provision  of per-
manent radio  and television  studios in  parlia-
mentary  buildings  in  which  provision  could 
be made for commentary, summary, interviews 
on  matters  of  significant  topical  importance 
and  special  interventions  by  prominent  par-
liamentarians.  ' 
He felt  too that there  was  a  place  for  better 
reporting  of the  work done  by  parliamentary 
committees.  In  this  field  there  was  a  big  job 
to be done in educating the public. Parliaments 
had a dual role to play both in devising legisla-
tion  and  in  reacting  to  matters  of  topical 
interest. It was important to improve methods 
of combining these  two  aspects  of the  parlia-
mentary  function.  He  made  a  distinction 
between  the  parliaments  of  the  United  King-
dom  and  Ireland  which  were,  he  thought,  to 
be preferred for  their methods of dealing with 
urgent motions  and with questions,  and those 
of the  countries  of the  Six  which  were  more 
effective  in  their  committee  procedures  to 
achieve  a  consensus  of opinion.  He  said  that 
the two  aspects  of initial  comment on topical 
matters  and committee work should be  given 
equal attention. 
Mr Lenihan referred briefly to the question of 
participation  and feedback.  He did  not agree with the use of referendum except as  a means 
of amending constitutions. He considered that 
it was an avoidance of parliamentary respons-
ibility  to  refer  back to  the electorate matters 
which  the  elected  representatives  should  be 
competent  to  decide.  The  presentation  of  a 
black  and  white  question  to  the  electorate 
might so  simplify the issues  as  to be virtually 
dishonest.  Finally,  he  said  that  he  thought 
public  opinion  polls  represented  a  dangerous 
intrusion  into  the working of  parliament and 
elections and that they should be banned dur-
ing  election  campaigns. 
Doctor SAROGNI, from the Secretariat of the 
Italian  Senate,  said that the man in the street 
was  completely  cut  off  from  parliament  and 
needed  to be  better informed of what it was 
doing.  Parliamentary  problems  with  all  the 
new and changing factors  involved, should be 
introduced  into  the  schools  where  interest 
was  keen.  Information  given  in  the  schools 
should not only be about the national parlia-
ments  but  also,. about  the  European  Parlia-
ment. 
She  saw summary reports of proceedings  as  a 
possible  means  of  disseminating  information 
on  parliamentary  activities.  At  the  present 
time,  however,  these  summary  reports  had 
only a  limited distribution,  although it would 
be  very  desirable  that  they  should  reach  all 
citizens. 
In Italian constitutional law and in regulations 
enacted  by  both  Houses  of  Parliament,  pro-
vision  was  made for  petitions  as  a  means  of 
expressing  'common  needs'.  If  this  practice 
were  to  be  expanded and given  real  signific-
ance,  said the  speaker, it could lead to vastly 
improved  relations  between  the  public  and 
parliament. 
The Rules  of Procedure  of the Italian  Senate 
(new  1971  version)  made  provision  for  pub-
licising  not  only  the  work  of  the  Assembly 
but  also  the  deliberations  of  the  Standing 
Committees  when  these  were  exercising legis-
lative power. 
Dr  Sarogni  concluded  by  saying  that it was 
essential  to  create  greater  public  awareness 
of  the  matters  discussed  at  meetings  similar 
to the Symposium. 
Mr BEHRENDT,  Vice-President  of  the Euro-
pean  Parliament,  stressed  the  need  for  the 
work  of  the  groups  to  be  made  public.  As 
in  Bonn  the  groups  of  the  European  Parlia-
ment  should  issue  press  releases  after  their 
meetings;  committees should do  the same and 
it was for the committee chairmen to see  that 
this  was  done.  The  European  Parliament's 
press  releases  might also  be  published on oc-
casion  in  the  bulletins  of the national parlia-
ments.  It was more difficult when the Council 
was  meeting  at the  same  time  as  the  Parlia-
ment;  the  Council's  meetings  naturally  took 
precedence  with  journalists,  as  it  took  the 
final decisions. 
Mr  Behrendt  thought  more  use  should  be 
made of invitations  to members of the public 
to  visit  the  European  Parliament;  he  thought 
members  of  the  Parliament  should  invite  not 
only  schoolchildren,  students  and  represent-
atives  of interest groups, but also journalists-
especially  from  local  papers.  He  could  not 
agree  with  Mrs  Sarogni  that  greater  use  of 
petitions  would  do  much  to  improve  the 
European Parliament's public relations.  It was 
most  important for  the  Community's  citizens 
to  be  able  to  identify  themselves  with  the 
decisions made in Parliament; only then would 
they  be  prepared  to  support  the  State.  This 
was  why  public  relations  were  particularly 
important. 
Mr  LIOUS,  Secretary-General  of  the  French 
Senate, as  a former publicity consultant, wish-
ed  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  participants 
at the  symposium  to  the  concrete  experience 
gained  by  the  French  Senate  in  the  field  of 
information and public relations over the past 
few years. 
With regard, first  of all,  to relations with the 
press,  the Senate  issued  rapidly  drafted  ~om­
muniques  after each  sitting  and each  commit-
tee  meeting. 
As  far  as  audio-visual media were  concerned, 
all  experiments  so  far  tried  had  proved  dis-
appointing.  The daily  televised  news  bulletins 
could  only  broadcast  truncated  accounts  of 
parliamentary  proceedings  which  were  often 
incomprehensible  to  the  general  public. 
When proceedings were brodcastet in full  the 
public was found to get bored very quickiy. It 
301 was true that certain very topical debates  (e.g. 
on  abortion)  were  likely  to  interest  a  great 
many people but such debates were rare. Nor 
could  there  be  any  question  of  creating  a 
special television channel for broadcasting par-
liamentary proceedings. This was  not possible 
for  financial  reasons. 
The experiment tried  with  the television  pro-
gramme 'Ia parole est a  l'Assemblee nationale', 
in  the  form  of a  political  forum,  also  ended 
in  failure  because  it very  quickly  turned into 
a series  of monologues.  Another formula  was 
now being suggested which consisted in bring-
ing  one  or  two  parliamentarians  into  extra-
parliamentary  discussions. 
As to other means of communication and pub-
lic  relations  the  Senate  had,  in  1969,  tried 
'  h  .  experiments  in  direct  publicity:  at t  at  time, 
General  de  Gaulle  had  proposed  doing  away 
with  the  Senate  by  referendum  and,  in 
response  to  this  project,  the  Senate  had  is-
sued,  before  the  referendum,  some  600 000 
copies  of  a  publicity  booklet.  To  the  same 
end  the Senate now published a short weekly 
bulietin  presenting  the  main  work  of  this 
Assembly,  which  was  very  well  received.  It 
was  now  being  circulated  to  about  3 500 
people,  including  journalists  and  the  'active 
forces' of the country (trade unions, employers, 
etc.).  The  Senate  was  considering  preparing 
a volume for students with the aim of encou-
raging  them  to  follow  its  work.  It was  also 
considering  organising,  in  collaboration  with 
the  ORTF,  a  kind  of civic  instruction  course 
for  secondary  schools  with  special  emphasis 
on the parliamentary institution. 
Finally,  the Senate organised luncheons bring-
ing  together  representatives  of the  specialised 
press and the 'active forces' when an important 
project  or bill  was  being  discussed  within  a 
parliamentary committee. This experiment had 
also  proved a success. 
Mr  TAMES,  Hansard  Society  London,  said 
that the Hansard Society was  originally form-
ed to promote understanding of the  work of 
parliament.  It had  thirty  years  of  experience 
and it was  ready to place this  at the disposal 
of others. 
Mr Tames  had  the  following  suggestions  to 
make: 
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- parliaments  should  seek  advice  from 
educationists  and  practising  teachers  on 
education techniques and materials; 
- they should direct their efforts to teachers 
who  were  active  in  civic  education  and 
those who trained teachers; 
- MPs  should  be  invited  to  talk  to  young 
people.  As  MPs  tended  to  be  busy,  the 
Hansard  Society  had  drawn  up  a  list  of 
former  MPs,  officials  and journalists  with 
suitable  experience  who  were  prepared  to 
perform this task. 
He  went  on  to  say  that  he  thought  there 
was  a  case  for  better facilities  in  the  parlia-
mentary constituencies. It was sometimes hard 
to  track down one's MP.  The MP was,  none 
the less,  the  only  point of  access  to the vast 
and baffling governmental machine. 
Parliaments  were  not  the  only  institutions 
undergoing  a  crisis  of  legitimacy  but  they 
were the most visible  and they had to restore 
the confidence of the public, starting with the 
European  citizens  of  tomorrow. 
Mr  HJOR  TDAL,  Secretary-General  of  the 
Folketing,  referred  to  press  coverage  of  the 
proceedings  of parliament.  Nowadays,  people 
had  less  time  to  keep  abreast  of  events  in 
newspapers  and  were  not  keen  on  reading 
full  reports  of  parliamentary  proceedings. 
Journalists  therefore  prepared summaries,  but 
it was  difficult  to  make  them  readable  with-
out laying  themselves  open  to  criticism.  The 
result was  often a subjective report expressing 
the writer's political convictions. 
In  Denmark  television  was  regarded  as  an 
alternative.  There was  a  permanent television 
studio in the Folketing and programmes could 
be  transmitted  at  any  time.  The  system  had 
been  favourably  received,  and  there  was  no 
desire  to  limit  it.  In  his  opinion  there  had 
been  no  abuse  of  transmissions  from  the 
Folketing.  Question  time  especially  was  of 
interest  to  television,  which  was  an  effective 
information  medium. 
As  to  the  problem  of keeping  young  people 
informed, Parliament's working methods often 
seemed to them strange and difficult to under-
stand.  The  language  alone  often  caused 
astonishment.  Teachers  kept  schools  and young  people informed,  and special  program-
mes  about the  Folketing  were  transmitted  to 
schools.  The  Folketing  had  now  decided  to 
transmit  a  series  of  programmes  for  schools 
showing the  progress  of a Bill  from  the time 
it  is  conceived  until  a  law is  finally  enacted. 
The CHAIRMAN asked whether any one had 
comments  on  the  associations  of  voters  and 
the  contributions  they  made  particularly  in 
the  selection  of  candidates. 
Mr  DEWULF,  Vice-President  of  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament,  said  that  a  Member  of  the 
European  Parliament  was  in  a  paradoxical 
situation.  In  the  first  place,  he  represented 
his  constituency,  and  as  such  was  at  the 
service  of  the  electors,  who  were  concerned 
in the first instance with their own immediate 
interests.  As  a  Member of the European Par-
liament,  however,  he  also  had  much  wider 
responsibilities,  but  if he  moved  into  other 
constituencies,  his  colleagues  did  not  like  it. 
An  attempt was,  however,  made to  deal whh 
issues going beyond regional interests. Further-
more,  a  personality  cult  continued  to  prevail 
among  the  public.  A  Member  of  the  Euro-
pean Parliament was  thus limited both by  his 
geographical  basis  and  by  the  jealousy  of his 
colleagues. 
On  the  basis  of  his  experience,  the  speaker 
felt  that  in  future  the  European  Parliament 
would have to work in harmonious collabora-
tion with the national parliaments. The Euro-
pean  Parliament  was  shutting  itself  into  an 
artificial  circle.  It  assumed  that  all  powers 
originated  from  the  Member-States,  but  the 
national institutions also had something to say. 
The European  Parliament was  at present  cut 
off  from  the  national  parliaments.  It  ought 
however  to  maintain  contact with  them,  and 
Mr Dewulf would invite the Bureau to do so. 
The future  lay  in  absolute  harmony  between 
the  national  parliaments  and  the  European 
Parliament. 
As  long  as  the  European  Parliament  did  not 
have  the  courage  to  collaborate  with  the 
national  parliaments, it would not succeed  in 
its  task.  Parties  also  could only achieve  their 
objectives in  a European context. 
Mr  BEHRENDT  spoke  first  about  voters' 
initiatives.  He believed  that Members  of Par-
liament  should  enlist  the  help  of experts  on 
the  formation  of  public  opinion.  A  wide 
audience could be reached by means of public 
hearings,  debates  arranged,  for  instance,  as 
part of  the  secondary  school  programme  or 
by  employers'  associations.  These  debates 
worked in two ways,  by passing on informa-
tion  to  the  public  and  by  conveying  the 
electorate's  views  and  encouragement  to  the · 
Members of Parliament. 
Voters'  initiatives  had  been  highly  successful 
in  the 1972 elections  in  the  Federal Republic. 
Even  the practice of carrying  placards-as in 
American  elections-helped to enlist the pub-
lic's  participation.  Other  means  which  the 
Federal  Republic  had  found  very  effective 
during its last election in 1972 were advertise-
ments  in  local  newspapers,  giving  the  Mem-
ber's  name  and  position,  leaflets  distributed 
in factories,  and public meetings  addressed by 
artists  and writers. 
The  CHAIRMAN  suggested  that  experts 
might  be  summoned  to  engage  in  a  public 
dialogue with politicians. 
He then asked the speakers present to explain 
how  their  individual  countries  provided  sup-
port for their political parties to enable them 
to  pursue  informational  and  political  activ-
ities.  What  funds  did  they  receive  for  these 
purposes? 
Mr HANSEN, representing the Speaker of the 
Folketing, said that in Denmark state aid was 
not  granted  to  political  party  organisations 
but to  provide expert support for  parliamen-
tary work, depending on the number of mem-
bers.  During  the  EEC  campaign,  however,  a 
certain  amount  of  state  aid  was  granted  for 
information  purposes.  Youth  organisations 
received  indirect  aid  from  local  authorities 
and  other sources. 
Mr  VAN  DER  SANDEN  said  that  no  sub-
sidies were granted in the Netherlands, though 
the  research  services  of parties  represented  in 
the Parliament were subsidised.  They received 
a  flat  rate  payment  plus  an  amount  in  pro-
portion to their number of seats in the Second 
Chamber.  Fairly  large  subsidies  were  granted 
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television  technology opened up  so  many pos-
sibilities that as soon as the cost problem could 
be  solved,  continuous  television  reports  on 
Parliament would have to  be introduced. 
Mr DOOGE explained that in  Ireland  allow-
ances  were  granted  to  political  parties  on  a 
small  scale.  These  were  intended  for  secreta-
rial  services  and to  some  extent for  research. 
A  large  grant  had  been  made  in  the  year 
preceding the referendum on accession,  to the 
Irish Council of the European Movement. The 
small  grant  at  present  available  to  the  Irish 
Council of the European Movement was  used 
largely for the purpose of explaining the work 
of  the  Community.  In  addition,  grants  had 
been  made directly in the past to bodies such 
as  the  Young  Farmers  Association.  A  grant 
was made now to the National Youth Council. 
The subsidy  received  by  the  latter was  quite 
substantial  and  was  allocated  by  them  to 
various  youth  organisations.  These  were  the 
only  payments  to  political  or  quasi-political 
organisations so far as  he could recall without 
investigation. 
Sir  Tufton BEAMISH,  British  Member of the 
European  Parliament,  explained  that political 
parties  in  the  United  Kingdom  received  no 
support  from  public  funds.  The  European 
movement,  however,  was  given  a  little  help. 
It was his view that the work of the European 
Parliament was  newsworthy  but it was  given 
little  coverage  by  the  press,  radio  and  tele-
vision.  He wondered whether the public rela-
tions  organisation  of  the  European  Parlia-
ment was  adequate  to  discharge  its  immense 
task. 
The  European  Communities'  information  of-
fices  in  London had done a good job in pro-
viding the public with information during the 
negotiations  for  Britain's  membership  of  the 
EEC.  Since  then,  however,  their  work  had 
declined  in  quality  and  scope.  The  literature 
was  no  longer  up  to  date  or even  relevant. 
Economic  questions  were too difficult  for  the 
public  to understand unless  reduced  to  bread 
and  butter  issues  such  as  pensions  and  food 
prices.  Experts  were  needed  to make such  is-
sues  fully  comprehensible to the public. 
304 
Sir  Tufton had noted a  great deal  of interest 
in Community affairs. What the public requir-
ed  was  a  simple  explanation  of  events  in 
Europe.  The  public  relations  department  of 
the  European  Parliament  was  not  given 
enough money to carry out its job satisfactor-
ily.  Not only  Europe  but  other  parts  of  the 
world were  interested  in  European  affairs.  A 
recent  lecture  tour he  had undertaken  in  the 
United States, especially at a number of Ameri-
can  universities,  had shown  this  very  clearly. 
He had been astonished to discover the degree 
of ignorance of European affairs there. During 
the  course of his  visit to  the United States  he 
had occasion to visit the Commission's delega-
tion in Washington headed by Mr Krag, a man 
of  great  ability.  His  staff  were  doing  a  very 
good job  but it was far  too small. 
More money  and skiiled  experts  were  needed 
to  get across to the public the European Com-
munity's  achievements  and  goals.  Great  im-
provements  could  be  made  in  this  direction 
both in  Europe  and  in  the  rest  of the world 
to explain the role of the European Commun-
ity  in  the  promotion  of  peace,  stability  and 
prosperity. 
Mr BEHRENDT  said  that the  German  Bun-
destag financed the staff of the political groups 
(e.g.  the SPD  group maintained a staff of 150 
assistants)  and refunded  the  election  expenses 
of  any  party  which  won  over  2.5°/o  of  the 
electorate  vote  at  the  rate  of  DM  3.50  per 
voter. 
He stressed the parties' need for public aid to 
enable  them  to  perform  their  constitutional 
function. 
Mr DEWULF said that in Belgium no subsidies 
were granted to political parties. The Christian-
Democrats  and the Socialists  had asked  for  a 
subsidy.  There  were  subsidies  for  the  press. 
The parliamentary parties  were  not financed. 
There were indirect subsidies  through the De-
partments of Culture and of Economic Affairs. 
Dr SAROGNI  said  that  a  law  providing  for 
public  financing  of  political  parties  had  just 
been  passed  in  Italy  with the  approval of all 
the  political  groups  in  the parliament,  except 
the Liberals. In  conclusion,  the  CHAIRMAN  thanked  all 
those  who  had participated in  the  day's  pro-
ceedings.  The problems with which they were 
concerned  had  been  intelligently  discussed. 
They had not been  expected to  reach conclu-
sions  but  merely  to  raise  issues  for  further 
consideration. 
Their  work  would  be  continued  by  the  Di-
rectorate-General for Research  and Documen-
tation with a view to further studies. This had 
been a valuable initiative from which they had 
all  learned  a  great  deal.  The  European  Par-
liament had benefited greatly. 
The meeting concluded. 
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RESUMED  PLENARY SESSION The  resumed  Plenary  Session  commenced  at 
5  p.m. 
Chairman:  Professor  Georges  VEDEL,  Uni-
versity  of Paris. 
The  CHAIRMAN  opened  the plenary session 
by  calling  upon  each  of  the  rapporteurs  of 
the  working  groups  to  deliver  his  summary. 
Professor KOOIMAN, University of Delft, first 
took  the  floor  to  report  on  the  discussions 
that took place in the Working Group on Par-
liament  and the Administration. 
Professor  Kooiman  first  stated  that  giving  a 
summary  of  the  deliberations  was  a  difficult 
task particularly  as  far  as  conveying  the  at-
mosphere during the discussion was concerned. 
The exchange of views  by  the working group 
on parliamentary control of the administration 
was  very  satisfactory.  It had  concentrated  on 
three main areas of control namely: 
1)  pre-legislative  control; 
2)  ad hoc  control  and 
3)  post  hoc  control  (e.g.  roal  and  written 
questions, etc.). 
The  working  group  then  expressed  the  wish 
to examine the pre-legislative form  of control 
most closely. 
The main  points  which  came  out during  the 
discussion were the following: 
The  question  of  policies-one  of  the  points 
which  was  raised  was  whether in  fact  parlia-
mentary  control  actually  existed  in  this  area. 
Frequently governments were not very  willing 
to  give  detailed  information  in  the  planning 
stages.  This  was  clearly  a  political  problem 
which  was  not  always  clear-cut.  However, 
there  were  areas  of government policy which 
were  more  'non political'  than  others.  It ap-
peared  that  in  the  U.K.  such  policies  were 
tending to be discussed in parliamentary com-
mittee  meetings.  Governments  always  had  to 
choose  exactly  the  right  moment  for  parlia-
ment  to  come  into  action.  In  the  planning 
stages  parliament  had  to  be  rather  ingenious 
in its relations with the government if it wished 
to obtain maximum information. 
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The matter of budgets-budgetary procedures 
and  techniques  usually  did  not  allow  much 
room for manoeuvre. The planning and finan-
cial aspects of the budget had to be dealt with 
simultaneously by parliament. A British report 
did suggest that certain 'non-political' subjects 
be debated on some days every year. However, 
politicians had not as  yet shown much interest 
in  the long-term  aspect  of problems.  Political 
life still tended to be stronger than procedural 
life. 
Finally,  the  rapporteur  stated  that most  par-
ticipants  felt  that  a  determined  parliament, 
whatever  forms  of  procedure  existed,  could 
make a real use  of its investigatory powers. 
Professor  MANZELLA,  rapporteur  for  the 
Working Group which had discussed  the role 
of opposition in parliament, said that the  de-
bate had focussed on two topics:  the changing 
concept  of  opposition,  and  the  influence 
exercised  by  pressure  groups  from  outside 
Parliament on relations  between  majority and 
opposition parties. 
The changed  concept of opposition had been 
examined  with  particular  reference  to  the 
action  of  political  and  social  forces  outside 
the Parliament. As Professor Vedel had pointed 
out,  the  term  'opposition'  can  be  understood 
today not only in the traditional sense of par-
liamentary  opposition  or  opposition  to  the 
government  but  also  in  the  sense  of  social 
confrontation. 
In  this  connection  Professor  von  Beyme  and 
Professor  Ionescu  had  emphasized  the  need 
to draw a distinction between extraparliamen-
tary  opposition  (or  'sectoral  opposition',  ac-
cording  to the terminology  proposed by Pro-
fessor  Ionescu)  and  antiparliamentary  opposi-
tion. 
The general  conclusion  was  that these  forces 
outside  parliament  must  be  included  in  any 
accurate  definition  of the  modern  concept  of 
opposition. 
The  second  topic  on  which  the  Working 
Group  had  concentrated,  namely,  the  in-
fluence of pressure groups on relations between 
majority and opposition, had been  dealt with 
mainly by Mr Burgbacher, Mr von Hassel and 
Senator Premoli, all  of whom had emphasized the  threat  of  genuinely  binding  ties  between 
such  groups  and  Members  of  Parliament  the 
effect of which would be to change the normal 
dialectic  between  majority  and  opposition  to 
the detriment of minorities. 
On the other hand, Professor Steffani, Profes-
sor  von  Beyme  and  Professor  Thayssen, 
arguing from the experience of Germany, urged 
the  need  to  rationalise  this  phenomenon-
which in  a  modern parliament should not be 
regarded  as  a  weakness-by institutionalising 
the contribution made by these external groups 
in  order to  strengthen  the  representativity  of 
the system. 
A third view was  taken by Professor Predieri. 
Referring  to Italian experience,  he  stated that 
pressure  groups  operating  as  an  independent 
sub-system,  exercised  the  same  degree  of  in-
fluence on opposition as  on the majority. This 
was  changing  the traditional pattern  of rela-
tions  between  these  two  component parts  of 
Parliament,  as  was  demonstrated  in  practice 
by Italian legislation,  800/o  of which was  pas-
sed with a substantial measure of support from 
the opposition. 
The Working Group then sought to transpose 
these  changes in the relationship between ma-
jority and opposition to the level  of the Euro-
pean  institutions.  One  speaker  recalled  that 
Professor  Ionescu  had  emphasized  that  by 
expanding  the  institutional  framework,  it 
would  be  possible  to  free  the  relationship 
between  majority  and  opposition  from  the 
constraints imposed at national level. Professor 
Vedel,  on  the  other  hand,  had  invited  the 
Working Group to consider if the relationship 
between  majority  and  opposition  within  the 
EEC  might not be  better envisaged  as  a  rela-
tionship  of  opposition  between  institutional 
roles.  The relationship  between  Congress  and 
President in the United  States  could be trans-
posed  to the  European  Community  as  a  re-
lationship of dialectic between Parliament and 
Commission.  Professor  Siotis  did  not  agree 
with  this  hypothesis  and  insisted  instead  on 
the need to find room in the European context 
for  a  politically  more  advanced  opposition, 
arguing that this  was  necessary  for the Com-
munity's  development. 
The  conclusion  reached  by  the  Working 
Group, as reported by Professor Manzella. was 
that in a changing parliament, opposition could 
not but change also.  The direct confrontation 
between  the  two  traditional  protagonists  of 
parliamentary  debate  had  been  tempered  by 
the weakening of the powers of parliament and 
even of the government; in these circumstances, 
an  attempt  should  be  made  to  reconstruct 
political power on a higher institutional plane 
i.e.  at European level  by  contrast with Italian 
constitutional frameworks. 
Mr PETERSEN reported on the conclusions of 
the  working  group  which  had  discussed  the 
topic 'Parliament and public opinion'. 
He said  that the debate  had not been  a  very 
profound one  but that some important points 
had  emerged  from  it.  The  group  had  begun 
with the  assumption  that the work of Parlia-
ment could not be communicated to the public 
in  an  interesting  way  unless  the  work  itself 
was  seen  to  be  interesting  and  this  led  to  a 
discussion  of  Parliament's  working  methods 
and their effectiveness.  It was pointed out, for 
instance that speeches made in Parliament were 
often  found,  especially  by  young  people,  to 
be  very  boring  and  uninteresting,  and that it 
was very hard to make reports of meetings of 
parliamentary  committees  into  exciting  read-
ing. 
The  group  then  went  on  to  discuss  various 
aspects  of  communicating  Parliament's  work 
to  the  public,  for  instance,  communication 
with youth and the schools, relations with the 
mass  media and with journalism, etc.  Various 
suggestions  were  discussed  with regard to the 
presentation  of  more  effective  and  more 
substantial  press  reports.  It was  pointed  out 
that the press  was  often less  interested in the 
really important aspects of parliamentary work 
than in  sensational  or human  interest stories, 
but this was something which must be worked 
at.  Reference  was  also  made  to  publications 
issued  by  parliament and how these  could be 
distributed  both  at  home  and  abroad  to 
greatest effect. 
The group had devoted special attention to the 
question  of interesting  youth  in  the work of 
parliament.  Reference  had  been  made  to  the 
possibility of distributing information material 
to the schools  and  arranging visits  to  parlia-
ment for groups of young people and making 
them as  interesting  and enjoyable  as  possible. 
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how contact with the public could be fostered 
in  other ways, such as  the possibility of more 
members of the public being present at parlia-
mentary debates.  A special  instance cited was 
the idea of having public 'Hearings' of experts. 
The  possibility  of  having  public  petitions 
presented  to  parliament  by  deputations  from 
the citizens was also discussed. 
The group had concluded by stressing its con-
viction that parliaments must use every modern 
means,  especially  the  most  modern  electronic 
techniques,  to communicate their work to the 
people  they  were  elected  to  serve.  The work 
of parliament must be made meaningful to the 
citizens,  especially to the young.  This was  an 
essential  political  problem  which  every  effort 
must be made to solve. 
Mr SCELBA,  Italian Member of the European 
Parliament,  made  a  number  of  comments  on 
the  reports  presented  to the  symposium. 
It  would  be  wrong,  he  said,  to  judge  the 
European  Parliament by  comparison  with the 
parliaments  of the  national  democratic states. 
The European Community was not yet a State, 
but a political society in a  state of evolution. 
The Community had not yet got a government, 
and  this  had  many  practical  consequences. 
According  to  the  Treaties  the  Parliament 
enjoyed  advisory  but  not  decision-making 
powers. 
The authors of certain reports had clearly not 
fully  understood the ways in  which the Euro-
pean  Parliament  had  developed  and  the  op-
portunities  inherent  in  certain  gains  it  had 
made. 
Referring to budgetary powers, he said it was 
true  that  the  Parliament's  decision-making 
power did not extend to more than 4 to SOfo 
of  the  budget,  but  it  meant  that  Parliament 
had the final  say with regard to the operation 
of  the  institutions,  including  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  This  meant  that  the  roles  of  the 
two  institutions  had  been  well  and  truly  re-
versed.  Under  the  Rome  Treaties  it was  for 
the  Council to approve  the Parliament's  bud-
get, but today it was for Parliament to approve 
the  Council  budget.  This  was  an  important 
political weapon given into Parliament's hands. 
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Parliament could  also  reject the entire budget 
and thus  force  the  Council  to negotiate. 
Under the  Treaty of Luxembourg,  it was  for 
the President of the Parliament to record final 
approval of the budget. Where the budget was 
rejected by the Assembly, the President simply 
declared that the budget was not approved, at 
which  point  the  consultation  procedure  was 
set in motion. This conferred enormous power 
on the  European  Parliament. 
The European Parliament, as  representative of 
the peoples of Europe and the voice  of demo-
cracy, had already won many successes: 
1)  It had  reduced  the  absolute  power of the 
Council, 
2)  It had  achieved  a  policy  in  line  with the 
objectives of the Treaties, 
3)  It  had  worked  to  improve  the  living 
standards of the peoples of Europe, 
4)  It had worked to create a European-minded 
political  class  through  the  unified  action 
of the  political  groups, 
5)  It  has  secured  for  itself  powers  of  co-
decision  with  the  Council  through  the 
Commission,  and 
6)  It  had  endeavoured  to  enlarge  the  Com-
munity's  area  of responsibility  which  was 
even more important than its own powers. 
Professor VEDEL said, 'Mr Scelba, even if you 
have criticised the professors, you can be sure 
that  they  have  listened  to  you,  as  has  the 
entire  audience,  with  the  greatest  interest.  I 
confess that my function is a very unrewarding 
one;  we  have  a  song  in  our  country  which 
runs  "He had swallowed  a  clock";  you  may 
have  thought that that applied to me  and,  if 
so, I apologize. 
I  was  to have  given  a  summary of the  day's 
proceedings  and,  in  order to keep  within  our 
schedule,  I shall confine it to the five  minutes 
we have left. This is  a pity, because our work 
is  extremely  complex,  and  affords  us  a  great 
deal of useful material. 
What are we left with at the end of the day? 
I  would  say  this:  I  have  the  impression  that 
the parliamentary institution in the contempo-rary  world is  considered  essential  but,  at the 
same  time,  its  exact  role  is  not  precisely 
known. The old system we were used to, born 
of  a  series  of  practices  and  ideological 
syntheses, derived from the most diverse coun-
tries  of  Europe,  presented  parliament  at  one 
and the same time (the terms used varied from 
one  country to  another)  as  the  expression  of 
the  national  will,  of the  popular will,  of the 
mandate  given  by  the  electors,  etc.  It  was  a 
fundamental  centre of decision-making, it was 
the  place  where  the  system  of  government 
came  into being. 
It must be  admitted that this  image  has  been 
partly  destroyed,  at  least  in  some  countries. 
We  have  the feeling  that the decision-making 
system,  without ceasing  to pass  through par-
liament,  makes  extensive  use  of  extraparlia-
mentary channels.  The rise of governments as 
centres of decision, the rise of the technocracy 
(with  which  we  have  had little  to do  today, 
but which was, I am sure, present in all your 
minds), the growth of extraparliamentary con-
sultation (examples have been given of govern-
ments  dealing  directly  with trade  unions  and 
pressure  groups),  all  these factors  destroy  the 
old image of parliament at the heart of natio-
nal decisions.  I would add that the opposition 
itself is  decentralised in relation to Parliament. 
Certain forms  of opposition are not integrated 
in  the  institutional  system:  I  mean  all  those 
(and  in  Europe,  they  are  quite  numerous) 
which  challenge  the  political  system,  and 
sometimes  society  itself.  We  are  dealing  here 
with extremely powerful forces  even  in  those 
countries  which  like  to  conider  themselves 
safe. Above  all, we have an enormous opposi-
tion  system  of  groupings  which  has  a  fold 
over  the  whole  of society  and  produces  the 
rather  bizarre  result that,  when  one  adds  up 
the  number  of groupings  opposing  a  govern-
ment,  the  opposition  turns  out  to  have  a 
majority.  Fortunately  for  governments,  the 
sum of these opposition groups does not make 
up  an overall  opposition. 
What purpose does parliament then serve? We 
have  been  seeking  to  define  its  functions 
throughout today.  We  have  heard  about me-
diation  and communication.  I  would say,  for 
my own part, that parliament, in the uncertain 
situation  in  which  we  find  ourselves,  and 
naturally without overstating the fact that the 
decision-making  system  partly  escapes  its  in-
fluence has at the same time a personality and 
a  force  of legitimacy.  As  an  institution,  it is 
essentially a living being, which is  to say that 
power does  not exist in isolation.  Power does 
not stand alone  and conduct a monologue:  it 
is  always  exposed  to  approval  or condemna-
tion.  Parliament is  also  a  force  of legitimacy. 
We  are  aware  in all  our countries  that,  even 
if  we  are  in  the  minority,  even  if we  are  in 
violent opposition, we are  constrained by  the 
fact that, perhaps with a majority of only one 
vote, it is  "the others", I will not say who are 
right,  but who  have won the day. 
The position  of  the  parliamentary  institution 
in  our  European  countries  and,  generally 
speaking, in many other countries too, is  both 
a  lesson  and  a  subject  of  thought  for  the 
European  Parliament.  A  lesson  because  it  is 
evident  (and  on  this  point,  I  feel  that  Mr 
Scelba  a little while ago  exaggerated the pro-
fessors'  desire  to systematise)  that to seek  to 
model  the  parliamentary  institution  on  the 
national  parliaments  (please  excuse  this  per-
sonal  opinion)  does  not perhaps  make  much 
sense.  It makes  no  sense  first  of  all  because 
the Community system is something other than 
the  national  governmental  systems  and  also 
because,  within  nations  themselves,  the  old 
parliamentary  model  is  outdated  and  the 
present  model,  as  we  have  already  said,  is 
seeking  an identity and has  not yet found  its 
way. 
Does  this  mean that the European Parliament 
is  of no  importance, either intrinsically,  or in 
relation  to  European  integration?  I  believe 
exactly  the  opposite,  because  it  is  precisely 
that  force  of  legitimacy  which  is  lacking  in 
Europe.  A  little  while  ago,  when  we  were 
discussing  the  problem  of  transferring  the 
powers  of  the  national  parliaments  to  the 
European  Parliament,  we  raised  this  very 
question, and I am sure we shall be discussing 
it again  tomorrow. We also  lack the function 
of  representing  the  governed  vis-a-vis  those 
who  govern.  This is  perhaps  a  vague  notion, 
but it leaves  room  for  the  imagination.  And, 
finally,  what if the European Parliament were 
the place where claims  are pressed?  One may 
well  ask:  what claims?  Obviously, if we  were 
to become  bogged  down  in  sectoral  or geo-
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much,  but  perhaps  Parliament  could  be  the 
place  where  European  claims  were  put  for-
ward;  this  would  give  it its  most  profound 
role,  a  role  it already fulfils  but with insuffi-
cient  vigour,  because  the  development  pro-
vided  for  by  the  treaties  have  not  yet  been 
put into effect. 
So  much  so  that, on the evening  of this  first 
day,  which  has  been  filled  with  such  out-
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standing contributions  and addresses  which  I, 
like each one of you, have particularly appre-
ciated and which have taught us  a great deal, 
I wonder if the problem which is  more or less 
consciously present in our minds, namely what 
models  the national parliaments have to offer 
the  European  Parliament,  cannot be  replaced 
by  another  problem,  perhaps  of  a  rather 
dreamlike  quality,  but  possibly  a  reality  of 
tomorrow:  "What  model  can  the  European 
Parliament  offer  our  national  parliaments?" ' PLENARY SESSION 
FRIDAY, 3 MAY 1974 The  Plenary  Session  resumed at 9.30  a.m. 
Chairman:  Professor  G.  IONESCU, University 
of Manchester. 
The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting with a 
reminder about the practical arrangements for 
speakers. He was pleased to announce that Mr 
Gregoire,  President  of  the  Luxembourg 
National Assembly,  had given  those attending 
the symposium invitations to lunch. He noted 
that  some  very  distinguished  members  were 
due  to  speak  including  Mr Edgar  Faure  but 
said that there would be a further opportunity 
for  contributions  at  meetings  of  the  three 
working groups in the afternoon. 
The second day's discussion should go straight 
to the  heart of the future  shape of Europe in 
contrast  to  what  had  been  heard  on  the 
previous  day  about the  state  of  the  national 
parliaments.  This  discussion  would  focus  on 
what  the  European  Parliament  was,  what  it 
would  be  and what it should  be.  He looked 
forward  to  hearing  the  summing  up  by  the 
three  chairmen  of  the  working  groups  on 
what  the  European  Parliament  in  particular 
should be. 
He  drew  attention  to  the  exhibition  in  the 
library  of the  European  Parliament.  Professor 
Mackintosh  had  commented  to  him  that this 
provided a  complete bibliography on the sub-
ject of the symposium. 
Professor FRIEDRICH, University of Harvard, 
paid  tribute  to  other speakers  who,  he  said, 
had dealt with many of the points better than 
he could. He referred particularly to Mr Vedel 
and  Mr  von  Beyme.  Like  them  Professor 
Friedrich  said  there  had  been  a  very  great 
divergence of experience with parliaments. This 
made  it difficult  to  draw conclusions  for  the 
European  Parliament.  He  was  very  reluctant 
to make any prophecies. The public was always 
asking for prophecies but it was not a promis-
ing  enterprise  to  predict the course  of events 
in  politics. 
Professor  Friedrich  referred  to  the  work 
occasioned  by  the  symposium  particularly  on 
direct elections and greater powers. He referred 
too  to  the  issue  of  relations  between  the 
national parliaments and the European parlia-
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ment and the attempt to  assess  the difficulties 
of this  relationship. This was, he said, a long-
time issue in the  United States  where reforms 
now pending  concerned  what the  relationship 
between  the  national  parliaments  and  its 
constituent components should be. After apply-
ing  a  federal  system  for  over  100  years  in 
the United States neither political scientists nor 
other experts  felt  that they had got the  right 
answer.  The speaker said  it was  too  early  to 
say what the answer might be. 
He then turned to  the talk of democracy  and 
the use  of such popular phrases as  'participa-
tion'.  He  was  surprised  about  the  extent  to 
which practitioners and theorists assumed that 
democracy  was  beyond  question  or  doubt. 
This  was  simply  not  true.  It  was  in  doubt 
precisely because democracy  meant everything 
to everybody.  He referred  to his  Russian  col-
leagues  in  the  International  Political  Science 
Association  and  said  that in  conversation  he 
had now reached agreement with them to the 
effect that democracy  in  Moscow  was  perfect 
because  everyone  was  satisfied  that it was  as 
it should be and imperfect in the United States 
because there no one was satisfied that it was 
as  it should  be. 
He went  on  to  speak  about  the  legitimation 
of government and said that nowadays this was 
not  determined  as  much  as  lt  formerly  was 
by  popular  elections,  as  election  results  did 
not prove  as  much  as  was  claimed  for  them. 
To-day there was  'success' legitimation, which 
meant that as long as the system of government 
worked it was  legitimate.  It reminded  one of 
the Chinese Emperor of ancient times who was 
believed  to be the  Son  of  Heaven  as  long  as 
the dams did not break. But when they did any 
rival was  free  to set himself up  as  a legitimate 
claimant to the throne. 
This  applied  to  the  European  Parliament.  It 
was  not necessarily  true  that what succeeded 
was right and what was bigger was necessarily 
better, but this was the philosophy of our time 
and  had to be  borne in  mind  in  speaking  of 
the  European  Parliament,  which  was  bigger 
than  any  national  parliament. 
The  critics  of the  European  Parliament  were 
aware of this trend of thought and countered it 
by  saying  that if Europe  was  becoming  more 
prosperous, this  was  not because of the Euro-pean  Parliament;  it  would  have  happened 
anyway.  They  asked  whether  the  European 
Parliament was a good thing at all and added 
that in difficult historical situations, too much 
talking was  not the most effective  method. 
The speaker commented on the documents that 
had been  drawn  up  on increased  powers  for 
the  European  Parliament  and  said  that  they 
bore out what he had been saying-they were 
extremely  well  drawn  up  documents  ranging 
over  all  the  possibilities  and factors  involved 
but not coming to firm  conclusions. 
He went on to say that in some  respects,  the 
modern  enthusiasm  for  parliaments  was  a 
throwback to the  nineteenth  century  enthusi-
asm for constitutions. At this point he pointed 
out that i£  his  hearers  were to understand his 
message, they really needed to be familiar with 
his theoretical writings as  be was using certain 
political  terms  in  a  changed  sense,  a  sense 
which they did  not have  in earlier  and  more 
traditional writings  on this  subject.  To return 
to his  argument, he said that nowadays success 
conferred legitimacy, or rather that the former 
enthusiasm for constitutions and legitimacy was 
a thing of the past. He pointed to the example 
of  certain  twentieth  century  revolutions  and 
also to the setting up of post-colonial national 
states  in  Africa  and  elsewhere.  In  these 
instances, the people setting up these  national 
states had to have a constitution drawn up for 
them,  largely  because  it was  the  thing  to do, 
but without any real enthusiasm for  constitu-
tional  legitimacy.  In  fact,  Professor  Friedrich 
said,  much  of  the  blame  for  the  disastrous 
Nigerian  civil  war could  be  laid  at the  door 
of  the  Nigerian  constitution  drafted  in  this 
way. 
Professor  Friedrich  said  that  Professor  von 
Beyme  was  right  in  making  the  legislative 
function  of  parliament  only  one  of  its  six 
functions,  where formerly  it was  the first  and 
most  important  function.  He  said  that now-
adays  the  problem  for  all  modern  states  was 
to keep  parliaments out of policy making. He 
cited United States foreign policy as an example 
and said that it was bedevilled by the unneces-
sary  participation  in  it  of  democratically 
elected  representatives.  Every  man  who  was 
voted into Congress  by his  electorate thought 
that he had a right to make foreign policy and 
the result was chaotic. The weakness of demo-
cracy  was  that the electorates,  the masses  of 
people, knew little about the realities of foreign 
policy  making-they  felt  that  they  wanted 
peace  but they  always  seemed to want things 
that could only  be  got by making  war. 
Professor  Friedrich went on to  ask whether a 
parliament for  Europe was  really necessary  at 
all.  When  the  great  European  nation  states 
were being built up,  the concern of the rulers 
was  to  muzzle  their  parliaments  and  to  take 
vigorous  a.nd  effective  action  on  their  own 
initiative,  and  this  had  been  successful  in 
building  up .  the  modern  European  states.  As 
other  instances  of  increased  strength  and 
effectiveness  derived  from  by-passing  the 
normal democratic channels  and processes,  he 
cited  George  Washington  and  Konrad  Ade-
nauer. Washington let Congress do the talking, 
but made the decisions  himself, and i£  he had 
not done so  there would have been no United 
States.  Adenauer  also  was  a  true  democrat in 
that he  let the  Parliament talk  but did  much 
of the work himself.  He also  cited the British 
Parliament  as  an  example  of  effectiveness  in 
spite  of  democracy,  rather  than  because  of 
democracy.  He  went  on to  develop  his  argu-
ment about the inherent weaknesses  of demo-
cracy,  which  may  never  be  questioned,  and 
asked whether one had to democratise Europe 
in  order to make it legitimate. 
When  people  were  arguing  about  democracy 
and parliament, no  one dared question demo-
cracy.  No one  asked  was  democracy  a  good 
thing  although it had often  been  pointed  out 
that it can only work under special conditions, 
such  as  small  size,  rural  population,  etc.  In 
the  US,  democracy  was  more  talked  about 
than anywhere else. However, Jefferson's ideas 
on  democracy  were  not  followed.  Almost 
everyone  was  an  employee  today,  therefore, 
there could  not be effective democracy. 
The  speaker  said  that,  when  someone 
advocated  the  democratisation  of  an  institu-
tion,  he  was  really  calling  for  its  destruction. 
Democracy is  not lived and i£  institutions such 
as  General  Motors  were  to  be  democratised, 
they  would  disappear.  The  big  trade  unions 
were  the  greatest  advocates  of  democracy-
but it did not exist within them. 
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in Europe. He did not agree that, to be legitim-
ate,  Europe  had  to  be  democratic;  if  it 
succeeded it was legitimate. 
Mr FAURE  then  said,  'Mr  Chairman,  ladies 
and gentlemen, I am afraid that this contribu-
tion  of  mine  should  not  be  considered  as  a 
logical  follow-up  to  the  address  given  by 
Professor  Friedrich,  which  I  followed  with 
much interest. As I explained to you yesterday, 
I  wish  to  submit  to  this  meeting  a  concrete 
and  specific  proposal,  which,  for  this  very 
reason,  is  a  modest  one.  I  have  already  had 
occasion to mention this proposal at a lecture 
I  gave  in  Bonn,  some  months  ago,  and those 
of you who would like a copy of the document 
in question, have only to ask for it, since I ha.d 
some prepared especially for this purpose. Th1s 
proposal  is  for  the  creation  of  an  institute  I 
have  called  the  "European Institute of Parlia-
mentary  Research".  This  institute  would  be 
based  on  the  activities  of  representatives  of 
parliaments, i.e.  parliamentarians, and  also .of 
university  staff,  that is  to say,  two  categones 
which  exercise  a  role  of  intellectual  stimulus 
and  act  as  it  were,  as  disseminators,  since 
universicy  staff  are  in  contact  with  students 
and researchers, while  parliamentarians  are in 
touch with the population at large. These two 
categories,  both  represented  here,  have  in 
common a teaching, informational and mediat-
ing role. I defined the purpose of this institute 
in my  first  address  as  an institute of research 
into parliamentary democracy, the fundamental 
problems of growth and international relations. 
This  idea  fits  in  well  with  the  concerns  that 
led  to  the  organisation  of  this  symposium. 
There was perfect, if fortuitous,  harmony be-
tween  the ideas  of the President of the Euro-
pean  Assembly,  in  convening  you  today,  and 
my  own  suggestion.  In  short,  this  institute 
would be what you yourselves  are and would 
do  what you  yourselves  do;  it  could  extend, 
organise and exploit the research we have been 
carrying out together since yesterday. I should 
like to state the four basic formulae on which 
my  proposal  is  based:  first,  the  problems  of 
the  parliamentary  institution  exist  in  each  of 
our countries;  it is  therefore logical  for  us  to 
coordinate our work of analysing and adapting 
this parliamentary institution. That is  my first 
proposal.  We  could,  by  this  same  means, 
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prepare the  development of the parliamentary 
institution  in  the  Community-this  is  the 
second  basic  formula.  Thirdly,  I  believe  that 
Europe's  true  identity  is  to  be  found  in  the 
similarities  in  its  institutions  combined  with 
geographical  proximity.  Europe  must  assert 
itself  not  only  as  a  grouping  of  economic 
interests  but also  as  an entity of thought and 
conscien'ce.  My  fourth  and  last  point,  which 
is  of a strategic and operational nature, is  that 
the gr,oups  we  represent here-namely parlia-
mentarians  and  university  staff-having  an 
official but non-governmental status, are parti-
cularly well  placed  to impress  popular think-
ing  on  reticent  governments. 
I should like  to look briefly  at certain aspects 
of these  different  points.  First,  the  problems 
of  the  parliamentary  institutions  facing  our 
different countries  are rather similar.  It is  fair 
to say that the heroic times  when parliaments 
made possible the fights  against autocracy are 
largely forgotten, and today we meet with two 
similar types of reaction. Among young people 
in  advanced  societies,  which  are  often  very 
affluent, the reaction is often one of "It's all the 
same  to  us",  "Democracy,  we  couldn't  care 
less".  On the other hand, among the poverty-
stricken and the wretched, the reaction is rather 
one of "That is  of no interest to us,  we  have 
more tangible needs to satisfy first". The liberty 
represented  by our whole set of institutions is 
thus  seen  as  being  limited  to  a  purely  legal 
liberty, felt  to be without substance. In actual 
fact,  it would appear very  precious to us  if. it 
was  taken  from  us;  those  of  our  countnes 
which have been deprived of this liberty, even 
when it has been of a purely abstract and legal 
kind,  have  fully  appreciated  its  worth. 
Unfortunately,  it  is  not  possible  to  use  the 
deprivation of liberty, in a theoretical way, to 
demonstrate to the people, by depriving them 
of it  how  pleasant  their freedom,  in  fact,  is. 
It  m~st also  be  said, however,  that there is  a 
problem of substance because changes are tak-
ing place both in  the extent of power and in 
the means  of exercising power-in the extent 
of power  because  power is  moving  into  new 
areas,  particularly  economic  areas,  which  are 
highly technical. 
And  then  there  are  changes  in  the  means  of 
solving problems and in the means that can be 
used  to falsify  them.  We  have  new means  of solving  problems  such  as  the  computer  and 
opinion  polls,  but  we  also  have  the  means 
of falsifying  problems  because  these  scientific 
methods  can  be  used  to  manipulate  public 
opinion and not simply to reflect it:  the prob-
lem now is not only to ensure balance between 
the executive and the legislature considered as 
analogous powers, but of ensuring balance be-
tween  scientific  procedures  designed  to aid in 
decision-making  and  the  decision  itself.  This 
will require a greal deal of research and reform 
perhaps  and  means  must  be  given  to  parlia-
mentarians  to  help  them  define  their  role.  I 
have  no  intention  of  proposing  that  opinion 
polls  should  be  banned,  but  we  must  study 
this  question from  the point of view of a true 
democracy for  we  can see,  for  example,  from 
the  polls  on  the  presidential  election  in  my 
country  that,  in  the  space  of  two  weeks, 
opinion  swung  from  one position  to another, 
which  possibly  existed  in  its  subconscious; 
from  then onwards, corrections  may  be  made 
as  the  campaign  proceeds,  but  it  would  be 
very  dangerous,  on  any  given  question  to 
consult  public  opinion  simply  through  a  poll 
taken  once  only,  since  it might reflect  super-
ficial  rather than underlying trends of opinion. 
We  must,  therefore,  be  wary  of a  democracy 
which  seeks  to  replace  the  procedure  of 
elaboration  and  parliamentary  debate  by 
instant  consultation  procedures,  even  if  these 
offered every guarantee of sincerity. How many 
new problems  we  have,  even  so,  to consider; 
this  morning, for instance, I read in the news-
paper  that  Mr  Nixon  had  distributed  a 
voluminous  document  recording  his  own 
telephone  conversations.  Are  we  to  arrive  at 
a  type  of  democracy  in  which  the  official 
journals  covering  parliamentary  proceedings 
are  replaced  by  an  official  account  of  the 
telephone  conversations  of ministers?  This  is, 
of course,  a  problem and must be  considered 
as  such; but there are many others. 
What I  wanted  to  say,  for  my  time  is  short, 
is that, as we are faced with common problems 
of modern  democracy,  we  ought  to  consider 
them  in common;  first,  because  that is  more 
convenient  and,  second,  because  I  feel  that 
only  in  this  way  can  we  save  the  democratic 
model.  I  think  that  the  democratic  model 
should be adapted to cover a large  area;  that 
is why I feel that Europe should be democratic 
but that the  democratic  model  should  be  on 
a  European  scale.  We  must  have,  in  fact,  an 
institutional model comparable to that existing 
in  the  economic  field;  here,  power  is  very 
wide;  it covers  considerable areas, it is  multi-
national.  We  must  therefore  propose  an 
ambitious  political  model.  On  this  point,  I 
would reverse J.  ].  Rousseau's idea that demo-
cracy  is  only  suitable  for  a  small  country; 
I  think that democracy  can  only  survive  if it 
covers an extensive area. Otherwise, one might 
have  a  small  country  which  is  democratic 
within  but  dominated  from  outside-this 
would be contrary to democracy. 
My  second  observation  is  that,  while  under-
taking this work of developing the democratic 
model,  the  institution  I  propose  could  also 
play  a  role  in  European  construction  itself. 
We  should  not  miss  the  fact  that,  at  the 
moment,  parliaments  play  little  part  in  the 
work  of  European  construction;  attention 
focuses  on the decisions  of governments, even 
on  meetings  of  the  Commission,  but  hardly 
on the work of the European Assembly.  This 
is  not the  fault  of this  Assembly-it is  just a 
fact.  So  the  parliamentary  role  must  be 
strengthened  and  at  the  same  time-this  is 
stipulated  in  the  Acts  and  Treaties-the 
political institutions must be prepared. This is 
the  role  of  the  European  Assembly  but,  for 
it  to  be  performed,  it seems  to  me  that  the 
Assembly  must be able to count on the assist-
ance  of  the  national  parliaments  and  that, 
around  the  European  Assembly,  which  is 
naturally  the  competent  body,  we  must  be 
able  to  unite  a  great  body  of initiatives  and 
support in  the  national  parliaments  and  also 
among national streams of thought, particularly 
in  the universities. 
I should like to raise a very important question 
here:  should  direct  elections  to  a  European 
Parliament be organised? This question is often 
falsified  by  internal policy  attitudes.  I  should 
like  an  independent  and  respected  body 
emanating  from  all  the  parliaments  and  the 
greatest universities  to be  able  to  define  such 
a directly elected parliament, its advantages or 
drawbacks  and  its  operation.  As  this  is  only 
the  opinion  of  Mr  Edgar  Faure,  it  may  be 
worth  something  but  it  is  not  an  opinion 
which  has  to be followed.  But  if you  have  a 
research  body  backed  by  the  European 
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enlisting  the  help  of  recognised  researchers, 
this  opinion  would  be  very  important  for 
public opinion. 
My  third  point  is  that  we  should  seek  to 
proclaim  a  European  identity.  This  European 
identity cannot be limited to a  "zollverein", a 
set of customs  measures,  or even  to common 
technical  policies.  There must  be a  European 
conscience and thought;  to a great extent it is 
up  to us,  parliaments  and universities,  for  we 
are  gathered  here  in  these  capacities-and 
certain  of  us,  myself  included,  can  combine 
them-to  promote  this  European  conscious-
ness  and thought. Someone with whom I was 
discussing this said to me:  "In short, you want 
to take us  back to the eighteenth century, the 
period of enlightenment", and it is true that, at 
that  time,  there  was  a  European  intellectual 
community. It would not be such a bad thing 
to go  back to that situation,  but in  reality,  it 
is  not simply  a question of going back to the 
past, because we would be taking a great step 
forward. The concept of the intellectual Europe 
of the eighteenth century is  very attractive, but 
it is  an  elitist concept;  it was  only  of benefit 
to men who belonged to a type of aristocracy; 
it  is,  rather,  at  the  level  of  democracy,  the 
peoples  and  the  masses,  that  we  should  be 
concerned with this culture-a political culture 
and  a  general  European  culture. ·And  what 
should  some  of  its  applications  be?  I  would 
like to take up again here the subject of Euro-
peanisation  of  the  universities.  I  laid  a  great 
deal  of stress  on  this  when  I  was  Education 
Minister, and so did others, but finally virtually 
nothing was  done  about it.  Now, if we  have 
an  institute  like  the  one  I  am  advocating,  it 
could set about this undertaking. Our students 
and professors must be able to pursue a Euro-
pean career;  a French student who spends one 
of his  four  years  in  Germany  should  be  able 
to credit that year to his  course, because it is 
certain  that,  with  three  years  in  France  and 
one  year  in  Germany,  he  will  have  a  wider 
culture than if he  spent four years  in  a single 
place.  But  these  rules  are  given  very  little 
application at the present time.  Our European 
universities  must  be  able  to  specialise;  each 
must be able  to  attract experts  of all  nation-
alities  in  order  to  create  powerful  centres  of 
research  and progress. 
318 
A  word  now  about  the  economic  aspect,  for 
I  should  not  like  there  to  be  any  misunder-
standing  about  this.  Some  of  our  colleagues 
have  been  afraid  that  I  wished  to  give  this 
institute  an  economic  role  which  would 
encroach  on  the  province  of  the  European 
Parliament.  That is  not  my  intention.  I  shall 
make myself  very  clear.  When I broached the 
question  of  economic  prospects,  I  wished, 
above  all,  to  deal  with  the  very  important 
problem  of  the  concept  of  growth.  All  over 
the world the problem exists of how we should 
view  growth and eminent Europeans, such  as 
Mr Mansholt, have  taken up strong positions 
on the matter.  Some  think  that growth  must 
be stopped, others that it must be guided;  we 
have  the  work  of  the  Club  of  Rome  and 
various  other  groups,  but  we  do  not  know 
what it is  worth. Why should we not have  a 
truly European study of this model of growth 
and  why  should  we  not  have  an  authority 
which  could suggest  certain guidelines? 
In  all  these  matters  and in all  questions  con-
cerning the protection of nature, ecology, com-
mon  regulations  for  green  spaces,  the  fight 
against  pollution  and  other  problems,  the 
Institute could be useful  in  collaborating with 
the governments  of  the  Communities  and the 
Assemblies. 
Finally, with apologies  for taking up so  much 
of your  time,  I  should  like  to  say  one  more 
word  about  the  study  of  international  rela-
tions.  Naturally,  the  problems  of  daily 
diplomacy  and  defence  are  government  prob-
lems  and if Europe attains a certain sovereign-
ty,  they  will  be  problems  of  the  European 
governments  or the European bodies.  But we, 
within  the  framework  of  the  institute,  could 
raise  general  questions  of  international  rela-
tions, such as security, arbitration, the possibil-
ities  of  disarmament,  studied  in  a  scientific 
and  impartial  manner;  at  the  same  time,  we 
could  study the  systems  of  relations  between 
our Community and other countries.  I should 
like  to  cite  a  concrete  example  for  we  are, 
at  least  some  of  us,  politicians  and  we  are 
interested  in  politics.  One problem facing  the 
European  Community concerns  relations  with 
the United States. This is  an inescapable prob-
lem.  It is  often  said that  these  relations  are 
based  on  the  imperative  of  defence.  That  is 
possible.  This idea must not be dismissed.  But leaving  aside  for  the  moment what is  known 
as  the  American  umbrella,  there  is  the  strik-
ing  fact  that  Europe,  as  I  conceive  it,  is 
characterised by its democratic institutions and 
geographical proximity. It is  only natural that 
it should have special relations with a country 
like the United States which, although geogra-
phically  distant,  has  institutions  analogous  to 
ours.  It  is  only  natural  that  we  should  seek 
some  kind of special  relationship between the 
European  democratic  grouping  and  the 
American  democracy;  this does  not mean that 
the Community will not have any dealings with 
or  consideration  for  countries  which  do  not 
have the same political system. But do you not 
think that, through the Institute I am  propos-
ing, we  could open an objective dialogue with 
men and women belonging to peoples attached 
to  institutions  which  seem  so  strange  to  us? 
Does  this  not offer  a means  of attempting to 
tackle  these  problems  of  confrontation  be-
tween  different  types  of  life  and  civilisation? 
The  Institute  I  propose  must  not  be  a 
ponderous organisation with buildings, admin-
istration machinery and employees;  that is  not 
how I visualise  it;  on the  other hand it must 
be something more enduring than a symposium. 
It  must  call,  in  the  main,  on  services  which 
already  exist  as  well  as  on  disinterested 
assistance.  There  is  a  great  deal  of  this.  I 
should like the European Assembly to be at the 
heart  of  this  effort  and  a  sort  of entente  or 
council  to  be  organised.  I  envisage,  for 
example, the Presidents of our national parlia-
ments  or their representatives,  and in  each  of 
the  countries  a  special  parliamentary  group 
composed  of  members  of  all  parties  and  an 
extra-parliamentary  group  composed  of  uni-
versity  staff  and  researchers.  This  grouping 
could  constitute  the  basic  structure  of  the 
Institute.  Let me  say  once again that it is  not 
my  intention  to  take  power  away  from  the 
European  Assembly  but,  on  the  contrary,  to 
consolidate  and  assist  it.  The national  parlia-
ments  must  also  follow  this  path.  Each 
national  parliamentarian  must  consider  him-
self as  being,  already,  a European parliament-
arian  even  if  he  has  not  been  personally 
delegated to the European Assembly. Naturally 
the  delegates  have  an  institutional  authority, 
but  around  this  parliament  composed  of 
delegates,  there  must  be  in  each  parliament 
and around those parliaments in  turn, a force 
of proposal,  a  force  of  support-in short,  a 
kind  of  lever  bearing  on  public  opinion  to 
oblige governments to meet the aspirations  of 
their peoples who are,  in general,  more Euro-
pean  than  their  governments.  That  is  my 
proposal-it  may  seem  modest  but,  as 
Montesquieu  said,  "It is  not the  means  that 
must be  brilliant, but the end';  it is  the goal, 
and  I  think  all  of  us  here  conceive  of  this 
goal in the same way.  I would be very  happy 
if you  agreed  to work with me  in  this  direc-
tion."' 
The CHAIRMAN thanked Mr Faure  warmly 
for  his  attendance  and  contribution,  and 
expressed  the  hope  that  his  very  interesting 
proposal would be taken up. 
Mr  VON  HASSEL  welcomed  collaboration 
between  parliamentarians  and  academics.  He 
expressed  strong  support  for  Mr  FAURE's 
proposal  concerning  the  establishment  of  a 
European  political  research  institute. 
Mr  von  Hassel  also  referred  to  President 
Berkhouwer's  introductory  address  and  spoke 
of the need to persevere in the search for new 
models  and methods  for  Europe.  Referring to 
Professor  Friedrich's  remarks  he  asked  what 
alternative  there  could  be  to  the  democratic 
system.  The  European  Parliament  deserved 
great  appreciation  for  its  valuable  work  in 
difficult times. Personally he could not imagine 
the  unification  of  Europe  without  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament.  He  urged  the  members  of 
Parliament  and  those  responsible  in  the 
Members  States  to break the vicious  circle  in 
the  debate  as  to  which  should  come  first, 
elections with universal suffrage or an increase 
in the powers of the European Parliament. He 
thought  the different  problems  mentioned  by 
President  Berkhouwer  should  be  tackled  as 
far  as  possible  simultaneously.  Members  of 
the  Council  were  parliamentarians  too,  and 
stronger pressure  should  therefore  be  put on 
them  at  national  level.  Mr von  Hassel  urged 
the parties in the Member States to help create 
at  long  last  European  political  parties.  The 
national parties should provide funds  to assist 
in the construction of Europe.  He stated that 
the  German  Bundestag  had  just  made  an 
amount available for  this purpose. 
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national  Relations,  Basle,  in  connection  with 
the proposal presented by  Mr Faure,  referred 
to  two  events  which  had  taken  place  in  the 
previous  week. 
The first was a lecture given in Basle by Com-
missioner  Dahrendorf  on  the  Future  of  the 
European  Communities.  The lecturer  asserted 
that the European  Communities  had not only 
an economic,  but also  a  political  future,  that 
their progress  would, however, be slow in the 
next few years during which time the opportun-
ity for reflection must be seized. In conclusion, 
Mr Dahrendorf  had  put forward  the  idea  of 
setting  up  a  sort  of  'Constitutional  Council' 
composed of members of the European Parlia-
ment,  members  of  the  national  parliaments 
and experts on constitutional law and political 
science. 
The speaker thus noted a convergence of ideas 
which  seemed  to  him  significant. 
After  developing  his  ideas  on the  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights,  promulgated  in  the  same 
year  (1789),  and independently in France  and 
America,  the  speaker  arrived  at  the  second 
event  which  he  wished  to link  with the  first. 
A  measure  had  recently  been  adopted  in 
Luxembourg  to  create  a  post-graduate  Inter-
national  University  Institute  in  Luxembourg, 
one  of  whose  departments-the  Centre  for 
European  Studies  and  Research-was  already 
operating under the direction of Mr Pescatore, 
judge at the  Court of Justice of the European 
Communities  and  Professor  at the  University 
of Liege.  In the opinion of Professor Wolf, the 
Luxembourg  university  body  could  act  as  a 
reception facility  for the Institute proposed by 
Mr Faure.  Professor  Wolf invited  participants 
at the  symposium  to  consider this  suggestion. 
He  hoped  that  the  implementation  of  Mr 
Faure's  very  interesting  project for  collabora-
tion  between  parliamentarians  and  university 
academics  would  prove  one  of  the  positive 
results  of the  symposium. 
Lord  GLADWYN,  United  Kingdom  Member 
of  the  European  Parliament,  expressed  grati-
tude to Mr Faure and Mr von Hassel for their 
defence  of  democracy  and  for  Mr  Faure's 
brilliant expose of the scheme for the creation 
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of an international institute. He had, however, 
been impressed by the large number of experts 
who  had  the  impression  that  the  European 
Parliaments  generally  were  going  through  a 
period of decline. 
It  was  clear,  of  course,  that  in  an  age  of 
television,  automation  and  the  nuclear  bomb 
the nature of all our institutions had to change. 
But  it was  surely  the duty  of those  who  had 
experienced another age  to see  to it that such 
changes  did  not  simply  result  in  a  new 
barbarism. If, indeed, the parliamentary system 
collapsed power would pass to regimes control-
led  by  co-opted  officials,  perhaps  legitimised 
by referenda, with parliaments merely acting in 
an  advisory  role,  rather  in  the  way  that  the 
Supreme  Soviet  acted  as  a  sort  of  Greek 
chorus  to  the  Prresidium  in  the  USSR. 
Lord Gladwyn  did  not necessarily  accept  this 
gloomy prognosis but he recognized that unless 
a  central  authority  was  developed  in  Europe 
then  the  small  and  medium  nation  states 
would,  under  the  pressure  of  world  events, 
with  spiralling  inflation  and  unmanageable 
deficits, have to have recourse to the equivalent 
of  separate  wartime  regimes  that  would  in 
the long run come under the political influence 
of the Soviet  Union. 
Yet if,  out of necessity, such a central author-
ity  was  created  it  would,  in  default  of  some 
popular  and  legitimising  element  inevitably 
evolve  towards  a  kind  of  Empire  in  which 
power  would  tend  to  be  assumed  by  those 
who had the strength to wield it. 
How  then,  could  European  parliamentarians 
convince  Ministers  and public  opinion  of the 
grave  dangers  besetting  Europe  and  the  con-
tinuing necessity  of preserving ancient liberties 
by parliamentary means? 
Lord Gladwyn considered that they should not 
aim  too high  and  thus  terrify  the  uninitiated 
by  huge  federal  projects;  he  did  not  believe 
that  democratic  control  over  the  essential 
European  authority  could  be exercised  by  an 
assembly  which  would  in  any  way  resemble 
existing  parliamentary  institutions.  What was 
needed  was  some  institution  in  which  the 
various  oppositions  in  all  the  countries  con-
cerned-and the great pressure groups-could 
be adequately represented and which possessed the  negative  power  of  dissenting,  by  given 
majority,  from  any  major  decision  taken  by 
the  Council  which  would  itself  have  to  take 
such decisions  by a  qualified majority vote  on 
the recommendation  of  an independent  Com-
mission.  Once  this  possibility  was  grasped  by 
the  nation  states  and  the  various  electorates, 
then Lord Gladwyn believed that the necessary 
political enthusiasm would be  engendered  and 
direct elections could become a real possibility, 
but not before. 
Lord  Gladwyn  believed  that the  simplest  and 
best  way  to  start  in  this  direction  was  to 
induce  the  Ministers  to  give  to  the  existing 
European  Parliament  certain  limited  powers 
immediately and then to get it directly elected 
on  a  national  basis. If the  Council  could  not 
immediately  discard  the  unanimity  rule  they 
should nonetheless modify the existing method 
of  arriving  at  decisions  and  tran&fer  at  least 
some of the powers  now resting with  CORE-
PER  to  the  Commission  in  accordance  with 
the evident  intention  of  the Treaty of Rome. 
Lord  Gladwyn  felt  that  such  a  small  step 
forward could now be taken by all the govern-
ments concerned-even by the British Govern-
ment  if  it  obtained  some  satisfaction  in  the 
coming  negotiations-without  any  great 
popular outcry. 
Perhaps it would be necessary to undergo some 
great  economic  crisis  involving  much  unem-
ployment and general misery by which time, of 
course,  it  might  be  too  late.  But  equally  it 
might then be apparent, even to Ministers, who 
had  to  reflect  popular  opinion,  that  only  by 
unity  could  Europe  produce  by  itself  enough 
food  to  eat,  enough  substitute  raw  materials 
and  energy  to  keep  the  wheels  of  industry 
turning  and  enough  conventional  weapons  of 
a modern type to ensure the physical  defence 
of  Europe.  Lord  Gladwyn  did  not,  therefore, 
feel  that exaggerated  pessimism  was  justified, 
although the dangers  were great.  The existing 
Community  might  not  be  popular,  but  few 
would  seriously  believe  that  they  would  be 
better off if it collapsed. He believed this  even 
applied  to  Britain  where,  if  it  was  fully 
explained what the grim consequences of with-
:lrawal  would  be,  the  people  would  not  ap-
Jrove  such an action.  He believed  that unless 
:here  was  some  breakdown  of  all  industrial 
societies  induced  by international  events  over 
which  Europe  had  little  control,  the  Com-
munity  would  go  on  as  it  was  until  such  a 
time  as  Ministers  were  induced  to  take  what 
he  referred  to  as  a  small  but  crucial  step 
forward.  If they  did,  things  would  snowball. 
Mr  DAMGAARD,  President  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Assembly,  felt  that  it  was  necessary 
to  re-examine  the  nature  of  the  problem  of 
European  integration.  Calling  for  direct  elec-
tions  to  a  European  Parliament  implied  the 
selection  of  a  federal  course  which  would 
encounter opposition:  this  in itself should not 
impede  progress  although  it  involved  certain 
disadvantages  which should be  aired. 
He believed  that by  the  creation  of  a  federal 
state,  Europe  would  be  travelling  along  the 
same  lines-the  creation  of  a  super  block-
for  which,  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union were criticised. Some of Europe's prob-
lems,  those  relating  to  energy  and  the 
environment,  for  example,  could  be  solved 
outside  the  context  of  a  federal  state  simply 
by  cooperation  between  all  the  developed 
countries. 
He wondered whether the  establishment  of  a 
federal  state  was  not somehow  an  outmoded 
concept.  He said that the Scandinavian exper-
ience  showed  that  states  could  be  extremely 
close  but a federal  solution seemed inconceiv-
able. Some believed that international coopera-
tion  would  be  slowed  down if Europe  chose 
a federal route. It was necessary to evolve new 
systems  to  regulate  and  control  the  problem 
of  American  investment  in  Europe  and  this 
could  only  be  done  through  cooperation 
between Europe and the United States.  He felt 
that European integration should take place in 
clearly restricted fields  and that with the prob-
lem  of  direct  elections,  no  speedy  solution 
should be sought. 
He welcomed  Mr Faure's  idea  of  a  research 
institute  which  could  take  account  of  the 
global  problem involved  in  European integra-
tion  and  the  increase  in  the  powers  of  the 
European  Parliament,  for  if Europe  rapidly 
developed  into  a  super-power  there  would 
clearly  be  violent  opposition  in  parts  of  the 
Community. 
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heard  too  much  gloomy  talk  about  Europe's 
future;  he  supported  the  previous  speaker's 
optimistic attitude and he wished to dissociate 
himself  from  those  who  took  a  pessimistic 
attitude;  it  was  also  important  to  discard 
the  notion  of  the  17th  century  nation  state. 
The  defects  of  national  parliaments  were 
directly  due to the decay  of the nation states, 
whose  products they were. 
The idea  of parliamentary  democracy  was  no 
less  important  because  it  had  become 
somewhat outmoded in the form now practised 
in  Member States. 
In considering the future of the European Par-
liament it was important not to pay too much 
attention  to  historical  experience  of  national 
parliaments,  as  the  European  Parliament  was 
something quite new. 
He  did  not  agree  with  the  widely  held  idea 
in  the  UK  that  the  Common  Market  had 
suddenly  ravished  British  sovereignty;  for 
example the multinational companies had been 
doing  this  for  years  and  Britain  was  part  of 
the international monetary community.  British 
parliamentarians  and  public  opinion  were 
beginning to realize the new situation .that had 
developed in Europe and the rest of the world. 
In Britain, the European Community was being 
used  as  a  handy scapegoat during the  painful 
process  of getting  used  to Britain's  new  posi-
tion in  the world. The best way Britain could 
control the future development of Europe was 
to  extend  the democratic nature of  the  Com-
munity,  in  particular  by  supporting  the  prin-
ciple  of  direct  elections  to the  European  Par-
liament.  It  was  necessary  to  make  the  Com-
munity  Executive  directly  responsible  to  the 
people.  Britain's  best  future  lay  in  the  Com-
munity.  He hoped that the Symposium would 
constitute  a  useful  staging-post  on  the  long 
dangerous  road  leading  to  Europe's  ac-
countability  to  its  people. 
Professor FRIEDRICH speaking on a point of 
personal  privilege  in  reply  to  Lord  Gladwyn, 
simply wished to make it clear that the latter's 
implications  were  not  correct.  Any  one  who 
had read  his  writings  would  know  that.  Just 
because one was in favour of scientific investi-
gations  being  carried out in  certain  fields  did 
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not mean that one advocated the continuation 
of the conditions under investigation. 
Mr GREGOIRE, President of the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies, declared his support for 
Mr Faure's  proposal  for  the  creation  of  the 
European Institute  of Parliamentary  Research, 
as  well  as  Professor  Wolf's  suggestion  that 
this  institute  could  be  established  in  Luxem-
bourg.  The Institute  needed  to  maintain  rela-
tions  with  the  European  Parliament ·and  the 
Council of Europe. Mr Gregoire also favoured 
the  idea  put forward  by  Mr  Behrendt  when 
he  was  President of the European Parliament, 
of  bringing  together  the  Presidents  of  the 
national  parliaments  from  time  to  time  to 
discuss  European  problems.  In  conclusion,  he 
declared that Luxembourg was ready to receive 
a  new  European  Institute  of  Parliamentary 
Research. 
Mr BEHRENDT  thought the symposium  had 
already  demonstrated  the  need  for  politicians 
and academics  to  be able  to meet for  mutual 
inspiration  regarding  future  progress  towards 
European  integration.  Obviously  the  sympo-
sium  could not provide the answers  sought at 
this  time  of  'stocktaking'  in  the  Community, 
nor solve_ the crisis  in  Europe, which .  had not 
been envisaged at the time the symposium had 
been planned. 
He summarised his  conclusions  under the  fol-
lowing headings: 
1)  Studies  and  study  meetings  were  essential 
for  the  further  development  of  the  Euro· 
pean Communities  and particularly for  thE 
European  Parliament,  not  least  in  con· 
nection  with  the  strengthening  of  it~ 
powers; 
2)  European  politicians  should  continue  ir 
future  to  enlist  the  help  of  politica 
scientists; 
3)  Attempts  must  be  made  to make  politica 
practice  consistent with academic  thinkin! 
on the subject; 
4)  The national parliaments and the Europear 
Parliament must come together; 
5)  Studies  of  the  institution  of  parliamen 
in the Member States  should be encourag 
ed; 6)  The great European foundations  should be 
given  financial  support  for  research  into 
European  political  problems. 
Common action by all the Member States was 
conditional  on  the  adoption  of  a  common 
position at European level. 
Mr  TONCIC-SORINJ,  Secretary-General  of 
the  Council  of Europe,  began  by  saying  that 
he was sure that the gathering would welcome 
some information from him on the Council of 
Europe  and its  Consultative  Assembly,  which 
was  now  celebrating  its  twenty-fifth  year  of 
existence. 
He spoke  of  the  anxiety  expressed  originally 
that  the  Council  of Europe  should  be  under 
the  control  of  the  Council  of Ministers,  even 
to the extent of having  its  agenda  drafted  by 
it, something which was resisted and eventually 
did  not  come  about.  He  also  referred  to  the 
election  of  the  secretaries-general  which  the 
Council  has  so  far  had  and  said  that  while 
the  Council  of  Ministers  nominated  the  first 
two  secretaries-general,  the  last  election  of  a 
secretary-general  had been  carried  out by  the 
Consultative  Assembly  in  a  secret  ballot.  He 
thought that these facts  and their implications 
would  be  of interest  to  the  European  Parlia-
ment. 
Membership  of  European  Parliamentary  As-
semblies  created great difficulties  for members 
of  national  parliaments  with  home  constitu-
encies  to  look  after  and  constituency  work 
to  do.  It was  no  secret  to  those  present  that 
many  European  members  had lost their  seats 
in  their  own  national  parliaments.  This  was 
leading to a situation where Europe could not 
call  upon  the  best  political  talents  from  the 
national  parliaments.  This  led  in  turn  to  the 
conclusion  that  there  was  a  need  for  direct 
elections to the European Parliament, however 
this might be worked out in practice. 
Looking at the future  of the European Parlia-
ment,  Mr  DAILLY,  President  of  the  Senate 
of the French Republic, asked himself on what 
basis  the  Community  should  advance:  fed-
eralism or confederalism. 
He noted  that the federalist  cause  was  losing 
ground and that it no longer constituted in the 
short,  or  even  in  the  medium,  term  the  best 
way  to  strengthen  the  European  Parliament. 
It  assumed  direct  election  by  universal  suf-
frage,  which  raised  many  technical  and 
political  problems. 
If the  confederal  scheme  could  be  defended, 
it  was  still  necessary  to  agree  on its  content. 
Mr Dailly was strongly opposed to re-adopting 
the  Fouchet  Plan,  for  this  would  rapidly  lead 
to the substitution of intergovernmental bodies 
for  the  Community  executives.  The  Fouchet 
Plan  would  also  have  the effect  of restricting 
the  European  Parliament  to  a  purely  con-
sultative role without the national parliaments 
being  compensated  for  the  powers  they  had 
lost. 
In  his  opinion,  the problem of the powers  of 
the European Parliament must be settled in the 
near future, for the report on European Union 
had to be drawn up in 1975. In 1975, too, the 
Communities were to be wholly financed from 
their  own  resources.  In  France's  case,  this 
meant 10 000 million French francs not subject 
to parliamentary control; and the 'second read-
ing' procedure would not compensate for  this 
loss. 
Mr  Dailly  felt  that  a  strengthening  of  the 
powers  of  the  European  Parliament  could 
unblock  the  functioning  of  the  European 
Institutions,  which  was  now  marked  largely 
by  the  absence  of  real  balancing  structures; 
this  explained  the  sharp  tensions,  not to  say 
confrontations, in the Council of Ministers. He 
saw another reason for  developing the powers 
of  the  Parliament  in  the  fact  that  the  latter 
was the only institution in which the minority 
opposition was represented. 
In  conclusion,  he  gave  his  support  to  Mr 
Faure's proposal for the creation of an Institute 
of Research into the democratisation of Euro-
pean institutions. 
Mr  NEDERHC)RST,  Vice-President  of  the 
First House of the Dutch States General, began 
by  expressing  his  agreement  with  Mr Faure's 
proposal.  There  was  a  need  for  permanent 
contact between academics and politicians. The 
troubles  of the present time  were  common to 
all  democratic countries  of Europe.  The work 
of the Symposium  ought therefore to be  con-
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research could back up the work of politicians. 
Although  the  speaker  thus  welcomed  Mr 
Faure's  ideas,  he  also  warned  against  a  pro-
liferation  of  European  institutes.  He  was 
therefore  pleased  that Mr Faure  also  did  not 
want his  institute  to be  too  cumbersome;  for 
the  moment  a  work programme  was  enough. 
There should be  a limitation on its  tasks,  but 
participation should be  extended to the Euro-
pean  countries  which  maintained  links  of  as-
sociation  with the  Communities. 
Professor VEDEL felt that Professor Friedrich's 
address  was  both refreshing  and  exaggerated 
One must guard against  a  certain parliament-
ary enthusiasm and consider three things: 
- First,  no  integrated  institution  could  exist 
without a parliament because  there had to 
be a dialogue with opinion; 
The  parliamentary  institution  was  es-
sentially flexible.  For this reason the evolu-
tion  of  the  European  Parliament,  its 
development  and its  problems must be  the 
prime  subject  of  research  of  the  future 
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European  Institute  of  Parliamentary 
Research  whose creation was  requested by 
Mr  Faure.  It  was  already  clear  that  the 
European  Parliament  was  the  body  which 
could  examine,  resolve  and pass  judgment 
upon issues  at the European level; 
- Finally,  what else  could  be  done  over  and 
above  strengthening  the  powers  of  the 
European Parliament? Government had, up 
to  now,  announced  and  proclaimed  that 
European  construction  must  be  achieved 
through  them.  Considering  the  results 
achieved to date, there was reason to doubt 
this.  In  fact,  the  only  voice  open  to  the 
construction  of  Europe  would  be  that  of 
the  European  Parliament. 
The CHAIRMAN, in  closing the morning ses-
sion,  regretted  that  there  had  been  so  little 
time  for  general  discussion.  He welcomed  the 
widespread agreement which had been expres-
sed  to  Mr Faure's  proposals,  and  announced 
that  the  working  groups  would  resume  at 
2.45  p.m. 
The session adjourned. FRIDAY, 3 MAY 1974 
Working Group No 1 
'WORKING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS' The meeting commenced at 2.45 p.m. 
Chairman:  Miss  Colette  FLESCH,  Luxem-
bourg  Member  of  the  European  Parliament. 
Before  opening  the  proceedings,  the  CHAIR-
MAN gave a brief introduction to the problem 
of  relations  between  the  national  parliaments 
and the European Parliament;  she  referred to 
a report presented some time ago to the Euro-
pean  Parliament  by  Mr Furler. 
These  relations  were  generally  approached 
solely  from  the  angle  of  the  dual  mandate, 
although  the  problem  had  not yet  given  rise 
to  many  scientific  studies  or  parliamentary 
debates. 
The  first  question  that  came  to  mind  was 
whether the  holder  of a  dual  mandate  could 
be considered as  an ambassador of his national 
parliament  to  the  European  Parliament  or  as 
a  European  ambassador  to  his  national  par-
liament. 
The  second  question  might  be  in  what way 
relations  between  European  Parliament  and 
the  national  parliaments  could  be  improved; 
this question was all the more important since, 
within the framework of the Community insti-
tutions,  some  of  the  powers  of  the  national 
parliaments  had  been  transferred  not  to  the 
European  Parliament  but  to  the  Council  of 
Ministers. 
Finally,  it was  to  be  noted  that the  national 
parliaments  had  adopted  widely  varying 
methods  for  controlling  Community  activities 
(special  or  ad  hoc  committes,  foreign  affairs 
committees, etc.). It was therefore necessary to 
define  means  of  harmonising  procedures  and 
of establishing better cooperation between the 
various bodies concerned. 
Mr PETERSEN,  stressed  four  further  points: 
1)  Members  of  the  European  Parliament 
should  as  a  matter  of  course  have  seats 
on national committees dealing with Com-
munity problems. This was  both necessary 
and natural because of the desire for  good 
relations between the European Parliament 
and  national  parliaments; 
2)  It should be  possible for  national commit-
tees and their counterparts in the European 
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Parliament  to  collaborate.  In  his  opm10n, 
some  of  the  European  Parliament's  com-
mittees  were  ahead  of  the  national  com-
mittees;  they  had  particularly  valuable 
material that could be used by the national 
parliaments and their committees. 
It  would also  be  reasonable, he  added, to 
set aside  a  few  days  in each national par-
liamentary  session  for  the  purpose  of  dis-
cussing Community affairs. A more relaxed 
attitude  towards  Community  problems 
could, he  felt,  be  achieved in national par-
liaments,  which  generally  tended  to  deal 
with  the  more  controversial  Community 
issues, if they worked in close collaboration 
with the European Parliament and exchan-
ged  information with it; 
3)  He thought that an effort should be  made 
to  send  summaries  of  the  European  Par-
liament's  proceedings  to  all  members  of 
national  parliaments  and  to  make  them 
available  to  the  press; 
4)  Finally,  he  felt  it would  be  desirable  for 
separate  meetings  to  be  held  between  the 
national  parliaments  and  the  European 
Parliament.  This  could  take  the  form  of 
delegations  discussing  further  cooperation 
between  the  European  Parliament  and  na-
tional  parliaments. 
In  conclusion, he felt it was important to take 
practical  steps  along  the  lines  he  had  just 
mentioned as  soon as  possible. 
Mr  HUMBLET  regretted  that  the  proposals 
made  at  the  conference  held  on  15  January 
1973  in  Strasbourg  by  the  Presidents  or 
Speakers  of  the  Parliaments  of  the  Member 
States  of the  European  Communities  and  the 
European  Parliament  had  not  been  followed 
up.  The speaker  recalled  that this  conference 
had  closed  with  a  final  communique  stating 
that  moves  would  be  made  to  improve  co-
operation between organs of the national par-
liaments  and  the  European  Parliament.  The 
present  situation  was  unsatisfactory,  as  the 
only  communications  made  by  parliamenta-
rians  sitting  in  the  European  Parliament 
amounted  most  of  the  time,  within  the 
national parliaments,  to use  of the written or 
oral question procedure and very exceptionally 
to that of motions for resolution. In  conclusion,  Mr  Humblet  suggested  the 
adoption of a procedure already applied in the 
Bundestag,  which  gave  national  parliamenta-
rians the possibility and opportunity of analys-
ing  documents  prepared  by  the  Commission 
before submitting them to the Council. 
Mr  GREGOIRE  submitted  to  the  working 
group  a  proposal  he  had  presented  to  the 
Luxembourg  deputies.  This  was  a  proposal 
for  instituting  a  European  Parliament Day  at 
the  Luxembourg  Parliament;  this  day  would 
enable European Parliament representatives to 
report  on  their  activities.  In  addition,  the 
speaker  felt  that  parliamentarians  should  in 
· future  be  able  to profit from  the work done 
in  the  other  national  parliaments  or  within 
the European Parliament and proposed to this 
end  that  a  central  information  body  should 
be  made  responsible  for  developing  this  ex-
change  of  information  between  the  different 
parliaments. 
Mr  NEDERHORST  felt  that  Members  of 
national  parliaments  who  were  interested  in 
the  activities  of  the  European  Parliament 
received  every  conceivable  support  from  the 
European  Information  Service  in  their  own 
country;  The fact  that little use  was  made  of 
the  many  opportunities  was  a  result  of  par-
liamentarians'  lack  of  time.  Members  of  the 
European  Parliament  did  try  to  keep  their 
party  colleagues  in  the  national  parliament 
informed,  but  the  major  problem  was  again 
lack of time. 
There  was  no  advantage  in  the  proposal  by 
Mr  Petersen  and  Mr  Gregoire  to  have  the 
European  Members.  of  Parliament  make  a 
report  to  their  national  parliaments.  How 
could this  be  arranged? At least one represen-
tative  from  each party,  and a  whole series  of 
experts, would have to speak on the numerous 
problems  of  Europe.  This  would  all  have  to 
happen  in  one  day.  Moreover  the  press  was 
not interested  in  reporting  what  had  already 
taken  place;  the  press  was  only  interested  in 
what was actually happening. 
It was however much more important for  the 
national parliaments to call their own govern-
ments  to  account for  the  position  adopted  in 
the  Council  of  Ministers.  In  the  Netherlands, 
the  government  was  required  to  report  on 
the line  it had taken  in  the  Council  of  Min-
isters.  Here  again  the  problem  was  that  of 
not  being  too  late.  Moreover,  the  intention 
was  as  far  as  possible  to  let those who were 
not  Members  of  the  European  Parliament 
speak.  The  issues  were,  however,  frequently 
too  technical,  so  that  the  national  Members 
of Parliament were  not sufficiently  competent 
to speak on them. 
Closer contacts should be  established between 
the committees of national parliaments and of 
the  European  Parliament.  The  committee 
meetings  of  the  European  Parliament  ought 
not  to  be  secret.  Members  of  the  national 
parliaments  should  be  granted  access  to  the 
meetings  of the European Parliament commit-
tees  whose terms of reference corresponded to 
those  of  the  national  parliamentary  commit-
tees on which they sat. 
Professor  MACKINTOSH  said  that  the  dif-
ficulties  facing  an elected representative  active 
both in  his  own country and in the European 
Parliament  were  particularly  acute  in  Britain. 
The  problems  in  the  typical  single  member 
constituency  were  becoming  more  arduous 
year  by  year,  and  members  found  that  they 
were expected to be continuously available to 
their  constituents  at  any  time.  Indeed,  the 
strain  of  running  a  British  constituency  and 
attending  the  European  Parliament  was  be-
coming virtually intolerable. It had been found 
that  membership  of  the  European  Parliament 
would be held against a member of the House 
of  Commons  who  would  be  stigmatised  as 
being  always  absent  in  Europe.  Any  member 
who  took an  active  part in  the  work of  the 
European  Parliament  had  to  be  resigned  to 
the  fact  that he  was  unlikely  to  progress  in: 
his UK parliamentary career. He was sure that 
the  problems  were  much  more  difficult  than 
was  generally  realized;  to  play  an  effective 
part in  Europe,  the  British  MP  would  either 
have  to  have  a  very  safe  seat,  to  be  on the 
point of retirement or,  indeed,  to be  a  mem-
ber  of  the  House  of  Lords.  This  chain  of 
circumstances  meant  that  the  UK  representa-
tives  to  the  European  Parliament  were  not 
truly typical of British parliamentarians. 
Mr Mackintosh argued that to make progress 
towards direct elections before the Community 
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dent  authority  could  lead  to  a  situation  in 
which the European Parliament might be  dis-
credited  because  of  a  low  turnout  for  the 
elections.  He  thought  that  direct  elections 
must be  seen as  being some way in the future. 
He invited the  working group  to consider the 
compromise  proposals  put  forward  by  the 
former  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Michael 
Stewart,  who  had  suggested  the  election  of 
supernumerary  members  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  on  a  regional  basis,  at  the  same 
time  as  a  general  election.  Such  a  scheme 
would  have  the  advantage  of  freeing  these 
members  from  constituency  ties.  It  would, 
however,  be  necessary  to  ensure  that  a  pro-
portional basis  of election would maintain the 
overall  balance between political parties. 
It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  European 
representatives  would  be  elected  or  defeated 
not on European grounds but by  reference  to 
the public attitude to national political parties 
at the  time.  It  was  important  to  avoid  such 
mechanistic  solutions  as  the  European  Day: 
in  particular,  it  should  be  remembered  that 
conflict,  clash  and  division  were  interesting 
while  the  mere  reporting  on  reports  lacked 
excitement. 
The  CHAIRMAN  thanked Professor  Mackin-
tosh  for  his  contribution,  saying  that  clearly 
the  points  he  had made were of common ap-
plication  in  all  Community  countries.  She 
found  the  ideas  of  Mr Stewart  provided  an 
inter~sting compromise  which  was  worthy  of 
consideration  at  a  time  when  there  seemed 
to be  no  immediate  chance  of securing  direct 
elections  to the European Parliament. 
Mr LYON,  Secretary  of  the  French  National 
Assembly,  as  a  former  Deputy  Clerk  of  the 
European  Parliament,  wanted  his  address  to 
be  technical  rather  than  political.  As  he  saw 
it, the problem of relations between the Euro-
pean Parliament and the  national parliaments 
stemmed  from  the  isolation  of  the  national 
delegations.  The  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the 
National  Assembly  stipulated  that  the  Euro-
pean  delegation  must  draw  up  an  annual 
report  on  its  activities  within  the  European 
Parliament.  But  this  was  just  another  of  the 
many  written  documents  that  weighed  down 
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the  lives  of  parliamentarians.  It  was  there-
fore  ineffective  even  among  the  specialised 
services. 
To solve this problem, Mr Lyon proposed the 
development  of  human  relations  between  the 
members  of the  parliamentary  committees  at 
national  and  European  level.  Meetings  could 
take place when there were important debates; 
at such meetings  the  committees  of the  Euro-
pean  Parliament would be  able to receive  the 
chairmen  and  rapporteurs  of  the  committees 
of  the  national  parliaments  and  vice  versa. 
This  system  would  ensure  that  parliamenta-
rians  were  effectively  briefed  and  meetings 
held  in  the  different  capitals  would  have  a 
greater impact in the press. 
Professor  MITCHELL,  University  of  Edin-
burgh,  said  that  he  had  known  Professor 
Mackintosh  for  a  number  of  years  which 
had  been  characterised  by  a  friendly  atmo-
sphere  of  alternate  agreement  and  disagree-
ment.  He proposed to continue that tradition. 
He  accepted  that  the  Michael  Stewart  pro-
posals  had substantial  merit but thought that 
his  solution  was  a  choice  forced  by  despair 
and  that members  thus  elected  would  within 
the United Kindom Parliament be  regarded as 
second-class  citizens;  in  the  past,  there  had 
been precisely such a group of parliamentarians 
(he referred to the Irish members). They would 
be,  or would  risk  being,  so  regarded  in  the 
House as  emerging by a  different process  and 
having  in  the  House  more  limited  functions 
than the  ordinary members. 
The connection between the two parliamentary 
levels  was  fundamental  because of the 'educa-
tional'  role  of  Parliament,  Hence  the  impor-
tance  of  links  between  the  European  parlia-
mentarians  and  those  whose  interests  were 
primarily  national  or  regional.  The  work  of 
the national parliamentarians in the European 
Parliament  might  be  improved  if  the  dual 
responsibility were removed, but it was doubt-
ful  whether  the  realities  of  the  European 
questions  would  be  any  better  understood  in 
the  individual  national  capitals. 
There was  a point of view which argued that 
national  parliaments  should  concern  them-
selves  closely  with  the  detail  of  draft  com-
munity instruments etc.-this was what West-minster  was  concentrating  on  at  the  present 
time.  But  there  were  great  dangers  in  this 
because  of  the  different focuses  of  that legis-
lation and those  who were examining it were 
adjusted  by  different  educational  processes. 
He preferred  to  take  an  optimistic standpoint 
and  to  assume  that  some  evolution  towards 
economic  union  would  soon  be  possible:  this 
might,  he  thought, provide  an impetus  to the 
reawakening of interest in the European Parlia-
ment and the problems  of this  group.  In  that 
context, the connection between the two levels 
was  even  more  important.  He  was  not  con-
vinced  that  total  exclusion  of  the  double 
mandate  was  desirable.  If  political  parties 
would  take  their  European  roles  seriously,  it 
would be  possible  for  them  to  ease  consider-
ably  the  problems  of  the  member  who  was 
obliged  to play a  dual  role. 
Dr  GUIZZI  spoke  on  the  relations  between 
the  national  parliament  and  the  European 
Parliament.  He said  that there  was  a  depart-
ment  attached  to  the  Italian  Chamber  of 
Deputies  with  special  responsibility  for  rela-
tions  with  the  European  institutions,  and  in 
particular  with  the  European  Parliament.  In 
addition,  European  Parliament  resolutions 
were  announced in  the House,  printed,  distri-
buted  and  discussed  where  appropriate  at 
committee meetings. 
He  also  recalled  the  interesting  experiment 
tried  out  in  Rome  in  1970,  when  there  had 
been  a  meeting  between  the  Bureaux  of  the 
Committees  on  Social  Affairs  of  the  various 
Member States  and the European Parliament's 
Committee  on  Social  and  Economic  Affairs. 
The declared  purpose  of this  meeting  was  to 
harmonise  Community  and  national  legisla-
tion  on social  matters. 
Finally,  he  put  forward  a  concrete  proposal 
for  speedier harmonisation of national legisla-
tion.  He  suggested  that  following  hearings 
with  interested  parties,  the  European  Parlia-
ment  should  draw  up  outline  plans,  which 
it would then  be  for  the national parliaments 
to translate into law. 
Sir  John PEEL,  British  Member  of the  Euro-
pean  Parliament,  proposed  to  introduce  one 
or  two  practical  points  as  distinct  from  the 
philosophical  and  theoretical  side.  He  found 
himself  very  much  in  agreement  with  Profes-
sor  Mackintosh,  although  he  considered  that 
the  latter  tended  to  exaggerate  in  order  to 
make his  points. 
He  welcomed  a  greater  degree  of  consulta-
tion  and  contact  between  the  committees  of 
the  national  parliaments  and  those  of  the 
European Parliament,  but thought that it was 
not really  possible  for  all  committee meetings 
to  be  held  in  public.  There  were  many  un-
official, party political, behind-the-scenes com-
mitte  meetings  which  were  essential  to  the 
smooth working  of  parliament.  On the  other 
hand, standing and specialist committees could 
rightly  hold  public  meetings  and  might  well 
be  suitable for  joint meetings. 
He  questioned  whether  it  was  correct  for 
Professor  Mackintosh  to  say  that it was  im-
possible for  a British MP to do  both jobs.  Of 
course,  their political  opponents  would  make 
the most of periodical absences in Europe, but 
the  last  UK  election  did  not  make  it  seem 
that it was too difficult to combine both roles 
from  the electoral point of view. 
It  was  likely  that  the  more  importance  the 
Community  attained,  the  more  interested 
would  the  electorate  become  in  their  repre-
sentatives  being  members  of  this  European 
Parliament. 
Sir  John  Peel,  one  of  the  longest  serving 
British  members  of  the  various  European 
assemblies,  thought that he  could  detect even 
now  at  this  time  of  crisis  that  the  British 
were  becoming  more  interested  in  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament  and  were,  therefore,  likely 
to  be  less  critical  of British  members  of Par-
liament being members of the European Parlia-
ment  as  well.  There  must,  he  said,  be  an 
eventual solution to tl,le  problem of workload 
and  the  ideas  of  Mr  Michael  Stewart  came 
nearest  to  the  mark;  he  did  not,  however, 
accept  that such  a  system  would lead  to the 
creation of what might be derogatorily termed 
second  class  members  of  Parliament,  if the 
directly-elected  European  representatives  were 
entitled  to  attend  and  participate  in  appro-
priate  debates  in  their  national  parliaments 
without  having  a  right to vote  on matters  of 
purely domestic concern.  But whatever system 
was  adopted,  it  was  imperative  to  maintain 
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institutions at the present stage. 
Direct  elections  were  inevitable  because  the 
burden of work was  really very heavy indeed. 
He  affirmed  his  belief  in  the  future  of  the 
Communities and of the European Parliament; 
he  thought that, at the present stage, member-
ship  of  both  parliaments  was  necessary,  that 
this imposed a great burden which could only 
be  relieved  by  direct elections,  that the  main-
tenance  of  direct  contact  was  essential  and 
that there must be  no more talk about second 
class  members  of  parliament.  The  stronger 
and  better  the  Community became,  the  more 
interested  would  the  electorate  become  in  it. 
He  advised  against  impatience  and pessimism 
which  would  only  encourage  the  enemies  of 
European integration. 
Professor  KOOIMAN  felt  that  in  discussing 
relations  between  the  European  Parliament 
and the  national parliaments too  much atten-
tion was  paid to procedural matters, whereas 
in  fact  political  factors  were  more  important. 
There was  no point in talking about relations 
between the European Parliament and national 
parliaments  unless  the  functional  relations 
were  taken  as  a  basis.  The  structural  roles 
only  had  a  meaning  if  they  related  to  the 
functions  carried  out. 
The  speaker  further  drew  attention  to  .  the 
importance  of  the  so  called  'legitimation  of 
success';  when  the  relationship  between  the 
European Parliament  and  the  national  parlia-
ments  attained  political  relevance,  it  would 
automatically be  reflected  in the  structure. 
Mr  LIOUS  mentioned  the  meeting  of  15 
January 1973 attended by the Presidents of the 
various  Assemblies.  Three  months  after  that 
meeting,  in  accordance  with  the  wish  ex-
pressed  at  it,  the  French  Senate  set  up  a 
European  Affairs  Service;  this  service  pro-
vided,  among  other  things,  information  on 
what  was  happening  in  Europe  and  sought, 
with  the  modest  means  at  its  disposal,  to 
establish  closer  links  between  the  various 
parliamentary  institutions.  Mr  Lious  wanted 
some form of interaction between the different 
parliamentary  committees  of  the  European 
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Parliament  and  the  national  specialised  com-
mittees. 
Turning to  the  European  Community  institu-
tions, the speaker expressed the hope that the 
procedure  followed  in  the  Bundestag  would 
be  adopted  by  which  draft  Community  legis-
lative  proposals  were  submitted  to  it  before 
their  adoption  by  the  Council  of  Ministers 
or  the  Commission.  Mr  Lious  was  aware, 
however,  that  this  proposal  would  be  quite 
difficult to implement in  certain countries. 
Concerning  the  dual  mandate,  he  could  see 
the  drawbacks  of  the  system  but emphasised 
that they  need  not  necessarily  exist,  citing  as 
an  example Mr Poher,  France's  second citizen 
and,  at the same time, a Member of the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
Dr  SAROGNI  pointed  out  in  her  opening 
remarks  that  at  European  level  we  members 
were  faced  not  only  with  political  problems 
but also with important practical problems. 
There was  no doubt but that national  parlia-
ments were taking on a different kind of role; 
but it was also  true that the European Parlia-
ment too was looking for new fields  of action. 
This  was  clearly  a  political  problem,  but  it 
was  nevertheless  necessary  that  the  adminis-
trative  departments  should  take  a  hand  in 
solving  it,  and a  decisive  one  at that.  In  fact 
at  both  official  and  national  parliamentary 
level  there was often a lack of information on 
what was  happening  in  the  European  Parlia-
ment. 
Referring  to  the  valuable  experience  gained 
from  the  preparation  of  summary  reports  of 
proceedings  in  the  national  parliaments,  Dr 
Sarogni  proposed that similar  reports  be pre-
pared for sittings of the Euroepan Parliament. 
They should be  published immediately in  the 
various  languages  and  edited  by  a  specialist 
team of officials. 
What was needed, in other words, was a closer 
link  between  the  two  administrative  services, 
European  and  national,  and  the  most highly 
qualified officials should be selected from both 
administrations  for  this  purpose. 
In  addition,  joint studies  could be  undertaken 
by means of staff 'exchanges' designed to bring the  two  administrations  closer  together.  As 
things  stood at present, the national adminis-
trations with a few  laudable exceptions, know 
little or nothing of the work of the European 
Parliament and vice  versa. 
Some  political  effort  was  clearly  required  if 
all this was to be  organised. In this connection 
it  was  pointed  out  that  the  Italian  mem-
bers  of  Parliament  were  very  active  at  both 
European  Parliament  and  national  level,  in 
promoting endeavours  to  alert public opinion 
to  the  principal  European  problems. 
An  important step  forward  in  this  area  was 
the  setting  up  of  a  committee  for  relations 
with the  parliaments.  With the help  of  mem-
bers of the European Parliament, of secretaries 
of  delegations  and  of  European  Parliament 
officials,  such  a  committee  could  map  out 
forms  of  cooperation  between  European  Par-
liament  and  national  parliaments  and  pick 
out  the  most  important  resolutions  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  promote  discussion 
of these topics at the national level. 
Dr Sarogni  concluded by  expressing the  hope 
that practical cooperation on those lines would 
become  a  reality  since  truly  effective  action 
depended on the support of all concerned. 
The  CHAIRMAN said  that Mrs  Sarogni  had 
been  right  to draw  attention  to the need  for 
the  distribution as  soon as  possible of a  sum-
marised  version  of  debates  in  the  European 
Parliament.  She  thanked  the  working  group 
for  making  their  contribution  so  precise  and 
to the point. 
The meeting concluded. 
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Working Group No 2 
'THE POWERS  OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
IN A EUROPEAN  UNION' The meeting  commenced at 2.45  p.m. 
Chairman:  Mr  Maurice  A. M. J.  DEWULF, 
Vice-President of the European Parliament. 
The  CHAIRMAN  declared  the  meeting  open 
and apologized for the absence of Mr Bertrand, 
who  had  to  take  part  in  an  important  vote 
in  his  own country. He suggested  that Profes-
sor Chapman should be appointed Rapporteur 
and  that  Professor  Chapman  should  be  the 
first  speaker on the  European  Parliament and 
European union. 
Professor  CHAPMAN  said  that  he  could  be 
brief as  he had already put forward his  views 
in his paper for the Symposium; but he thought 
that their discussion  that afternoon could  fall 
into two parts. 
Firstly,  what  form  of  union  was  there  likely 
to  be  in  1980  and the  years  immediately  fol-
lowing?  He  hoped  that  their  discussions  on 
this  would  be  practicable  so  that they  could 
report  back  to  the  plenary  session  with  con-
crete ideas as to the probable kind of European 
union. Would it be federal or confederal-how 
was  public  opinion  moving?  When  he  talked 
of federation  he  envisaged  a  form  of  central 
government with independent powers over the 
Member  States.  Confederation,  on  the  other 
hand, meant central government or a directing 
body  which  would  remain  the  instrument  of 
the  Member  States  with  no  great  degree  of 
independent power. Naturally, these categories 
shaded  into  each  other .  but  they  might  help 
their  discussions. 
The second  part of  their  discussion  might  be 
concerned with the role that Parliament should 
play following union, but this of course would 
depend  on  what sort  of  union  was  likely  to 
emerge. 
In his view the time had come for them to say 
that the Treaty of Rome should no  longer be 
regarded,  as  so  many  still  regarded  it,  as  a 
blue-print for quick progress towards a federal 
form  of  Europe.  Under  that view  the  Treaty 
made  the  Commission  the  blue-print  of  a 
future,  post-union,  gov~rnment responsible  to 
the  European  Parliament  which  would  be 
directly  elected.  The  Council  of  Ministers 
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would  then  wither  away  into  something  ap-
proaching a Senate. 
This, however, was no longer likely:  the situa-
tion had changed since the Treaty was drafted. 
In  the  first  place,  the  UK,  Denmark  and 
France  were  against  any  quick  move  towards 
a Federal Europe by 1980. Secondly, there was 
no  trans-European  party  system  which  could 
give  stability  to  a  European  Parliament  in 
which a European Government would have to 
operate.  It was  far too early for  this.  Thirdly, 
the  lessons  taught  by  the  history  of  other 
federations  were important;  the EEC  was  not 
unique  and  they  could  draw  useful  lessons 
from Germany and America; frequently federa-
tion  was  preceded  by  the  confederation  of 
nation states. 
There were two other points against the blue-
print argument.  Firstly,  in the  daily  workings 
of the Community the provisions of the Treaty 
were  often  being  put  aside;  the  Council  of 
Ministers  had  become  a  collegiate  body  and 
it  had achieved  a  direct  relationship  with the 
European  Parliament.  Moreover  the  scope  of 
the  Treaty  was  constantly  being  extended  to 
such matters as the environment, foreign policy 
and  now  there  was  even  talk  of  a  common 
defence  policy.  Certainly  foreign  and  defence 
policy would not work within a federal frame-
work  in  the  near  future  though  they  would 
more  likely  be  successful  within  a  confedera-
tion. 
Secondly,  economic  and monetary  union  now 
seemed  to  be  an  unattainable  aim.  If it was 
to be achieved this would be by  confederation. 
Key  issues  would  continue  to  need  central 
decision and this was hard enough to envisage 
in  confederal  terms,  let  alone  by  a  central 
independent  government.  In  this  sense  the 
Treaty of Rome was outmoded. 
As  far  as  the  second  part of their  discussion 
was  concerned,  if they  agreed  that confedera-
tion  was  likely,  then  it  might  be  that  the 
powers envisaged for the European Parliament 
in the 1970s would be the right sort of powers 
under  confederation  in  the  1980s.  This  went 
with the Commission's  current budgetary pro-
posals. Where the Council of Ministers decided 
on the harmonisation of national policies, then 
Parliament's  powers would have  to  be  limited 
in  some  way;  the  most  they  could  hope  for was  a  conciliatory  role  with  no  final  word. 
But  where  a  genuine  Community  activity 
started then Parliament should be able to have 
the  last  word;  and  that too  was  in  the  pro-
posals  of  the  Commission,  since  Parliament 
would  have  a  right  of  rejection  by  reducing 
appropriations to zero, and they could always 
dismiss  the Commission if need be. 
A  confederal  Europe  could  be  built  on  the 
present  basis  of  the  likely  distribution  of 
powers.  He  suggested  then  that  they  should 
divide  their  work  and  describe  what  sort  of 
union  was  likely  and  what  role  Parliament 
would have to play. 
Mr  VAN  DER  SANDEN  was  disappointed 
with  Professor  Chapman's  paper  and  with 
what he had just said.  A confederation  could 
never  be  a  solution  for  Europe.  The  goal 
should  be  to  put national  interests  in  second 
place.  An  extreme  example  of  defence  of 
national interests  was  the energy  crisis,  which 
had  caused  so  much  harm  to  Europe.  The 
ideal  of  a  federal  Europe  ought  not  to  be 
given up because the Labour Party was making 
difficulties  or because  France for  the moment 
did  not  like  it.  Europe  should  also  take  a 
single  line  on  defence  and  foreign  affairs.  If 
this  was  not  achieved,  other  powers  would 
control  our affairs  in these  areas. 
The  requirements  for  a  federal  Europe  were 
a  single  decision-making centre and a  genuine 
parliament.  This  need  not  mean  that  all 
national powers would have to be transferred. 
Cultural  differences  too  should  continue  to 
exist.  An  example  of  a  federal  state in which 
certain  matters  were  left  to  the  component 
parts  was  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany, 
where  education  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
Lander.  There  were  also  many  similar  exam-
ples  from  the United States. 
As  regards the relationship between the Coun-
cil,  the  Commission  and  the  Parliament, 
Europe was  no  stronger than its  weakest link, 
to  wit,  the  Council. 
Opinion  surveys  in  Europe  the  previous  year 
had  shown  that  both  the  people  and  the 
representatives  were  clearly  pro-Community. 
The  stagnation  in  Europe  was  to  be  blamed 
on  the  political  will  of  the  governments.  In 
conclusion  the  speaker  pointed  out  that  the 
concerns  of  the  people  were  not  reflected  in 
the policy pursued by  the governments  of the 
Member States. 
The following speech was delivered by Profes-
sor RONZITTI of the University of Pisa: 
'On the whole I  agree that the  debate  on the 
future  European  political  union  should  be 
about  whether  this  union  ought  to  take  the 
form  of  a  federation  or  of  a  confederation. 
Having  settled  this  matter,  however,  we  shall 
then  have  to  decide  what  role  to  assign  to 
the  European  Parliament  in  the  one  or  the 
other  case.  For  the  moment,  however,  I  feel 
compelled  to  appeal  for  a  realistic  approach 
to  the  problem,  which  would  take  a  clear-
sighted  look  at  the  present  situation  and 
distinguish  what  is  possible  from  what  is 
merely  desirable.  If we  do  this,  the  debate 
will  not peter out in mere academic verbosity. 
In  this  connection it is  well  to point out that 
a notable feature of the present situation is  the 
return  to  methods  of  intergovernmental  co-
operation,  a  type  of cooperation  which  puts 
a  premium  on  national  sovereignties  to  the 
detriment  of  supranational  bodies,  especially 
of  a  parliamentary  nature.  This  would  carry 
with  it  the  danger  of  exacerbating  conflicts 
between  national  states  or at least of causing 
a  standstill  in  endeavours  to  mediate  these 
conflicts. 
In order to prove the truth of this assumption, 
it is  sufficient to refer to the dichotomy, which 
by  now  seems  to  have  become  a  definite 
reality, in the process of European integration. 
Two  fairly  distinct  structures  are  in  fact 
discernible.  On  the  one  hand,  we  have  what 
is  termed  political  cooperation  between  the 
Nine;  although  separate  administrative  bodies 
exist for  this  purpose, they  are  no  more than 
forms  of  intergovernmental  machinery-we 
need  only  mention  the  Summit  Meeting  of 
Heads  of  State  or  Government,  the  Con-
ference of Foreign Ministers, the Political Com-
mittee  of Directors  of  Political  Affairs  in  the 
Foreign  Ministries  of  the  Member  States  and 
other such groups.  Consideration has  recently 
been  given  to  setting  up  machinery,  which 
would  be  necessarily  intergovernmental  in 
character,  for  outlining  a  common  approach 
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Community.  But  this  common  approach  has 
yet  to  be  seen  in  action.  We  need  only  men-
tion  a  number  of  crucial  problems,  such  as 
relations  between  Europe  and  the  United 
States,  relations between Europe and the Arab 
countries and the recent energy crisis. 
As  far  as  European  integration,  as  envisaged 
by  the  constituent  Treaties,  is  concerned,  it 
should  be  pointed out that intergovernmental 
decision-making  machinery  has  been  streng-
thened  all  along  the  line,  beginning  with  the 
so-called  Luxembourg  Agreement.  Joint 
policies have difficulty in getting off the ground 
or fail  to do so  altogether, with the result that 
of  the  three  possible  alternatives  facing  the 
Community-expansion, regression  or stagna-
tion-some  see  stagnation  as  being  the  most 
likely. 
Looking  at  the  machinery  which  should  link 
up  the  two  structures  we  have  just  briefly 
outlined we  can see  that the European Parlia-
ment forms  a  rather tenuous  link.  All  that is 
provided  for  is  a  "colloquy"  between  the 
Foreign  Ministers  and  the  members  of  the 
Political  Affairs  Committee  of  the  European 
Parliament,  plus  a  communication  from  the 
President-in-Office  of  the  Council  to  the 
European Parliament  on the  state  of  progress 
towards  European Union. 
All  this  tends  to confirm that the  Community 
process,  whether  in  relation  to  European 
political  union  or to European  integration,  is 
an intergovernmental process, which stands out 
as  a  fact  of  foreign  policy  and is  difficult  to 
control  by  the  national  parliaments  in  the 
absence  of  a  European  Parliament  with  ef-
fective  powers.  This is  certainly  true of those 
areas  covered  by  the Treaties  of  Rome,  areas 
which  belong  only  to  internal  policy  and  are 
managed  by  joint agreement  (by  means  of  an 
intergovernmental  procedure)  at  Community 
level.  Experience  shows  that  this  machinery 
favours  national  executives  and,  in  states  in 
which  there  are  coalition  governments,  such 
as  there  is  in  Italy,  the  leading  party  in  the 
governmental  majority.  Given  the  ineffectual 
control of members of parliament over foreign 
policy,  this  means  that the leading  party can 
put  certain  policies  into  effect  without  any 
significant control over them by political forces 
which operate at the national level.' 
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Mr  KIRCHNER,  Economic  and  Social  Com-
mittee,  was  suspicious  of  the  relevance  of 
historical  precedents  for  the  situation  which 
was  facing  Europe.  He was  not convinced  of 
the relevance of the distinction between federa-
tion and confederation. It had been seen  how 
progess  was  made  via  joint  decision-making 
on  neo-functionalist  lines  and  the  slow 
transference  of  powers  to  the  European  Par-
liament. 
Mr  SCHWED,  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities,  emphasized  that  the  supra-
nationality  dispute  should  now be  considered 
outdated. There were some areas which could 
be  organised  along  federal  lines  and  others 
along  confederal  lines  such  as  foreign  affairs, 
defence and, to a lesser extent, currency. 
The  role  of  the  European  Parliament,  the 
second  subject  for  thought  suggested  by  Mr 
Chapman, was worth going into more deeply. 
In answer to the question as to whether deci-
sions  should be  taken  by  the Nine independ-
ently,  the  speaker  replied  that this  procedure 
was already being followed. The European-Arab 
Conference,  decided  by the Foreign Ministers, 
was  one  example  of  this.  At  all  events,  a 
European  Parliament  was  essential,  even 
within the  framework of a  confederation.  But 
what place  and  role  was  it to  have? 
Professor  VAN  ER  VE,  University  of  Tilburg, 
said the question as  to whether we were head-
ing for a confederation had again arisen. From 
1975,  9 000  million  guilders  would  be  taken 
from  the  budgets  of  the  Member States;  this 
money would be voted by the Council without 
control by  the European Parliament. It should 
further be borne in  mind that under the  1970 
Treaty,  decisions  on  agricultural  expenditure 
were  taken  away  from  the  national  parlia-
ments.  The  Communities'  own  resources, 
especially  as  regards  agriculture,  therefore 
already  entirely  fitted  into  the  federative  pat-
tern.  The  whole  agricultural  policy  was  in 
advance of the rest of the Community policies 
insofar  as  its  autonomous  deciskm-making 
rested  on  a  federative  structure;  there  was 
however  no  control.  Mr  van  Erve  drew  the 
conclusion  that  the  federal  road  should  be 
taken. Professor  CHAPMAN,  correcting  certain  mis-
understandings  of his  original paper, affirmed 
that  he  was  not  in  favour  of  Europe  being 
merely  a  loose  association  of  states.  Con-
federation  he  regarded  simply  as  a  first  step, 
principally because of the problems  associated 
with the making  of  common decisions  in the 
field  of foreign  affairs,  defence,  and monetary 
policy.  This  confederation  should,  however, 
lead  in time  to a situation in  which members 
of  the  supreme  body  ceased  to  be  members 
of their national governments, and in this way 
a true federation could be established gradual-
ly.  For  all  this  the  EEC  Treaty  was  an 
inadequate  blueprint.  The  most  important 
question  was  how  to  preserve  the  Commis-
sion's  powers  of initiative,  given  the fact  that 
there  was  a  risk that they would be  replaced 
by  those  of an  intergovernmental  conference. 
The answer to this question perhaps lay in the 
fact  that  Member  States  at  the  Copenhagen 
Summit  had  pledged  themselves  to  progress 
which  would  not involve  any  going  back  on 
Treaties  and  Agreements  already  signed.  So 
union could comprehend the economic activity 
of  the  Rome  Treaty,  including  the  Commis-
sion's powers of initiative. 
Mr VAN  DER  SANDEN  thought  that for  a 
thorough  debate  on  European  union  a  full 
three days  would be  necessary.  He considered 
the  first  sentence  of  Professor  Chapman's 
report somewhat unsubtle:  'This paper will be 
concerned with what is  feasible  for  the Euro-
pean  Community rather than with ideal  solu-
tions;  and  it  will  concentrate  not  on  some 
vision  of  a  united  Europe  or  even  on  the 
year  2000  AD,  but  on  what  is  within  our 
grasp for the last two decades  of the century.' 
Mr  van  der  Sanden  wished  to  develop  the 
idea  of  a  power  centre  in  Europe  with  a 
European government responsible to the Euro-
pean  Parliament.  He was  of the  opinion  that 
the  legitimate  rights  of the  states  should  be 
honoured,  but he  wished  to  give  the ideal  of 
a  united  Europe  priority.  Instancing  the  Ber-
trand  report,  which  envisaged  three  stages 
before  union  (firstly  without  amendments  to 
the Treaties, secondly with limited amendments 
to the Treaties,  and thirdly with fundamental 
amendments  to  the  Treaties),  he  pointed  out 
that the Paris Summit Conference had already 
decided  on  a  fundamental  amendment  to  the 
Treaty. 
The speaker did not wish to tie himself down 
to the achievement of full  union by 1980, but 
wished  to  remain  realistic  while  still  basing 
himself  on  the  ideal.  There  was  a  Rubicon 
to be crossed and there was no way back. But 
before crossing that Rubicon, which should be 
done even  at the first  stage, Mr van  der San-
den  did  not want to  give  up the last line  of 
defence:  resistance  to  any  form  of  confedera-
tion. In his view, the goal ought to be a federal 
Europe.  Even  in  the  Davignon  procedure  in 
connection  with  political  union,  Europe  now 
spoke with one voice,  while  another question 
closely  connected  with the  idea  of confedera-
tion, namely defence, had finally been brought 
up  in  the  European  Parliament  following  on 
the  Mommersteeg  report. 
The speaker  concluded that if he,  as  a realist 
inspired  by  an  idea,  set  his  sights  on  Euro-
pean union, he did not need the Fouchet plan, 
and  rejected  it  in  principle. 
Professor  DESSART,  University  of  Brussels, 
believed  that  European  union,  which  had  to 
be  achieved  by  1980,  would  aim  above  all 
at  bringing  about  economic  and  monetary 
integration.  This  being  so,  it  would  be  dif-
ficult  to settle for the organisation of Europe 
on a  confederal basis.  If the intention was  to 
institute a  single  currency,  the Member States 
would  have to surrender a  large part of their 
national  sovereignty,  as  employment  and 
inflation problems influenced strongly the pos-
sibility of an approach to monetary union. 
The example provided by  the United States of 
America  showed that political unification  had 
been achieved long before the monetary system 
of the  Federal  Reserve  Bank,  which  appeared 
as  late as  1913. As  far as European integration 
was  concerned,  the intention  was  to  institute 
monetary union at the same time as  European 
union. 
The speaker  then went on to  ask  whether  it 
would be  desirable  to give  the European Par-
liament  extensive  powers  to  manage  the  eco-
nomy.  He  recalled  in  this  connection  that  a 
year  or two  ago  the  Belgian  Parliament  had 
empowered the government to decide whether 
the monetary parity ought to be modified. This 
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order  to  make  it  possible  to  take  a  rapid 
decision  in  the  monetary  field  protected  by 
secrecy  up  to the  very  last moment. 
The  CHAIRMAN  thought  that  a  federation 
must be the ultimate  aim  but in certain areas 
a  confederal  approach· would  have  to  suffice 
for  the  time  being.  The  sensitive  question  of 
sovereignty·  arose  in  all  the  countries~  There 
was  an  increasing  tendency  towards  a  more 
global  approach  to  these  problems. 
Mr  FUGMANN,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the 
Christian  Democratic  Group  of the  European 
Parliament,  commented  on  the  first  part  of 
Professor  Chapman's  study  (the  federation/ 
confederation issue). 
Professor  Chapman's  arguments  in  favour  of 
a  confederal  future  for  the  Community  were 
unconvincing;  he  suggested,  since . it  already 
possessed federal as well as confederal features. 
In  the  European  Parliament  the  view  was 
generally  held-and  confirmed  by  a  reading 
of  constitutional  law-that  the  Community 
should  be  regarded  as  a  phenomenon  sui 
generis.  · 
The federal  aspects  included: 
- the  Communities'  power  to  enact  laws 
directly  affecting  citizens . and  without 
recourse  to  national  authorities  (even 
though  the  Council  of Ministers  might be 
said  to  function  virtually  as  an  inter-
governmental body), 
- the  Communities'  budgetary  powers;  they 
already had their own resources  and, from 
1975  onwards,  would be entirely  financed 
by  such  resources,  to  which  the  Member 
States had no claim, being simply respons-
ible for forwarding  the  funds. 
On the other hand, the absence  of any  refer~ 
ence  in  the  Community  treaties  to  federal 
loyalty, in contrast to current German constitu-
tiona~ practice for  instance,  could be regarded 
as  a confederal element. There was no clause in 
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Community  law  preventing  claims  by  the 
Member  States  against  the  Community. 
These  examples  showed  the  hybrid  nature  of 
the  Community,  It  hardly  seemed  profitable 
therefore  to  argue  whether  it was  federal  or 
confederal. If, however,  the talk of confederal 
elements  was  meant  to  influence  the  features 
of  the  future  Union  (for  example,  insistence 
on the unanimity  principle,  rejection  of· direct 
elections or of any extension to the European 
Parliament's  powers),  such  an  argument  was 
dangerous. 
Mr KIRCHNER, felt that in the next five years 
emphasis  would  have  to  be  placed  on  the 
obstacles  to be  overcome  in  order to  achieve 
European  union  as  laid  down  in  the  Com-
munique  of· Paris  and  in  Article  35  of  the 
Treaty  of  Rome. 
Professor CHAPMAN, was Of the opinion that 
a  useful  report  could  be  drawn  up  in  view 
of  the  fruitful  discussions  held  during  the 
Working Group.  All  the participants regarded 
a federal Europe as the ultimate aim and ideal. 
However, the blueprints of the Treaty of Rome 
for  a  federal  union  to  be  achieved  by 1980 
did not strike  him  as  being very· realistic.  He 
could  not ·envisage  the European  Commission 
becoming  a  European  Government  by  1980. 
Clearly, a confederation would have to precede 
a  federation  of. Europe,  especially  for  matters 
such  as  foreign  and  economic  policy.  When 
a constitution for Europe was eventually drawn 
up  it  wou,ld  have  to  contain  a  mixture  of 
federal and confederal elements. 
Meanwhile, he stressed that the importance of 
the  European Parliament  should increase,  not 
least because of the loss of powers of national 
parliaments  and the control of powers  by  the 
European Parliament. 
He  agreed  that the  next .  stage  of  integration 
was  linked  to  the  hard  core  of  national 
sovereignty. The will for confederation had to 
be strengthened still further. 
The meeting concluded. FRIDAY, 3 MAY 1974 
Working Group No 3 
'DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. 
AND THE ROLE  OF POLITICAL PARTIES' The meeting commenced at 2.50 p.m. 
Chairman:  MrS. PATI]N, Dutch Member of 
the  European  Parliament. 
The  CHAIRMAN  opened  the  meeting  and, 
after  making  a  few  technical  announcements, 
proposed  that  the  following  agenda  be 
adopted: 
1)  A uniform system for direct elections. 
2)  The  combination  of  a  European  mandate 
and a national  mandate. 
3)  The number  of  seats  of  the  European 
Parliament. 
4)  The relation  between  direct  elections  and 
extension  of  the  powers  of  the  European 
Parliament. 
5)  Consequences  of direct elections for  natio-
nal  political parties. 
It  was  agreed  that  Professor  Rose  should 
introduce  points  1  and 3,  that the  Chairman 
should introduce points 2  and 4, and that Dr 
Gianni  Bonvicini  should present the 5th.  The 
agenda was  agreed to and the chairman asked 
Professor Rose to introduce the discussion. 
Professor  ROSE,  Strathclyde  University,  Scot-
land,  started  by  making  two  related  points; 
firstly  that  the  mechanics  of  elections  in  the 
country  in  which  an  individual  was  brought 
up seemed the most natural to that individual; 
secondly, he thought it important to consider 
the question:  why have elections?  He felt that 
Professor  Friedrich  had  overlooked  the  con-
cept  of  representation,  of  which  Parliament 
was  one  form.  It was  impossible  to  have  a 
representative  parliament without elections.  If 
the  Common  Market  was  to  become  more 
important,  the  authority  of  the  Community 
would  depend  on representation.  He felt  that 
loyalty  to  the  Community  would  be  a  vital 
element  and  that  that  loyalty  would  be  in-
creased if the people had a say in the constitu-
tion of the Community. 
Professor  Rose  thought  that consideration  of 
a  system  for  direct elections  could  be  divided 
into two parts: the mechanism for the election 
and  the  question  of  who  would  have  power 
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under  that  system.  He  believed  that  the 
question  of  power  was  the  more  important. 
In  his  view,  the  implications  of  a  system  of 
direct  representation  would  be  clear.  First  of 
all,  under  any  conceivable  representative 
system  there  would  be  no  majority  party,  or 
even  a preponderant one. The eventual system 
could  well  resemble  the  state  of  parties  in 
Luxembourg, for example, where the arrange-
ment was  slightly  less  fluid  than  in  Holland 
or Belgium,  but it would not be  the same  as 
in  Italy,  Ireland  or  Germany  with  major 
parties  obtaining  nearly  50°/o  of  the  vote. 
Under  any  likely  system,  there  would  be  a 
majority  when  two  out  of  three  groups, 
Christian,  Liberal  or  Socialist,  coalesced. 
Clearly,  this  would  be  different  from  the 
system  which  existed  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
In  his  paper,  he  had  pointed  out  that  the 
maximum  range  of seats  in a  directly  elected 
parliament  would  be  between  200  and  1000. 
But,  in  fact,  neither  the  number  of  seats 
selected  nor  the  relative  weight  accorded  to 
Member States would fundamentally affect the 
balance between the groups: Christian, Liberal 
or Socialist.  Under  any  scenario,  there  would 
still have to be  a coalition. 
As  regards  the  mechanics,  it would be  neces-
sary  to  have  a  system  which  most  people 
would  regard  as  recognisable.  If you  had  a 
uniform  system  of  election,  it would  be  the 
British system that would need  to change the 
most.  Clearly,  if the  decision  were  on  the 
question  of  proportional  representation,  four 
fifths  of  the  community  would  be  in  favour. 
Should the system  be  uniform? Professor Rose 
thought  that  it  would  be  dangerous  not  to 
have  certain  minimum  standards  with  some 
common  provision.  As  to  whether  the  elec-
tions  should  be  coincidental,  this  raised  the 
question  of  the  implementation  of  the direct 
elections  system.  Some  Member  States  might 
be  prepared to introduce such a system in the 
next three to five  years.  Could, or would, the 
others  stop  them?  Clearly,  if  one  waited  for 
the  most  reluctant  Member  States,  the  wait 
would  be  very  long.  If it were  left  to volun-
teers,  one  could  see  that the  small  countries 
might  demonstrate  the  possibilities  of such  a 
system.  At  some  stage,  the  scales  would  be 
turned and the remaining half of the members 
unelected  would want to be  elected. Professor  Rose  believed  that it  was  desirable 
that  the  turnout  of  votes  in  such  elections 
should be  high  and this  evoked arguments  as 
to  whether  or  not  the  elections  should  be 
held  at the  same  time  as  national  elections. 
He  believed  the  turnout  should  be  at  least 
51  °/o  because  below that, the authority of the 
European  institutions  would be  weakened. 
According  to  Professor  VEDEL,  methods  of 
election  provided  a  professor  with  delightful 
opportumtles  for  juggling  with  electoral 
systems.  But  he  was  a  convinced  European 
who  wanted  to  see  direct  elections  finally 
becoming  a  reality.  As  he  saw  it,  the  neces-
sary  and obvious  conditions  for  bringing  this 
development  about were  two-fold: 
1)  There  could  be  no  uniform  electoral 
system at this stage; 
2)  Voting  must take place everywhere  on the 
same  day. 
He  felt  that  a  uniform  system  would  take 
years  to  introduce  and  would  be  more  diffi-
cult  to  arrive  at  than  the  United  States  of 
Europe. 
With  regard  to  election  day,  he  felt  that,  if 
this  day  was  not  the  same  in  all  countries, 
each Member State would look to  the  electo-
ral results  of  the  other  countries;  that would 
be  contrary to the  principle  of  universal  suf-
frage.  He felt  that  these  two  questions  must 
be put to  one side  if the proceedings were to 
advance. 
Mr  YEATS,  Irish  Member  of  the  European 
Parliament,  began  by  saying  that  he  did  not 
intend to discuss  the principle of the question 
of direct elections to the European Parliament, 
but  simply  to  make  some  remarks  on  the 
practicalities. 
He was  in favour  of the  direct election  of all 
members  of  the  European  Parliament  on  the 
same day and he felt that much of the benefit 
of the entire system would be  lost if this were 
not  done,  in  view  of  the  possibility  of  the 
voting  results  in  different  countries  swaying 
the  results in  other countries. 
With  regard, to  the  system  of  election  to  be 
employed, he  did not feel  that it was  realistic 
to press for  a uniform method of  election,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that different  countries  had 
so  many  different  systems.  It  was  not  fair 
to  impose  upon  the  voters  of  any  country 
an electoral system  with which they were  not 
familiar  and which they  could not use  to  the 
best possible  advantage. 
The next question was  one  of  the  apportion-
ment  of  seats  to  the  different  countries.  He 
quoted  some  figures  to  show  that  it  would 
be  unfair  to  smaller  countries  to  make  their 
number  of  seats  in  the  European  Parliament 
directly  proportional  to  their  population-he 
said  that  this  would  be  obviously  unfair  to 
smaller  countries  like  Ireland  and  Denmark, 
and even  more  so  to Luxembourg.  It did not 
look  as  if a  one-man-one-vote  system  would 
be possible. 
The  CHAIRMAN  summed  up  the  discussion 
as  follows:  (1)  a  uniform  method  of election 
was  desirable,  but it  was  too  much  to  hope 
for  in  the  near  future;  (2)  the  group  agreed 
on the principle of elections on the same day, 
and  (3)  the  representation  in  the  European 
Parliament  should  be  more  proportional,  but 
a  full  one-man-one-vote  system  would  never 
be  achieved.  He then invited further contribu-
tions from the group in amplification of these 
points. 
Professor SCHEUNER felt  that each  Member 
State  could  have  its  own  system  of  direct 
election  for  its  representatives  to  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament.  As  to  the  number  of  seats 
per country,  the  speaker felt  it was unaccept-
able  for  the smaller States  to have to observe 
the principle of 'one man, one vote'; the ratio 
of 1 to 4 between small States and large States 
for  the number of representatives  was  a good 
one. 
Professor Scheuner felt it necessary to organise 
European elections on the same day as national 
elections;  he  thought  there  was  a  risk  that 
fewer  people  would  vote  within  the  frame-
work of the European election alone, with the 
result that the  members  of the European Par-
liament  would  not  be  representative  of  the 
electorate. 
Mr VON HASSEL  was in favour  of applying 
national  electoral  systems  and  of  holding 
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currently with national elections. 
On  the  question  of  apportioning  seats,  he 
advocated  a  system  of  weighting,  in  favour 
of the smaller states and referred to the system 
in  the  Federal  Republic  which  gave  Lander 
with small populations  a proportionally high-
er share  of votes  in  elections  io  the  Bundes-
rat  (Second  House).  The Bundesrat  also  pre-
sented  an  example  of  a  parliamentary  body 
functioning  successfully  although  constantly 
renewed  through  the elections  in  the  Lander. 
By  analogy  a  system  might be found  for  the 
European Parliament whereby .the  delegations 
were  . renewed  at  different  times  through 
national elections. 
The  CHAIRMAN  pointed  out  that  since 
smaller  countries  had  proportionately  greater 
power in the Council  of .  Ministers  in  relation 
to their size  and population, he  felt  that this 
meant that,  in  matters  where  co"decision. was 
called for,  there  did not seem  to be  a:s  much 
need  for  an  upward  weighting  of  European 
Parliament representation in favour of smaller 
countries~ 
He then  went  on to  explain  the  second  and 
fourth items  on the agenda he  had drawn up 
for  the  Working  Group,  namely  the  question 
of the double mandate and the further question 
of  the  relation  between  direct  elections  and 
extended powers for the European Parliament, 
and invited  contributions  from  the  Group  on 
these two points. 
Mr  VON  HASSEL  was  convinced  that  the 
extension of the European Parliament's powers 
and the introduction of direct elections had to 
be considered and tackled at one and the same 
time.  He  also  suggested  that  the  dual  man-
date would be unavoidable for some time. He 
thought the extra work devolving on the Euro-
pean  delegates  could  be  reduced  if they  had 
the  right ·only  to  speak  and  not  to  vote  in 
the national parliaments, as  in the case  of the 
Berlin delegates in the German Bundestag. The 
European  delegates  could  then  be  retained  as 
advisers  in  the  national  parliament. 
Professor  SCHEUNER  agreed  with  Mr  von 
Hassel  and  thought  that  a  solution  must  be 
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found  for  elections  to  the  European  Parlia-
ment  by  universal  suffrage,  even  if  the  fight 
for  the  enlargement  of  its  powers  had  not 
been  won.  The  speaker  proposed  that  four 
or five  seats be reserved in the European Par-
liament for  eminent figures  from  the national 
parliaments  when  important  questions  were 
debated. 
Mr KUBY, Honorary Director of the European 
Parliament, stressed the political significance of 
the dual mandate. As  things stood at present, 
power  lay  with  the  national  parliaments.  So 
long as political power could only be exercised 
at national level no delegate could be expected 
to  give  up  a  national  seat  with  power for  a 
European seat which had none. 
Commenting on Mr von  Hassel's  comparison 
between  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Bundesrat,  Mr Kuby  said  that  there  was  an 
essential  difference  between the two bodies in 
that  the  Bundesrat  had  no  influence  what-
soever on the formation of the government. It 
should  be  realised  that  if  elections  to  the 
European  Parliament  were  linked  with  elec-
tions to the national parliaments there would 
be  no  chance  of forming  stable  majorities  in 
the  European  Parliament.  Yet  it had to  have 
stable  majorities  if it  were  to  influence  the 
composition of a European executive-even if 
this  was  only the Commission-and a parlia-
ment  was  powerless  without an  executive  on 
which to exert influence.  At present it was in 
the  Member  States,  not  at  European  level, 
that political power was won, retained or lost. 
The national parliaments with all  their weak-
nesses  and  problems  remained  the  centres 
where  this  power  was  concentrated  and 
distributed. The dual  mandate admittedly im-
posed  a  heavy  burden  on  the  individual  de-
legates,  but  a  single  European  mandate  in 
present  circumstances  would further  diminish 
political influence. 
Mr YEATS  said that all members were agreed 
that. the  problem  of  the  dual  mandate  was 
very  difficult because  of the conflicting  requi-
rements  of attendance at the European Parlia-
ment  and  at home  parliaments,  often  at the 
same  time.  Also,  there  were  difficulties  with 
regard to dealing with one's constituents. The 
difficulties would increase rather than decrease. However,  equally  intractable  problems  could 
arise  with  direct  elections.  It  would  be  dif-
ficult  to. work  out  who  the  member  would 
represent. He would not be bound up with the 
political  work of  his  own country  and could 
become an expert on a European level without 
any knowledge of home problems. 
It first  must be  decided why a  European Par-
liamentwas wanted. It was wanted in order to 
have a strong democratic element in the Com-
munity,  to  represent  the  various  needs  of 
people at home and the conflicting viewpoints 
of the various political partners. 
If the  members  of  the  European  Parliament 
were  not  members  of  their  national  parlia-
ments,  they  might  be  less  representative  than 
present  members.  The  speaker  was  attracted 
to  the  suggestion  that some  members  be  di-
rectly  elected  and  some  appointed.  It  was 
necessary  to  keep  some  connection  between 
the national and European parliaments. 
Sir Tufton BEAMISH considered it was almost 
impossible  to  combine  active  work  in  both 
parliaments.  In  sixteen  months,  he  had never 
felt  that he  had enough time  to do both jobs 
to  his own satisfaction. 
He agreed  that  close  contact  with  the  work 
of  the  national  parliament  was  essential.  He 
did not see  why a dual mandate should mean 
dual loyalty. The member is  supposed to take 
a  community  view  of  community  problems, 
while bearing home problems in mind. He felt 
that, while direct elections on a uniform com-
munity  basis  could  come  later,  some  kind  of 
half-way house was necessary-certainly in the 
case  of Britain. 
Professor  ROSE  referred  to  the  pointlessness 
of having someone in Strasbourg who was un· 
important  at home.  He  felt  that the  political 
parties  could  play  an  important  role.  If the 
parties  co-opted people  to the European  Par-
liament,  they  would choose  people they were 
prepared to listen to at home. 
The  CHAIRMAN,  concluding  the  discussion 
on  direct election,  said that every  one  agreed 
that the dual mandate was not to be ruled out; 
it could or should be maintained in some way. 
He mentioned the relation between direct elec-
tions  and the powers  of the European Parlia-
ment.  However,  it was  for  the  politicians  to 
decide  when  they  had  enough  powers,  and 
also,  on  the most  appropriate time  for  direct 
elections. 
Professor  BONVICINI  of the  Institute  of In-
ternational  Affairs  in  .  Rome,  discussed  the 
problems  of  relations  between  the  European 
Parliament and political forces. He said he was 
not convinced that there was any  definite  re-
lationship between the problem of direct elec-
tions  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
development  of  political  forces  at  European 
level.  In  order  to  obtain  some  idea  of  the 
present  situation,  it  was  first  necessary  to 
consider the national political parties and their 
attitude to the process of European integration. 
Seen  from  this  angle,  the role  of the political 
parties  had  always  been  a  superficial  and 
sporadic one.· They were interested in  Europe 
only at particular times. 
European  party  organisations  at  Community 
level  had also  been  a  negligible  factor  so  far. 
The one positive development was perhaps the 
improvement  in  operational  machinery,  for 
instance, in the bureau of the Socialist Parties 
of the European Community and in the Union 
of Christian Democratic Parties; amongst other 
things, the Union had set up an ad hoc politi-
cal committee for Community questions. 
Likewise  important  was  the  attempt  to  in-
corporate the respective political groups in the 
European  Parliament into  the party organisa-
tions.  This  w~s especially relevant to the pos-
sible  creation  of  European  political  parties. 
Professor  Bonvicini  was  therefore  critical  of 
the arguments  advanced by Mr Vredeling and 
by Mr Mansholt that a European Party could 
exist  in  a  state  of  detachment  from  the  na-
tional political parties and from  the European 
party organisations. 
He wound up by pointing to the positive and 
negative  factors  in  the  present  situation.  The 
natural  tendency  of the  EEC  political  parties 
to meet  amongst  themselves  to  discuss  Com-
munity  problems  was  a  positive  factor.  Like 
the Socialist and the Christian Democrats, the 
Communist  parties  had  also  taken  the  same 
course with their recent convention. A negative 
feature,  however,  was  the  limited  powers  of 
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direct  communication  between  the  base  and 
the  summit,  as  was  the  sectoral  character  of 
the  process  of  European  integration.  These 
restrictions made the development of European 
political parties even  more  difficult. 
Mr KUBY  thought that attempts made so  far 
to achieve cooperation between parties did not 
amount  to  very  much.  One  reason  was  that 
parties  were  organisations  concerned  with in-
tegrating  interests  and  winning  the  political 
power required  to  achieve  specific  objectives. 
The natural context for their activities was the 
society  of the  particular  state  and its  consti-
tutional  system.  This  limited  the  scope  for 
international cooperation: a Western European 
society with interests requiring organisation on 
a trans-national scale did not as yet exist. The 
majority of West Europeans saw their interests 
in  national  terms- even  though  Community 
factors  were  increasing-and the  parties  took 
account of this, or even deliberately encouraged 
it. 
Then  again,  the  political parties  were  finding 
it difficult to reconcile the conflicting interests 
in  their  own  society.  In  the  smaller  Member 
States,  no  less  than in  the larger ones, it was 
becoming  more  and more  difficult  to  achieve 
coherence in the parties. Voting with affiliated 
parties  with  partially  different  aims  and 
methods  only  brought  further  problems  and 
was  at best an  unhappy  compromise.  It also 
encouraged  the  formation  of  party  wings 
which  were  even  more  difficult  to  integrate 
than  the  main  national  parties.  The  parties 
344 
were  having  difficulty  even  in  preserving  the 
status  quo  of  their  organisations.  There  was 
no  sign  of forces  able  or willing to break up 
the national party groups and gradually trans-
form  them  into  Community  parties. 
Mr  VON  HASSEL  thought  Mr  Kuby  too 
pessimistic.  At least the situation he  described 
did not exist in his  party, the CDU,  in which 
there  was  no  tension  between  national  and 
European  identity. 
Mr von  Hassel  thought  that  the  creation  of 
European  party  groups  depended  principally 
on financial  resources.  The Bundestag had al-
ready promised to release  funds  for  this  pur-
pose,  and it was  to be  hoped that other par-
liaments  would follow  suit. 
Mr  WIJSENBEEK,  Chef  de  Cabinet  of  the 
President of the European Parliament, referred 
to the difficulties political groups had in find-
ing  a  complete programme on which  they all 
agreed.  It might be  better if  they each  had at 
least  a  joint  European  paragraph  in  their 
respective  party programmes. 
Professor  ROSE  pointed  out  that  they  were 
not  discussing  the  normal  kind  of  election 
whose  end  result was  to form  a  government. 
The  question  related  to  a  representative 
assembly-19th  century  Germany  was  pos-
sibly  more  relevant  than  20th  century  Ger-
many,  for  in  the  former,  the  assembly  could 
comment  upon  but not depose  the  executive. 
The  meeting  concluded. FRIDAY, 3 MAY 1974 
RESUMED PLENARY SESSION The  resumed  Plenary  Session  commenced  at 
5 p.m. 
Chairman:  Professor G.  IONESCU,  University 
of Manchester. The CHAIRMAN called upon 
Mr Faure to take the floor. 
As  the suggestion for the establishment of the 
European Institute for Parliamentary Research 
seemed  to  have  ben  favourably  received  by 
the participants in the symposium, Mr FAURE 
proposed  that a  preparatory  committee  or  a 
working group should be formed at once. The 
President of the European Parliament and the 
Presidents  of  the  national  parliaments  and 
assemblies  could  be  included in this  working 
group. Members  of parliament from countries 
other than the Nine could  also  act as  consul-
tants. 
Mr P  A  TIJN reported on the discussio'ns in  th~ · 
Working  Group  on  Direct  Elections  to  the 
European  Parliament.  There  had  been  an 
exchange  of views  on five  item:s: 
1)  The  need  for  a  uniform  electoral  system. 
The general opinion was that in the short 
term it was not possible to unify electoral 
systems;  for  the  moment  elections  could 
be  arranged  according  to  the  national 
systems. 
It would be desirable, though not essential, 
for  the  elections  to  be  held  on  the  same 
day. 
2)  Number  of  seats  per  Member  State.  At 
present the small Member States were over-
represented.  More proportionality was  ne-
cessary.  On the  other hand,  however,  the 
'one man-one  vote'  principle  need  not be 
too  strictly  adhered  to.  The  number  of 
representatives from small countries should 
not be  below  a  certain  minimum.  A pos-
sible  basis  would  be  for  Luxembourg  to 
retain  its  present number of seats. 
3)  The maintenance of the double mandate. In 
general,  the  working  group  was  of the 
opinion  that this  could  be  maintained  for 
the  moment.  The  link  with  the  national 
parliaments and the parties was  important 
for the role of a European member of par-
liament. 
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4)  The  postponing  of  direct  elections  until 
Parliament  was  granted  full  powers.  Full 
powers were  not an  absolute requirement. 
Direct  elections  need  not  be  postponed 
until the powers  were  obtained.  However, 
if direct  elections  were  to be  held,  simul-
taneous  strengthening  of  powers  was 
desirable. 
5)  The political parties were  not yet  adjusted 
to  the  European  scale.  There  was  as  yet 
no  significant  cooperation  at  European 
level.  The national  parliaments,  in coope-
ration  with  the  national  parties,  should 
make funds  available  for  the formation  of 
European parties. 
In general there had been broad unanimity in 
the working group discussions. 
Professor  CHAPMAN,  reporting on the work 
of Working Group No 2 on the Powers of the 
European  Parliament  in  a  European  Union, 
stressed  the  necessity  for  Europe  to  move 
forward  at  aU  times  and  by  every  possible 
means  in  the  direction  of  federal  union.  He 
said  that  his  Working  Group  saw  a  certain 
danger in the use  of the word 'confederation', 
as  this  might  be  taken  to indicate  a  kind  of 
lowest common denominator of the action that 
could  be  taken  by  many  Member  States 
working  jointly. 
He said that the end-product of the discussion 
in  the Group was  an  agreement that one had 
to  think  in  terms  of  two  kinds  of  action, 
federal  and  confederal.  In  some  matters  pro-
gress  would be made federally,  in  others  con-
federally. 
He  instanced  economic  and  monetary  union 
as  an example of the distinction between these 
two modes of action. For monetary union one 
had to  think  on  a  federal  level,  whereas  for 
economic union, the approach was rather con-
federal  in  the  sense  that  Member  States  all 
trading  in  the  same  currency  would  all  be 
fighting hard to protect different interests and 
advantages. 
On  the  road,  therefore,  towards  European 
union,  there  were  some  areas  where  action 
would be  federal  as  already  described,  where 
there was  question of central decision-making 
at Council  of Ministers  level  and other areas where  action  would  be  confederal,  with  all 
the  Member States  trying  to  hammer  out as 
much  agreement  as  was  possible,  and  con-
sistent with defending their own position. 
He stressed the need for  the European Parlia-
ment  and  all  those  who  were  concerned  for 
its  future  to work for  greater  and more  real 
powers for the European Parliament on every 
occasion,  especially  in  areas  where  central 
decision-making  and  co-decision  were  in 
question. 
He  concluded  by  saying  that  the  discussion 
had  been  a  very  valuable  one  and  that  he 
himself  and,  he  felt  sure,  all  the  participants 
had learned very much from it. 
Miss  FLESCH  reported  on  behalf  of  the 
working party on relations  between the Euro-
pean Parliament and the national parliaments. 
After  outlining  the  difficulties  affecting  these 
relations,  she  set  out  a  number  of  remedies 
in  her summary  of the  working  party's  con-
clusions. 
The present difficulties were essentially due to 
the existence  of a  dual  mandate,  She  stressed 
that because  of the  dual  allegiance  of parlia-
mentarians  to  their  national  parliament  and 
to the European Parliament, they all too often 
had insufficient time to devote themselves fully 
to  their  duties  within  the  European  Parlia-
mentary Assembly,  particularly as  their career 
was  still  mainly  dependent  on their  activities 
within their national parliaments.  Various  so-
lutions  had  been  proposed  in  order to mini-
mize  these difficulties:  one such solution men-
tioned  by  Miss  Flesch  was  the  possibility  of 
members of the European Parliament sitting in 
their  own  national  parliaments  as  super-
numeraries,  without  the  right  to  vote.  This 
would  have  the  advantage  of enabling  them 
to  be  freely  available  for  their  European 
activities,  while  assuring  for  them  a  personal 
link  with their  national  parliaments. 
As  to  the  possibilities  of  ensuring  better  re-
lations between the different parliaments, Miss 
Flesch  suggested  the  creation  of  a  European 
Day  on  which  national  parliamentarians 
would be invited to study the activities  of the 
European  Parliament.  She  also  proposed  a 
regular exchange of parliamentary personalities 
and a regular flow of information between the 
national  parliaments  and  the  European  Par-
liament. 
The  CHAIRMAN  set  forth  the  conclusions 
he had drawn from the second and final  day's 
proceedings. 
It was  a  happy  coincidence,  he  thought, that 
the participants  had been  able  to hear  three 
reports, all  of great interest and,  on the same 
day, Mr Edgard Faure's proposal. 
The reports  had been  submitted by three  dif-
ferent working groups on three different mat-
ters.  They  dealt  with  topics  of  immediate 
practical importance and  also  looked far into 
the future. 
The report most concerned with current reality 
had  come  from  Miss  Flesch's  group.  Their 
report discussed  the present position of mem-
bers  of the European Parliament and the con-
flicting  loyalties  with  which  they  had  to 
contend.  The Chairman expressed his  admira-
tion for the work they had carried out so well, 
Miss Flesch's report proposed a European Day 
aimed  at developing  public  awareness  of the 
functions  and  activities  of the  European  Par-
liament. This was something new and thought-
provoking,  and which  could  well  be  adopted 
by national parliaments in the future. 
The Patijn report was much more speculative 
in character, the Chairman continued. It posed 
the question whether Europe's parliaments and 
political  parties  of  the  future  would  be  or-
ganised  as  at present or along quite  different 
lines. The report made very far-seeing remarks 
on the  formation  and evolution  of the  Euro-
pean  political  parties. 
The Chapman report belonged to the realm of 
political science  fiction.  It attempted to divine 
the most likely political form European union 
would take in the target year 1980.  This was 
one of the most important question, but, alas, 
it did not seem  topical  in  the  present condi-
tions. 
The  three  reports  were  all  quite  impressive. 
They  reflected  an  awareness  that,  more  than 
anything else, imagination was needed if Euro-
pean  union  were  to  be  made  a  reality.  The 
European  Parliament should  not slavishly  re-
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ments.  Innovation  was  important.  New  insti-
tutions  might  and  indeed  should  differ  from 
their  models,  just  as  the  political  process  of 
industrial  Europe  differed  from  the  political 
processes in the European nation states in the 
19th Century. 
It was here that the 'coincidence' was revealed. 
The  symposium  had  helped  to  show  how 
fruitful discussions between academics and po-
liticians could be.  Mr Faure's idea of an Insti-
tute  for  the  Study  of  European  Parliaments 
would  be  the  continuation  on  a  permanent 
basis  of the  symposium, for which he  wanted 
once more to congratulate the organisers. 
Mr BERKHOUWER concluded the symposium 
as follows:  'Your Excellency, ladies and gentle-
men,  at the  end  of this  two-day  symposium, 
I should like  to put forward  some  considera-
tions  to  round  off  this  particularly  valuable 
meeting. 
In  the first  place  I  wish  to thank once  more 
all  those  who  have  enriched  this  symposium 
with  their  contributions  in  this  European 
House  of  Parliament  in  which  we  have  sin-
cerely tried to make you welcome. 
May I now touch very briefly on some aspects 
which  have  struck me:  not  only  ought we  to 
strive towards one or more European universi-
ties  along  the  lines  of what we  already have, 
but I  think it is  also  useful  to strive  towards 
Europeanising  university  education  using  the 
techniques  available,  television  and  so  on, 
especially between universities  which are  close 
together,  particularly  if  they  are  on  different 
sides  of frontiers,  such  as  Aachen,  Maastricht 
and Liege. 
We  were  extremely  interested  to  hear  the 
ideas and proposals of President Edgar FAURE, 
who  spoke to us  with his  usual  brilliance. 
I think that the specific proposals he made for 
a  joint  institute  bringing  together  academics 
and political authorities will have to be studied 
further by our Parliament through its  respon-
sible committees. 
A further elaboration might be  the  setting up 
of  a  joint  committee  of representatives  from 
the European Parliament and the national par-
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liaments  of  our  nine  Member  States  plus 
representatives  from  the  world  of  political 
science. 
In this connection we may welcome the hospit-
able  offer  by  Luxembourg  to  accommodate 
such  an  institute  in  the  capital  of the  Grand 
Duchy. 
Ladies  and  gentlemen,  apart  from  all  this  I 
should  like  to  make  a  few  practical  observa-
tions.  Where  have  we  actually got to?  Where 
do we  stand at present? 
The dual role of the representatives who have 
to  do  the practical  work  of  European  parlia-
mentary  democracy  has  repeatedly  come  up. 
Let this  symposium  make it perfectly clear to 
public  opinion  and  to  our  national  parlia-
ments as  representatives of that public opinion 
that the  double  mandate  is  daily  becoming  a 
more  unbearable  burden  for  all  of  us  on 
whom it is  imposed, since  our human powers 
are limited. 
This fact by itself must necessarily lead to the 
bringing about in one way or another of Euro-
pean popular representation by members  who 
have  only  one mandate. 
I should like  here  to recall  what Miss  Flesch 
said in  connection  with  the  ideas  of Michael 
Stewart who has had some  particularly note-
worthy  thoughts  on  the  matter. ·There  is  a 
similar  situation in  the  German Bundestag  as 
regards  the  representatives  for  Berlin,  that is, 
the free  sector of Berlin.  All  sorts of variants 
on  this  are  possible  even  in the existing state 
of affairs,  even  if Article  138(3)  of the Treaty 
of  Rome  is  not  implemented  in  the  short 
term.  The double mandate to national parlia-
ments and the European Parliament places too 
high  a mental and physical load on members. 
Is  the fundamental question facing us  here not 
still  that  the  national  parliaments  no  longer 
have  the  dimensions  to  deal  with  European 
matters,  and  that on  the  other  hand  there  is 
as  yet  no  European  representative  body with 
powers  to  match  the  demands  imposed  by 
European  construction  as  regards  the  extent 
of  democratic  representation  which  exists  in 
the  European  Community? 
Do we  not find  that technology,  industry and 
trade  are  further  integrated  here  than  we  are politically, using the term politics in the sense 
of the consideration of all matters which con-
cern  jointly  all  citizens  of  the  Community? 
Ladies  and  gentlemen,  in  bringing  this  brief 
closing  speech  to  an  end,  I  should  like  once 
more  to  express  my  heartfelt  thanks,  and 
last  of  all  to  say  the  following.  The  word 
symposium  first  occurs  in  world  literature  in 
Plato's  famous  dialogue.  Like  other  dialogues 
of  Plato,  the  Symposium  does  not  end  with 
resolutions  and  conclusions.  Nor  is  this  the 
case with our symposium of today and yester-
day. This does not change the fact that all who 
have  been  here  can  feel  themselves  enriched 
by  the  inspired  contributions  made  by  the 
important representatives  of  the national par-
liaments who have  been here in our midst. 
I hope that all those present who are members 
of  national  parliaments  will  urge  in  those 
Parliaments  and  on  their  governments,  who 
are  responsible  to  the  parliaments,  that  the 
governments  should  now  implement  the 
agreement they made in  Luxembourg in  1970 
to  strengthen  the  powers  of  the  European 
Parliament. 
Apart  from  all  the  other  desires  you  have 
expressed,  this  is  a  binding  obligation  on the 
governments  of all  nine  Member States. 
That is  what we have discussed together here, 
a question of political will,  of common politi-
cal  will  which  we  shall  force  out of each  of 
the nine governments. 
Finally in  that connection the vicious  circle-
powers, elections and so  on. Here I once more 
launch, for the last time, the three-stage rocket 
-rights,  power,  elections-the  European 
machinery  will  start  working  once  the  in-
creased power is there. Elections for the people 
who are to exercise  this power, and  political 
party groupings  at European level  to delegate 
these  people. 
Ladies  and gentlemen,  with these  final  words 
I  declare  this  symposium  closed  (5.50  p.m.). 
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POSTSCRIPT ON THE IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE FUNCTIONS  OF  PARLIAMENTS 
by Mr K. Helveg PETERSEN, M.P., former Minister of Education and Culture, Denmark. Member 
of the European Parliament and Chairman of a Working party of the Symposium. 
Introductory remarks 
Throughout both the papers and the debates of the Symposium, and, indeed, in political discussions 
in the Community generally, the term 'parliamentary crisis' is being used more and more frequently. 
It is clear that the influence of our parliaments is declining and that a gulf can rightly be said to exist 
between parliament and public. It is  quite common for the peoples of various countries to be dissat-
isfied with the achievements of their parliaments, and there is every reason for devoting all possible 
attention to this problem and suggesting solutions. This was the aim of the Symposium,  and the 
notes below attempt to highlight some of the questions raised and to call attention to some important 
themes  which  should be followed  up  in the future. 
I.  General  remarks  about parliaments  and the  steering  process 
(a)  Technological  developments 
Technological developments  are becoming an increasingly decisive  factor.  They are in many cases 
crucial to the political  deci~ions taken.  In theory, the legislative power can resist technological in-
novations, but in practice this will not happen since our whole present-day society is  based on the 
greatest  possible  technological  progress.  The structure of economic life  and of society  in  general 
is  constantly  changing :  large  institutions  and undertakings  are  getting  larger,  quite  irrespective 
of the importance attached in political circles to preserving small undertakings. New means of prod-
uction  and working  methods  evolve,  and in every  country technological  developments  are  seized 
upon in the desire  to raise  the  people's  standard of living. 
As  a result, parliaments are continually obliged to revise the law to keep pace with the demands of 
technical development and even to promote it ; and the very speed with which changes occur throws 
a further burden on parliamentary work. This leaves them with too little time to consider more long-
term problems and prevents them from gaining a lead in these matters. Parliaments have,  in fact, 
little enough time to cope  with day-to-day  problems. 
(b)  Dependence  on the  outside  world 
Dependence on the outside world, on both world and regional events, is growing. This dependence 
will vary according to the size and nature of the country, but in all cases the fact of being dependent 
on other countries  means  that national legislation  and administration must take this  aspect fully 
into consideration and this inevitably means that parliaments are often left with little choice of action. 
The greater the technical development, the greater the dependence.  The more trade and relations 
there are between countries, the greater the need for common solutions - which is in fact a guiding 
principle of the institutions of the European Community. The present world crisis clearly indicates 
the importance of co-operation across the frontiers and of common solutions. National isolation is 
virtually impossible. 
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Various types  of organisations and pressure groups exert an ever-increasing influence, and it is true 
to say that -·  generally speaking - the members of these organisations feel more allegiance to them 
than  to political  or constituency  organisations.  The  way  these  organisations  and interest groups 
function in rdation to parliament may  vary from  country to country,  but the power of the large 
organisations is  unmistakable  in all  countries (1). 
(d)  Limitation  of parliament's  influence  on the legislative  process 
Several contributors to the Symposium pointed out that parliament's influence on even the legislative 
process  has  become  more  and more  restricted.  The parliamentary  contribution is  often  confined 
to amending Bills introduced by the government : in practice there is no possibility of putting forward 
major alternative proposals. Characteristically,  the~ view was put forward at the  Luxembourg  Sym-
posium that even 'the mother of parliaments' - the United Kingdom's  House  of  Commons ·- is 
practically reduced to a kind of advisory body (2). This is  partly due to the fact that only the govern-
ment has sufficient staff to draw up major Bills,  which, as  society gets more and more complicated, 
become  more:  and  more  complex  (see  comments  on technological  developments  above).  In this 
connection it was pointed out at the Symposium that even though the public sector in the Member 
States is  generally increasing the extent of its responsibilities, there has been no comparable increase 
in the number of Members of Parliament. This means that the same number of elected representatives 
have to cope with an ever-increasing number of laws whilst, as international cooperation is extended, 
there is  an ever  greater  need  for  an outward-looking contribution (
3
). 
As  a result, Private Member's Bills, in other words, Bills drawn up by individual members of parlia-
ment  or party groups,  are  seldom passed and fewer  will  be  passed in the future. 
Even if most Bills are drawn up by the civil service, commissions or committees, their actual content 
originates from large trade organisations or from public bodies such as  universities.  For example, 
educational reforms are often proposed by members of the educational profession and educational 
institutions. The same is  often true of the social services,  trade matters and so on. 
Altogether, parliament's influence as  regards whkh Bills  should be  introduced, and when, is  rather 
limited. Generally speaking, it is difficult to get a coherent picture of parliamentary work. The lack 
of planning and cohesion (') in the organisation of the daily work makes it even more difficult. Alth-
ough this is primarily an inconvenience to parliament, it also contributes to the public's lack of know-
ledge  of  and interest in public  affairs. 
One facet  of  this is  that parliamentary work tends to be  organised solely round government pro-
grammes,  and parliaments  become  caught up in the need  of governments  to improvise and their 
own desire to decide themselves how to dispose of their time. The result is an inefficient use of the 
individual Mf:mber's time and abilities so that the proceedings become superficial, formal and un-
inspired. 
Although it can be said that there has always been a lack of cohesion and clarity in legislative activity, 
it is more marked now than previously precisely because of the number of laws and their complexity, 
and finally because societies are dynamic. More static societies would find the absence of the requisite 
comprehensive!  view  less  of  a  setback.  The  process  of  disillusion  is,  moreover,  increasing : it is 
characteristic of many young people occupied with society's problems to think that there is  a need 
for  sweeping  changes. 
( 1)  See  paper  by  :Professor  A.  Manzella,  p.  93.  paper  by  Professor  Uwe  Thaysen,  p . .49,  Mr John  Mackintosh, Summary  Report 
p.  287,  Professor  Ionescu, Summary Report,  p.  285,  Professor  von  Beyme,  Summary  Report,  p.  279. 
(')  See  paper by  Professor  K.  vou Beyme,  p.  11. 
(')  See  paper by Professor  Rose  on the number  of members  of  parliaments,  p.  225. 
(4)  See  e.g.  paper by  Professor  Predieri,  p.  200. 
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It was pointed out repeatedly during the Symposium that the way in which information about parlia-
mentary  work  is  presented leaves  much to be  desired (1).  Although admittedly this is  largely  due 
to parliamentary working methods, it is  also due to the tendency prevalent among the mass media 
to deal first and foremost with current problems and material developments, and also to dramatise 
political events. 
The advent of television opened up new communication possibilities that have penetrated political 
life with far-reaching results : the public can now in some countries follow parliamentary debates 
on television and watch discussions between leading politicians and others. There is  no doubt that 
this  centralisation  of  political  debate  makes  for  diminished  interest in political  discussion  in  the 
constituencies. One result is that the public often gain impressions from television programmes about 
parliament  which,  because  of  the  fragmentary  presentation (
2
),  are  liable  to cause  dissatisfaction 
with the proceedings.  The fact that there  are often few  members  present at debates  surprises the 
public and arouses resentment. for they are not always aware of the amount of committee work in 
which politicians are involved. The very language of politics with its traditional forms  also has an 
effect.  What is  most crucial, however, is  the almost daily appearance of leading politicians on the 
television screen : the public's attitude towards them is not at all the same as when they were more 
distant figures. 
The ever more frequent sounding of opinion among the electorate (Gallup polls and the like) in recent 
years  to determine how much support the parties have was given  various assessments at the Sym-
posium. But it is certain that the information so collected has an effect on political life (3). It is inevitable 
that the tactics the parties adopt are influenced by the ratings they are given in the opinion polls. 
A  degree  of unpredictability thus  affects  political patterns of action. 
II.  How can parliaments  be  strengthened ? 
Considerable changes will have to be made if there is to be any hope of strengthening parliamentary 
influence  on the development  of  society. 
There is  obviously no general formula that can cover all aspects in all the Member States, but the 
following  points  are  probably relevant in most cases : 
1)  A  better overall  view  of legislation 
Parliaments must be  given a  better overall picture of the consequences of legislation.  To this end, 
data must be  obtained on the effects  of technological developments on legislation. Dependence on 
other countries  must also  be  evaluated and where possible  quantified.  The undue and sometimes 
clandestine pressure of organisations and pressure groups must be  circumscribed, while giving,  such 
organisations the opportunity to put forward their wishes so that they can be taken into consideration 
before  legislation is  drafted (4).  Consideration should  be  given  to the possibility  of  establishing  a 
special  body, composed of the leading members of the main organisations, that would function as 
a  mouthpiece for  the desires  of the  organisations  concerned (5). 
In order to enable parliaments to play their proper role vis-a-vis governments, consideration should 
be given to the increasing of staff to serve the parliament, so that the latter may effectively defend 
(1)  See  e.g.  Miss  Sarogni, Mr Lious,  Summary Report. 
(1)  See  e.g,  Mr Lenihan,  Summary Report. 
(')  See  e.g.  Mr Lious,  Summary Report. 
(')  In  Sweden  the  Government  forwards  Bills  to  Parliament  together  with  a  documentation  of  views  and  wishes  expressed  by 
organisations,  the  central  administration,  countries,  municipalities,  etc. 
(')  See  examples  mentioned in various  papers by e.g.  Prof.  Gerard  Liboi,  Koiman  and Vis,  etc. 
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various Member States, the increase in influence to be gained in this way would in general be limited. 
Given the large number of specialists in the civil services, they will always be in a considerably better 
position than the parliaments. 
A prerequisit•! for change is that members of parliaments should in all instances be able automatically 
to consult the civil  service  and its  employees  when drafting bills,  etc. 
2)  Parliaments  and the  drafting  of legislation 
If the position of parliaments is to be strengthened, they must under all circumstances be involved 
in the drafting of legislation at an earlier stage than is  the case at present, when they are generally 
presented with Bills in their finished form. There is much to be said for involving parliaments in the 
legislative process at the planning stage. In a sense it is  possible to talk of legislative control before 
Bills  are drafted (1). This could be  achieved by  having important Bills  submitted to parliaments in 
draft form while there is still a chance to choose between alternatives. At the same time the consequences 
of the various alternatives should be set out. In this connection consideration should be given to the 
holding of  more general  political  debates  in parliaments. 
There would thus be greater certainty that things would be seen in a broader context, without any 
predetermined restriction as  to form,  as is  the case when Bills  are submitted in their final version. 
It should be ia  prerequisite that papers (in the United Kingdom  called 'Green Papers')  on important 
areas  of legislation should be  furnished  for  discussion in all the interested circles  - constituency 
organisations,  trade  organisations  and so  on.  The way  would thus  be  opened for  the people to 
exercise greater influence than at present on Bills to be introduced in due course. The mass  media 
should obviously also  be  able to make  a considerable contribution towards this. 
Obviously,  certain technical  problems  will  arise  in connection with such  a  procedure.  There will 
be a time lag between general debates and discussion of Bills. But, in addition to being better informed 
of the views  held by parliament and constituency organisations, governments will acquire a better 
basis  for  the  technical preparation of  the  Bills. 
Another consideration, which is  a direct extension of this, is  the desirability of discussing simulta-
neously Bills  on related  subjects.  A  better overall picture can then  be  formed,  and simplification 
is  made  possible. 
These comm•!nts should be seen in the light of the fact that the electorate often regard parliamentary 
discussions as of little interest. To them, the discussions are reminiscent of lawyers presenting opposing 
points of view, without there being any real debate. The electorate know that the real political debates 
are often held in parliamentary committees, which are not normally open to the public. It is obvious 
that prior consideration of important Bills in connection with general political debates in parliaments, 
during which the guiding principles for legislation in a given area could be established, would increase 
public interest and such debates would be  an important element in improving the position of the 
parliament (
2
)  as  it is  viewed  by the public. 
3)  The use  of 'hearings'  by Parliamentary  Committees 
Many references were made during the Symposium (
3
)  to the possibility of improving or extending 
the system  of 'hearings'  by  parliamentary  committees,  whereby  they  interview  representatives  of 
interested  parties  in order to obtain  better background for  their work.  Where  complex  areas  of 
(1)  See  Professor  Kooiman's  report  from  the  working  party  on  the  relationship  between  parliaments  and  civil  services,  Summary 
Report. 
(1)  See  the  paper  on the  effects  of  public  planning  on  the  legislative  branch  by  Professor  Thaysen. 
(')  See  e.g.  Mr.  IBehrendt,  Summary Report. 
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should obviously be invited to participate and civil servants given the maximum possible freedom 
to express  themselves.  Written material should not be excluded,  but the emphasis should be  laid 
on oral communication between the person or persons appearing and the parliamentary committee. 
Whether the persons involved, the  'witnesses',  should themselves have the opportunity of questioning 
the committee members is  another question ; it would undoubtedly make the meetings more lively. 
It is important also that the hearings should, whenever possible, be in public. 
The procedure for hearings must obviously vary from country to country, according to local practice. 
The important part is to attempt to achieve the objective of putting important questions of public 
policy  before  parliaments  while they still have  a  chance to consider alternatives. 
4)  Referenda 
The system of representative democracy is based on the idea that the electorate chooses representatives 
to look after its interests for a given period, depending on how often elections are held. However, 
can this be regarded as a definitive solution ? Many voters find it unsatisfactory only having to decide 
at arbitrary intervals which party to vote for.  As the party programmes - despite ideological differ-
ences- come increasingly to resemble each other, it can be difficult to decide on election day which 
party to choose. 
There is  also the strong argument that it is rather absurd to appeal to the electorate to widen its 
knowledge of political affairs and legislative matters if they are not called upon to take part in the 
decision-making process. There comes a time when a person, having acquired extensive knowledge 
of a subject, wishes to have a say in further developments relating to it. This is where the referendum 
comes  in. 
At the Symposium in Luxembourg, opinions varied (1). A majority of participants considered that the 
principle of the referendum could be allowed to play a more organic part in the legislative process (
2
). 
In certain countries of the Community, it is possible to hold a referendum on a Bill provided certain 
conditions are met, e.g. a certain number of Members of Parliament must request a referendum on 
a particular Bill, but the referendum is  not widely used in any of the Member States. The country 
that holds the most referenda is  Switzerland where, in fact, there is  no question of a parliamentary 
crisis (
8
). 
In Switzerland, the referendum system has roots far back in history, but in every country, there is  a 
need to break new ground in order to strengthen democracy. It would certainly seem to the writer to 
be a good idea to begin experiments- especially at local level, where there are numerous practical 
possibilities for citizens to take a direct decision on well-defined issues. In places where direct parti-
cipation has been practiced, experience has shown that there is considerable interest in joint decision, 
whether it is  a  matter of town planning, the establishment of new institutions or other clear-cut 
matters which can easily be put to a referendum. It becomes more difficult in cases where the problem 
is  not so clear-cut and citizens may have difficulty  in answering  a  question  with 'yes'  or 'no'. In 
any case, it is absolutely necessary, if it is desired to put a matter directly to the electorate, to ensure 
that sufficient  background information is  provided. 
It is often objected that the use of referenda may result in people opposing changes at a time when 
changes are unavoidable, as they are today. It is  argued that people may not know enough to take 
(1) •"sec  e.g.  paper by  Professor  K.  von  Beyme,  Mr Lenihan,  Summary Report, Professor  Coombes. 
(")  There  was,  however,  also  strong  opposition  to  the  idea  which  became  an  important issue  affecting  British  membership  of  the 
European  Communities.  See  'The  Case  against  a  Referendum',  Political  Quarterly,  January-March  1975,  by  Professor  John 
Mackintosh,  M.P.,  one of  the participants in the  Symposium. 
(1)  In  Switzerland  - depending  on  the  type  of  Bill  concerned  - referenda  are  either  obligatory  or  optional.  An  optional  refer-
endum  must  be  held  at the  request  of  at  least  30,000  voters  or 8  cantons.  There  is  also  the  right  of  initiative,  which  means 
that either  50,000  or  any  one  of  the  cantons,  any  one  Member  of  Parliament  as  well  as  the  Nationalrat,  the  Bundesrat  or 
the  Standesrat  have  the  right  of  proposing  an  initiative  in  order  to  amend  the  Constitution.  An  initiative  is  followed  by  an 
obligatory referendum. 
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the authority of Parliament would be undermined, and so on. Much depends on the way in which 
the  public  is  furnished  with information.  If there  is  a  referendum  in  conflict  situations  without 
sufficient publlic debate and public involvement, it is  clear that the system will not operate satisfac-
torily. There must be time for a thorough, well organised information campaign covering all  sides 
of  the problem in question. 
More time may possibly be required when dealing with specific  Bills  than would otherwise be  the 
case, but more time should perhaps be allowed anyway. The rapidity with which developments take 
place and with which changes in the life of the individual take place should be a major consideration. 
It may  be  possible to counteract contemporary insecurity and rootlessness precisely  by taking the 
time to explain the background of Bills to be implemented, so as to avoid the alienation from legislation 
and the administration which nowadays is so typical. There can be no doubt that, in every country, 
there is a great deal of scepticism, indifference and, in some cases, downright hostility to the steady 
stream of laws and instructions issuing from the central authorities. Much of this hostility undoubtedly 
stems from the fact that people are not sufficiently aware of what is going on. This may lead to strong 
reactions from the electorate and sudden shifts in the political constellation, which again have a direct 
influence  on the power of representative  democracy to steer  developments. 
A considerable psychological advantage of referenda would be that people would no longer be able 
to allege manipulation by the public authorities as they do at present (1). If the people can ultimately 
have a decisive influence on whether or not a law is  passed, they will feel  powerful and no longer 
regard  themselves  as  victims  of  manipulation. It would  be  hard to overestimate  the far-reaching 
effects  of a  move  to put proposed legislation to the public vote. 
There is  no doubt that the idea is  gaining ground. This can be seen at local level where there are 
examples  of  authorities holding an experimental referendum without any obligation to do so  and 
acting  on the  result. 
Where complex matters are concerned, involving decisions on a series  of problems, some of which 
may  have  side  effects,  it is  much  more  difficult. 
It has  been suggested from various quarters that electronics would permit a referendum to be held 
quickly. It would, in fact, be technically possible to hold a referendum in one day by making use of 
the telephone: system. This could be seen as  an extension of  the opinion poll, but in fact the use of 
such  extended  opinion  polls,  referenda  that is,  in connection  with  the  political  decision-making 
process would be a way of arousing a more active interest in political problems amongst the electorate. 
Whatever form the referendum might take, it is significant that increased participation in the decision-
making proce:ss will create greater interest in understanding the problems. A great deal can be achieved 
by increasing information, but inevitably there comes a time when the people want to know what 
purpose such wider information serves if they have no means of taking part in the actual decision. 
There is  at present  a  definite  loss  of interest in  political life,  and widespread dissatisfaction  with 
what is  done and the way in which parliaments function. In the long run, it is  an intolerable state 
of affairs that an increasing number of citizens should be satisfied with remaining passive and critical 
while  others  resort to non-parliamentary  methods,  which  may  be  understandable  as  spontaneous 
reaction, but which do not really help to produc:e solutions. In these circumstances, a considerable 
effort  must  be  made  to  find  ways  of  strengthening  representative  democracy,  something 
extra that will improve its functioning. I feel  that the loss of power which has to be suffered by the 
decision-makers is fully compensated by the advantages resulting from the better contact and satis-
faction felt by the electorate if it is directly involved in taking decisions on questions which concern 
the individuaJ  and the development  of society. 
(1)  See  e.g.  paper  by  Mr Damgard,  p. 38,  where  it  is  shown  that  in  Denmark  4  referenda  on  Bills  led  to  rejection  by  the 
voters  in  two cases. 
360 5)  Election  of members  of parliament 
The election  of  members  of  parliament is  a  problem which was  discussed  time  and again  at the 
Symposium (1). It is  often stated that in the various countries a type of political establishment grows 
up, in the form of political clans whose members continually appear on the political scene, and that 
there is not sufficient variety. There is a desire for renewal, and this is where the question of the electoral 
procedure comes in. It is important to ensure the best possible choice of political candidates, which 
means in particular that a greater part of the electorate should participate in nominating the candidates 
that are to run for office  than is  normally the case (2). 
This brings us to the problem of constituency organisations and their role in political life. In certain 
countries the constituency organisations  have  great difficulty  in recruiting members.  Many people 
are unwilling to attach themselves to a particular party, there is a desire to remain independent ; yet 
the constituency organisations have the important task of nominating candidates. The small member-
ship of constituency organisations means that their financial situation is precarious, and the question 
should be considered whether the State ought to give these organisations financial  support. 
This is  a solution which has been adopted in some countries (3), but in most cases  the individual 
organisations  have  to fend  for  themselves. 
Another aspect of the nomination of candidates is the diversity of professions  represented  by  politi-
cians. In some countries there is  an increasing tendency for public servants to take part in politics, 
while there are fewer representatives from the liberal professions  and industry('). Many business-
men have difficulty in finding time to go into politics whilst simultaneously running their own concerns. 
Obviously, there is a danger of an unbalanced situation occurring here, and thought should therefore 
be  given to how things could be put right. In this context it is  natural to look at the relationship 
between the political organisations and their parliamentary representatives.  There is  an increasing 
tendency amongst those organisations to require their representatives in parliament to follow a particular 
line, e.g. to adhere to decisions taken at party congresses - which may to some extent be seen as an 
expression of the desire to obtain more direct influence on the decision-making process - but there 
is  a certain contradiction between this trend and the right of the individual member of parliament 
to follow his own convictions (6). Here, too, the referendum would be helpful, since it represents the 
necessary correcting factor in the conflict which may arise between the party's political programme 
and public statements and the personal views held by the individual member of parliament on specific 
political questions. 
6)  Parliamentary  information activities 
A brief description of the influence of the information activities  has already been given.  It is  now 
necessary  to consider the relationship  between such  activities  and parliaments. 
In every country reports and documents are distributed with information on parliamentary deliber-
ations,  but in general, it is  true to say  that they only reach a limited readership (
8
). The question 
was therefore raised at the Symposium of publishing a parliamentary journal to appear weekly whilst 
parliament is  in  session. 
There is  undoubtedly a need for a  well-written  paper that would 'translate' parliamentary debates 
and decisions. Wider advertising in the daily newspapers would serve a twofold purpose by providing 
useful and necessary information and, at the same time, strengthening the position of the daily press. 
(1)  See  'Recruitment in the  United  Kingdom':  paper by Mr Mackintosh p. 156. 
(')  Cf.  e.g.  the  American  'primary system'. 
(')  On  public  financial  support  to  political  parties  see  e.g.  Mr  Ninn  Hansen,  Mr  Behrendt,  Mr  van  der  Sanden  and  others, 
Summary Report. 
(')  See  e.g.  paper  by  Prof.  Thaysen,  p.  49. 
(')  On  the  question  of  the  imperative  mandate  see  e.g. :Messr  •Burgbacher,  von  Hassel,  Thaysen,  Summary  Report. 
(')  See  e.g.  Mr Lious,  Summary  Report,  on French  practice. 
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library network would be  an effective  way of increasing public access  to information about what 
is  going  on, and would also  provide  a  sort  o:f  feedback,  whereby  questions  and requests  arising 
throughout the library network would find their way to the documentation centre and thus be passed 
on to members  of parliament. 
One possibility would be  to set  up  committees  to receive  and evaluate or pass  on questions  and 
suggestions  from  the  citizen (1).  An  institution  of this  sort would  probably  arouse  considerable 
interest provided that it functioned as a genuine go-between and produced reactions from politicians. 
Parliamentary  press  departments  were  mentioned  several  times  at the Symposium {
2
).  One could 
consider the possibility  of  a  parliament being  granted a  limited amount of  broadcasting time on 
radio and television, e.g. one or two weekly broadcasts of a  factual, informative nature. This would 
complemem the idea of publishing special parliamentary journals or articles about legislative matters. 
Programmes of this sort could, in particular, serve  as  a  source of preparatory information for the 
public debates prior to the formulation of important legislative proposals. They could also be used 
to publicise: the hearings mentioned earlier. Special programmes of this sort should not, of course, 
involve  any limitation on the freedom  of expression  of radio or television. 
At the Symposium, it emerged that there were a great many objections to the way radio and tdevision 
dealt with political activities { 3). There was reference in this respect to so-called 'instant' democracy, 
.e. the fact that politicians often are allowed only a limited period of time on radio or TV in order 
o put forward their views and to comment on important Bills, party programmes, etc. So it frequently 
happens that politicians and parliamentary work are not given very satisfactory hearings on radio 
and television. In this respect, the introduction of one or more special weekly programmes prepared 
by parliaments would be likely to improve the situation. Obviously, clear rules should be laid down 
on how information provided by  parliament on the radio or television should be  presented. 
7)  European  Parliament 
Many of the ideas raised above may recur in connection with the European Parliament, but there 
are numerous other questions which have been discussed time after time, the most important being 
the requirement for the European Parliament to be elected  by direct universal suffrage.  Until this 
is  achieved it is  to be expected that the members of the European Parliament will continue to be 
appointed by the national parliaments,  and an effort  should therefore  be  made to strengthen this 
link as far as possible. Two questions arise. First, how can the activities of the European Parliament 
best  be  accomplished ? Here, of course,  reference should be made to many of the remarks already 
made concc!rning  the work of national parliaments.  One point worth considering when discussing 
the procedures of the European Parliament is  whether debates should not be held in the European 
Parliament before the Commission  draws  up its proposals.  Surely it would be better if' Parliament 
did not always  have to wait for proposals to be  served  up,  ready-made, in documents from the 
Commission.  Admittedly,  some progress  has been made in this direction : for example, the Com-
mission submitted its  environment action  programme to the  European  Parliament for its  opinion 
before beginning to work out definite proposals in this sector. This line of action should be extended 
to other fields,  where problems are still at an early stage. Even if the European Parliament as  a rule 
only has advisory powers,  a procedure of this sort would produce useful effects. 
The question of special European days was raised during discussions at the Luxembourg Symposium('). 
Even though one must avoid a rigid definition of the concept 'European days', in the sense that they 
were days on which certain subjects should be debated in all the European parliaments, the idea of 
(1)  See  also  Miss  Sarogni,  Summary Reporr,  on the Italian  sys1tem. 
(1)  See  e.g.  Mr Behrendt, Summary Reporr. 
(')  See  e.g.  Me:ssrs  van  der  Sanden, Lenihan,  Licus,  Dewulf,  Summary  Report. 
(')  On Europe•m  days :  see  Messrs  Gregoire,  Nederhorst,  and Mackintosh,  Summary  Report. 
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ation by the European institutions, could be attenuated in national parliaments. At all events, it would 
be  highly useful if steps were taken to arrange wide-ranging discussions that linked the debates  of 
the European Parliament with the work of the national parliaments. Further, even if debates were 
not held on precisely the same day, it would still be desirable if there was some degree of synchron-
isation between the Member States. If these were more or less simultaneous debates conducted across 
the internal  borders  of the  Community,  they could be coordinated with debates in the European 
Parliament and a two-phase  system  might thus  be envisaged : debate in the European Parliament 
followed by debates in the national parliaments on Commission proposals. Clearly, advantage should 
be taken of the proposals circulating within the European institutions. Both Commission documents 
and the reports of votes in the European Parliament contain a great deal of material which would make 
a good basis for discussion in the national parliaments. It is  absurd that the very valuable material 
produced at European level  virtually never  reaches  the national parliaments (1). 
All  in all, there should be an attempt to break down the barrier between the national parliaments 
and the European Parliament and ensure that there are genuine exchanges  between the two.  The 
situation at present is obviously unsatisfactory. There is very little contact, and members of the Euro-
pean Parliament frequently have to admit that it is very difficult to obtain sufficient time at national 
party meetings  to report  on the situation in the  European Parliament. 
Consequently, the idea that emerged when the Presidents of the national parliaments met immediately 
after the enlargement of the Community to discuss relations between the European Parliament and 
national parliaments should be pursued. There should be an opportunity for committees from national 
parliaments to meet the corresponding committees of the European Parliament (
2
). There is  nothing 
standing in the way of a procedure of this sort, provided the various countries regard it as the duty 
of Members of Parliament generally to take part in international work. On this point, there is a signifi-
cant blockage. The current situation is that the electorate in the various countries does not consider 
it very important for elected representatives to participate in international work. What does  seem 
important to the electorate is the extent to which they are concerned with local matters, and it may 
here be added that the knowledge that, as the main rule, the European Parliament has only consultative 
powers,  has  a  strong negative  effect. 
III.  Final remarks 
The world is in deep trouble. The population explosion, famine, the gulf between the industrialised 
countries and the poorest of the developing countries and the energy crisis are some of the headlines 
that indicate the character of the difficulties we are faced with. The combined sum of these tendencies 
threatens to precipitate  a  fundamental world crisis, which many observers compare with the crisis 
of the thirties. How is the world prepared to solve the great issues? Very badly.  One of the reasons 
is  that international  management is  failing. 
In view of these heavy challenges the EEC has a decisive role in the world of today. Not only for its 
own sake,  but also for the sake of  the  whole  mankind. The Community must support all efforts 
in order to promote a peaceful development in a world full of danger. It is highly important that the 
national parliaments of Europe and the European Parliament are  as  well  prepared as  possible to 
assume  their part of  the immense  task ahead. 
(1)  See  Miss  Sarogni,  Summary  Report. 
(1)  See  on this, Mr Nederhorst,  Summary Report. 
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